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Stability between India and Pakistan relies on a complex interplay of many factors. There are many drivers working in tandem, and at times parallel, to each other: grand strategies, leadership capabilities, military strategy, awareness of each others' capabilities and powerful domestic public opinion.
The two Southern Asian neighbors have a history of bilateral conflict, hostile propaganda, and persisting tensions. The countries have different political systems, varying approaches to arms control regimes, and variable foreign policy preferences, and are now laboring with hitherto unsolved issues of nuclear weaponization and deployment, command and control, and military strategy.
But as the most recent crisis between India and Pakistan continues to de-escalate, questions arise whether the crisis was coercive diplomacy at its best or nuclear brinkmanship at its worst. India threatened to take military action but never initiated, it as it was testing the limits of coercive diplomacy - threatening to go to war but not actually going to war. The U.S. shuttle diplomacy managed to obtain an assurance from Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that the infiltration into India by Muslim radicals had been ended permanently. That seemed sufficient for India in order to de-escalate.
What were India's other options?
Broadly speaking, there were three options for handling the Dec. 13, 2001, bombing of the Indian Parliament and the subsequent attacks in Jammu: diplomatic, economic and military.
India had initiated the diplomatic option in December when it reduced the staff at the High Commission, snapped the rail, road and air links. Stepping up its diplomatic offensive against Pakistan in the wake of the Jammu massacre, India asked Islamabad to withdraw its High Commissioner in New Delhi, Ashraf Jehangir Qazi. In addition, India repeatedly appealed to the Western world in general and the United States in particular to step up pressure on Pakistan. India also considered visa restrictions, consulate facilities and further reducing the High Commission staff.
Growing impatient with the international coalition against terrorism and faced with an eager ruling alliance, the ruling National Democratic Alliance headed by the Bhartiya Janata Party considered a "go at it alone" approach. One of the few bilateral successes between the two countries has been the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. India has been scrupulous in keeping with the terms of this treaty. If India had chosen to abrogate it, the impact of the denial of water would have been quickly felt in Pakistan economically and socially. But abrogating the treaty could have caused a ripple effect, leaving the door open for Pakistan to walk out of the 1972 Simla Agreement, which emphasized bilateral settlement of disputes.
Economically, if India had taken certain measures to halt the illegal parallel trade that runs across border into Pakistan, the impact would be immediate and widespread. This would have required a major effort from the Indian states bordering Pakistan. India also had the choice of withdrawing the Most Favored Nation (MFN) status under the World Trade Organization regime. Incidentally, Pakistan has so far not given India reciprocal MFN status. Since there is very little official trade between India and Pakistan, this option was at best a blunt sword.
Perhaps last in the line of options was the military option, which required India to clearly understand its politico-military objectives. High on the escalation ladder of the military options was the use of air power on terrorist training camps, which at best would have been few tents, with the trainee terrorists probably dispersed deep inside Pakistan. The second option was the use of Indian Special Forces and dropping para-commandoes close to where these camps are. Most of these camps, like Oghi village, Ojheri camp, Para Chinar, Saidgali and Sargodha, have already shut down operations, however. A third option could have been a "hot pursuit": envisaging "salami slicing" of Pakistan administered Kashmir. India had to consider whether it was willing to occupy and retain territory, or whether closing down training camps would have been its only objective. Obviously, these camps can be quickly established elsewhere. A fourth option could have been an all out war involving regular armies.
All military options, of course, involved the risk of escalation to a nuclear level. The two countries should not lull themselves into thinking they can call each other's bluff. If India does cross the Line of Control or the international border and Pakistan decides that it is threatened and issues a warning, explicit or implicit, that it is contemplating its nuclear options (better used early enough to deter), what would be the Indian response? Would India stop the air strikes and/recall its troops, calling off the operation? Or would it go ahead and continue in the hope that Pakistan would not make good on its nuclear threats. An element of strategic uncertainty obtains here. It is precisely this kind of uncertainty that could breed misperceptions that lead to miscalculations.
As the most recent crisis was being defused, there were a spate of statements from both sides about nuclear weapons and their role in managing the crisis itself. India and Pakistan both choose to engage in the use of force short of overall armed conflict. There have been constant artillery exchanges. There were voices within India opining that "force can be stepped up in a calibrated manner to a limited war still short of full-scale general hostilities." Such statements, and the constant nuclear saber rattling particularly by Pakistan, that drew global attention, and the direct intervention of the United States.
The first direct outcome of this was the Jan. 12 speech by Musharraf pledging the cessation of support to terrorism. Later he promised to "permanently" end cross-border terrorism. The future of Pakistan is now balanced delicately on the execution of these promises. This verbal commitment should translate into closure of training camps and the communication infrastructure associated with infiltration, which could be monitored credibly by the United States, India, or both. The use of monitoring technology would go a long way toward restoring trust.
The results could mean some gains for both countries. First, war was never a positive sum game or to the advantage of either. Second, any outbreak of large-scale armed hostilities always carried the seeds of escalation. Third, Pakistan's Kashmir policy, just like its Afghan policy, has failed the country. Fourth, a war would have been detrimental to U.S. interests in the region as it would have destabilized the entire region. Once the issue of infiltration is settled, both countries will probably pull back the million troops that are on the border.
It appears that neither country wants an armed conflict for fear of uncontrolled escalation. In the meantime, each side seems determined to convince the other that it is not blustering, maintaining the threat of actual war. However "victorious" either side may feel from the standoff, one thing is clear: An unresolved Kashmir issue always carries the risk of another such crisis.
Indians continue to point out that the United States has the authority to coerce Pakistan into making substantial internal policy changes. But the credibility of Washington's role as a peacemaker and the leader of the international coalition against terrorism seems, from an Indian viewpoint, to have been compromised by its inability to stop the terrorist infiltrations into India after the attack on the parliament. And some charge that now Pakistan realizes that it can get away with testing India's patience at a threshold higher than ever before.
Where does this leave India? After the present standoff, India should realize that a military buildup coupled with far-reaching political demands does not work. The next time around, India must exercise better judgment about the probability of various consequences, including its own ability to execute a threatened course of action. In crisis transparency measures aimed at instilling confidence, increasing credibility, avoiding miscommunication-that may lead to misperception and misinterpretation-and making clear policy statements are needed rather than nuclear saber rattling.
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