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While the world riveted its attention to World Cup soccer competition in South Korea in recent weeks, a major shift in political power has begun to take place in that nation which may bring significant changes to the delicate security balance in East Asia. The recent episode at sea, in which North Korean patrol vessels reportedly attacked South Korean navy boats, killing at least four South Korean sailors, may be an early reflection of heightened security posturing in the wake of local elections held in June. The conservative Grand National Party (GNP) soundly defeated the Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), formerly under the leadership of Kim Dae Jung, in local and provincial elections. (Kim resigned his leadership of the MDP in May in the face of corruption charges against two of his sons, opening the way to a victory by the opposition party.)
The GNP victory in 11 out of 16 key races catapulted its presidential candidate, Lee Hoi-chang, into the lead for the presidential election scheduled to take place in December. Some Korean polls indicated that the MDP candidate, Roh Moo-hyun led Lee by 28 percentage points as recently as April. Post-election polls in Korea indicate that Lee has assumed a 14 point lead following the recent local elections.
Although the outcome of Korea's forthcoming elections to the National Assembly in August and to the presidency in December remains uncertain, it is not too early to examine the potential implications of a shift in power to the GNP regarding regional security issues affecting East Asia. Regardless of electoral results, however, certain strategic factors remain clear. Relations of the principal regional actors with North Korea, for example, will likely remain highly unpredictable; the economic and military development of China will have a major role to play; and future directions of U.S. foreign policy could generate major adjustments to the regional security balance.
Internal domestic politics in South Korea will also play a role in evolving security matters since public support for Lee's candidacy could ultimately prove to be thinly based. If that is true, Lee could have difficulty in gaining widespread support for controversial changes to security policies if he is elected. Low turnout at the local elections appeared to favor the GNP. Only 46.4 percent of the registered voters cast ballots, down from 52.7 percent in the 1998 elections and 57.2 percent in the parliamentary elections of two years ago, when MDP candidates enjoyed greater success. Korean newspapers widely reported that younger voters, historically associated more with the MDP, stayed away from the polls, perhaps anticipating Korea's World Cup match scheduled for the following day. Korean pollsters are increasingly uncertain, however, about whether the GNP's victory in the recent elections will influence young voter behavior in the forthcoming assembly and presidential elections.
Many voters who selected GNP candidates did so to protest the Kim government rather than endorse GNP candidates. Dissatisfaction over lack of progress in implementing key domestic programs of Kim's "sunshine policy" is widespread. According to Korean defense experts, Korean public opinion believes that the security benefits gained through the sunshine policy have been limited and that promises for reciprocity by North Korea have not been fulfilled. Many voters had hoped for greater success in expanding and improving high priority domestic programs of Kim's policy, including the family visit program, creating more business opportunities with the North, and widening communications and transportation between the two countries. Some have concluded that Kim's government did not go far enough; others believe that a more confrontational approach with North Korea will be the only way to insure the Pyongyang government's cooperation. Many voters objected to the corruption cases involving Kim's sons, particularly in view of Kim's anti-corruption platform that brought him to power in 1997.
Korea's local elections did not engage the public in the major security issues that are likely to be addressed during the presidential campaign this fall. Conversations with Korean security policy experts, however, provided a preview of how those issues will be debated between MDP and GNP candidates. (Important note: MDP candidate Roh was recently reaffirmed by his party following its recent defeat. The party may choose, however, to move to another candidate should Roh's popularity not rebound in coming months.)
The center piece of the presidential campaign debate will focus on the "sunshine policy" supported by the MDP. Korean defense experts agree that the GNP will adopt a tougher line than that espoused by the MDP. Lee has not yet specified the details of his more confrontational approach toward North Korea, but has indicated that he would seek greater reciprocity and transparency regarding cooperative programs. Korean defense experts agree that candidate Lee would abandon the terminology "sunshine policy," but would continue to pursue engagement with the North Korean government, perhaps under a different slogan.
Lee's demand for greater reciprocity and visibility will be likely to affect several key cooperative programs. According to Korean defense experts, GNP party members have expressed concern that South Korea's food aid program is being used to support the North Korean elite and military forces rather than the general population in need. Lee is likely to demand that North Korea provide greater visibility into the distribution of food aid, or risk losing a substantial portion (or perhaps all) of agricultural assistance from Seoul. Lee is also likely to push a harder policy regarding the family exchange program, which has permitted thousands of Korean family members to reunite for short visits during the past several years. GNP members would like to see the program expanded to include multiple visiting centers more convenient to South Korean families. They agree that inducements will be needed to obtain North Korea's agreement to expand the program, but the form of those incentives has not yet been specified. Clearly, financial incentives would be attractive to the cash-starved regime in Pyongyang, but other inducements such as food aid and business investments could also be forthcoming.
The "Agreed Framework," a multilateral agreement assuring North Korea of energy assistance in exchange for their abandonment of a nuclear weapons program, will be a third critical "cooperative" program under scrutiny next fall. South Korea currently provides significant funding to support that agreement and will soon train North Korean technical personnel on operations and maintenance of light water reactors that are central to the current agreement. The Bush administration, however, is reassessing the framework and may well push to amend it in order to provide greater transparency into North Korea's nuclear program. Some in the Bush administration believe that the agreement is fatally flawed, however, and would prefer that the United States withdraw from it entirely. Within that context, the new Korean administration may be forced to assume a new line regarding its own participation in the program. It is possible that Lee may choose to support U.S. proposals to amend the agreement and use South Korean funding and training levels as bargaining tools to win concessions from the North Koreans. Any initiative to cancel the agreement, however, is likely to raise considerable opposition among a Korean population that is very concerned about North Korea becoming a recognized nuclear weapons state.
Other U.S. defense and foreign policy initiatives are also likely to play a role in next fall's election campaign. Though both candidates are likely to support the continued presence of U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula, they will likely differ on key military issues such as forward deployed missile defense and "pre-emptive strike" counterterrorist military strategy. Kim joined Russian President Vladimir Putin last year to denounce the U.S. missile defense program and abrogation of the ABM Treaty. Despite Kim's recent departure from the MDP, it is unlikely that the party's candidate will stray from that line in any significant way. Indeed, according to Korean defense experts the MDP will likely oppose forward deployed sea-based missile defense for two important reasons: The system would play no important military role versus the North Koreans and China has strongly and repeatedly opposed it. The GNP's position on the matter is less clear, although observers have heard Lee endorse Bush's missile program in public presentations. Whether the GNP candidate will be willing to risk aggravating important relations with China over the matter of forward deployment is not clear at this point. The issue may be a matter of campaign rhetoric in any event, since the likelihood of forward deployed sea-based missile defense is not likely to occur until later in the decade.
On one point, according to Korean observers, both candidates are likely to agree: U.S. discussions of a pre-emptive strike military posture with respect to the Korean peninsula will not be helpful.
The delicate security balance in East Asia will continue to reflect China's military, economic, and political posture with respect to the Korean peninsula. Both party candidates are well aware of the importance of China to the Korean electorate. Recent headlines have featured the issue of North Korean defectors and have suggested that a showdown could be in the making. If no arrangements are made before September, it is likely that North Korean defectors will become a major campaign issue. Lee's harder line versus North Korea may seek to pressure the Chinese government to expand their cooperation in dealing with the refugee problem. If an assistance formula is right, China may agree. If no assistance is forthcoming, however, China may choose to reject South Korean proposals at the risk of raising their human rights profile before the international community. China has been selected to host the Olympics in 2008 and is likely to be concerned about this matter as the games approach.
Korea's fall presidential campaign is likely to witness contentious debates over the security issues outlined above. The naval battle in the Yellow Sea may be only the first such issue to get national attention. Korean voters will be asked to examine their crystal balls and decide whether the major shift in direction promised by the GNP would bring greater cooperation, security, and stability to the region. If the GNP proves victorious, its campaign rhetoric may ultimately be diluted by pragmatic concerns as real world events intervene. Despite the GNP's resounding victory in June's local elections, the presidential election is not yet a foregone conclusion.
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