Iranian Nuclear
Activities:
IAEA Board of Governors Considers
UN Security Council Notification
Steven C. Welsh, CDI Research Analyst,
swelsh@cdi.org
Sept. 23, 2005
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The confidential report to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on investigations into Iranian nuclear
activities sounds a now-familiar refrain: partial cooperation, delays, some
progress, ongoing unanswered questions, and the need for greater transparency.
Halting, partial progress has characterized much of the global community’s
dealings with Iran in the nearly two years since it was confirmed that Iran had
been engaging in what the United States and other critics have characterized as
decades of concealment and deception regarding a suspected clandestine nuclear
weapons program.
The IAEA report notes only partial cooperation even with
respect to the aftermath of one of the more dramatic chapters in the Iranian
matter, the refusal to permit the IAEA access to the Lavizan-Shian military
site, revealed to have received items potentially useful to a nuclear weapons
program, until well after the site was razed, with equipment, rubble, and a
layer of earth hauled off to parts unknown (links to “before and after”
satellite images are provided below). Despite its limited legal authority and
limited capacity to conduct proactive investigations, the IAEA’s robust
environmental sampling capabilities had in fact helped launch the past two years
of more in-depth inquiry. Environmental sampling had detected evidence in Iran
of highly enriched uranium, forcing Iran to disclose previously concealed
imports of foreign centrifuges in an effort to explain away the findings. Given
that Iran’s behavior at Lavizan-Shian would be consistent with efforts to thwart
environmental sampling, it is difficult to infer a logical explanation for the
behavior other than that (1) Iran was engaged in illicit nuclear activities or
(2) Iran wanted people to think it was. Certainly the public explanation, that
a local municipality kicked the Iranian military off the land and undertook the
destruction and earth removal, arguably is not entirely convincing.
Publicly pointing to the “confidence deficit” created by
past Iranian action, the IAEA notes the need for a rigorous investigative regime
going beyond the narrower legal strictures of Iran’s safeguards agreement and
signed but unratified Additional Protocol. At this point, of course, it might
not easy to track down material, such as what was at Lavizan-Shian, and Iran
also has been rumored to have engaged in tunneling projects and other
underground construction.
Despite stonewalling by Russia, an Iranian nuclear
contractor, continued concerns over Iranian nuclear activities may finally be
leading to formal notification to the UN Security Council (UNSC). The IAEA
Statute mandates referral in cases of safeguards noncompliance, a fact already
noted by IAEA reports, as well as in cases impacting international security.
The European Union and the United States reportedly have
the votes on the IAEA Board of Governors for UNSC referral. However, Europe,
with U.S. support and deference, has pursued a cautious, diplomacy-based
approach to the Iranian matter all along, and in any event the Board of
Governors does customarily seek to act with consensus. In response to Russian
hesitation, Europe has provided a revised draft IAEA Board resolution which
reportedly does not refer the matter to the UNSC immediately but (apparently to
Russia’s chagrin) simply acknowledges realities which, under the IAEA Statute,
require referral – safeguards noncompliance and the existence of a matter of
concern to international security. Reportedly, Russia in turn has sought to
remove references to noncompliance, but Europe is insistent.
Two of the leading issues in the Iranian matter are (1) a
record of concealment and partial cooperation and (2) Iran’s insistence on
developing a “in-house” nuclear fuel cycle, the technology for which could be
used to develop both reactor fuel and weapons grade nuclear material suitable
for use in a nuclear weapon. Iran already has unilaterally abandoned what was
known as its “Paris Agreement” with the EU-3, Britain, France, and Germany, by
resuming uranium processing.
In recent days, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did
not help his cause by making confrontational remarks before the UN General
Assembly. Ahmadinejad insisted on an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, raised the
prospect of disseminating Iranian nuclear technology internationally in his
Sept. 17, 2005,WHEN address?. Further, speaking at a Sept. 22, 2005 military
parade in Iran featuring medium-range ballistic missiles bearing banners calling
for a particular Middle Eastern nation to be “wiped off the map.” The missiles
would be capable of hitting parts of Europe and the Middle East, including
various U.S. forces.
The IAEA and the UNSC are, of course, both elements of the
UN system, designed to work together. While a primary concern in the Iranian
matter centers around the threat of a state sponsor of terrorism developing a
nuclear device, there also is a broader institutional question of UN reform that
could be raised over the capacity of the UN system effectively to assure
nonproliferation. The IAEA as originally conceived essentially engages in a
form of accountancy, auditing and monitoring voluntarily declared sites,
materials, equipment and activities. An overriding institutional question will
be the extent to which the IAEA can be built into, and legally empowered as, a
more proactive investigative body with the capacity to serve as a true
“watchdog” and nuclear policeman – that is, to be more like an FBI of
nonproliferation.
Under the UN Charter the UNSC has broad discretion for
dealing with matters impacting international peace and security and would have
the legal authority to call for, as well as other possible measures, an
aggressive inspections and investigative regime going well beyond the limited
auditing and monitoring procedures ordinarily undertaken by the IAEA. The UNSC
could also take Iran’s response into account before considering economic
sanctions or other measures.
It is not entirely unclear why UNSC referral, which could
be a simply mechanistic, administrative notification, would be viewed so
ominously, but hesitation over UNSC referral reportedly could center mainly
around two contradictory concerns. One is that once in the UNSC, the situation
somehow could escalate, possibly a carryover of institutional memory over the
Iraq matter, despite the veto power of Russia and China, another Iranian
commercial partner. Another is that the UNSC could be presented a resolution
that Russia and China would find impossible to veto – one simply sending the
matter back to the IAEA accompanied by firm instructions to Iran to cooperate
fully with IAEA demands.
Further complicating matters, of course, is Iran’s unique
historical relationship with the United States. The Iranian people did suffer
as the result of an authoritarian regime allied with the United States. While
the United States appears to have legitimate security concerns over the Iranian
nuclear program and is called to contribute genuine leadership on the matter, a
cooperative multilateral approach involving the global community, such as the
effort led by the European Union, arguably is made all the more necessary by the
legacy of the Shah. Ironically, to the extent that popular anger over the
Shah’s repression and the chaos surrounding his overthrow made possible the rise
of Iran’s current radical regime, as a practical matter the repression suffered
under the current Iranian regime also could be argued to be a consequence of the
Shah’s legacy as well.
Report to the IAEA Board of Governors
The Sept. 2, 2005, report acknowledges in paragraphs 49-50:
49. The Agency continues to
follow up on information pertaining to Iran’s nuclear programme and activities
that could be relevant to that programme. In this regard, it should be noted
that, absent some nexus to nuclear material, the Agency’s legal authority to
pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited.
The Agency has, however, continued to seek Iran’s cooperation in following up on
reports relating to equipment, materials and activities which have applications
in the conventional military area and in the civilian sphere as well as in the
nuclear military area ….
50. In view of the fact that
the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding
issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation,
Iran’s full transparency is indispensable and overdue. Given Iran’s past
concealment efforts over many years, such transparency measures should extend
beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional
Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related to
procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research
and development locations. Without such transparency measures, the Agency’s
ability to reconstruct, in particular, the chronology of enrichment research and
development, which is essential for the Agency to verify the correctness and
completeness of the statements made by Iran, will be restricted.
The report noted in paragraph 4, moreover, that even prior
to this round of inquiry, the IAEA already had acknowledged Iran’s noncompliance
with IAEA safeguards:
In the comprehensive report
of the Director General to the Board of Governors dated 15 November 2004
(GOV/2004/83), it was concluded, on the basis of all information available to
the Agency as of that date, that Iran had failed in a number of instances
over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its Safeguards
Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing
and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had
been processed and stored.
Even though Iran apparently has been forthcoming with
respect to accepting current monitoring of a set of voluntarily declared
activities and materials, including some previously concealed, IAEA Director Dr.
Mohammed ElBaradei spoke publicly before the Board of Governors about the need
for Iran to compensate for a “confidence deficit” by accepting investigations
that go well beyond the current legal requirements of its Safeguard Agreement
and signed but unratified Additional Protocol:
As the report makes clear, Iran
continues to fulfill its obligations under the safeguards agreement and
additional protocol by providing timely access to nuclear material, facilities
and other locations. This is, however, a special verification case that
requires additional transparency measures. Two decades of concealed activities
have created a situation that makes it imperative for the Agency´s investigation
to go beyond the confines of the safeguards agreement and the additional
protocol. This is a prerequisite for the Agency to be able to reconstruct the
history and nature of all aspects of Iran´s past nuclear activities, and to
compensate for the confidence deficit created. I therefore call on Iran to
expand the transparency and confidence building measures it has already
provided. By promptly responding to these Agency requests, Iran would well serve
both its interests and those of the international community.
Case Study: Lavizan-Shian Razing and Topsoil
Removal
Among various other incidents and standing issues, one of
the more visible and dramatic illustrations of IAEA frustration with Iran
involved Iran’s refusal to permit access to the military site at Lavizan-Shian
in northeastern Tehran until after the site was dismantled, with rubble and
topsoil hauled off to parts unknown. Iran claims a local municipality ordered
the Iranian military off the site and undertook its demolition.
In March 2003, an Iranian opposition group had alleged the
Iranian military’s Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center was involved with
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), albeit biological weapons research as opposed
to nuclear activities. At a later point, despite the fact that Iran had
declared the site had nothing to do with nuclear activities, it was discovered
that a whole body counter, a radiation detector device, was imported from
overseas and sent to the site, along with spare parts of a type that could have
been used to modify the whole body counter to enhance its usefulness for a
nuclear weapons program.
As mentioned above, in another instance the IAEA had
engaged in environmental sampling that revealed evidence of highly enriched
uranium, when Iran had claimed it had never created such material. In order to
explain away the evidence, Iran had been forced to disclose yet another
violation -- its nondisclosure of the importing of centrifuge equipment, used
for uranium enrichment -- previously concealed from the IAEA. (Iran argued that
there must have been contamination on the equipment from enrichment occurring
elsewhere before the equipment came into Iran).
In the case of Lavizan-Shian, Iran helped make it less
likely the IAEA could engage in successful environmental sampling by removing
buildings, equipment, and a layer of earth.
“Before, during, and after” satellite photographs of the
Lavizan-Shian site may be viewed at the following URL’s:
The Iranian actions at Lavizan-Shian arguably imply that
either (1) Iran was conducting nuclear activities at Lavizan-Shian which it
wishes to cover up or (2) Iran wishes to create the impression that it was
conducting nuclear activities at the site which it wishes to cover up.
Moreover, it could be argued that the only motive Iran
could logically have for covering up nuclear activities would be that Iran in
fact was developing nuclear weapons, or wished to engage in certain uranium
enrichment activities while pretending it was not.
The events surrounding Lavizan-Shian, taken with the brief
references to Lavizan-Shian in the latest IAEA report on Iran, sound what in the
past few years has become a familiar refrain in the IAEA’s attempted oversight
of Iran – partial cooperation, partial investigation, delays, the appearance of
an explanation arising from the partial investigation, the appearance of partial
corroboration but without actual corroboration, additional investigation yet to
be done, additional transparency looked for, and still no answers.
The IAEA report reads:
38. In connection with the
Lavisan-Shian site and the two whole body counters (WBCs) that had been located
there, as indicated in the November 2004 report to the Board, although Iran’s
description of events concerning the WBCs appeared to be plausible, the
Agency still wished to take environmental samples from the remaining trailer
said to have contained one of the WBCs.
39. However, with regard to
the razing of the Lavisan-Shian site, in August 2005, Iran provided further
clarification and additional documentation in support of its statement that
the site had been razed following the return of the site to the Municipality of
Tehran in connection with a dispute between the Municipality and the Ministry
of Defence. Iran explained further that the razing of the site had been carried
out by the Municipality, and that it had begun in December 2003 and was
completed within two or three months. The information provided by Iran
appeared to be coherent and consistent with its explanation of the razing of the
Lavisan-Shian area.
40. The Agency is still awaiting additional information
and clarifications from Iran regarding, and interviews with the individuals
involved in, efforts by the Physics Research Centre, which had been located at
Lavisan-Shian, to acquire dual use materials and equipment that could be used in
uranium enrichment or conversion activities
In other words, the IAEA was denied access to the
Lavizan-Shian site until after Iran was able to remove everything there and
undertake dramatic steps to thwart efforts at environmental sampling. Even at
this point, Iran has refused access to a trailer said to have contained a
particular piece of equipment, apparently to prevent environmental sampling in
the trailer. And, in a country dominated by a core group of radical clerics
backed by the military, the explanation offered is that a local municipality was
permitted to kick the military off the site and undertake its demolition and
removal of earth rings suspect. Documents have been generated manifesting the
regime’s account, but given the circumstances arguably could be considered just
as suspect. Of course, after the steps taken at Lavizan-Shian, it may now prove
difficult if not impossible to track down what was removed from the site, or
verify any Iranian claims that any one item Iran now produced actually was had
been from the site.
Conclusion
The IAEA and UNSC are meant to function as partners within
the UN system, and the IAEA Board of Governors is legally bound to notify the
UNSC about safeguards noncompliance and, independently, matters potentially
impacting international security. UNSC involvement need not be ominous, but has
the potential to help strengthen the IAEA to behave more like a proactive
nuclear watchdog rather than a mere auditor and accountant of voluntarily
disclosed activities, in the process strengthening the UN system in its capacity
to build peace and forestall conflict.
Sources and further reading:
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Address to UN
General Assembly, Sept. 17, 2005,
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/iran050917eng.pdf.
“Beware our fiery wrath, Iran warns foes,” Reuters, Sept.
22, 2005,
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L22325773.htm.
Louis Charbonneau, “Russia shields Iran from UN action,”
Reuters, Sept. 23, 2005,
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=uri:2005-09-23T131854Z_01_
SCH334529_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml
&pageNumber=0&summit=
Louis Charbonneau and Francois Murphy, “EU, US press for UN
action on Iran nuclear plans,” Reuters, Sept. 19, 2005,
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/newsArticle.aspx?type
=worldNews&storyID=2005-09-19T182752Z
_01_MCC762956_RTRUKOC_0_UK-NUCLEAR-IRAN.xml.
IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, “Introductory
Statement to the Board of Governors,” Sept. 19, 2005,
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n009.html.
FACTBOX-Key excerpts from EU nuclear draft on Iran,
Reuters, Sept. 22, 2005,
http://today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2005-09-22T105033Z_01_SCH239003
_RTRUKOT_0_TEXT0.xml&related=true.
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran,” Report by the Director General, International Atomic
Energy Agency, Information Circular Gov/2005/67, Sept. 2, 2005,
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions: Resolution adopted 11
August 2005,” Information Circular Gov/2005/59, Aug. 11, 2005,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Board/2005/gov2005-64.pdf.
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions: Resolution adopted 29
November 2004,” Information Circular Gov/2004/90, Nov. 29, 2004,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/
gov2004-90_derestrict.pdf.
“Iran to have nuclear bomb in six months, says Israel,”
The Independent Online, Sept. 21, 2005,
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article314008.ece
“ISIS Imagery Brief: Destruction at Iranian Site Raises New
Questions About Iran's Nuclear Activities,” June 17, 2004, Institute for Science
and International Security,
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/lavizanshian.html.
Ambassador Gregory Schulte, “U.S. Statement on Iran to the
IAEA Board of Governors,” September 2005, transcript from U.S. Mission to
International Organizations in Vienna Web site,
http://www.usun-vienna.rpo.at/_index.php?cmd=
cmdFrontendSpeechesAndRelatedDocumentsDetail&speechid=
132&PHPSESSID=8aeb850c0f7413ff81670b1da6ababf4.
Steven C. Welsh, “Iran’s Nuclear Program and International
Legal Instruments: IAEA Statute,” Center for Defense Information, Nov. 24, 2004,
http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iaea-statute.cfm.
Steven C. Welsh,
“The Iranian Nuclear Program, Russia, and International Law,” Johnson’s
Russia List, Nov. 23, 2004,
http://www.cdi.org/news/law/iran-russia-nuclear.cfm.
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