[click here for key links]

Even as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors prepares for a Feb. 2, 2006, special meeting to once again address UN Security Council (UNSC) referral of the Iranian nuclear matter, Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that attorneys for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) have undertaken procurement contracts to bolster fortifications for Iranian nuclear facilities in anticipation of possible preemptive strikes.  The program reportedly is in coordination with North Korean experts, largely focusing on tunneling and other underground construction.[1]

The British publication cites “diplomatic sources” as indicating that in mid-2005 the IRGC legal department called in dozens of representatives from leading Iranian construction companies to sign joint-venture contracts for underground tunnel networks and reinforcement of underground facilities.  It also indicates that a group of North Koreans led by Lyu-Do Myong, affiliated with the North Korean government, arrived in Iran to provide assistance with the design and construction of underground projects.

The contracts reportedly have been signed and intensive construction efforts already have been underway, with a focus that includes Isfahan, site of a uranium conversion facility, and Natanz, site for the development of centrifuge cascades.

Centrifuge cascades are the portion of the nuclear fuel cycle that can enrich uranium to a level sufficient to provide nuclear reactor fuel or, if involving sufficient quantities of material, processed by sufficient numbers of centrifuges over sufficient periods of time, with the proper sophistication and expertise, be taken to levels of enrichment high enough to be considered weapons-grade (i.e., sufficient for use in a nuclear warhead, not simply a radiological “dirty-bomb”). 

At least one nonproliferation expert has provided a worst-case rough estimate that Iran might be able to produce a nuclear weapon by 2009, while allowing that other experts, including some in the U.S. intelligence community, consider that it would take Iran a longer period of time. 

In any event, Iran in August of 2005 resumed uranium conversion at Isfahan and on Jan. 10, 2006, began removing 52 IAEA seals from facilities at its Natanz, Pars Trash, and Frayand Technique sites. 

The European Union (EU) and Europe’s “EU-3,” Britain, France, and Germany, have stated that the August 2005 uranium conversion by itself was already a breach of the 2004 Paris Accord, the agreement between the EU-3 and Iran that had provided impetus to delay referral of the Iranian matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC).  Among additional concerns cited by the EU and EU-3, as well as the United States and others, are a past record of concealment and deception and revelations of links to the A.Q. Khan illegal nuclear network that was also tied to proliferation in North Korea and Libya.

On Sept. 24, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors took the formal step of acknowledging Iranian noncompliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards requirements and noting the existence of security concerns within the purview of the UNSC.  The legal framework governing the IAEA and explaining its partnership role within the broader UN system mandates referral in such cases.

Ironically, if taking proper account of lessons learned from the Iraq experience, UNSC referral may lessen the likelihood of, for example, the United States or Israel ever coming to feel pressured to act unilaterally over the Iranian matter, to the extent both parties continue to defer to international cooperation and are made to feel that the international community views the matter with gravity, is giving it due care, and is engaging Iran with a bottom-line mentality demanding Iranian cooperation with international peace and security interests.  Moreover, Iranian commercial partners Russia and China hold UNSC vetoes.  Even though their UNSC votes presumably are not “up for sale,” and considering that neither Russian nor China have voted against IAEA Board of Governors resolutions expressing growing alarm over the Iranian matter, one might speculate whether deepening ties with Iran at least could contribute to a heightened Russian and Chinese understanding of the unique sensibilities of the Iranian regime.

At the same time, the context in which the controversy unfolds promises to be complex.  Iran experts have pointed to the economic clout of the Revolutionary Guards, including robust commercial interests.  The above-mentioned article indicates one of the contractors reportedly profiting from underground construction is the IRGC-owned company Shahid Rajaeia, also playing a role in setting nationwide standards for underground nuclear facility fortifications.  Any shifting in political power within Iran, including shifts designed to defuse international concern over nuclear proliferation, conceivably may have to confront the Revolutionary Guards’ business interests.

An additional issue not discussed in the Iranian debate, but long a concern of Iranian nuclear contractors since the time of the Shah, is the fact that Iran is one large earthquake zone.  One question left unanswered is how Iranian and North Korean contractors, as well as Russian contractors at Bushehr, address not only the question of a military attack, but natural disaster in the form of earthquakes. 

For that matter, concerns over environmental dangers could be compounded by allegations that at least some design aspects of the plant at Bushehr, such as the control panel, are alleged to be based on the same engineering used at Chernobyl.

Further reading:

David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “Iran’s Next Steps: Final Tests and the Construction of a Uranium Enrichment Plant,” Institute for Science and International Security,” Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/irancascade.pdf

“E3/EU Statement on the Iran Nuclear Issue,” text of statement, Jan. 12, 2006, http://www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2006/
iran_nuclear011206.asp

“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, Sept. 24, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf

“In Focus : IAEA and Iran: News Update on IAEA and Iran,” IAEA News Centre (updated regularly with new headlines), http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

“New satellite image of the Natanz uranium enrichment complex in Iran,” Digital Globe-ISIS, Jan.13, 2006, http://www.isis-online.org/
images/iran/dg_jan2_2006_ann.jpg

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html

“Tehran takes steps to protect nuclear facilities,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Jan. 25, 2006, p.4, http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jdw/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/
janesdata/mags/jdw/history/jdw2006/jdw13220.htm
@current&Prod_Name=JDW& (note that online version requires subscription)

[Content available on this site is for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. Use of this site does not create an attorney-client relationship.]

  

Click here for recent
News Watch archive
 

Search

Search the ISLP Search the Internet