

The Center for Defense Information conducts in-depth research on the social, economic, environmental, political and military components of international security. CDI aims to educate the public and inform policymakers on issues of security policy, strategy, operations, weapon systems and defense budgeting, and to produce creative solutions to them.

©2004 Center for Defense Information — Washington, D.C.

ISSN # 0195-6450 • Volume XXXIII, Number 1 • January/February 2004

Rogue States: Nuclear Red-Herrings

By Bruce G. Blair, Ph.D., CDI President

FOR ALL THE TALK ABOUT ROGUE STATES acquiring nuclear weapons to threaten the United States, and all the heated debate about the United States developing mini-nukes and bunker busters to keep the rogues at bay, the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment does not pay much attention to the “axis of evil.” The real obsession of the U.S. nuclear enterprise at all levels — from Strategic Command in Omaha to the bomb custodians and designers in New Mexico — is keeping U.S. nuclear forces prepared to fight a large-scale nuclear war at a moment’s notice with ... Russia.

The dirty little secret of America’s current nuclear policy is that 99 percent of the nuclear weapons budget,

planning, targeting, and operational activities still revolves around this one anachronistic scenario. The rationale is a throw-back to the Cold War, but however absurd, it still is the axis of current nuclear operations.

Scratch Russia from the list of enemies — as it should be — and all justification for maintaining a large U.S. nuclear arsenal evaporates.

There would be no planning to build a new factory — possibly in New Mexico — to produce plutonium triggers by the hundreds annually to support a U.S. arsenal of thousands of nuclear bombs. The drumbeat to resume nuclear testing to ensure the reliability of aging bombs would end. The drive

to develop new bunker busters, reputedly to target rogue states but really meant to put at risk high-level nuclear command bunkers inside two mountains in Russia, would lose its impetus. The many tens of billions of dollars spent each year on operating and upgrading the thousands of U.S. bombs would be saved.

The United States and Russia currently possess 96 percent of the world’s total inventory of 30,000 nuclear weapons. Most of the remainder belongs to U.S. allies and friends — Britain, France and Israel. The combined arsenals of Pakistan and India, with whom the United States enjoys reasonable relations,

CONTINUED ON PAGE 2

A War of Choice or of Necessity?

By Lawrence J. Korb, current CDI Senior Advisor and Center for American Progress Senior Fellow, and former assistant secretary of defense. Excerpt from an op-ed which first appeared in *The Washington Post*, Dec. 8, 2003.

MONTHS AFTER the Bush administration got us involved in a bloody war in Iraq, we are now told by one of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell’s closest advisers that Iraq was a war of choice after all. According to Richard Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department until June 2003 and still the Bush administration’s special envoy to

Northern Ireland, the administration “did not have to go to war against Iraq, certainly not when we did. There were other options.” Really?

This is not what the administration told us before the war and continues to tell us to this day. On March 20, as he was sending troops into Iraq because the regime of Saddam Hussein allegedly possessed weapons of

mass destruction and had ties to al Qaeda, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld told them, “We are at the point at which the risk of not acting is too great to wait longer. As you prepare, know that this war is necessary . . .” Some three weeks into the war, Powell, who had made the case for war to the United Nations, stated:

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

ROGUE STATES

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

represent a small fraction of 1 percent. That leaves China, hardly an enemy, whose 1 percent of the world total includes 20 long-range missiles that could hit the United States (compared to 6,000-plus U.S. nuclear weapons that could reach China today). Then there is North Korea, which possibly has a couple of weapons but no missiles or planes capable of dropping them on U.S. targets. The other proliferant states of concern — notably Iran — do not yet possess a single nuclear bomb.

A small fraction of the current U.S. arsenal of 10,650 bombs would amply cover all plausible nuclear threats to the American homeland, U.S. allies and interests overseas, if only the idea of fighting a large-scale nuclear war with Russia received the ridicule it deserves. Reasonable people not only scoff at the obsolete idea that the United States must be prepared for such a war in order to deter it, but also appreciate the many unnecessary risks incurred by clinging to this outdated world view.

This anachronistic nuclear thinking has perpetuated the risky practice of keeping a hair-trigger on early warning and decision-making, as well as nuclear missile forces. Warning crews in Cheyenne Mountain, Colo., are allowed only three minutes to judge whether initial attack indications from satellite and ground sensors are valid or false. Judgments of this sort are rendered daily, as a result of events as diverse as missiles being tested, or fired — for example, Russia's firing of Scud missiles into Chechnya — peaceful satellites being lofted into space, or wildfires and solar reflections off oceans and

clouds. If an incoming missile strike is anticipated, the president and his top nuclear advisors would quickly convene an emergency telephone conference to hear urgent briefings. For example, the war room commander in Omaha would brief the president on his retaliatory options and their consequences, a briefing

“The dirty little secret of America’s current nuclear policy is that 99 percent of the nuclear weapons budget, planning, targeting, and operational activities still revolves around this one anachronistic scenario — Russia.”

that is limited to 30 seconds. All of the large-scale responses comprising that briefing are designed for destroying Russian targets by the thousands, and the president would have only a few minutes to pick one if he wished to ensure its effective implementation. The order would then be sent immediately to the underground and undersea launch crews, whose own mindless firing drill would last only a few minutes. These tight timelines for decision-making at all levels are driven by only one scenario — a sudden, massive Russian attack.

The risks of launching on false warning, or by some unauthorized action, posed by this pressure-packed, decision-making-by-checklist may have been acceptable during the Cold War, but not today. Why carry such high risks if they stem from a totally fictitious threat? Ironically, the U.S. hair-trigger posture forces Russia into an identical stance, and the risks of a false alarm on the Russian side have grown since the end of the Cold War due to the steady deterioration of its early warning and command system. By acting as though Russia may intentionally attack, the United States is exposing itself to a real threat of unintentional Russian attack.

By keeping thousands of nuclear weapons fueled, armed, targeted, and ready to fire upon receiving a couple of short computer signals, the United States and Russia are further playing roulette with another real danger: nuclear terrorism. Keeping weapons cocked on hair-triggers raises many terrifying questions in the light of the global terrorist threat. Could terrorists spoof U.S. or Russian early warning systems, causing false alarms and semi-automatic responses that lead to and over the brink of nuclear war? If scores of heavily armed Chechens could take over a theater in Moscow, could terrorists seize mobile intercontinental Russian missiles, figure out how to circumvent the safeguards, and fire them? Could terrorists electronically hack into missile launch circuits from remote locations, or into the communications network used to command strategic missiles, and cause an unauthorized launch?

If these scenarios sound far-fetched, remember that foresight of terrorist scenarios is much less than perfect, as the Sept. 11, 2001

CONTINUED ON PAGE 3

Thinking About Iran

By John Newhouse, *CDI Senior Fellow and author of Imperial America: The Bush Assault on the World Order*, and Thomas R. Pickering, *a former undersecretary of state for political affairs. Excerpt from an op-ed which first appeared in The Washington Post, Jan. 1, 2004.*

IRAN IS CREATING AN OPTION to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. But whether it actually does so will depend on how the United States and other governments deal with the issue. Possessing these weapons is not Iran's highest priority even if, since the time of the shah, it has been moving on and off in that direction. But the program does reflect Iran's enduring sense of insecurity...

The question of whether to cross the nuclear threshold is, for Iran's leadership, a matter of finding a balance between the pluses and minuses. If the regime sees the country threatened by the instability (or intentions) of its neighbors and by the Bush administration's open advocacy of regime change in Tehran, it is more likely to go forward. Hence, the administration should agree to work with other governments to tilt that balance to the minus side. Together they should agree on steps aimed at strengthening Iran's security and internal stability.

But first they should also continue to discourage Iran's apparent intention to develop an independent nuclear fuel cycle with the purported goal of achieving energy independence — a patently disingenuous rationale for the program. The United States and others ought to test Iran's intentions by broaching an alternative. They could, for example, assure Iran a continuing supply of fuel and a willingness to take back spent fuel from a nuclear state such as Russia, and lift their objections to Iran's expansion of its reactor program. In return, Iran would halt development of the fully independent fuel cycle and, in particular, suspend its uranium enrichment program unambiguously and under thorough inspection. Iran began to meet one condition for receiving help with its reactor program when, on Dec. 18, it signed on to an additional protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at improving detection of covert efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

At another level, security arrangements covering the Persian Gulf could be taken up with Iran by its neighbors, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, and through the United Nations. These talks could lead first to a Security Council resolution guaranteeing Iran's territorial integrity. In return, Iran would be required to remain in full compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And Iran would further be expected to end its support of groups that advocate terrorism and obstruct the peace process with Israel.

Iran's reformist government might be willing to meet those conditions; it has favored limiting Iran's role in the Middle East conflict to moral and ideological support for the Palestinians. But whether the hard-line clerics agreed would doubtless depend on what they could get in return. Supporting Iran's application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a

CONTINUED ON PAGE 4

ROGUE STATES

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 2

hijackings revealed. And consider this: A past Pentagon review found a gaping hole in the computer security of a Navy radio network used to transmit launch orders to U.S. nuclear missile submarines. The investigation found that unauthorized persons, including terrorist hackers, might be able to slip electronically inside the network, seize control

over the radio transmitters, and illicitly send fake orders to the boats. The deficiency was deemed so serious that the sub launch crews had to be given elaborate new instructions for validating launch orders, in order to ensure that they would not fire upon receipt of phony orders.

All of the thousands of U.S. and Russian launch-ready weapons only represent an accident waiting to happen and a temptation to terrorists to gain control over them. Maintaining

these large, cocked arsenals is not needed to prevent a nuclear war between the United States and Russia, nor does it deter terrorists or provide a useful tool in fighting them. Doing so instead represents a grave danger to the civilized world if these weapons fall into the wrong hands.

Russia is no longer the enemy. We deny this truth at our own peril and expense. Facing and accepting this truth lights a path to deep nuclear reductions and true security. ■

CHOICE OR NECESSITY?

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

“We do not seek war. We do not look for war. We don’t want wars. But we will not be afraid to fight when these wars are necessary to protect the American people, to protect our interests, to protect friends.”

Even after it had become abundantly clear that the arguments the Bush administration advanced for going to war were specious, both Vice President Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz explicitly rebutted Haass’s position. In an Oct. 10 speech to the Heritage Foundation in which he lashed out at those who said we had a choice about invading Iraq, the vice president said: “Some claim we should not have acted because the threat from Saddam Hussein was not imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?” On Nov. 4 Wolfowitz stated: “But one of the things that Sept. 11 changed was

that it made it a war of necessity, not a war of choice...”

Haass weakens his own case by arguing that the first Persian Gulf War was a real war of necessity and Vietnam was only a war of choice. Even those who argued against the recent

*“Iraq is a war of choice
— a bad choice
as it turns out.”*

invasion of Iraq would not contend that it was less necessary than the first Persian Gulf War. As Secretary of State James Baker noted in 1990, that war was really about oil. And Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as such defense hawks as Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), wanted to give sanctions more time to work before invading Iraq. (If it was so necessary, why did the administration of

the elder Bush not invade until it got other nations to fund the war?)

It is equally absurd to argue that the first Gulf War was more necessary than Vietnam. In the mid-1960s many Americans, including most of us who were in the armed forces, believed that if South Vietnam fell to the Communists all of Southeast Asia would soon follow and the containment policy would be undermined. This is why the American people supported that conflict through the Tet offensive of 1968, even though more than 30,000 Americans had died by then.

Ironically, while Haass is wrong about Vietnam and the first Gulf War, he is right about Iraq. It is a war of choice — a bad choice as it turns out. Unfortunately, he was unwilling to go public with his views, as did Gen. Eric Shinseki, while he could have made a difference. This article should have been written nine months ago when Congress and the American people had a choice. Now our only real choice is to continue to stay and absorb the casualties and the cost. ■

IRAN

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3

step that should carry weight. Moreover, the lengthy process involved in applying for membership would create transparency; it would oblige Iran either to begin ridding itself of the corrupt practices that inhibit its economic reforms or reveal them to the WTO and its members.

A Security Council guarantee for Iran would at some point have to be matched by a guarantee to an Iraqi government and other Gulf states against the possibility of aggression

from Iran. Indeed, the guarantees should become steps in a sequential process aimed at building a solid security structure for the Persian Gulf. Any such structure could become a model for similar multilateral arrangements in Northeast Asia, where the problems are troublingly similar, albeit different in history, scope and detail.

In thinking about Iran, Washington should take account of Tehran’s capacity for making life uncomfortable and messy for the United States and its allies in Iraq (as well as the helpful role Iran seems to be playing there now). U.S. forces are already

overstretched on the ground and would be unable to do much about Iran-based troublemaking if the hardliners chose that course.

Awaiting regime change in Tehran, or expecting it, amounts to an attitude, not a policy. The United States, together with major allies and other governments, needs to develop a policy that responds to our interests and, wherever possible, to Iran’s as well. (The aftermath of the earthquake in Bam would seem a good time to speak with Iran.) Where these interests coincide, we believe there are opportunities. ■

China's Shifting Role in North Korea's Negotiations

By Yali Chen, *CDI Research Analyst and Editor-in-Chief of Washington Observer*, and Eric Hagt, *graduate student of public policy at UC Berkeley*.

CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD North Korea is undergoing an important transformation. A classified Chinese government memo titled, "China Plays Key Role in North Korean Crisis," leaked in September 2003, demonstrates Beijing's changes in its overall approach to North Korea. Once a loyal Cold War ally of North Korea, China is now adopting a far more cautious stance and increasingly perceives North Korea as a security threat. Washington should take note of this new policy's potential benefits and pitfalls, and understand its implications for China's role in the North Korean crisis.

A close bond was forged between the two countries during the Korean War (1950-1953), when China sent troops into North Korea to help fight the American-led United Nations force. The Communist North was preserved, but at a high cost. It ushered in an era of expanded U.S. presence in the region and it set the stage for the U.S. commitment to protecting Taiwan from the People's Liberation Army.

The Sino-North Korean relationship remained strong throughout the Cold War, but was irrevocably altered in 1992, when China formalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. It was an early indication of Beijing's shifting ideological position and was seen by North Korea as a betrayal. China's realignment effectively alienated it from the Communist North, putting the latter firmly on the path of hermetic concealment.

This new configuration of Sino-North Korean relations was due to

both a change in China's perception of its own national security environment as well as North Korea's behavior. First and foremost is Beijing's fear of a nuclear domino effect in northeast Asia. A nuclear North Korea could potentially drive Japan, South Korea and—perish the thought—Taiwan to arm themselves with like weapons.

North Korean refugees also pose a serious security threat to China. The state-owned sector in northeast China, bordering North Korea, has been hit hard by the nation's economic reform, leaving the former industrial center with high unemployment. With a 1,400 km border, North Korean refugees could undermine the region's stability. Beijing's recent campaign to catch and deport them not only strains relations with China's own 2 million citizens of Korean ancestry, but creates unwanted international attention in the face of the approaching 2008 Olympics.

Cross-border crimes committed by North Korean military personnel increasingly worry China. Theft is already commonplace, but organized prostitution and murders are also on the rise. This is complicated by the historical involvement of local Chinese military units with North Korean smuggling rings.

A little-publicized, but far more insidious, security threat is North Korea's potential for committing terrorism against China. Racial continuity across a long and porous border, local resentment due to economic hardships, and a heavily armed North Korean society makes policing the region difficult and

providing anti-terrorist security a near-impossible task.

Lastly, North Korea presents a challenge to Beijing's role as a responsible member of the international community. Viewing itself as a global player, China is beginning to grasp that true global legitimacy entails full participation in international agreements. Its willingness to engage North Korea through six-party talks is a bold demonstration of this growing trend.

The aforementioned leaked memo echoes China's internal policy debate on North Korea. Its conclusion indicates a decisive shift from "non-interference" to "active involvement," and underscores the rise of sophisticated, mid-level policy thinkers who support more interventionist, though cautious, goals regarding North Korea.

China's bottom-line policy regarding the Hermit Kingdom had been the "three no's:" no nukes, no war and no collapse of North Korea. Many in China argue that these should, at a minimum, be officially upgraded to: no nuclear proliferation, no security threats, and slow regime opening.

Proponents of policy change in China also see the need for developing a hedge if and when China's interests are challenged in a crisis over North Korea. A recent move toward this is the deployment of 150,000 Chinese soldiers along the Sino-North Korean border.

China's determination to intervene has not yet created an explicit hard-

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

Missile Defense is Spiraling Out of Congress' Control

By Victoria Samson, CDI Research Analyst

THE FIRST INTERCEPTORS intended to protect the United States from long-range missile attacks are to be put in the ground by October 2004. With crucial parts of the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense (GMD) network still being built (the radar, the booster rockets) and a less than stellar track record during highly-scripted flight tests, Bush administration claims that this system will work as promised are simply misleading.

The American public, and the U.S. Congress holding the public's purse strings, has repeatedly been told that this first system is a rudimentary one and will provide an initial defense against a limited missile attack. Therefore, deploying it before testing it operationally is okay, say system supporters, since GMD and other missile defense programs are showcasing the Pentagon's new policy of spiral development. The problem is that while missile defense efforts have been exempted from the Defense Department's normal rules for buying weapon systems, these programs have not yet been officially swept into the spiral development system, such as it is. Thus, the entire missile defense program — expected to cost tens, if not hundreds, of billions of dollars — is essentially being managed by Missile Defense Agency (MDA) whim, and is spiraling beyond Congress' financial control.

In May 2003, the Department of Defense released an updated version of its acquisition policy, known as the 5000 series. This is to ensure that the funding planned for developing and purchasing weapon systems

from Fiscal Year 2003 through FY 2009 — more than \$1 trillion — puts programs out in the field as quickly as possible.

The 5000 series establishes a development schedule and lays out milestones for weapons. It would seem that a complex set of programs as politically sensitive and schedule-challenged as missile defense would have all these steps clarified in the hopes of easing its way to deployment. That assumption would be incorrect.

“Missile defense truly has become a program beholden to no one and a law unto itself.”

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicated that all missile defense projects would be exempted from the 5000 series, instead granting the authority to determine development to the Missile Defense Agency. Only when the individual missile defense projects reach the production commitment step in their development cycle (known in Pentagon jargon as “Milestone C,” and a step that is far, far away for nearly all the missile defense programs) would they be obliged to fulfill the 5000 series' requirements.

Meanwhile, missile defense took up 15 percent of the \$43.1 billion allotted to weapons development

funds in FY 2003. That funding was more or less free from any official outside examination. The upcoming deployment of interceptors in Alaska and California has forced the program to skip directly to its production phase — without the Pentagon having to officially declare it at Milestone C. GMD managers simply have ducked their oversight obligations, and most likely will continue to claim the program is still in its development phase in order to put off compliance as long as possible.

DoD officials routinely refer to MDA's basket of programs as poster-children for the new acquisition process of spiral development. The FY 2003 Defense Authorization's Section 803 spells out the parameters of and criteria for spiral developments. Once the secretary of defense or his designee has decided a program is undergoing spiral development, that program then has to show its development strategy, test plans, performance parameters, exit criteria, and operational assessment. Furthermore, from 2003 to 2008, the secretary must give a report to Congress by Sept. 30 on the status of each program undergoing spiral development.

Spiral development is practically synonymous with missile defense. In Rumsfeld's May 14, 2003, written testimony to the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on defense, he explained, “Take, for example, the approach to ballistic missile defense. Instead of taking a decade or more to develop someone's vision of a

CONTINUED ON PAGE 7

MISSILE DEFENSE

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

‘perfect’ shield, we have instead decided to develop and put in place a rudimentary system by 2004 — one which should make us somewhat safer than we are now — and then build on that foundation with increasingly effective capabilities as the technologies mature. We intend to apply this ‘spiral development’ approach to a number of systems.”

The head of the MDA, Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, in front of the same committee on April 9, 2003, stated that the missile defense system being deployed in 2004 has a complex set of tests which, “combined with analysis of simulations and exercises, give us confidence that the system can take the first steps toward initial defensive operations while performing as a test bed for further realistic testing and continued spiral development.” He used the phrase “spiral devel-

opment” five more times that day. Pete Aldridge, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, asserted to the House Armed Services Committee on March 20, 2003, that “We will do spiral development as we are applying to missile defense so that when the initial block of capability gets ready to be deployed, we can do it in a short period of time, but we do it with mature technology.” And J.D. Crouch, assistant secretary of defense for international security, defended President George W. Bush’s initial deployment decision during a Dec. 17, 2002, press conference: “We are using what we call a spiral development approach, in terms of the missile defense program, and an evolutionary approach to the acquisition of missile defense capabilities.”

Surprisingly, according to the GAO, the Pentagon draft report on the status of each program applying spiral development (incomplete as

of Oct. 23, 2003) “states that there are no research and development programs that have been approved as spiral development programs as of Sept. 30, 2003...DoD anticipates that there will be approved spiral development programs to report in 2004.” How can missile defense, which has been repeatedly used by the Pentagon as a shining example of spiral development, not be officially designated as such?

Put simply, the Pentagon wants to have its cake and eat it too. It wants the flexibility in what missile defense can deliver by qualifying it as a program undergoing “spiral development,” yet it doesn’t want to have to follow through with any of the reports or responsibilities that such programs require. Congress has little ability to exercise its right of oversight and power of the purse. Missile defense truly has become a program beholden to no one and a law unto itself. ■

CHINA

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

line approach in Beijing. However, several prominent Chinese analysts believe Beijing should use more coercive measures in response to North Korea’s provocations. Beijing’s deep concern over developments in North Korea will propel it to play a more active role in the Korean Peninsula.

Beijing must also support internationalizing the nuclear crisis. China has helped push North Korea to accept multilateral talks, but only cautiously, as Beijing has yet to ease its own resistance against intervention by international bodies on issues such as human rights and refugees.

Last, China must focus on transforming the Kim Jong-Il regime from a failed state to a viable government that is cooperative with Beijing. While this is the safest way to alleviate the threat of North Korea, it will require Beijing to initiate greater military, official and people-to-people exchanges.

Washington would be mistaken to believe that China will support policies such as “regime change” and “preemptive war” to solve the Korean crisis. Beijing simply has too much to lose from a destabilized Korean Peninsula. By the same token, Beijing understands the gains from a stable, non-nuclear North Korea. Beijing has been motivated to push

North Korea to accept a “peaceful revolution,” but now Washington must accept that de-escalation of the nuclear crisis has to be closely coupled with assurances of gradual economic and social reform. In its coordination with China, the United States must bring into balance both U.S. desires and China’s limitations when it spurs Beijing to act assertively. A turbulent Sino-U.S. relationship will force China back to its former ways of using North Korea as an anti-American card, while a cooperative spirit will guarantee a more active and interventionist approach by Beijing in the urgent goal of bringing the North Korean crisis to a peaceful conclusion. ■



Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036-2109
(202) 332-0600 • Fax: (202) 462-4559
www.cdi.org

NONPROFIT ORG.
US POSTAGE
PAID
Washington D.C.
Permit No. 4627

ADDRESS SERVICE REQUESTED



THE STAFF

President and CEO:

Dr. Bruce Blair

Vice President:

Theresa Hitchens

Senior Advisors:

Hon. Philip E. Coyle, III
Dr. G. Wayne Glass
Hon. Larry Korb

Senior Fellows:

David T. Johnson
John Newhouse

Visiting Senior Fellow:

Winslow Wheeler

Distinguished Military Fellows:

General Charles Wilhelm
U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
General Anthony Zinni
U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

Executive Assistant:

Eleanor Harrison-Little

Senior Analysts:

Marcus Corbin

Rachel Stohl

Research Analysts:

Mark Burgess
Dr. Michael Donovan
Victoria Samson

Research Assistants:

Jessy Cowan
Victoria Garcia
Andrew George
Sandhya Reddy
Christopher Sandlin
Ian Shifrin

Office Manager:

Judy Edwards

Web Manager:

Steve Welsh

IT Director:

Samy Moutanabbih

Graphic Designer:

Rachel Freedman

Development:

Lynn Schuster

TV Production Staff

Superpower:

Glenn Baker
Colin McCullough
Stephen Sapienza
Mark Sugg

Washington ProFile:

Dr. Nikolai Zlobin, Senior
Fellow & Editor-in-Chief
Aleksandr Grigoryev, Editor
Margarita Gorelik, Database
Manager

Vsevolod Gunitskiy,
Research Associate
Lilit Petrosyan,
Associate Editor

Washington Observer:

Yali Chen, Research Analyst &
Editor-in-Chief
Li-Yuan Kuan, Database &
Website Manager

CDI Brussels, Belgium:

Tomas Valasek, Director

CDI Moscow, Russia:

Dr. Ivan Safranchuk, Director

© Copyright 2004 by the Center for Defense Information. The Center for Defense Information encourages quotation and reprinting of any of the material, provided the Center is credited. The Center requests a copy of such use.

BOARD OF ADVISORS

Doris Z. Bato—Santa Fe, N.M.

Bruce and Barbara Berger—Aspen, Colo.

Arthur D. Berliss, Jr.—Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.); former Vice-President, Allen-Hollander Co., New York, N.Y.

Edward H.R. Blitzer—Former Chairman, Lightolier Inc., New York, N.Y.

Dick Brukenfeld—Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.

Ben Cohen—Founder, Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., South Burlington, Vt.

James R. Compton—Chair Emeritus, Fund for Peace Board; Chair Emeritus, The Compton Foundation, Menlo Park, Calif.

Joseph N. Deblinger—President, Deblinger Sales & Marketing Corp., Manhasset, N.Y.

Gay Dillingham—CNS Communications, Santa Fe, N.M.

James A. Donovan—Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Author, former publisher Journal of the Armed Forces, Atlanta, Ga.

Raymond Frankel—Los Angeles, Calif.

Seth M. Glickenhau—Investment Banker, New York, N.Y.

Eva Haller—Santa Barbara, Calif.

Yoel Haller, M.D.—Santa Barbara, Calif.

James D. Head, Ph.D.—President, Strategy Development Company, Freeland, Mich. Chairman of the Board, CDI.

David H. Horowitz—New York, N.Y.

Robert G. James—Rear Admiral, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.), President, Enterprise Development Associates, New York, N.Y.

Alan F. Kay, Ph.D.—Businessman, St. Augustine, Fla.

Gene R. La Rocque—Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), President Emeritus, CDI, Washington, D.C.

Eugene M. Lang—Founder/ Chairman Emeritus, REFAC Technology Development Corp. and "Pericles" Foundation, New York, N.Y.

Ellie Meyers—Deerfield, Ill.

Robert M. Meyers, M.D.—Deerfield, Ill.

David E. Moore—Rye, NY

Paul Newman—Motion Pictures, Los Angeles, Calif.

Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Pulitzer IV—St. Louis, Mo.

John M. Rockwood—Publisher, Chicago, Ill.

Martha S. Schauss—Redmond, Wash.

Julie Schecter, Ph.D.—Director, Peaked Hill Trust, Wayland, Mass.

Gloria Scher—New York, N.Y.

John J. Shanahan—Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Ormond Beach, Fla.

Adele E. Starr—Mamaroneck, N.Y.

Philip A. Straus—Partner, Neuberger and Berman, Members, New York Stock Exchange, New York, N.Y.

Philip A. Straus, Jr.—Photographer, Philadelphia, Pa.

Andrew Ungerleider—Earthstone International Ltd., Santa Fe, N.M.

Albert B. Wells—President, The Abelard Foundation, Inc.; Kingsley, Schreck, Wells & Reichling, Private Investments, San Francisco, Calif.

Barbara Slaner Winslow, Ph.D.—School of Education and Women's Studies Program, Brooklyn College/ City University of New York

Joanne Woodward—Actress-Director, Westport, Ct.