Introduction

In October 1999, the U.S. Department of Defense renamed U.S. Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Va., Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to reflect a critical new mission: expanding inter-service cooperation in experimentation, training, research and development, and procurement to maximize the benefits of an integrated, interoperable military now and in the future. As well as being newly tasked with land and maritime defense of the United States, JFCOM, headed by Army Gen. William F. Kernan, has been in the vanguard of the U.S. military's struggle to redefine strategy, doctrine and force structure to face the rapidly changing post-Cold War environment. For nearly a decade, the Pentagon and military services have been attempting to refocus on new and emerging threats fundamentally different from the erstwhile Red Army — such as so-called rogue states and non-state actors (tribes, armed gangs, terrorist groups) using weapons of mass destruction; skilled in urban and/or guerilla warfare; and, comfortable with ethnic cleansing, suicide bombing and other unconventional methods of waging war.

Unfortunately, efforts at major reform up to now largely have failed, due to a number of factors, including bureaucratic inertia within the Defense Department and military services, and budgetary politics within Congress. The terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, however, have put new emphasis on the long-running work at JFCOM — work now considered crucial to the Pentagon's overarching goal of 'transformation' to face future threats. Transformation is defined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of U.S. force structure as the "evolution and deployment of combat capabilities that provide revolution or asymmetric advantage to U.S. forces." In November, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld followed the QDR's emphasis on transformation by naming Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (Ret.) director of Force Transformation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, reporting to Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Cebrowski is charged with developing a top-level, cross-service strategy for transformation. He told reporters at the Pentagon Nov. 27 that his office will focus on five areas: key elements of strategy to face future ways of war; concept formulation; technology development; experimentation and operational prototyping.

As part of this renewed transformation effort, JFCOM continues to be tasked with exploring the new range of threats and potential military engagements and redefining America's war-fighting style and capabilities. In June 2000, JFCOM provided, in Joint Vision 2020, a kind of roadmap for how U.S. military services should work together on the battlefield: 'this is what we should be able to do, this is how we are going to think about fighting, etc.' Each service branch then created a plan for how it would support these joint operations of the future, and how internal transformation would shape them into the kind of forces that could decisively and creatively win any kind of future conflict.

Primarily, JFCOM has been charged with experimentation designed to tease out new forms of operation, and even possible new weapons requirements, that could improve the ability of the Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps to work seamlessly in future conflicts. Besides joint exercises, preplanned scenarios that help maintain operational readiness, JFCOM uses experimentation to refine concepts and test new theories of war fighting. The first such activity, during which JFCOM pitted their new ideas against "real-time" crises, was May 2001's Unified Vision 2001, a modeling event designed primarily to test joint command and control, headquarters organization, the way effects-based operations (military or non-military actions aimed at producing a specific outcome, event, or consequence which contributes to the overall goals) play out when applied in simulated contingencies, and what demands might be placed on U.S. forces in a new conflict. The next major joint integrating experiment is Millennium Challenge 2002. Scheduled for July and August and including the military services and special operations personnel, Millennium Challenge 2002 is the key war game for assessing the application of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) — the "how" of military strategy. It will also integrate elements of each service's future force concepts — for example, the Army's medium-weight brigades and Air Force Expeditionary Forces.

Millennium Challenge will determine the extent to which the joint force is able to implement the principles of RDO, JFCOM's specific strategic concept for leveraging American advantages in future warfare. RDO involves using American strengths in many different areas, not just military power, to weaken the enemy at his critical points. When maximized, RDO would mean that traditional armed conflict might not even have to take place — the United States would have hacked into the enemy's computers to prevent missile launch, or used psychological operations to convince the enemy's soldiers to defect and surrender, or frozen bank accounts and cut off foreign assistance. RDO takes the traditional concept of finding the chinks in an enemy's armor to another level, a level where all national strengths (from economic to informational to military) are aimed at the enemy's weak points in a rapid, paralyzing, demoralizing barrage.

An exposition of RDO and how it works, based on a presentation by Gen. Charles Wilhelm, USMC (Ret.), former head of U.S. Southern Command, is found below. Wilhelm, a CDI Distinguished Military Fellow, is a key participant in JFCOM's RDO and experimentation/war-gaming efforts.

Transformation, Joint Vision 2020 and the Development of RDO as a Strategic Concept

Although transformation is a key Pentagon goal, the definition of the term and the way it is being implemented differs somewhat across the military services and DoD agencies. To be successful, true military transformation will require a unified vision of future strategic and operational goals.

Gen. Wilhelm: We should look at transformation in much the same way that we look at a coin. Like a coin, transformation has two sides. One side is the way future forces will look; the other is how they will fight and operate. Joint Vision 2020 describes the attributes of future forces: precision engagement, dominant maneuver, full dimensional protection, focused logistics and full spectrum dominance. Attainment of these attributes will influence how future forces look. In pursuit of Joint Vision 2020, and while executing their own responsibilities to modernize, re-capitalize and transform their forces to make them relevant on future battlefields, the Army will field Interim Brigade Combat Teams, the Air Force will continue to develop and refine its Aerospace Expeditionary Forces, the Navy will pursue Network Centric Warfare, and the Marine Corps will nurture Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. These are all good and worthy efforts, but a question arises: What overarching concept unifies and harmonizes these service initiatives?

The framework for developing new joint operational concepts to support transformation is provided by the Defense Planning Guidance, and its goals served as a roadmap as JFCOM developed Joint Vision 2020. JV2020, in turn, defines how JFCOM will achieve the U.S. military's goals of being persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict. Yet the way these capabilities are applied — to actual doctrine, force structure, and weapon systems requirements and acquisition — remains one of the most crucial reform questions.

Gen. Wilhelm: When requirements are identified and capabilities are developed before concepts are articulated, the argument can be made that we have the cart (requirements) before the horse (concepts). With respect to transformation, that may be where we find ourselves now. U.S. Joint Forces Command has embarked on an ambitious experimentation program to develop a concept that can unify and exploit the capabilities that are emerging from service transformation programs. As the Rapid, Decisive Operations (RDO) concept takes shape, we will be able to assess how the service initiatives will come together to produce the coherent joint forces that will be needed to achieve JV2020 goals and succeed in future complex operating environments. This may not be as difficult as it sounds. In the past, we have developed capabilities that outpaced concepts. Through a process of reverse engineering, we have demonstrated the ability to retrofit and reconcile strategy and concepts with new capabilities and requirements.

RDO is the new conceptual approach being emphasized by JFCOM as an alternative to the traditional focus on military-to-military engagement and overwhelming superiority. The RDO method also identifies more ways to leverage and maximize American strength, since the focus is not solely on tangible military gains.

Gen. Wilhelm: RDO focuses on defeating an adversary's war-making ability, as opposed to only his war-fighting capabilities. RDO and its supporting concepts look upon an adversary as a complex, dynamic and interactive 'system of systems'. The objective of RDO is to destroy the cohesion that holds together the 'system of systems,' as opposed to simply destroying the adversary's armed forces.

To achieve this, a more holistic approach is emerging that considers the coordinated application of all elements of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) against the centers of gravity and key vulnerabilities that reside within the adversary's political, economic, military, social, infrastructure and information spheres. Again, the goal is not just to destroy military forces; rather, it is to change behavior in ways that do not threaten U.S. interests.

The ongoing operations in Afghanistan have, in many ways, applied this model. First, we froze assets — an application of economic power. Then, we diplomatically isolated the Taliban and al Qaeda; concurrently, we undertook aggressive information operations. As a fourth and final step, we applied military power. This successful holistic approach to the application of national power should have an influence on how future forces look, and how and when they will fight.

RDO is supported by four components, the first of which, effects-based operations, suggests engaging targets based on their contributions to the overall desired effect. The aim is to affect the whole picture, making war too costly from any perspective.

Gen. Wilhelm: One of the 'decisive actions' of Operation Allied Force was the interruption of electrical service to Belgrade. By muting [Yugoslav leader Slobodan] Milosevic's propaganda machine and curtailing defiant street parties, the allied coalition drove a wedge between the national leadership and the population, and began to dissolve the glue that held together Milosevic's base of power. This is an example of an effects-based operation. Rather than attacking objects such as weapon systems or buildings, we pursued a broader outcome — separating the leader (Milosevic) from his base of power (the people).

Second, an RDO uses standing joint command and control elements as a way to enable rapid mobilization. A direct and coordinated use of non-military tools of conflict management and resolution is envisioned, and would be implemented by government, non-governmental organizations, etc. The third component is Operational Net Assessment, and the fourth is joint tactical operations.

Gen. Wilhelm: For RDO to achieve its fullest potential, we need to reassess the ways that we do business within the interagency community. We need a combination of people, places and processes that will enable us to rapidly, continuously and efficiently apply diplomatic, informational, military and economic measures in the right sequence and in the proper proportions against the adversary's most vulnerable centers of power to bring about desired strategic outcomes.

Operational Net Assessment (ONA), the third component, signifies a radical shift away from the Joint Intelligence Prep of the Battlefield process now used to assess an ongoing conflict, to a predictive, preemptive focus on emerging threats. ONA would allow the identification of deviations from the norm — and a subsequent quick, effective response. This component will be supported by creation of a National Knowledge Advantage Center, enabling synthesis and analysis of information — because knowledge is synthesis of information. As a final aspect of RDO, soldiers will develop joint tactical actions to carry out military orders, revamping the antiquated command and control method that has been in use since Napoleon. The old non-fluid decision-making process is incompatible with the goal of making decisions faster — and staying ahead of — an adversary. You need to know: what is the adversary's perception of you? How can you apply your power to their value system?

While transformation must be achieved on many levels, including procurement priorities and doctrinal cooperation, the most crucial conditions of transformation are strategic ? how all possible broad-spectrum war-fighting advantages are developed to support the goals of transformation. RDO is one approach to achieving a unified strategic vision for transformation.

Gen, Wilhelm: Considered in its broader context, RDO, as a concept, extends well beyond the boundaries of the Department of Defense. It is an ambitious concept. That said, I and others see significant potential for RDO, even if it is applied only in the military domain. By taking outcome, rather than object-oriented, approaches; by pursuing knowledge-centric approaches to future warfare; by giving commanders the tools they need to make better decisions faster than future adversaries; by broadening our view of the spectrum of conflict to include consideration of actions to influence, deter, coerce, compel, defeat and transition back to pre-crisis conditions, we may avoid some future conflicts and achieve more enduring outcomes in those in which we do engage.

Joint Forces Command will next test its ideas and processes this summer in Millennium Challenge 2002, during a war-gaming exercise that pits its new effects-oriented approach against a potential future regional contingency.