The term ‘transformation’ has been increasingly used over the past few years to represent the broad changes the U.S. military must make in its structure and doctrine to meet the emerging challenges of the 21st century.  But beyond the general idea that transformation may involve revolutionary change and incorporate new advanced technologies, no single concept has yet coalesced within the U.S. defense establishment.  The lack of a coherent approach among the military services, the military leadership and top military civilians threatens to cheapen the transformation exercise to little more than rhetoric for business as usual, something that the country can ill afford at this juncture.

Efforts to work out a widely agreed definition of transformation are being hindered by disagreements within the Pentagon about emphasis and approach, as well as epistemological confusion: does transformation refer to the process, or the desired result (or both)?  There are at least three definitions of the term currently in use among various Defense Department bureaucracies.  Not only does this lack of coherence make coordination of the required service transformation efforts nearly impossible, it also allows the individual services and defense contractors to attach the term to whatever weapon system or program they choose.  For example, transformation has been applied as a term to everything from new U.S. Special Operations Command technologies to the Army’s cancelled Crusader self-propelled howitzer.¹

It is rapidly becoming apparent that a standardized, and agreed, concept is required in order for the U.S. military to start taking the steps necessary to do what is widely agreed as necessary:  transform from today’s Cold War posture and doctrine to a more agile fighting force for the 21>st century.

Webster’s Dictionary defines transformation as “an act, process, or instance of transforming or being transformed.”  To transform is to “change completely or essentially in condition or structure; to change the outward form or appearance of; to change in character or condition.” 

The term was first popularized as a description of DoD change by the report of the National Defense Panel, which was established to report in concert with the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.  The terms of reference were set by Section 924 of the Military Force Structure Act of 1996, which made no mention of transformation.  Yet the Dec. 1, 1997, National Defense Panel report, “Transforming Defense – National Security in the 21st Century,” was sufficient to establish the concept. 

Lexis-Nexis records barely two mentions of defense or military transformation in the 12 months prior to Dec. 1.  In the following 12 months, there were around 30.  The panel did not define the term itself, but recommended that a transformation strategy be launched that would include “technological change, emerging military systems, new concepts of operations, and force restructuring”.²  Experimentation was also seen as important.

George W. Bush mentioned the term in his first Citadel defense speech as a candidate in September 1999, and the concept gained speed as it became the label for the Army’s 21st century force plan, which was unveiled at the Association of the U.S. Army conference in October 1999.  However, only since the new administration took office has the transformation effort taken hold, and been increasingly applied to acquisition and reorganization programs.

A divergence on what transformation actually means began to appear as the various services laid out their individual transformation plans.  The Army was first off the mark when its program was announced in October 1999.  According to Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki, the Army defines transformation as the process of changing the Army “into a force capable of dominating at every point on the spectrum of operations.  The Army’s Transformation Strategy will result in an Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the present force.”3 

This definition places emphasis upon improving the Army’s medium-weight capabilities and increasing the speed of deployment.  Aspirations for the Objective Force include deploying a brigade worldwide within 96 hours, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions in theatre within 30 days.

By March 2001 the Air Force had produced its own definition of the concept, which described transformation as a “fundamental change involving three principal elements and their interactions with one another: (1) advanced technologies that because of the new capability they yield, enable (2) new concepts of operation that produce order of magnitude increases in our ability to achieve desired military effects, and (3) organizational change that codifies the challenges in the previous elements or enhances our ability to execute our national security strategy.”⁴ 

Given that most commentators seem to agree that technology is only one of the important elements of transformation, this definition could be viewed as the wrong way around.  New operational concepts, and the necessary re-organizations to exploit them, would likely be more revolutionary than the usual military pursuit of ever-advancing technology.

On April 27, 2001, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was presented with the findings of his special Transformation Study Group, which described a different process of “changes in the concepts, organization, process, technology application and equipment through which significant gains in operational effectiveness, operating efficiencies and/or cost reductions are achieved.”⁵

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in late September 2001, defined the process as the “evolution and deployment of combat capabilities that provide revolutionary or asymmetric advantage to U.S. forces.”⁶ 

When Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski was named as director of the new Office of Force Transformation (OFT) in late November 2001, he added a further definition: “those continuing processes and activities which create new sources of power and yield profound increases in military competitive advantage as a result of new, or the discovery of, fundamental shifts in the underlying rule sets.”⁷  

The U.S. Navy does not appear to use the term at all in a macro sense, instead deeming a wide range of its current programs, such as the new DD(X) surface combatant program, Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, the Cooperative Engagement Capability battle information sharing system, its unmanned vehicles (both aerial and submersible) program, and its new ForceNet initiative⁸ as being of a transformational nature.⁹

The four definitions cited above fall into two streams: (1) fundamental, revolutionary advances in combat capability, implied in the Army definition and at center stage in the QDR and OFT definitions, and (2) advances in technology, given primacy in the Air Force definition. 

While some within the military contend that it is not necessarily a bad thing to have the separate services take unique, service-centric approaches to transformation, others worry that the failure to impose a standardized definition allows for the services to concentrate on their pet programs rather than the overall effort to revamp the entire U.S. military.  The Army’s recent defense of Crusader, in a bid by the Field Artillery branch to preserve its traditional shape – heavy, self-propelled artillery that can maneuver alongside tanks – is a good example.

Pentagon efforts are under way to refine what transformation means, at least at the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and the military.  Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in early April that he had “sat in on eight meetings in the last month and a half…going over…what transformation means.”¹⁰ 

A Transformation Planning Guidance is currently being prepared to aid the services build their long-term budget and acquisition plans, as an appendix to the 2004 Defense Planning Guidance.  Whether that document will produce a further definition of the concept, or a definitive definition, is unknown, though the terms used to describe transformation will probably clarify the official DoD perception of the concept.  If the services and DoD agencies can agree amongst themselves on a single definition, then it will be good news for the overall effort, as some of the frenzied posturing over the concept will dissipate.  This will allow the serious business of preparing American armed forces for 21st century challenges to proceed with less contactor and service branch hindrance.

Endnotes

Colin Robinson CDI Research Assistant crobinson@cdi.org

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