

Reforging the Sword

FORCES FOR A 21ST CENTURY SECURITY STRATEGY

diplomacy



training

doctrine



allies

leadership



weaponry



CONDENSED REPORT

The goal of the Center for Defense Information's Military Reform Project is to regenerate vigorous debate over the uses, strategy, doctrine, and forces of the U.S. military, and to address the deep institutional problems currently vexing the military. Its products are being designed as tools for expression of a wide range of analysis and views. Interested parties are invited to contact the project for further information: www.cdi.org/mrp, Marcus Corbin, mcorbin@cdi.org, 202-797-5282.

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SECURITY STRATEGY

CONDENSED REPORT

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Executive Summary

This report proposes an alternative U.S. military force for the first quarter of the 21st century. The force is designed to execute a new international security strategy that attempts to respond to the challenges of a changing world and also shape what that world will look like in 2025. Principal findings and recommendations of the report include:

- The U.S. military will face new military scenarios and new forms of warfare in the next quarter century, yet change in strategy and forces has been slow. Reshaping of the military to respond to the changing face of warfare needs to be accelerated.
- Intervening in complex civil wars, internal violence, peacekeeping operations – “smaller-scale contingencies” – has become a frequent mission for the military. These missions are increasingly likely to feature asymmetric warfare that bypasses the U.S. military’s current strength – industrial age warfare of destructive attrition on the battlefield – and attacks its weaknesses.
- The dominant diplomatic and military role that the United States will continue to play in world affairs will generate resentment and resistance as well as support, which the United States must nurture and expand. This approach presupposes restraint on the unilateral use of force by the United States in its pursuit of global stability and other national interests, and elevates the principle of multinational response.
- This study takes the approach of trying to *produce* a more desirable world by 2025 rather than trying to *predict* what it will be. The approach suggests that shaping the future requires building a more flexible and agile military. The study looks at what strategies might help reach a desired

2025 world, and proposes forces to execute the strategies. The study rests on several assumptions about the world, which, if unrealized, would lead to different recommendations.

- A key to a 2025 world in which American values predominate and in which America remains a leader is the rebalancing of the application of the elements of national power. Military power, which over the last 60 years has been the dominant element in U.S. international relations, must be recast into its essentially supporting role as a complement and backup to the political, economic, social, and informational components of national security. Broad national security strategy should pay more attention to foreign perceptions and political views of the United States – and explore threat reduction by using all the components of national power to deal with those perceptions.
- The report supports conducting military operations in carefully selected humanitarian or peace enforcement cases even where the United States may not have a clear vital national interest. The United States can and should play a useful role in ameliorating the worst cases of violence, destruction, and abuse in civil wars, “failed states,” and similar situations.
- The study calls for a strategy that will:
 - *Broaden* national security tools to include stronger political, economic, and social components.
 - *Integrate* with allies and partners to improve multinational military capabilities, collectively engage with areas of conflict – heading off conflict if possible and jointly intervening in selected cases if not.
 - *Quicken* military forces and refocus some of them on smaller-scale contingencies – in which they are likely to face challenging asymmetric or “fourth-generation” warfare – by improving their mobility, agility, flexibility, and strategy and decision-making speed.
- The study proposes making U.S. forces more “expeditionary,” on the assumption that expanding bilateral and multinational training, exercises, rotational deployments to “show the flag,” and other military-to-military contacts will credibly indicate continued U.S. engagement in a similar way to permanent forward stationing of large, heavy U.S. forces.
- In contrast to trends in the Defense Department, this report emphasizes: preparation for the new challenges the military faces right now; fixing personnel issues and doctrine before buying new hardware; and seizing the

opportunity for expanded multinational action. Although the results of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's strategy reviews are coming out slowly, the Defense Department has tended to focus on: future challenges from a superpower competitor; high-tech hardware; and U.S. capabilities to act unilaterally.

- The report suggests that choosing specific weapon programs is the least important component of a defense review. The most important thing is to ensure that personnel policies create a force of cohesive units with agile, initiative-taking leaders. Some key reforms to personnel policies are outlined in the report.
- The report also proposes a force structure that, over time, is:
 - smaller, with reductions in the active forces of three Army divisions, three aircraft carrier battle groups, and close to four fighter wings;
 - partly refocused on smaller-scale contingencies, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement operations;
 - composed of more transformed, lighter, smaller, higher mobility units;
 - oriented towards broader jointness in developing force requirements and in operations with allies, friends, civilian agencies, and non-governmental organizations;
 - prepared to handle potential larger challenges in the future with a robust heavy reserve force and, in the longer run, a healthier defense industrial base.
- The report also calls for accelerated efforts to:
 - Transform some of the active heavy armored forces into “expeditionary” forces more suited to smaller-scale contingencies. Prepare to work more with other nations and non-governmental or international organizations in such contingencies. Deal with chronic transnational problems such as drug trafficking, illegal migration, and crime by integrating operations better with U.S. civilian agencies whose primary missions and core competencies are in these areas.
 - Boost the human intelligence capabilities that improve knowledge and understanding of foreign cultures and governments.
 - Focus transformation and funding on agile forces such as: light- and medium-weight Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations; littoral Navy; lift, close air support, and interdiction Air Force; and defensive nuclear, biological, and chemical forces and equipment. Help fund the re-orient-

tation with moderate reductions in the forces that are already overwhelmingly dominant in force-on-force combat such as: heavy active Army, open-ocean Navy, nuclear and air superiority Air Force, and offensive nuclear forces.

- Improve ability to conduct new “asymmetric,” “maneuver,” or “third/fourth-generation” warfare by creating agile and flexible forces. Strengthen joint capabilities by expanding the role of war-fighting commanders and the Joint Staff in planning, budgeting, and procurement.

I. Introduction

This volume is the condensed version of the full report. It necessarily omits some background, argument, footnotes, nuance, detail, and topics (such as discussion of regional issues) found in the longer version. In addition to the full report, several background papers on specific topics were prepared and are mentioned in the text. All of the reports are available from the Center for Defense Information in hard copy or through its web site, www.cdi.org.

To develop a U.S. military force structure for the first quarter of the 21st century, this report took the classic approach of looking at potential U.S. goals, developing strategies to reach those goals, and then proposing forces to execute the strategies. Although the report concludes that moderate force reductions – and hence moderate military spending reductions after a transition period – are possible, its methodology did not start with lower spending as a goal in and of itself.

The study attempts to serve as a discussion catalyst rather than as a detailed blueprint of future military forces. Several issues, strategies, and recommendations are raised that point to areas for more detailed exploration. Although this effort is similar in concept to the Defense Department's official Quadrennial Defense Review, the absence of several hundred comparable staffers and officers to perform detailed analysis in this effort has limited its scope. The goal was to contribute concepts and perspectives to the debate, rather than produce the last word in analysis. Hopefully, the study makes up in conceptual unity and freshness of view what it lacks in detail.

The proposed strategy takes the approach of outlining a *desired* 2025 world, rather than a *predicted* one. It suggests that to reach such a desired world,

there is a need to broaden the non-military components of national security – political, economic, informational, and social – by giving them a greater role and allocating more resources to improve their effectiveness. The report finds that the best way to win conflicts is to head off potential threats before they even develop and suggests that non-military components can contribute substantially to such threat reduction.

The strategy rests on several assumptions about what conditions in the world will be. These foundational assumptions likely lead to different conclusions than other studies in this area. Although there are several hedges in this proposal, if the assumptions turn out to be too far from reality, the recommendations would need revision. For example, a pivotal element of the strategy is a much-expanded role for allies, friends, and partners in future military operations, both to take advantage of their potential capabilities, and to share the responsibilities and liabilities of global leadership. U.S. forces would better integrate with allied and coalition forces to collectively engage with areas of conflict. This rests on an assumption or assessment that the *conditions exist* for others to increase their military capabilities and activities. The paper then makes a *prescription* for this potential to be realized in the future – rather than a *description* that it will be. But if the appropriate conditions do not even exist, nothing the United States does in its revised strategy will be able to bring about greater international effort.

II. The Future

UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE

The last 10 years have seen the structure of international relations change from dueling political-military blocs dominated by superpowers to a single, multitier alliance dominated by the United States. Economically, Asian powerhouses have fallen behind the United States and Europe in developing and exploiting new technologies. These same technologies have revolutionized the way in which individuals and societies acquire and share information. At the same time, most of the world's inhabitants have been only marginally affected by these rapid changes.

Despite the socio-political-military changes of the past decade, the one unchanged, overarching reality is the ability of a few countries to employ nuclear weapons. In this instance, the first and best line of defense remains diplomacy in the form of verifiable arms control/arms reduction and non-proliferation regimes. At the same time, diplomacy can advocate a general rollback in conventional forces to those needed for self-defense and promote a consensus that peace, not war, is the norm of international relations.

TRADITIONAL MILITARY APPROACHES

The military dimension of national security remains a core requirement in the early 21st century. The administration of President George W. Bush inherited a tripartite National Military Strategy (NMS) that envisions "shaping the international environment...responding to the full spectrum of crises...[and] preparing now for an uncertain future."¹ The Pentagon's 1997 Concept for Future Joint Operations states that the objectives of the NMS

are to “promote stability and to thwart aggression” through “peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and [being prepared to] fight and win.”²

One way to shape the environment is through presence – permanently stationing and rotationally deploying forces around the world, conducting exercises, and providing “defense cooperation” in the form of arms sales and educating foreign military personnel. Being there as opposed to having to get there is an effective way of deterring aggression and providing reassurance to friends. Shaping the environment was singled out by Adm. Dennis Blair, commander in chief Pacific Command, in March 7, 2000 congressional testimony, as his most effective tool.

Pentagon doctrine, organizations, and weapon purchases are ostensibly aimed at meeting the third element of current military strategy: “preparing now for an uncertain future.” But moving from Cold War patterns has progressed slowly. “Mass” still predominates in doctrine. As difficult as it is to change equipment, it is even more difficult to transform mindsets about doctrine and strategy. As the Army’s deputy commanding general for transformation, Maj. Gen. James Dubik noted, “The materiel part is hard, but human change and cultural change are a lot harder.”³

It is not feasible, prudent, or necessary to try to transform all of the force from current doctrine, organization, or equipment. But it is necessary and prudent in this time of “strategic pause” to undertake a clear, time-phased re-evaluation of foreseeable likely military threats to U.S. interests and develop a range of complementary military capabilities that will allow the United States to effectively deter and, if necessary, defeat an aggressive nation or sub-national group.

THE CHALLENGE OF VIOLENT CONFLICT TO GLOBAL STABILITY

Along with other nations, the United States wants sufficient stability in global affairs to ensure the continued prosperity of the nation. Americans believe that global stability is best achieved through democratic ideals that protect basic human rights and a growing global economy. This in turn implies an ability to create new sources of wealth; to allocate scarce resources equitably; and to deal early and effectively with nations or sub-national groups who refuse to recognize mutual interests and values.

This last reality justifies the creation and maintenance of military forces by nations, even in an era of relative cooperation. Even so, two significant, mutually reinforcing changes have emerged in the last decade of the 20th century that are altering war-fighting and the preparations for war-fighting.

The first is a significant shift from predominantly inter-state to intra-state conflict. This shift has lessened the relevance of defending the territorial integrity of the state – the traditional justification for large military forces – in deciding on the nature and structure of modern military forces. The reduction in military force size that has taken place around the globe reflects a belief that traditional force-on-force engagements are largely an anachronism. Among the more technologically advanced nations, the military principle of mass is giving way to better-informed, faster, more mobile, self-sustaining, and lethal units that can operate semi-autonomously over greater distances. In turn, this places a greater premium on highly trained, well-equipped personnel able to evaluate situations and make tactically and technically sound decisions while reducing risks.

In certain other ways, the 21st century will be like the 20th. The United States, given its human and natural resources, its power and size, will continue to play a dominant diplomatic and military role in world affairs. This will generate resentment and resistance as well as support, which the United States must nurture and expand. This tack presupposes restraint on the unilateral use of force by the United States in its pursuit of global stability and other national interests, and elevates the principle of multinational response.

These world conditions and the changing rationale for the use of military force lie behind what some may regard as a radical proposal for restructuring U.S. military forces over the course of the next quarter century. But all recommendations are premised on continued U.S. engagement with other nations diplomatically, economically, environmentally, socially, and militarily (in *ad hoc* coalitions or supporting international organizations). And all are based on the premise that how the United States chooses to exert its power and prestige over the next quarter century will be a significant, if not the determining, factor in the world's progress toward greater understanding, greater harmony, and greater prosperity for all nations for the remainder of the century and beyond.

III. A New Strategy

A DESIRED 2025 WORLD

Rather than rely heavily on predictions of what the world will be like in 2025 and what the specific threats will be, another approach to strategy is to outline what world the United States might *like* to see in 2025, and shape strategy and forces so as to encourage the realization of that world instead of other, less attractive, scenarios. The world of 2025 envisioned here as being the most promising for U.S. national security is one characterized by:

- recognition that a nation's social, political, economic, military, informational, and environmental strengths contribute equally to national security;
- a major reduction (to no more than 500 each) in nuclear warheads and delivery means in the arsenals of Russia and the United States, no significant increase from current levels in China, and progress towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons;
- implementation of more vigorous verification regimes (and their enforcement) for chemical and biological weapons and agents, and for nuclear weapons;
- greater use of targeted diplomatic and economic means to avert and mitigate crises that develop by addressing their root causes, and to reverse the consequences of violations of international norms and standards;
- general reductions in spending for conventional national military forces, made possible by strengthening the capacity of regional organizations (and possibly the United Nations) to respond to intra-state and inter-state violence and to humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters;
- more equitable economic development via open markets, free trade, and economic development and assistance from developed countries; and

- equitable use of the world's diminishing natural resources, including fresh water, arable land and food, forests, and energy sources.

What actions will help bring this world closer to reality? For the United States to retain its moral, diplomatic, economic, and military leadership over the next 25 years, it will have to:

- increase participation in shaping international legal, economic, environmental, and natural resource agreements and treaties that affect vital and important national interests;
- maintain strong ties to allies (NATO, EU, OSCE, OAS) and with key states in the Far East, Middle East, Asia, and Africa;
- encourage the evolution of new security relationships founded on common interests with Russia, China, India, Brazil, and other emerging regional power centers;
- develop military structures capable of efficiently responding to remaining threats or emergencies that are susceptible to military power and capabilities;
- move from dependence on fossil fuels to renewable energy sources.

Internally, the executive branch must improve the interagency process. As the distinctions between domestic and international issues, and between military and political/economic issues continue to blur, “improvement” may well mean broadening participation by agencies and offices and distributing information more widely to ensure that second- and third-order effects of a proposed policy reach consideration. At the same time, streamlined analysis of the real-world effects of national policy decisions will be required to preclude unacceptable delays in subsequent decision-making.

Within the U.S. military, programs and policies of the individual services need to be reviewed for their impact on joint operations. This is particularly true for communications and intelligence analysis and dissemination, which have become central elements in the joint commander's ability to assess reactions – desired, undesired, even unanticipated – and adapt peacetime planning or wartime operations to the changed environment.

Another key to a 2025 world in which American values predominate and in which America remains a leader is the rebalancing of the application of the elements of national power. Diplomacy is the first line of both offense and

defense of U.S. interests, the realm in which the nation signals its intention to involve itself or abstain from participation in world affairs. Supporting diplomacy are economic actions, positive (reducing tariffs, expanding trade agreements) and negative (sanctions). Military power – another supporting capability but one which, over the last 60 years has been the dominant element in U.S. international relations – must be recast into its essentially supporting role. Above all, the United States must avoid even the perception of threatening military force unilaterally in pursuit of narrowly defined “national interests” at the expense of international equity.

WHAT IF WE'RE WRONG?

Underlying this proposal are a number of assumptions which, if not fulfilled, would require adjustments to various conclusions. The main assumptions are:

- Classic cross-border aggression will be less frequent and of more restricted intensity and duration than in the 20th century.
- The need to posit and prepare for two nearly simultaneous major theater wars is unnecessary, given the increasing integration of interests among major powers, the conventional military overmatch against lesser powers, and the potential for greater allied contributions to winning such wars should they occur.
- Major allies and friends of the United States are politically and financially *able* to continue to move toward acquiring the capacity (sometimes unilaterally, more often multinationally) to provide for their own defense and security needs and to build intervention forces. A reorientation of U.S. strategy as proposed here, and hence strong U.S. encouragement for allied transformation, might help allies to do so.
- Expanding bilateral and multinational training exercises, rotational deployments to “show the flag,” and other military-to-military contacts will credibly indicate continued U.S. engagement in a similar way to permanent forward stationing of large, heavy U.S. forces.
- Projected technology advances necessary to support strategy and tactics driving the transformation efforts of the military services will materialize.
- Improved and expanded transformation of national-level information collection, analysis, and dissemination by intelligence agencies will be able to rectify existing shortfalls in these activities; be able to keep abreast

of the intentions and capabilities of allies, friends, possible and identified adversaries; and identify potential internal upheavals in other nations that might affect peace or stability in a region.⁴

- Overall, a Depression-type collapse of the global economy will not occur, and nations will prefer accommodation to war with regard to the distribution of scarce resources such as energy and water.

There are measures – hedges⁵ – against the failure of one or more of these assumptions to materialize. They fall into three main categories: organizational (people, ideas, and transformational processes); alliances and multilateral approaches to security challenges; and the industrial base. All are underpinned by the same critical ability – first-rate, comprehensive analysis of information about the intentions and military capabilities of others, both friends and potential adversaries.

THREATS, CAPABILITIES, AND THEMATIC STRATEGIES

“Generations” of Warfare

At root, the “American way of war” remains focused on a paradigm variously known as attrition, second-generation, or Industrial Age warfare. This style of war-fighting tends to be linear and slow moving, relying on masses of men and material to physically crush (albeit not necessarily through frontal assaults) or threaten to crush an opponent. Industrially, second-generation warfare emulates and relies on mass production techniques to mobilize, train and equip, and deploy military forces.

Real third-generation war-fighting breaks battlefield linearity by seeking and exploiting a combination of “spaces and timing” *vis-à-vis* an enemy – that is, creating or at least finding weak points or gaps in enemy thinking and dispositions and taking advantage of these openings before the opponent can rectify them. The objective of this kind of warfare is to collapse the opponent’s will to fight early (ideally, even before becoming decisively engaged) by introducing chaos into his intelligence/surveillance-evaluation/command-action/reaction processes.⁶ This can be done by anticipating the actions of the opponent and preempting his intentions via unexpected thrusts and parries by highly agile, dispersed friendly forces brought together quickly for the mission and just as quickly dispersed when the action is finished.⁷ This type of warfare also may free forces from the ponderous support structure characteristic of Industrial Age warfare.

Just as second- and third-generation warfare intermingle, they are both interpenetrated by what some call fourth-generation warfare. This primarily involves land forces (although targets can be naval vessels and air assets) – irregular or guerilla warfare carried out by groups motivated by ideology, revenge, lust for power, ethnicity, religion or some other unifying bond. Such irregulars often are associated with or supported by regular military forces, but in the late 20th century this was less often the case. In fact there are countervailing trends. There are more small groups or very loosely knit organizations which employ terror by threatening to or actually attacking civilian populations and infrastructure – the so-called asymmetrical style of warfare. Some receive support, safe harbor, or encouragement from nations while others seem to operate with little support. Conversely, regular military forces are trying to reconfigure and redirect themselves toward more rapid force projection. They are responding – albeit at a seemingly slow pace – to the perception that the preponderance of future missions will be low intensity, “stability” ones – peace monitoring, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief support, nation building, and peace enforcement. In one sense, this change in orientation seeks to make the asymmetrical symmetrical by confronting wherever possible the irregular forces on their own terms.

An indication of the focus on symmetrical warfare is the attention devoted to how many major theater wars (MTWs) the U.S. military should be prepared to fight at one time. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s strategy review appears ready to move from a two MTW approach to one MTW.⁸ If this is ultimately implemented, it will be an improvement, but more important than merely changing the number of MTWs is dropping the concept of defining rigid “MTW forces” and using them to drive force size. Rather than focus on fixed MTW forces, the ability to put together and jointly operate varying force packages tailored to specific circumstances should be improved and quickened.

Directions for Transformation

The end of the Cold War reduced the requirement to permanently forward deploy heavy military forces and their supporting structures. It also removed the always loose discipline over international relations that was part of the bipolar world, allowing the re-emergence of global societal ills such as poverty, sickness, urbanization, environmental degradation, competition for natu-

ral resources, and cultural divisions that spawn conflict. The first line of offense against these problems is economic development and diplomacy. The military's contribution, which should be reflected in unit structure, training, and doctrine, is to provide forces that can establish (or re-establish) general security in a region so that non-military international and even U.S. national agencies can aid indigenous governments to reclaim legitimate power.

To effectively provide such forces for the disordered new world, the military should more fully assume the transformation initiative. This means improving the ability of U.S. forces to act and, when necessary, to fight employing a combination of advanced third- and fourth-generation warfare against opponents who are structured and trained primarily for second- or early third-generation warfare.

Structuring and training itself for advanced third- and fourth-generation warfare does not mean that the U.S. military will be unable to defend the nation against more substantial military forces. The whole point of the transformation is a realignment and reorientation of combat power that is more readily adaptable to unfolding scenarios but with emphasis on disrupting evolving scenarios early in their development – perhaps even before hostilities begin. With this as a principal focus, the unduly narrow definition of the military's *raison d'être* – “to fight and win the nation's wars” – assumes an inherently broader range of capabilities than in the 20th century.

A Proposed 21st Century Security Strategy

The strategy proposed here consists of several different but related elements that apply to specific types of threats. In combination they should help reduce the growth of threats, assist in defeating those that become realized, and help move the world toward a more desirable state in 2025. The following chart lists the overarching elements of the strategy.

The proposed strategy echoes the “Shape” element of the recent official “Shape, Respond, Prepare” approach in strongly endorsing military engagement around the world, but emphasizes more the potential contributions of non-military national security tools and of allied or partner forces *if and when* their capabilities are improved. The proposed strategy also calls for “Preparing” for the possibility of a future superpower challenge, but emphasizes the strategic breathing space the United States is likely to enjoy in the medium term and the need to improve capabilities for the operations the military is

“Broaden, Integrate, Quicken”: A Proposed Strategy

- Broaden national security tools to include stronger political, economic, informational, and social components. Recognize the second- and third-order consequences of military actions in political and grand strategic arenas.
- Integrate with allies and partners to collectively engage with areas of conflict, head off conflict if possible, and jointly intervene if not. Work with them to transform their militaries and to improve joint, multinational capabilities.
- Quicken military forces in order to refocus them on smaller-scale contingencies in which they are likely to face asymmetric or fourth-generation warfare. Improve their mobility, agility, flexibility, and strategy and decision-making cycles.

and should be called upon to perform in the immediate future.

More detail on common elements of the proposed strategy follows. “National security strategy” includes the diplomatic, economic, informational, and social components of security as well as the military component. Military strategy focuses on the military component of national security.

Elements of a National Security Strategy

- Increase use of the diplomatic, economic, informational, and social components of national security to identify and prevent conflicts before they explode into violence.
- Avoid generating major threats. Potential threats against the United States are not fixed – U.S. actions can increase or decrease them.
 - Focus on preserving positive relations with Russia and China, paying particular attention to how U.S. actions affect politics in those countries.
 - Recognize and respond to a perception in the Islamic world of conflict with the United States. Avoid “drive-by” cruise missile or bombing attacks. Be aware of the potential political costs of basing U.S. forces in the Middle East.

- Recognize the foreign perception of the United States as a global bully, and then shape foreign and military policy so as to minimize that perception.
 - Work more with allies and other nations on common problems and in military interventions, giving them substantial, and in some cases, leading roles.
 - Act to correct the foreign perception of hypocrisy on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, which arises out of U.S. maintenance of a vast nuclear arsenal of its own while striving to halt proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons elsewhere. Re-energize serious nuclear arms reduction efforts to help delegitimize proliferation.
- Conduct military operations in carefully selected humanitarian or peace enforcement cases even where the United States may not have a vital national interest. The United States can and should play a useful role in ameliorating the worst cases of violence, destruction, and abuse in civil wars, “failed states,” and similar situations.

Elements of a Military Strategy

- To replace the ongoing Cold War threat-based force structure model, use a tripartite model: a “threat-based” approach to force sizing and structure for certain military challenges; a “capabilities-based” approach for others; and an “industrial-based” approach for long-term challenges. For militarily-quantifiable challenges – nuclear war and conventional theater war – size the force according to the threat. For hard-to-quantify challenges – terrorism at home and abroad and smaller-scale contingencies such as peacekeeping – create a range of capabilities that enable flexible responses. For a potential future peer challenge, preserve robust industrial and technological capabilities.
- Make use of, and improve, allied military capabilities and conduct military operations multinationally.
- Make U.S. forces more “expeditionary.” Adjust forward deployment by reducing Cold War heavy, permanently-deployed forces and increasing short-term deployments, exercises, training, military-to-military contacts, and engagement with foreign militaries.
- Prepare to conduct the equivalent of one major theater war at a time along with smaller-scale contingencies, but prepare to use adjustable

- force packages so as to maintain flexibility and options.
- Transform some of the active heavy armored forces into forces more suited to smaller-scale contingencies. Prepare to work more with other nations and non-governmental or international organizations in such contingencies. Deal with chronic transnational problems such as drug trafficking, illegal migration, and crime by integrating operations better with U.S. civilian agencies whose primary missions and core competencies are in these areas. Preserve a heavy capability primarily in the reserves.
 - Boost the human intelligence capabilities that improve knowledge and understanding of foreign cultures and governments.
 - Improve ability to conduct new asymmetric, maneuver, or third/fourth-generation warfare by creating agile and flexible forces. Reform personnel and promotion policies to better support agile and flexible leaders. Establish doctrine suitable for maneuver warfare and train with it. Strengthen joint capabilities by expanding the role of war-fighting commanders and the Joint Staff in planning, budgeting, and procurement.
 - Focus transformation and funding on agile forces such as: light- and medium-weight Army, Marine Corps, Special Operations; littoral Navy; lift, close air support, and interdiction Air Force; and defensive nuclear, biological, and chemical forces and equipment. Help fund the re-orientation with moderate reductions in the forces that are already overwhelmingly dominant in force-on-force combat such as: heavy active Army, open-ocean Navy, nuclear and air superiority Air Force, and offensive nuclear forces.
 - Fund cooperative destruction or safeguarding of Russian nuclear weapons and materials.
 - Maintain a long-term ability to respond to the potential emergence of a superpower challenge by preserving a robust defense industrial base. Restore competition to the industry. Continue research and development on complex weapons, but favor prototyping over large production runs. Where possible, upgrade existing weapon platforms with new software, avionics, electronics, and other subsystems rather than produce entirely new platforms.

Two elements of the strategy deserve special discussion – the proposed role of partners and allies, and forward engagement.

Allies – Can't Live With Them Can't Live Without Them*A Prescription for Greater Allied Cooperation*

A pivotal component of the strategy proposed here is to join more with partners and allies in concerted military, political, and economic action. For this to happen in the military sphere, allies will have to improve their military capabilities and be more politically ready to intervene than they were in the second half of the 20th century. (And the United States will have to alter its equipment and doctrine to allow for greater interoperability with allies.) One of the key assumptions (p. 19) underlying the strategy is *that the conditions exist* that would allow allies to increase their military capabilities and political will to take action. Whether or not it *will* happen is a more open question.

Regardless of today's forecasts on allies, this report's call for allies and the United States to develop the military capabilities and political will to conduct joint operations more effectively is not *descriptive* of the future as it looks now, it is *prescriptive*. The proposal is that the United States embrace a new strategy featuring increased allied and coalition cooperation. With such a re-orientation, and hence strong U.S. encouragement for, and participation in, military transformation among allies and at home, it becomes more imaginable that allies and partners will undertake substantially greater responsibilities. The challenges will be great, the task is ambitious, and it may take the entire quarter century covered by this report, but that is why a high level of focus and attention is proposed here for U.S. strategy in this key area.

Increased cooperation does not always mean the commitment of U.S. troops. In many cases it will be desirable for the United States *not* to jointly conduct military operations with other nations, but to help improve partners' capabilities so that they can act by themselves. The potential for other nations to act or intervene in their own regions so that the United States does not have to is still insufficiently tapped. A problem with several recent multinational or U.N. interventions is that the military forces have not been adequately prepared for the task and procedures for operating jointly have not been smooth.

If, for whatever reasons, allies or partners are politically, financially, or militarily unable or unwilling to play a greater role, then the approach taken here would have to be substantially revised.

One premise that the United States should avoid with respect to its allies and friends is "exceptionalism," which implies a right to lead. Leadership is a

status that must be earned and re-earned; it cannot come solely from military preponderance or stationing the most troops in a region. No nation, especially one that eschews military conquest, can retain its leadership unless it engages the rest of the world across the spectrum of diplomatic, economic, and environmental activities. In this regard, U.S. positions of the last few years – rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the Senate, opposition to creation of an International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), disavowal of the Kyoto Agreement on the environment, opposition to a proposed convention regulating the international small arms trade – suggest a growing disposition for the United States to disengage from efforts by nations collectively to create a more stable and predictable world in which the rule of law prevails. As the most powerful nation in the world, the United States may well lay claim to a leadership role, but unless others are willing to follow consistently, such “leadership” ends up an aggregate of one.

Forward Engagement and Forward Deployment

Adjusting Forward Deployment to Serve Forward Engagement

Stationing U.S. forces permanently in foreign areas serves the goals of providing opportunities for peacetime military engagement with other nations, of demonstrating a willingness to fight for them, and of providing additional options for deploying forces to conflicts. Among other benefits, military engagement provides valuable interaction, training, and relationship-building with potential partners; indicates U.S. willingness to be involved in a region (including to fight there); and provides an additional channel of access to leaders.

The strategy proposed in this report strongly endorses U.S. military engagement with other like-minded nations. The multilateral approach to deterring and responding to conflicts proposed here greatly benefits from prior training with, exposure to, and contacts in other militaries. This approach rejects isolationism and recognizes that an important component of U.S. engagement with the world is military engagement, alongside political, economic, and social interaction. Some level of military deployment provides an irreplaceable signal of U.S. interest in a region, partnership with it, and willingness to expend resources and even blood in support of it.

There are, however, some drawbacks to forward deployment of large, permanent forces, so the nature and size of today’s forward deployment may

need adjustment. Being there “first with the most” firepower is a valid option, but it can have diplomatic and political costs as well as economic ones. In some countries, particularly in Asia, residents of towns and communities near U.S. bases are pressing their national governments to cut back on military training activities if not the entire U.S. presence. Permanently stationed forces also can be tempting targets for terrorists; at the very least, forward stationing requires additional force protection measures.⁹

More broadly, a heavy military presence can feed the negative perception of the United States as a global policeman or worse, a global bully, building up popular resentment and opposition to the United States and its policies. The issue is particularly salient in the Middle East where it is easy to inflame opinion against the United States and to add to the perception of a U.S. conflict with Islam.

Can engagement, which this paper fully supports, be accomplished through modified deployment and other, more cost-effective means that minimize the political and social problems and allow better use of available funds? Forward deployment can take many shapes and forms. It is possible that the benefits of engagement can be gained with a less heavy footprint.

The strategy of this paper suggests phasing out the permanent deployment of much of the remaining large, heavy ground forces in Europe, Japan, and possibly Korea depending on events, and being ready to adjust other deployments that have outlived their usefulness. It does not call for a withdrawal of all forces from foreign countries nor for a termination of military engagement, exercises, training, and cooperation with other nations. And it does not propose closing access to bases in foreign countries. Rather it calls for beefing up facilities where necessary to improve U.S. ability to deploy forces. If it becomes necessary to redeploy large permanent forces in the future, these facilities could again serve as the infrastructure foundation for a long-term presence. Regional U.S. commanders in chief (CINCs) have appropriately suggested that the theoretical commitment in national security strategy to military engagement and “Shaping” has not been matched by a corresponding commitment of resources. This report endorses the suggestion that the full potential for engagement can only be realized with better strategic planning and funding to support it.

This paper takes the view that short-term, rotational deployments, plus increased military-to-military contacts and training, can serve many of the

same goals as large permanent forces in an extensive base infrastructure, and that irregular, as opposed to rote, exercises can establish effective military-to-military relationships. It holds that a more flexible and agile form of forward deployment can reduce the political and other costs of the old version.

Precipitous withdrawal is neither called for nor being called for by allies – yet. Any contemplated reductions should be coordinated with allies before actions are initiated, and usually phased withdrawals – unless other demands are made by host nations – should be the rule. Bringing selected forces back to the United States, coupled with regular combined force exercises and aperiodic deployments of military units, will allow the United States to more centrally position forces to respond to emerging contingencies without being seen as isolationist.

An alternative view is that adjusting forward deployment and pulling back some forces would send the wrong signals about U.S. involvement in a region, would reduce U.S. influence and leadership, and would excessively limit deployment options. This view holds that rotational deployments cannot be equivalent to permanent deployments, and that smart enemies will find “anti-access” means to prevent deployment and keep the United States out, to the extent that it is not there already. It also suggests that more and more countries will want U.S. forces to be stationed there, as a signal that the United States intends to defend them.

Although this report does not propose ending forward engagement and deployment, rather adjusting it, the study’s willingness to reduce permanent forward deployment can be traced to a greater sensitivity to the potential for negative second- and third-order effects of military policies in the broader national security arena – particularly on global perceptions of the United States as a hegemon, which may affect willingness to act in concert with the United States in a multitude of fora. This must be balanced with positive perceptions of the United States as a stabilizing force, but the report assesses a dangerous potential for popular anti-U.S. feelings, catalyzed by a large and high-profile presence, to explode in damaging ways.

This assessment is concerned that enthusiasm in governments of foreign nations for major U.S. deployments and implied defense commitment may not be as widely shared by their people. The lack of consensus on the threats to the interests of the United States and its allies, together with growing awareness of indigenous populations to pollution, crimes, and costs associated with

the American presence, suggests that the welcome for U.S. forces will be uncertain in the years ahead. In addition, this strategy suggests that while engagement is valuable, the United States must be careful about implied defense commitments and not signal a willingness to conduct a war where the nation is really not willing to do so, nor overcommit to too many contingencies in too many places.

Being There or Being Able to Get There

Some also argue that large forward deployments of heavy forces improves ability to intervene in a region. Being deployed already might seem the ultimate way to reduce deployment delays (the space-time interval) to zero. But forces permanently deployed forward seem rarely to be in the right place to counter a rapidly emerging conflict or, after lengthy bed-down, be agile enough to respond quickly.

The issue of “deployed” versus “deployable” recently came up concretely in the debate between the director of the strategy panel for Secretary Rumsfeld’s defense review, Andrew Marshall, and the CINC of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Dennis Blair. Marshall reportedly has argued that forward deployed forces in Asia may be increasingly vulnerable, particularly to Chinese ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and other forces. Hence long-range weapons and forces should substitute to some extent for the forward deployed forces.¹⁰ Adm. Blair denies that China has a robust ability to attack or scare off forward deployed U.S. forces, and puts more value on the relationships facilitated by forward basing and deployment.¹¹

The disagreement over vulnerability may be explained in part by the time frame – Marshall may be looking far ahead, as he is known to do. Still, the strategy advocated in this study attempts to use elements of each approach, since it both encourages working with friends or potential friends in a region and favors moderate reductions in permanent forward-basing. Basing forces in the United States can provide strategic flexibility, lower political costs in host nations, and, whether the level of exposure is potentially crippling or not, reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks in case of a war. “Being able to get there” as opposed to “being there” also introduces an added opportunity to reflect before committing forces or firing shots. It also allows time for consultation with allies and friendly nations whose interests parallel those of the United States and whose participation would add international legitimacy to

any contemplated military action. But this study acknowledges Adm. Blair's assessment of the benefits, for alliance building and positive relations with China and other countries, of military engagement with countries in the region, and certainly does not endorse the concept of winning primarily through long-range air power or other stand-off high-tech weaponry.

An option that needs serious consideration, given the changed post-Cold War world, is whether more forces ought to be centrally stationed so they can swing east or west as necessary. In response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and threat to Saudi Arabia, troops were taken from Europe, but the bulk came from the United States. After the fighting ended, a corps headquarters and two divisions were withdrawn from Europe (a similar sized force remained). The Army found it very difficult to deploy heavy forces to the Balkans from Europe for the Kosovo campaign against forces of the former Yugoslavia and ultimately the Army forces were not used in combat. Forward deployment might be judged as not providing any benefit in the latter case.

Increasing U.S. Capability to Deploy Forces

Credible, deployable forces can deter a potential adversary from initiating conflict. Naval forces have an inherent credibility as they are always armed. Credibility in terms of ground and air forces includes at least four elements: a well-trained, balanced combat force in-being; a responsive combination of rapid sea and air transport that can move or accompany the combat force; adequate resources to sustain the force (personnel, supplies and equipment, intelligence, transport); and the understanding that the United States, with allies or ad hoc coalitions whenever possible, is willing to act. In some cases, smaller sized units can provide a similar deterrent as larger units to would-be aggressors – the leaders are deterred by the presence of U.S. forces, rather than by the specific size of the units in question.

Naval vessels carry their combat load with them. The reach of modern aircraft permits round-trip flights from and back to the continental United States if necessary, although *en route* (and in-theater or even in-country) access is desirable. The reorganization of armored land forces into lighter-weight, more agile units with less oversized equipment lessens the strain on air transport engaged in deploying units to and sustaining them in the area of potential combat.¹²

Keyed by intelligence, air forces originating from the United States and transiting naval groups can contribute responses to unfolding events. With adequate fast sea- and airlift, ground forces centrally stationed in the United States can be deployed to reinforce the capabilities of the other services to preclude a “one-dimensional” response such as that in Kosovo.

If U.S. forces are to increase their deployment capabilities from the United States, an issue that will need much more examination is the possibility of “anti-access” attacks within the United States to prevent or hinder deployment, such as sabotage of rail lines serving military bases. An analysis of the level of vulnerability and threat is beyond the scope of this paper, but the strategy acknowledges that, as part of an effort to increase and improve U.S. deployment capabilities, domestic anti-access attacks will have to be addressed.

A Tripartite Approach to 21st Century Military Force Structure

The changed world presents the opportunity of re-examining and reformulating U.S. strategy. In the view of this study, the nature and extent of actual and probable threats in themselves are insufficient to justify the current force size, force structure, and budget. A possible alternative is to more selectively target threat-based and capabilities-based responses against actual or probable threats in the near and medium time frame, and to orient the long-term response to the continued evolution of the defense industrial base.

Military challenges in the 21st century can be grouped into five areas: nuclear war, major conventional theater war, terrorism at home and abroad, smaller-scale contingencies ranging from peacekeeping to non-combatant evacuation and humanitarian relief support, and a new peer challenge. The first two are prominent legacies of the Cold War that largely are quantifiable. The third and fourth are much less predictable, demanding different responses and different intensity of response. The fifth at this stage is unpredictable but considered inevitable by many analysts. In addition, in the course of responding to these challenges, particularly in smaller-scale contingencies, the military will be faced with transnational issues that are not clearly military challenges, such as the drug trade, crime, immigration, and environmental conflicts.

The proposed alternative to solely relying on either a threat-based or capabilities-based approach is to use each selectively depending on the type of threat and warfare in question.

- For militarily-quantifiable challenges – nuclear and conventional theater war – use a “threat-based” approach to force structure and size the force according to the threat.
- For hard-to-quantify challenges – terrorism at home and abroad and smaller-scale contingencies such as peacekeeping – use a “capabilities-based” approach and create a range of force capabilities that enable flexible responses.
- For a potential future peer challenge, preserve robust industrial and technological capabilities.

Strategies for Military Challenges

Threat-Based Responses for Nuclear War

Without question, the most dire threat to the survival of the United States and its way of life remains nuclear war, particularly with a weakened and chaotic Russia. In the near term, however, the threat of deliberate nuclear war, as opposed to an accident, is not very high.

The various strategic arms control agreements negotiated over the course of the Cold War cut the strategic arsenals of each superpower to approximately 6,000 warheads. Stricter limits are in place in the still unratified START II agreement to bring warheads down to 3,000-3,500 each and eliminate Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs).¹³ Even lower totals have been proposed for START III (2,000-2,500 warheads) and the Russians have proposed going down to as few as 1,000 strategic warheads.

Equally challenging are questions surrounding the nuclear posture – whether any of the force should be on hair-trigger alert, and the distribution of warheads among bombers, land-based missiles, and submarines. But whatever the size and complexion of nuclear arsenals, the threat level is calculable. Therefore, a threat-based response is an appropriate approach for devising a future U.S. nuclear strategy, and force structure.

A key strategy to reduce the threat of nuclear war would be to continue and expand U.S. funding of Russian nuclear weapon and nuclear material destruction, disposal, and safeguarding. Funds spent on such programs have a more direct effect on reducing numbers of potentially opposing nuclear weapons, and hence nuclear weapon threats, than funds put into either U.S. offensive nuclear weapons-building or missile defenses.

Threat-Based Responses for Major Conventional Theater War

The threat of a major conventional war is also quantifiable to a great degree by the straightforward process of counting people, equipment, and stocks of materiel held by allies and friends and by potential opponents. Therefore, a threat-based strategy is an applicable response.

It is important when defining the threat that the quantitative measure of counting “enemy” military assets is complemented by a qualitative overlay that factors into the equation morale, training, interoperability, and the level of technology in equipment. At the same time, this assessment must be careful to avoid the danger that the qualitative factors are accorded too much weight.

A key national security strategy to improve U.S. preparation for MTWs is better alliance building and utilization of allied capabilities. These need not be formal alliances – flexible “coalitions of the willing” and other informal partnerships are just as useful. This strategy would have diplomatic and economic applications (building coalitions, deterring aggressors, and establishing well-supported sanctions regimes), as well as military (making full use of allied military capabilities).

The military side of a strategy of utilizing allies should be enhanced. On the Korean peninsula, for example, the United States still plans to use a large force to defend the South. A Korean war is one of the pillars of the current two MTW force structure. Yet booming South Korea has an economy many times the size and quality of the North, which has had difficulty even feeding its people, and the South has twice the population. Clearly, a willingness to utilize allied South Korean capabilities more fully would permit a reduction in demands on U.S. forces. If the strategy of attracting friends to one’s side were pursued fully, it would even be possible to imagine bringing in the forces of other nations to assist in deterring an attack on South Korea.

A strategy emphasizing flexibility – the ability to be unpredictable, keep options open, and pursue lines of least resistance – suggests the current adherence to fixed MTW-fighting forces should be replaced with plans to use a variety of different force sizes and compositions in an MTW. This would provide some hedge in case of a second simultaneous MTW, since a second opponent could not be sure that a whole “MTW force” would be tied up in the first MTW. More flexible packages would also provide less telegraphing of U.S. plans to opponents, and would increase options for using forces in smaller-scale contingencies.

In addition to being more strategically mobile, forces should be made more operationally and tactically mobile for MTW-type combat. Rather than relying as much on mass for combat power, advances in information/communications technology and in stand-off weapon effectiveness should allow U.S. forces to be more mobile, more dispersed, smaller, more lethal, and faster. Testing and evaluation will need to be expanded and improved within the services and the Department of Defense to ensure that, to the extent this redesign relies on complex technology, the hardware actually works and performs the role desired.

Capabilities-Based Responses for Smaller-Scale Contingencies

Complementing the forces offsetting the quantifiable threats are forces that would constitute the U.S. reaction/preventive forces for smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). As it is difficult to predict the threat that will arise in such contingencies, a capabilities-based response is the best strategic approach.

This study takes the approach that United States does have an interest in intervening in largely – but certainly not solely – humanitarian SSCs in situations such as civil wars, “failed states,” genocide, massacres, and ethnic violence. This does not mean that the United States should intervene in *every* situation, only in carefully selected and weighed cases.

Some generic “capabilities” that the United States might want include:

- Halt the outbreak of civil violence in a foreign country early on.
- In combination with allies, establish civil security in a conflict-torn country.
- In combination with allies, end an outbreak of genocide, halt ethnic cleansing, or establish peace.

Examples of military capabilities to achieve such aims include:

- Deploy an airborne battalion within one day and a brigade within two days to halt an outbreak of civil violence.
- Deploy a light division equivalent within four days to enforce peace in a semi-hostile situation as part of a multinational force, and support transportation of allied forces.
- Deploy a medium division equivalent in five days in a hostile forced-entry environment to halt a civil war, followed by two more U.S. divisions and substantial allied forces.

The chief national security strategy to handle SSCs would do more to prevent them in the first place through economic development, promoting democracy, and conducting institution-building in pre-conflict situations. When prevention fails and an SSC is undertaken, more needs to be done in making the case for the operation to the U.S. public. If the case for an intervention has not been made and accepted by the public, successful conclusion of an SSC is also likely to be questionable if terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland occur. The solution is to make the case to the public for an intervention early on.

The large number and variety of these smaller operations call for a new focus on these operations as primary missions for the military in their own right, and suggest reshaping a portion of the force away from intense force-on-force combat and towards these more complex expeditionary missions. The experience of units in SSC interventions suggests that creating separate quasi-military units may not be the best course. The very unpredictability of SSCs argue for forces that are trained to operate across most of the spectrum of conflict. The Marine Corps' "three-block war" unit training regimen that includes scenarios for mid-intensity war-fighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian relief support seems to be appropriate for the majority of situations that U.S. ground forces actually will face in the foreseeable future.

There is substantial untapped potential for improved collaboration with allied or friendly forces in SSC operations. Operating more equally with coalition forces not only can reduce resentment abroad of the United States as a sole global policeman, but also could improve popular support for such operations domestically. The Defense Department has worked hard to make the services "joint," in terms of common – or at least compatible – communications, headquarters, equipment, and doctrine.¹⁴ A parallel opportunity may exist for integration of allied forces in SSCs along the lines of what the Defense Department has done for the U.S. services – expanding the concept of "jointness" to include foreign military services, too.

The definition of "Joint and Combined Forces" may also usefully be broadened to include civilian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as relief agencies, and non-military Other Government Agencies (OGAs), including international organizations. These groups often have been operating in an area before intervention forces arrive, and can provide essential understanding of the situation and culture where they are located. Moreover, intel-

ligence capabilities for SSCs need to focus as much on understanding the society and politics of an area as on targeting hostile weapons.

A growing concern for the Pentagon is force protection and managing operational risks. This concern extends to both permanent forward garrisons and to forces – land, sea, and air – deployed for exercises or specific missions that fall short of “war.” It is an issue because of the perceived need to detail forces for force protection missions – thus increasing the number of troops needed for each deployment. Some also believe that the emphasis on force protection plays a role in decisions on where, when, and to what extent U.S. forces will be engaged in world hot spots.¹⁵ Force protection has played a considerable role in *how* U.S. forces engage – shaping operational decision-making to the extent that some officers have decried its influence. As one general recently noted, “You don’t deploy somewhere to protect yourself. If you want to do that you stay in Kansas. You deploy somewhere to accomplish a mission.”¹⁶

Obviously, such risks can be avoided by complete withdrawal into a fortress America. Just as obviously, this is no solution at all for a nation with broad interests and allies in the world.

Capabilities-Based Responses for Terrorism and Homeland Defense

That there will be future terrorism attempts on U.S. soil is agreed by many observers, but when and exactly where are unpredictable. However likely or unlikely a terrorist attack, it is not clear that the military component of national security is well equipped to do much about it. National missile defense is the foremost military option, but it has never been satisfactorily explained why an opponent would choose the expensive, technically difficult, and suicidal method of delivering a weapon of mass destruction via missile rather than via truck, boat, or plane. Some scenarios in which it would be useful to have a working missile defense can always be described, but the program becomes a matter of priorities. The strategy proposed here puts other military needs – not least of which is fully funding personnel, training, and spare parts to ensure that today’s forces are fully ready – at a higher priority than a missile defense system of high cost, of unknowable reliability in actual use, and that will likely be politically costly in relations with allies and with Russia and China.

Essentially, the active duty military’s role is in intelligence and logistical support to local authorities after an incident of physical terrorism. National Guard units have been designated to form rapid response assistance teams to

help local “first responders”; however, the formation of these special units is behind schedule and training has been insufficient. The “other” terrorism – cyberterrorism – again largely falls outside DoD’s responsibilities except for the protection of its own systems. The lead coordinating agency for anti-cyberterrorism is the Department of Justice.

National security strategy should focus on three approaches to attempt to mitigate the incentive and desire for attacks on the United States. The first is to recognize and then shape foreign and military policy so as to minimize the foreign perception of the United States as a global hegemon. This involves working more with allies and other nations both in leading the world and in specific interventions.

Second, the United States should recognize and respond to a perception of conflict with Islam and Islamic peoples. America does not need to be in a “clash of civilizations” with the Muslim world. U.S. foreign policy should undertake an initiative to explore how to reduce tensions and avoid needless friction that contribute to a perception of inherent conflict.

Third, the United States should recognize and correct the perception that it is hypocritical on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is relevant to biological, chemical, and radiological terrorist weapons because these can be seen as “poor man’s bombs.” Conducting serious nuclear arms reduction efforts again would help delegitimize nuclear and other proliferation.

Industrial-Based Responses for a Peer Challenge

Virtually all forecasts out to 2020-2025 hedge on the possibility of the rise of a peer or near-peer.

The military strategy to handle a peer challenge if one does arise would preserve the U.S. economic and technological strength that backstops military hardware dominance. The key to remaining technologically dominant lies in preserving cutting-edge research in basic and applied science and technology. On the other hand, the military must recognize where the commercial sector is in the lead, particularly in computing power and the use of highly complex simulations. Advances in these fields enable much design work and virtual testing to be performed without actually producing pieces of equipment.

Maintaining a design-prototype-limited production/testing-cycle would require the Pentagon to spend more on research and development, but the

costs incurred would be offset by cuts in procurement made possible by not having to recapitalize the entire force. Production lines for existing aircraft, ships, and tanks, still the world's best, could be updated to produce the very latest iterations of proven systems such as the F-16 Block 60.

Joint Agency-Based Responses for Transnational Challenges

Transnational problems such as international drug trafficking, illegal migration, crime, environmental conflict or damage, access to water, and health are often tied together in conflict zones. For example, drugs, crime, the environment, and economic issues are deeply intertwined in the conflict in Colombia. If U.S. forces are present in such conflict zones, it is likely they will be exposed to these issues and may have to deal with them. The approach suggested here is that procedures be improved for military units to collaborate more with the civilian agencies who focus on these issues. Current *ad hoc* arrangements can be made more effective if a high-level effort is undertaken to assess how military, non-military, international (and non-government) organizations can best work together to address these complex issues.

IV. A Responsive, Balanced Force

FORCE STRUCTURE PRIORITIES

In recent years, defense strategy debates have often degenerated into arguments over which new weapons are needed most. This has been encouraged by the popularity of the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) concept in defense circles. The RMA view holds that unprecedented change in the capabilities of high-tech hardware, computers, and electronics can change the nature of warfare itself – that the United States can develop a slate of new hardware able to see, identify, and destroy all the opposing vehicles, vessels, missiles, and aircraft it needs to, anywhere on the battlefield, often from long distances.

As noted earlier, the Pentagon’s direction has been changing in doctrine along RMA lines, but much more slowly in terms of overall strategy. In doctrine, the Air Force has been emphasizing long-range strike capabilities. And while it has long used the term aerospace, the interrelationship between air power and space power has been receiving increased emphasis,¹⁷ spurred in part by missile defense testing and the January 2001 report of the congressionally-created Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, chaired, until December 2000, by now Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. The Navy emphasizes its role in fighting along and controlling the littoral areas (as opposed to deep water ocean areas) and supporting the Marine Corps who envision striking much deeper inland than in the past. For its part, the Army is trying to reshape its force structure, in part for faster deployability, to give substance to its long-standing contention that it is truly a strategic force.

Media reports concerning the “Rumsfeld review” and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review point to a drive by the Bush administration to push the Pentagon faster into “transformation.” This is reflected in the intense effort to move more fully into space: protecting U.S. assets while being able to deny others the use of their space capabilities and developing missile defense against long-range threats.

The RMA model of war is most relevant to high-tech global war and to major theater wars. It is not very useful for smaller-scale contingencies such as complex peacekeeping interventions where the opponents may not have many vehicles at which to shoot, where it may not even be clear who the opponents are, and where an adversary is likely to fight back with asymmetric warfare.

In accordance with its emphasis on improving preparations for smaller-scale contingencies, the strategy and forces proposed here focus on elements – people and doctrine – most relevant to the numerous messy conflicts that will be fought by humans rather than machines. The discussion does not delve extensively into the merits of the various new high-tech weapons and equipment that are the focus of much attention in the defense establishment and reportedly in Secretary Rumsfeld’s defense review, such as satellite and space hardware, communications gear, unmanned aerial vehicles, and precision-guided munitions. This strategy emphasizes that the United States already has overwhelmingly dominant military capabilities on the battlefields of the major theater wars for which the new hardware is most relevant. (The United States may not be “dominant” in missile wars in the short- or medium-term future. For reasons discussed previously (p.37), this strategy does not prioritize national missile defense.) The strategy also assesses that warning time is such that the United States can keep its technological lead with a moderate effort until a new hostile superpower appears on the horizon. It prioritizes new efforts on the conflicts where the United States certainly does not have overwhelming dominance – smaller-scale contingencies.

This is not to suggest that new technology has no role to play – research, development, and selected procurement should continue at a moderate pace – merely that people and doctrine issues need attention and resourcing more urgently. The following chart summarizes some of the higher priority areas proposed for this strategy and force structure.

PRIORITIES FOR THE FORCE

- *People*: fix personnel problems, adequately fund military readiness and “quality of life.”
- *Doctrine and training*: adequately fund training and refine doctrine for third- and fourth-generation warfare and for joint operations with other nations, civilian agencies, international bodies, and non-governmental organizations.
- *Hardware*: improve mobility with airlift, sealift, overseas facility infrastructure, and force transformation; develop equipment for interoperability with allies; prioritize development of human intelligence capabilities (and ability to process data into “understanding”) over new satellite or other technical data collection and communication systems.
- *Other national security tools*: adequately fund other components of national security, including the State Department, economic aid programs, and agencies that deal with transnational issues.

PEOPLE

This report emphasizes the importance of “people” over “units” and “hardware.” A force structure cannot be complete without attention to the people that make it up. The focus on people characterizes a school of military thought that reaches back 2,500 years to Sun Tzu.¹⁸ More recently, John Boyd expanded the discussion. In his extensive strategic analyses, Boyd considered military *forces*, that is, combinations of people, ideas, and hardware. In this scheme, “people” includes all the normal personnel issues of selection, retention, and promotion, as well as the various “moral” forces that hold units together during the stress of combat. “Ideas” include both doctrine and those concepts that are widely shared but are not written down.

Not that weapons are unimportant. But Boyd’s historical studies have shown that time and again, the smaller or less technologically advanced force could win, whereas there are relatively few instances in which technology or size

alone was able to overcome deficiencies in people or ideas. Thus Boyd would insist on “People, ideas, and hardware – *in that order!*”¹⁹

Throughout history, cohesion/trust is the one constant among successful, highly effective units. It has been called the “lubricant for friction” in military operations.²⁰ Cohesion works because it creates and in turn depends on

PERSONNEL REFORMS

- Pass a new Defense Officer Personnel Management Act.
 - Replace the “up-or-out” promotion system with an “up-or-stay” system.
 - Reduce the size of the officer corps in the land forces to 5 percent over 10 years.
 - Replace the “all or nothing” retirement system with a “Vest at 10, Collect at 55” approach.
- Design the land forces structure around a regimental system (for cohesion). Replace the individual personnel system with a unit personnel system. Revolve personnel policies around a unit system, and move to an Army force structure that can be supported by a unit replacement system.
 - Flatten the force structure, eliminating many headquarters above brigade.
 - Integrate reserve and active components into each regiment.
- Empower leaders to exercise more initiative without excessive fear of hurting their careers.
- Change the personnel management system.
 - Reform accessions and entry.
 - Revise the education system, where mid-level education is conducted earlier in an officer’s career, as well as moving to an education system that emphasizes the art of war, including the study of military history.
 - Decentralize management and promotion policies. Revise the officer evaluation system to involve a narrative officer evaluation report on character.

trust.²¹ The first item in any defense review should be to stop doing those things that erode cohesion and mutual trust. In his epochal study, *The Revolution in Human Affairs*,²² U.S. Army Maj. Donald Vandergriff describes specific changes that could be made (see chart on page 44).

The current dysfunctional military personnel policies have long roots in U.S. history and society. Although they may have been suitable to U.S. security challenges in the past, including the Cold War and preparations for global war against another superpower, they are no longer well adapted to the situation the nation faces in the early 21st century. The “maneuver warfare” required to win in third- and fourth-generation warfare, and the particularly difficult urban combat that is more likely in the future, will require an especially high degree of unit cohesion. Maneuver warfare has been characterized as:

*... high tempo war; fluid war that has no defined fronts or formations; decentralized armies where troops act on their own with high initiative as opposed to centralized command structures where troops ask permission and wait for orders; ... war where soldiers act on judgment not on rules; war without rules; war that seeks to penetrate the enemy rather than push opposing lines backwards and forwards; war waged by a cohesive team that is like a family or tribe with a common culture and common outlook.*²³

Transforming the personnel system in ways such as these so that it improves unit cohesion and promotes officers best able to conduct new, more complex and subtle operations will best prepare the military to meet the third- and fourth-generation warfare challenges of the 21st century. Having put personnel issues at the forefront of the proposed force structure, what forces – types and numbers of units and weaponry – might be the best tools for a force composed of such cohesive, bold, and innovative personnel?

FORCES FOR THE FUTURE

The following chart indicates directions for transformation for types of forces. **The “Current” column does not indicate that a type of unit or its capabilities listed there would be eliminated from the force, merely that some portion of the units would be transformed.** These capabilities continue to deter would-be aggressors. The suggestion is that the United States enjoys such “overmatch” in these areas, and the potential exists for increased allied effort,

PRIORITIES FOR FORCE TRANSFORMATION		
Strategic Principle or Threat Assessment	Current Strengths	Future Emphases
Low incidence of intense combat threat. Potential for increased use of allies. Improved mobility.	heavy ground forces	medium ground forces
Low open-ocean threat. Interventions likely close to coasts. Provides access without relying on bases.	blue-water sea forces	littoral sea forces
Focus on lower-intensity operations, peace-enforcement, humanitarian missions.	heavy ground forces	medium and light ground forces, special operations forces
Improved mobility. Trimmed forward deployment. Reduced nuclear threat from Russia.	nuclear bomber air forces	airlift air forces
Higher threat to ground troops than to U.S. air supremacy. Existing U.S. air superiority capabilities greatly overmatch others.	air superiority air forces	close air support and interdiction air forces
Increased warning time for “traditional conventional threat” after end of Cold War.	heavy active forces at states of very high readiness	reserve forces
Greater threat from use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. troops intervening overseas than from deliberate major nuclear attack against the United States.	offensive nuclear forces	defensive units against weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Threats more likely to be asymmetrical than high-tech. End of the arms race means full fielding of new weapons not required. Smaller force structure reduces numbers of weapons needed.	high-volume production of new high-end weapons	R&D of new high-end weapons
Absence of high-tech arms race. Advances in commercial electronics, software, etc. far faster than in military hardware (aircraft, vehicle, ship “platforms”). U.S. forces still have “overmatch” with potential opponents in symmetric war.	high-volume production of new high-end weapons	production of existing weapons, with upgrades
Improve joint capabilities.	services’ decision-making powers	Joint Staff & commanders in chief (CINCs) decision-making powers

that deterrence can continue with moderately lower levels of force in these strong suits and a slower pace of technology development. “Current” and “Future” are meant as a broad guide to forces and programs that would receive more, or less, *priority* in attention, transformation, and usually, funding.

The chart below presents the proposed alterations to the force structure of the four services. As noted earlier, these changes envision a corresponding change in war-fighting doctrine that moves away from the ponderous and logistics-heavy formations of the 20th century to a more mobile, agile, responsive force.

Another critical change required for these force structure changes is less inter-service parochialism and more true jointness in thinking, planning, and executing missions, whether forward presence or contingency response.

The force proposed below maintains a U.S. capability to conduct the full spectrum of military operations.

- It maintains a substantial capability at the low end of the spectrum with ground forces and Special Operations Forces able to conduct a range of missions, starting with peacetime training and presence through deterring or preventing terrorist **attacks on the homeland** with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
- Somewhat heavier forces, including the mix of ground, air, and sea capabilities in the Marine Corps, would cover **smaller-scale contingencies**.
- Smaller but still very powerful medium-weight forces for **major theater wars** would remain, and a robust heavy capability would be maintained in a “strategic reserve” comprised of forces in the active and reserve components. These forces would preserve combat skills in case of possible **future peer challenges**.
- The proposed force would maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter a **nuclear war** in the invulnerable sea-based leg of the nuclear triad, in combination with renewed efforts to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons around the world.

The proposed reduction in ground forces in the Army is based not on a preference for airpower as the chief tool of intervention – there is often no substitute for “boots on the ground” – but primarily on an assessment of reduced need for heavy force-on-force units. (Note the proposed force preserves most of the Marine Corps’ extensive ground forces, and also calls for reduction

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE				
		Existing Force (end of Fiscal Year 2001)	Proposed Change	Proposed Force
ARMY	Active Corps	4	-1	3
	Divisions (Active)	10	-3	7
	active heavy divisions*	6	-2	4
	active light divisions*	4	-1	3
	Active Armored Cavalry Regiments	2	-2	0
	Attack Aviation brigades	14	-4	10
	National Guard Divisions			
	heavy	5	-3	2
	light	1	-1	0
	support	2	-2	0
	Enhanced Separate Brigades(National Guard)	15	-7	8
	heavy	8	-0	8
	light	7	-7	0
	Separate Brigades (National Guard)	3	-0	3
NAVY	Aircraft Carriers	12	-3	9
	Air Wings (Active/Reserve)	10/1	-3/-0	7/1
	Amphibious Ready Groups	12	-2	10
	Attack Submarines	55	-6	49
	Surface Combatants (Active/Reserve)	108/8	-9/-0	99/8
AIR FORCE	Active Fighter Wings	12.6	-3.6	9
	Reserve Component Fighter Wings	7+	-0	7+
	Reserve Component Air Defense Squadrons	4 [0.8 wings]	-4	0
	Bombers (Total Inventory)	208 † (94 B-52, 93 B-1, 21 B-2)	-12 B-52	196
MARINE CORPS	Marine Expeditionary Forces	3	-0	3
	Divisions (Active/Reserve)	3/1	-0	3/1
	Air Wings (Active/Reserve)	3/1	-0	3/1
NUCLEAR	Land-based ICBMs	550	-550	0
	Ballistic Missiles Submarines/ Sub-launched Missiles	18/432	-8/-192	10/240
	Nuclear Bombers	97 †	-12 B-52††	0††
* These active divisions (except for the airborne / air assault) would eventually convert to medium-weight.				
† The 208 heavy bomber figure includes the 97 nuclear bombers.				
†† 12 nuclear B-52 dropped, all others converted to conventional role.				

in air forces.) The proposed force does not abandon ground force engagement or intervention in favor of long-range bombing or cruise missile attacks.

The stress and strain on the force in executing today's missions and deployments is not uniform across types of units, but is concentrated on certain types of forces, such as reserve units that are called on to repeatedly deploy to peacekeeping operations. This force proposal addresses readiness problems in part by reducing and transforming heavy units, which consume resources that could be used for training, parts, fuel, and other components of readiness in more frequently-used units.

The strategy focuses on flexibility and joint international action, so the proposed force is deliberately not described as being able to fight X number of major theater wars and Y number of smaller-scale contingencies by itself. The point is to create flexible force packages according to circumstances, such that with the proposed increase in allied capabilities, a U.S. and multilateral force could conduct and win several engagements and deployments at once. If necessary, with increased mobility, forces could be redeployed from lower-priority contingencies to higher-priority conflicts.

Forward engagement would be continued but specific forward deployments would be modified as follows. (For discussion of regional issues, see the full report.) As the European Rapid Reaction Force takes shape, the United States should reduce its permanently stationed heavy forces but maintain its participation in ongoing peace maintenance operations and be ready to contribute to similar operations under NATO.

In Asia, the proposal would continue military exercises with all regional allies, emphasize more multilateral exercises and initiatives, employ rotational presence and periodic visits in anticipation of a reduction in forward permanent presence of U.S. troops, and maintain support infrastructure as needed (e.g., new pier at Singapore, which like the one at Port Klang, Malaysia, is able to accommodate an aircraft carrier).²⁴ With the concurrence of Seoul, initially reduce land forces to one mechanized brigade and preposition equipment for two more mechanized brigades. Depending on the pace and nature of reconciliation, reductions of the North Korean military, and increased South Korean capabilities, be prepared to withdraw the remaining brigade from South Korea in five years. In Japan, after the end of the current Status of Forces Agreement, reduce U.S. presence to supply, maintenance, and infrastructure activities that would allow rapid resumption of home porting for an aircraft

carrier. On Okinawa: maintain forward supplies, equipment, and infrastructure for a major forward staging base, phase out land forces back to Guam and Hawaii. In the Philippines, investigate emerging opportunity to redevelop a major maintenance, service, and supply base at Subic Bay.

Specific rationales for some of the force proposals follow.

The strategy envisions eventually pulling the remaining two divisions out of Europe and dropping them from the force because of the disappearance of the heavy force-on-force threat in Europe. It also assumes future improvement in the capabilities of NATO allies. When the heavy divisions are gone, the corps headquarters and associated units that support the divisions can be dropped.

If the situation on the Korean peninsula continues to improve and South Korea takes on a greater role in its own defense, withdrawing the division from Korea can be pursued in consultation with the South Korean government.

The reduction of the light division comes from merging the capabilities of the airborne and air assault divisions. Parachute drops in higher-intensity combat scenarios on well-defended positions are far too vulnerable and casualties would likely be at unacceptable levels.²⁵ Airborne capability would not be eliminated, however. One brigade of airborne parachutists in the airborne division, plus the 173rd airborne brigade that will absorb the battalion that is part of the Southern European Task Force (SETAF), plus the parachute-capable Rangers, would be preserved. The airborne brigade would combine with the air assault (helicopter-mobile infantry and attack helicopters) to provide a flexible, mixed force.

The proposed force endorses the view that divisions are too large and inflexible for modern war. A new brigade-centered force would permit support units to be moved up to corps headquarters and allocated more flexibly in support of brigades.

Given the greater distances over which combat service and especially combat service support must be provided, it may well be necessary to move some support units back into the active force structure. However, with greater reliance on through-put to the maneuver units and a reduction in the need to move and stockpile large quantities of ammunition, fuel, and other supplies, an opportunity exists to restructure and redirect active force support units to correspond with the changes envisioned for the maneuver units.

The planned medium-weight Army divisions are designed to handle more reconnaissance themselves. The Armored Cavalry Regiments, which

include a heavy armored component with M-1 tanks, are not needed.

One Attack Aviation Brigade is attached to divisions and corps in Europe. The removal of the two divisions and corps from Europe allows dropping three aviation brigades. An additional brigade is dropped in accord with the other reductions to the heavy forces.

National Guard Divisions are not integrated into the major war-fighting plans, so several of the heavy divisions can safely be dropped. The force would retain two National Guard divisions and the eight heavy Enhanced Separate Brigades in a “strategic reserve.”

European allies are developing a more robust carrier capability. Britain plans two new mid-size carriers, France has one nuclear-powered carrier with an option on another, and Italy has a mid-size carrier under construction. (Italy also has a smaller carrier, as does Spain.)²⁶ Although not as capable as U.S. supercarriers, these carriers would be able to handle a variety of smaller-scale operations in the Mediterranean, which would allow dropping the current U.S. plans to always have a carrier operational there. The United States would therefore not always have the capability to act unilaterally, but an emphasis of this strategy is acting multilaterally and reducing divergence of interests with close allies so that the United States is forced to act alone as little as possible. With the rotation used by the Navy to keep one carrier on station, this means that a total of three carriers would no longer be needed. A reduction of three carrier battle groups enables a concordant reduction of three air wings, nine surface combatants (cruisers, destroyers), and six attack submarines.

European allies are also developing an improved amphibious operation capability. The British and Dutch have worked particularly closely in this area, and France, Italy, and Spain intend to increase their participation.²⁷ This would permit a reduction in the current requirement for one amphibious ready group, and with rotation a total of two. (A drop of three might be feasible but is not called for due to the general utility of these forces for likely contingencies.)

In accord with the reduction in divisions, the number of active fighter wings is cut from 12.6 equivalents to nine, with two removed from the force in Europe. All the reserve wings are preserved.

The 12 B-52s held ready for nuclear missions would be retired from the force.

The Marine Corps maintains combined arms forces including infantry, heavy armor, fixed-wing and helicopter attack aviation, transport helicopters, artillery, and the ships in the Navy to deploy, supply, and provide combat

support for them. These flexible capabilities, in combination with the advanced state of their doctrine and thinking about new forms of warfare, make them well-suited for smaller-scale contingencies.

Although the stereotypical across-the-beach Marine mission is less relevant today, no reductions in Marine divisions are called for because of their utility for the more prevalent smaller-scale contingencies.

As the most invulnerable leg of the nuclear triad, a force of ballistic missile submarines, albeit at lower levels than today's force, is all that is preserved of nuclear forces. Once the United States and Russia reach levels of nuclear weapons in the low hundreds, further reductions may be possible after bringing in the other major nuclear powers, Britain, France, and China.

WEAPONS

The following chart provides brief indications of which types of weapons and equipment would be most suited to the strategy and threat assessment suggested here.

Unfolding Technologies

Two technologies that are opening new dimensions are unmanned vehicles and space-based assets. While unattended sensors (of vehicles, ships, personnel) have been used for decades, unmanned vehicles are just now proliferating in terms of capabilities and endurance. Aerial unmanned vehicles that were developed initially for reconnaissance and surveillance are mutating into unmanned combat aerial vehicles. Ground and underwater unmanned vehicles are under development. Micro- and nano-technologies are being developed for dangerous missions such as searching rooms and whole buildings.

Space will continue to be used for a range of new sensors and communications purposes. This is one area in which the United States will endeavor to maintain and, if possible, extend its lead. This will become more and more challenging as other nations develop the ability to devise and launch (or have launched) their own satellites. In particular, the sharing of the available communications spectrum looms as a significant issue for the international community.

FACTORS FOR PRIORITIZING WEAPONS		
Equipment	Factors	Recommendation
<i>Light Armored Vehicle (LAV)</i>	Improves mobility. Suitable for lower intensity operations.	Continue planned Army purchase.
<i>Crusader</i> howitzer ²⁸	Overweight; not very strategically mobile. Less suitable for SSCs.	Cancel. Apply subsystem technology to existing platforms.
V-22 <i>Osprey</i> -like fixed+rotary wing aircraft ²⁹	Useful for special operations including long-range insertion/extraction/evacuation. Improves mobility.	Continue (if current technical problems can be solved, otherwise develop a new program or upgraded helicopter).
RAH-66 <i>Comanche</i> scout/attack helicopter	Threat to helicopters is not primarily the radar-guided weapons that <i>Comanche</i> is designed to elude. Lower-tech threats common in SSCs. Capability overlap with <i>Longbow Apache</i> .	Cancel. Upgrade <i>Apaches</i> .
C-5, C-17, commercial, or new airlifter	Improves strategic mobility.	Increase airlift purchases.
B-2 <i>Spirit</i> bombers	Improved ground, close air support, air interdiction, and transport capabilities would have higher priority than costly B-2s.	Do not restart production.
Communications and other equipment for better interoperability with allies and partners	Improves multinational operations capabilities.	Expand programs.
More numerous, smaller vessels	Improves littoral, SSC capabilities.	Expand programs.
Large new carrier (CVX); new destroyer (DD-21) ³⁰	CVX vulnerable in littoral SSC operations. DD-21 not fully transformational.	“Skip a generation.”
“Low-density, high-demand” aircraft and tanker aircraft	Frequent deployments are overtaxing existing suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and electronic warfare (EW) assets (e.g., EA-6B). Tanker fleet is aging.	Increase purchases of replacement platforms.

Equipment	Factors	Recommendation
<i>Virginia</i> -class New Attack Submarine (NSSN)	Open-ocean Russian threat is gone.	Continue research.
Existing weapon procurement (e.g. F-16, F/A-18C/D) and upgrades (e.g. electronics, avionics) to existing weapons ³¹	Procurement of existing/upgraded platforms would address the problem of aging aircraft and vehicle fleets.	Increase purchases to prevent an increased average age of the fleets.
F/A-18E/F <i>Super Hornet</i>	Marginal additional capabilities of E/F version over upgraded C/D version, for the cost.	Purchase upgraded C/D versions.
F-22 <i>Raptor</i> ³²	High threat in SSCs is not enemy air-to-air capabilities, permitting a smaller purchase.	Continue but reduce the purchase.
Joint Strike Fighter	Vertical/short takeoff version may improve tactical flexibility.	Continue research and development.
National Missile Defense	Ballistic missiles are least likely delivery device for weapons of mass destruction. Higher priority for NBC defensive equipment (e.g. improved soldier protective gear) and theater ballistic missile defense for troops in SSCs.	Continue research.
Existing & new nuclear weapons (e.g. <i>Trident II</i> ballistic missile)	Nuclear reductions help preserve good relations with Russia & China. Destruction & safeguarding of Russian nuclear weapons and materials higher priority than additional/new U.S. weapons.	Fund nuclear threat reduction in Russia.

STRUCTURE

The Joint Inter-Service Imperative

The last 50 years have seen huge changes in the technology for warfare but not much change in developing modern approaches to a very basic military question: “What should each service be able to do separately and in conjunction with other armed services, and within what time frame, to provide usable

combat power?” Answering this question for the forces of the 21st century should involve reviewing both the current allocation of responsibilities, and revisions and additions to roles, missions, and functions. New roles that need to be reviewed include redefining “homeland defense,” determining the uses of space, and defining in whose domain protection of cyberspace falls. Missions that might need to be revised include ensuring freedom of the seas and commerce thereon, assisting allies in resisting aggression or intimidation by “presence,” and evacuating Americans abroad who become caught in civil disturbances/wars. Functions to look at include close air support, deep strike, sustained land combat, air and space defense, and power projection.³³

The process for allocating and rationalizing roles, missions, and functions has to be centralized under strong leadership. It must also be developed in a manner that makes military advice from the field and Joint Staff paramount – as opposed to service parochialism. Four key guidelines should shape decisions over roles and missions:

1. The allocation should be considered an on-going process to preclude locking the services into a system of rigid and often mutually exclusive roles and functions.
2. Some duplication of capabilities and roles among the services is desirable, as is healthy competition to perform specific roles.
3. More important than establishing ahead of time which service should do what is making sure that different services, roles, and functions operate *jointly*.
4. The universe of possibilities is opened up greatly if the concept of “services” is broadened to include those of close allies.

If strategy is to adapt as the environment evolves, as called for by Sun Tzu and John Boyd, it should:

- Establish focus of main effort together with other efforts and pursue directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and threaten alternative objectives.
- Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit success).
- Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as a basis to sever the adversary’s moral ties and disorient him.³⁴

Hence, the important concept in allocating roles and missions is to make sure that forces offer variety, present a wide range of options to commanders, permit rapid shifts in focus when required, and operate in harmony with each other.³⁵

The Unified Command Plan

In undertaking to revisit service roles and missions, careful consideration ought to be given to the Unified Command Plan and the role that the regional CINCs play (or don't play) in setting requirements and defining capabilities for their theaters. Moreover, the increasing importance of efficient and effective joint war-fighting, with its need to integrate better the capabilities of the U.S. military services with each other and with allies, suggests the wisdom of further realignment of the allocation of geographical responsibilities of the five war-fighting CINCs. In short, the Joint Forces Command should be totally oriented toward joint training and multi-service matters, and its remaining geographical responsibilities (most of the North Atlantic) be divided between U.S. Southern Command and U.S. European Command. This would leave four geographically oriented joint commands – European, Pacific, Central, and Southern – and five functional unified commands – Transportation, Strategic, Space, Special Operations, and Joint Forces. The commander in chief of Joint Forces Command should also be designated a full member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), which oversees joint weapon development, so that his insights are reflected in JROC deliberations and decisions. The new missions the military faces also suggest that the role of the CINCs in joint planning should be strengthened in additional ways, as discussed at length in a background paper, *An Assessment of Joint Doctrine*.³⁶

The CINCs are clearly responsible for the performance of their assigned missions, and they are given all the necessary operational authority and control over forces assigned pursuant to those missions. Their ability to affect how those forces are trained and equipped is truncated, however, because the Joint Establishment (the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Joint Staff, the Operations Deputies of the JCS, the commanders and staffs at the Unified Commands, and the various Joint Staff and Operations Colleges) has little real authority to direct how funding for force generation will be allocated and spent. The process of “Planning, Programming, and Budgeting,” used by the Pentagon to develop its annual and six-year budget proposals, offers the CINCs

only one chance to affect the design and capabilities of the forces that will be assigned to them. This “once or never” process creates problems for force structure development, among other areas.³⁷

The services assign the forces that support the CINCs. The size of the total force is limited, and many service-component units are assigned to more than one CINC. As this support to a CINC must compete with other service objectives, there may not be an exact fit between the mission and the capabilities of the forces assigned. Programmatic and institutional loyalty may drive service decision-making as to force structure in a direction not supportive of joint objectives.

The needs of the war-fighters must dominate budgetary, procurement, and manpower discussions. Also, the Joint Establishment must be actively involved in designing, establishing, and helping manage alliances and other mechanisms for ensuring that the U.S. military can act surely and swiftly with allies and partners.

INDUSTRY

From the perspective of soldiers on the front lines and the taxpayer, the defense industry is not performing well.³⁸ Weapon systems are taking a human generation to develop. Each new weapon is doubling or tripling the cost of its predecessor, and many are beset by performance and reliability issues. It is difficult to change or stop programs once they get started, regardless of what has happened elsewhere in the world.

It is especially critical to improve the health, and performance, of the defense industry because it serves as a key hedge against the possibility of the emergence of a new military superpower challenge to the United States in the next 25 years. A robust, competitive defense industry – one that is able to rapidly adopt successful commercial technology where possible – will be the key underlying capability needed to respond to such a challenge.

It is important, when considering ways to improve the development and production of major weapon systems, to keep in mind that the strongest influences on the current system, that is, the factors that most account for the stability of the present military-industrial-congressional complex, are:

- Lack of market forces to spur innovation and control costs; and equally important,

- The fact that the United States funds major weapons programs as much on their political utility (via “power games”) as for their effectiveness on the battlefield.

In the commercial world, the marketplace appears to be the most effective mechanism for fostering evolution in the direction of better products and services for the consumer. In the defense sector, market forces are limited, but it may still be possible to inject them to a larger degree than is the case today, especially if the government establishes clear policies to do so.

BUDGET RAMIFICATIONS

The approach taken in this study was to develop a strategy and force proposal independent of budget considerations. The strategy proposed here suggests a smaller, albeit transformed, U.S. military force. As a result, after a period of transformation that would require additional funding, military spending would be somewhat lower than today. The report calls for additional funding in areas such as airlift, equipping the Navy with some smaller, more numerous vessels, and supporting Army transformation. Such programs would partially offset the reduced spending on a force with fewer units, personnel, and curtailed production of selected weapons and national missile defense.

This report has also suggested that non-military components of national security could use additional attention, so all of the funds would not necessarily be returned to the Treasury. Some of the freed resources could be transferred to other national security programs, such as economic assistance, if so desired.

Transformation from the current force structure to that proposed here – or any other transformed force, for that matter – would not be without cost. Significant short term expenditures would be involved. Yet the national security strategy and military force structure presented here would result in considerable savings in the long term.

Although a detailed budget analysis and breakdown is beyond the scope of this report, estimated savings, once a steady-state budget were achieved, would be a minimum of 15-20 percent below Fiscal Year 2001 levels, adjusted for inflation. Hence the estimated steady-state budget range for the proposed force is \$250-265 billion per year in Fiscal Year 2001 dollars.

Additional savings might be achieved through implementation of a broad range of initiatives not directly related to the proposed strategy or force struc-

ture, many of which are already under consideration by the Defense Department. Additional military base closures, greater privatization of non-combat functions, and adoption of a “just in time” logistical support system are examples of such initiatives.

V. Next Steps

This report has attempted to point the way towards new directions for military strategy, personnel, equipment, and organizations. It has raised a variety of salient issues but did not have the space to explore them at the length and detail they deserve. The strategy and force structure approach taken in this report suggests that the following topics are worthy of reports themselves.

- How can other U.S. government agencies and non-government organizations be better integrated into military interventions and operations? What modifications need to be made to the interagency process? Can U.S. military engagement produce even better results if it is undertaken with regular strategic forethought, planning, and funding rather than on an *ad hoc* basis as it is now?
- What are the concepts, thought processes, procedures, and hardware that will provide the United States with “decision superiority” – the ability to win by making strategic decisions in quicker and more veiled cycles than an opponent? How can extensive U.S. information gathering and production assist this process?
- Is jointness no longer adequately served by the current structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed primarily of service heads? How can joint structures, thinking, and processes move beyond integration of services and of components to integration of functions and effects?
- What will fourth-generation warfare really look like in the future and how can the U.S. military – and U.S. society – transform its vulnerability to fourth-generation threats into dominance? How can deploying

forces be protected from anti-access attacks on infrastructure *within* the United States? Can asymmetric threats be channeled and transformed into symmetric threats? How can intelligence operations and organizations be structured to keep abreast of ever-changing threats and opportunities in the future?

Many of these topics are beginning to be studied in greater depth, but much more needs to be done to assist and accelerate U.S. military transformation so that change is brought on not by disaster, but by forethought.

ENDNOTES

- 1 *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, William S. Cohen, secretary of defense, 2000, pp. 5-9.
- 2 *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, Department of Defense, May 1997, p. 1.
- 3 Maj. Gen. James Dubik, deputy commanding general for transformation, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, in "Army Transformation: Soldiering Outside the Box," *Army Magazine*, September 2000, p. 22.
- 4 Homeland defense, of growing concern in many circles, is not mentioned because the Pentagon's involvement would be largely in support of other federal agencies. However, it has a role in collecting information (outside the United States) on potential threats. Moreover, military planners must take into account the diversion of resources to support non-military agencies in the event of an incident.
- 5 For a discussion of proposed hedges, see full report.
- 6 A more elegant formulation of this sequence is Col. John Boyd's OODA – Observation-Oriented-Decision-Action – Loop. The key to the OODA is executing the sequence more rapidly and more deceptively than the opponent on the battlefield, thereby keeping him off-balance. Interestingly, the same sequence could be applied quite usefully to the weapons acquisition process, a point made by Adm. Vernon Clark, chief of naval operations, during his April 12, 2001 address to the Navy League's 2001 Sea Air Space Exposition: "The whole process of thought and concept development and simulation and experimentation and production takes far too long today.... We need a quicker, more agile, and simpler way to move forward...."
- 7 In a real if limited sense, the military rationale for force dispersal emerged in the closing days of World War II with the advent of the atomic bomb. While initial development was directed toward strategic use, the evolution of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons focused attention on the need to move away from reliance on massed formations that offered lucrative targets.
- 8 "QDR 2001: The Battle Begins," Andrew Koch, Michael Sirak, Kim Burger, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, May 16, 2001. "The Defense Comfort Blanket," William Arkin, washingtonpost.com, May 21, 2001.
- 9 As an example, the Navy announced in late April a major increase in its Master-at-Arms armed security force to protect its ships and crews in port, both in the United States and abroad. Jack Dorsey, "Navy Expands Armed Security Force," *Norfolk Virginia-Pilot*, April 21, 2001.
- 10 See Michael Gordon, "Pentagon Review Puts Emphasis on Long-Range Arms in Pacific," *New York Times*, May 17, 2001.
- 11 Michael Gordon, "Rumsfeld Limiting Military Contacts with the Chinese," *New York Times*, June 4, 2001.
- 12 The Army's stated transformation goal is to be able to move a combat brigade overseas in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days.

- 13 Former Defense Secretary William Perry estimated that START II, once implemented, could save the United States almost \$5 billion over seven years.
- 14 Nonetheless, in a report released May 14, 2001, the Pentagon's inspector general noted that 90 percent – 39 of 43 – equipment acquisition managers were not using in their planning documents the 1999 Department of Defense joint architecture for command, control, communications, and intelligence systems.
- 15 As an example, NATO is planning to send 3,000 troops into Macedonia to collect weapons that are expected to be turned in by ethnic Albanian rebels. The United States is not planning to send forces to join this mission.
- 16 Gen. Daniel Kaufman, dean of West Point Military Academy, quoted in "For Tomorrow's Army Cadets Full of Questions," Serge Schmemmann, *New York Times*, July 8, 2001, Section 4, p. 1.
- 17 As if to emphasize this point, U.S. Space Command commander Gen. Ralph Eberhart earlier this year expressed interest in taking over NASA's canceled X-33 Venture Star program with a view to converting it into a sub-orbital "space bomber" that could strike targets virtually anywhere in the world and return to its base within 90 minutes of initial launch. See Ed Vulliamy's "Bush plans 'space bomber,'" *The Observer* (London), July 29, 2001.
- 18 This section borrows heavily from *A Swift, Elusive Sword: What If Sun Tzu and John Boyd Did a National Defense Review* by Chester W. Richards, a background study prepared for the Center for Defense Information, May 2001.
- 19 Richards, *A Swift, Elusive Sword*, p. 36 ff.
- 20 This is the title of an excellent paper by Dr. Jonathan Shay, at <www.belisarius.com>. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, *Warfighting*, also addresses this topic.
- 21 See, for example, Dr. Jonathan Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character*, Touchstone, 1995. Several papers by Dr. Shay on trust and cohesion are available at <www.belisarius.com>.
- 22 Available at Defense and the National Interest, <www.d-n-i.net>.
- 23 Col. Michael D. Wyly, USMC (Ret.), "Thinking Like Marines," 1991, unpublished paper available at <www.belisarius.com>. Col. Wyly was the founding vice-president of the Marine Corps University and one of the prime originators of maneuver warfare in the Marine Corps.
- 24 "First US Carrier to Moor Pierside in Singapore," DoD News Release 118-01, March 20, 2001.
- 25 The last significant employment of parachute units in that mode was Operation Just Cause against a very ill-prepared Panama Defense Force in 1989. In that operation, Rangers and a composite brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division – a total of some 4,000 men – were parachuted into Panama 15 minutes after Special Operations Forces began the fight. Five years later, airborne forces were already en route to Haiti as part of a force meant to restore Jean Bertrand Aristide as that country's president. The aircraft returned to base when the ruling junta agreed to vacate their power.

- 26 See <www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/148.html> for Britain. Warships Forecast – Luigi Einaudi, *Forecast International*, January 2001 for Italy. Jane’s *Fighting Ships* 2000 for France.
- 27 “Five European Nations Agree to Amphibious Warfare Initiative,” *Aerospace Daily*, December 6, 2000, p. 361.
- 28 Crusader could be a good long-range weapon for intense armored combat scenarios, but difficulties continue with integration of software and hardware and testing remains insufficient.
- 29 The V-22 is not meeting its troop-carrying requirements.
- 30 Navy progress in improving littoral capabilities (which typically suggests more numerous, smaller ships) is slow, as the General Accounting Office has noted: “The Navy has acknowledged that it currently lacks a number of key war-fighting capabilities it needs for operations in littoral environs. For example, it does not have a means for effectively breaching enemy sea mines in the surf zone; detecting and neutralizing enemy submarines in shallow water; defending its ships against cruise missiles; or providing adequate fire support for Marine Corps amphibious landings and combat operations ashore....Unless current efforts can be accelerated or alternatives developed, it will be another 10 to 20 years before the Navy and Marine Corps will have the capabilities needed to successfully execute littoral warfare operations against competent enemy forces.” (*Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities Needed*, General Accounting Office (GAO-01-493), May 18, 2001, p. 2.)

Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski, president of the Naval War College, has war-gamed a variety of promising new ideas for using more numerous networked “platforms” more suitable for littoral operations versus a few larger platforms – for example, using numerous hypothetical 4,000-ton carriers instead of a single supercarrier. (See, for example, “U.S. Navy Takes Look At Miniature Aircraft Carriers,” Robert Holzer, *Defense News*, September 18, 2000, p. 3.) Indeed, the Navy is already looking at new designs for future surface ships. In June 2001 a two-thirds scale British “trimaran” or three-hulled research vessel visited Washington. The U.S. Navy has invested \$2 million in equipment as part of risk reduction tests for the trimaran which it sees as a possible candidate for smaller, faster ships to operate in the littoral regions as part of the Navy’s “streetfighter” warship concept. (*Aerospace Daily*, June 5, 2001, pp. 1,3.)

The defense transformation study group for Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s review noted, regarding both DD-21 and CVX, “We were not persuaded they were truly transformational ... We didn’t see a substantial difference in operational capability in the DD-21 compared to the other systems.” (DoD News Briefing on Defense Transformation, Gen. James P. McCarthy, USAF (Ret.) June 12, 2001.)

- 31 The importance of systems vs. platforms was alluded to by Vice Adm. Dennis McGinn, head of Navy Warfare Requirements and Programs, in Senate testimony on June 7, 2001: “Our emerging priorities for investment by which I be-

lieve the Navy can best improve our war-fighting capability for every dollar invested are networks, sensors, weapons and platforms. Platforms, our ships, submarines and aircraft, have long been viewed as the principal symbols for any discussions about naval warfare capabilities. But ... these platforms in and of themselves don't deliver combat capability we need in the future unless and until they are networked to the rest of the fleet and to other services' capabilities." (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Senate Armed Services Committee, June 7, 2001.)

- 32 Congress has made clear it would like to see unmanned aircraft take over a substantial share of the manned aircraft role. In the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Act, Congress established the goal that one-third of all operational deep strike aircraft would be unmanned by 2010. ("Enactment of Provisions of H.R. 5408, The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4205," House Report 106-945, Section 220, p. 46 ff.)
- 33 The allocation of missions and functions in turn dictates the force structure and size because missions and functions drive the entire military establishment – personnel levels and budgets; equipment types and quantities (research, development and procurement); equipment maintenance, modernization, and replacement costs; the number, type, and locations of posts, camps and stations (infrastructure), etc.
- 34 Richards, *A Swift Elusive Sword*, p. 37.
- 35 Richards, *A Swift, Elusive Sword*, p. 46.
- 36 *An Assessment of Joint Doctrine*, by Thomas Baines, a background paper prepared for the Center for Defense Information, March 2001.
- 37 See the section, "Current Doctrine and Processes," in the background paper by Thomas Baines, *An Assessment of Joint Doctrine*, for a discussion of those problems.
- 38 This section draws heavily from *Reforming the Marketplace – The Industrial Component of National Defense* by Chester W. Richards, a background paper prepared for the Center for Defense Information, January 2001.



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