Rapid Decisive Operations: Getting the Structure Right
Among its many missions, Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is charged with "joint concept development and experimentation." This makes the command, located at Norfolk, Va., the chief engine for military transformation at the operational level and for the integration of the individual service transformational visions.
At the heart of JFCOM's effort is the requirement to develop an information-analysis-decision methodology that rapidly and reliably compresses the time interval between inputs — all-source information on the enemy and the capabilities of friendly military forces and supporting agencies — and outputs in the form of desired (as opposed to undesired and unexpected) effects on an opponent's capabilities and decision-making process.
To the extent that military capabilities are affected by such "Rapid Decisive Operations," an opponent's war-fighting options become limited, as does his range of possible decisions, thus rendering his actions more predictable and easier to counter. What drives the process of shutting down the enemy is information rapidly assessed and the equally rapid adaptation of plans to correspond to the changed situation.
Because the traditional American way of war emphasizes attrition-destruction of enemy armies and infrastructure, operational planning has tended to concentrate on the most effective ways of killing people, destroying things during the conflict and occupying what remains. While this is the military's traditional role, and will remain necessary in the 21st century, it will no longer suffice to provide the degree of security that has come from past victories. In fact, as demonstrated in the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, it is no longer sufficient to envision and plan a post-conflict order independent of the course of the war and the damage inflicted.
If the United States wishes to win both a war and the following peace, the preferred minimum post-conflict conditions on which to base rebuilding and rehabilitation of the enemy's country and population needs to be considered as a desired effect of the operational commander's war-fighting decisions. In fact, these desired effects should be well thought out even before the fighting begins.
In other words, the era of unrestricted warfare is over.
How might this be done? And what might it portend for structuring operational headquarters to facilitate Rapid Decisive Operations?
A model already has been proposed: a joint headquarters augmentation/support package for regionally based task forces. These standing packages primarily would include command and control; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and logistics specialists immersed in the operational opportunities and challenges that exist in the region to which they are oriented (Asia/Pacific, Europe/Africa, Latin America/Caribbean, Middle East/Central Asia, North Atlantic). The real key to the success of such augmentation is that its members have trained together, pooled their specialties across service lines, and exercised with the applicable headquarters under regional commanders in chief and Joint Task Forces.
Similarly, a non-military government employee augmentation package could be created to advise a regional commander in chief as he looks at the ultimate effect desired from any armed conflict: leaving a functioning post-conflict society that is stable and does not pose a threat to its neighbors or to the United States. For example, if a conflict takes place in a desert country, a commander might want to know the post-war conditions that might ensue if he targeted an underground aqueduct system vital for irrigation but used by guerrillas to hide and travel undetected. The commander might turn to a regional agricultural specialist from the Department of Agriculture, a humanitarian relief representative from the Agency for International Development, and a civil engineer from elsewhere in government able to estimate the cost and time to restore the aqueduct. The commander would weigh this information against the military effects desired — elimination of an enemy sanctuary — in making his decision. Having such expertise immediately available and having trust in the judgments of the experts allows for a rapid determination of the course of action that in turn affects the options available to the enemy.
In another very possible scenario — conflict in a petroleum-rich country — a geologist, petroleum firefighter, oil field infrastructure expert, an economist, and a petroleum-related disease specialist — all from appropriate government agencies — would be detailed as advisors to a regional commander on the effects of widespread oil field fires. Since such fires have direct implications for military operations as well as post-conflict implications, the commander may decide that the effect he desires is to deny his opponent the option of setting oil fires, especially during a critical phase of the campaign or entirely. Moreover, in wanting to avoid undesired effects, he might extend this concern to restrict certain operations by friendly forces to preclude the same outcome.
Having non-military specialists from other agencies and departments would not break new ground. For years regional commanders in chief have had with their headquarters advisors from the Department of State knowledgeable in the diplomacy of the region. Expanding this by employing a non-military augmentation team that, through exercises and visits, is already integrated with its military equivalent and with the headquarters staff of each regional commander in chief would enable the commander to make better-informed decisions adapted to the continuously changing battlefield without having to wait for the Washington-based interagency process to work itself out.
Since Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada in 1983, U.S. military campaigns (as opposed to peacekeeping operations) have been relatively swift. They have also relied on allies and friends, either during fighting, reconstituting national authority in a country, or both. Taken together, these circumstances suggest that the time available for critical decisions by regional commanders in chief is becoming more compressed at the same time that their execution can have profound effects on post-conflict events. While the military objective must remain the commander's primary focus, broader post-conflict effects from military action must be considered if the United States is to mitigate the twin outcomes of unintended and undesired consequences of military action.
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