The United States Army is pressing ahead with its 'Army Transformation' 21st century modernization program. This initiative is intended to make the Army more responsive, deployable, agile, and lethal. The Army National Guard has been integrated into these efforts to an extent. Yet the unique qualities of its part-time soldiers may be better used if some forces were refocused on smaller-scale contingencies. The Guard is now being well integrated in homeland defense efforts; some of the same thought should be given to its use in peacekeeping operations and other, less major, missions.

The Army 'Transformation,' incorporating and expanding upon earlier Force XXI and Army After Next programs, was first launched at an October 1999 Association of the U.S. Army conference. On Oct. 12, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki unveiled a new modernization paradigm for the Army in the 21st century. Shinseki outlined an Army transformation plan that would see the Army finally become "a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations."¹   An explicitly noted definition of 'transformation' for the Army is difficult to find, but the phrase above, sometimes reworded slightly, seems to be the nearest equivalent.

This definition notably differs from both retired Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski's DoD Office of Force Transformation definition and what the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review says on the subject. Cebrowski's definition of transformation "is those continuing processes and activities which create new sources of power and yield profound increases in military competitive advantage as a result of new, or the discovery of, fundamental shifts in the underlying rule sets." ²   The Quadrennial Defense Review sees the process, however, as the "evolution and deployment of combat capabilities that provide revolution or asymmetric advantage to U.S. forces." ³  

It is evident that 'transformation', as the current U.S. military jargon of choice, has had many proponents and much enthusiastic discussion. However, the mere frequent mention of the term does not imply that it refers to a well-thought out coherent body of ideas for military modernization, being cohesively implemented across the four armed services. The three conflicting definitions cited above would seem to disprove that. 'Transformation,' in its present form, is not much more than a much-quoted term to cover a myriad of interlinked modernization ideas.

The Army Transformation strategy, however, rests more upon a three-stage force redesign approach than upon the integrity of the 'transformation' definition itself. Weaponry and re-organization are pivotal; training and doctrine on the other hand are to be developed as the program unfolds. ⁴   Doctrinal change, for the moment, has been restricted to outlining standards for the 'Objective Force' in its final form; the way the Army will fight will change as the initially transformed forces shake down and new technologies evolve.

The current Army, known as the 'Legacy Force,' will transition during an initial phase by establishing an 'Initial Force' of two Initial Brigade Combat Teams equipped with Interim Armored Vehicles (IAVs). The selected vehicle was the GM/General Dynamics Land Systems LAV-III, a modified version of the LAV-25 already in service with the Marine Corps. Essentially, the Initial Brigades will be motorized infantry brigades with very good reconnaissance capabilities. The second, 'Interim,' phase will begin when the first battalion of Interim Armored Vehicles is fielded (this is underway now) and will end when the last of an anticipated five to eight Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) is fully manned, equipped, and trained to possess the capabilities specified in the IBCT operations and organization concept. During both of these phases, which may run concurrently, research and development will continue for the 'Objective Force,' which will be fielded in the third and final phase.

The third — 'Objective Capability' — phase will see the 'Objective Force' fully fielded, which will be capable of deploying a combat capable brigade in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. The 'Objective Force' will be equipped, says the Army, with significantly advanced systems such as the Future Combat System (a lighter main battle tank replacement), the Future Transport Rotorcraft, the RAH-66 Comanche attack helicopter, unmanned systems, and advanced command, control, intelligence, and reconnaissance systems. The 'Objective Force,' organized around a basic divisional design, will be required to dominate a non-linear battlefield encompassing all types of terrain. Depending on technological advances, the Army hopes to start implementing the 'Objective Force' about 2008.

The Active Army's intentions are thus quite clear. The National Guard has been included in the planned program, but has a greater opportunity, as part of the change process, to focus upon small-scale contingency roles for which it may well be better suited.

Official Army National Guard documents make only brief reference to the Army's Transformation initiative in their descriptions of modernization programs. An ARNG Brigade, the 56th Brigade from Pennsylvania's 28th Infantry Division (Mechanized) is designated as one of the next four brigades to transition to IBCT status, and it is stated that the ARNG is scheduled to achieve full 'Objective Force' status by 2032. However, most reorganization attention is given to initiatives designed to more closely integrate active and reserve units. These include the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS), Multi-Component Units, and the Active Component/Army National Guard (ARNG) Integrated Divisions. ⁵  

The National Guard Bureau acknowledges that the full implementation of the Division Redesign Study, the largest ongoing Guard reorganization, may change depending upon 'Transformation' requirements. The results of the initial brigade trials and future associated changes to the Active Army's force structure may mean that the number of formations required for Guard combat and support forces changes.

The National Guard has also been well integrated into the homeland defense mission. The seven Civil Support Teams declared fully operational on Jan.28 are part of 32 teams to be formed by 2002 to respond to a domestic weapon of mass destruction incident, involving nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. As well as the specialized Civil Support Teams, a large number of other Guard units have been called up since Sept. 11 both to guard various sites and to support active forces in the homeland defense effort.

The Guard's homeland defense posture is working; it is its other roles that need scrutiny.

The question of whether Army National Guard modernization efforts are fully transformational can be seen in different ways. The official answer would have it that the ARNG efforts are fully integrated — they will just 'transform', in the same way as the Active Army, but later. It could be expected that the ARNG's historical deficiencies in formation training and key equipment would continue, leaving it less ready for combat than desired, in the same way it has been though most of the Cold War. But if transformation is seen as more than strict adherence to the Legacy Force-Interim Force-Objective Force model, and is seen in terms of "dominance over the entire spectrum of operations" — attainment of the standard of Army transformation by the entire Army — the answer may be different.

The U.S. Army has historically excelled at conventional interstate conflict. However, when faced with a counter-insurgency challenge during the Vietnam War, it was defeated, and its performance in intrastate operations small scale contingencies and peacekeeping, apart from the actions of its Special Forces, has rarely shone. Vietnam and Somalia are the most painful examples of the U.S. Army's difficulty with counter-insurgency type operations. (The United States is not alone in this; it could be argued that the only counter-insurgency war ever won was the British-fought Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960.) Faced with a 21st century in which the majority of Army operations are anticipated to be those smaller-scale contingencies, some commentators have considered redesigning elements of the Reserve Component to cater specifically to those challenges.

Current plans would see the ARNG consisting, when the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study reorganization is complete, of six divisions and six separate brigades focused on the conventional war-fighting mission, as well as support forces. ⁶   In addition, there will be six other enhanced brigades forming two AC/RC integrated divisions. Recent commentators have suggested, however, reorganizing between two and four Guard divisions for the expeditionary, smaller-scale contingency role. ⁷   They cite evidence that suggests that reserve soldiers are more suited to constabulary, peace-support missions than active duty regulars constantly trained to fight and kill. ⁸   Experience with Canadian and U.S. Airborne troops in Somalia and the Balkans supports the idea of avoiding assigning elite, highly charged troops, especially airborne personnel, constabulary duties. The Canadian government took the dramatic step of disbanding its single regular Airborne Regiment after its soldiers were found to have tortured and killed Somali youths. However, as forces detailed solely to peacekeeping would find themselves vulnerable if they lost their war-fighting skills completely, such a role transition would have to be carefully managed. A possible structure might be an enhanced brigade with additional reconnaissance, engineer, and military police battalions, as well as additional support units. This force would retain two or three maneuver battalions as a war-fighting core.

The Defense Department's Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, released in July 1999, does explore several options for increasing Guard roles in small-scale operations. ⁹   However, it does not recognize the chance the Guard has to reshape part of its force specifically for the long-duration peacekeeping and other stability operations.

While the change of mission for part of the Guard force described above seems to be the better use of the Guard's unique skills, there are other options that could be chosen. The Guard could relieve the Active Army of a portion, or most, of the heavy mechanized role, with the regular force focusing on smaller-scale operations. This reversal of the above proposal would see the Active Army inheriting a role that it neither wants, nor is best fitted for. The Active Army has the time and resources to fully train for formation mechanized war-fighting. The Guard does company-level operations well; it has difficulty managing complex formation-level maneuver warfare. ¹⁰  

Finally, the Guard could follow the Army Reserve's transition over the past decade and concentrate on service support functions such as logistics, medical, and training support. This would remove the reserve of combat ground forces the National Guard currently forms, and unbalance the combat/support force ratio. Converting all the National Guard's current force to support roles would produce a total active and reserve force with far too little teeth and too much tail. The current lack of sufficient support forces is being addressed by partial conversion of Guard combat divisions; converting the whole force would be too much.

In summary, the Army National Guard has managed to stake a limited claim in Army Transformation. The question is: is that the role it is best placed for, in view of its unique citizen soldiers and the overwhelming emphasis of the Active Army on formation mechanized war-fighting the Active Army has, and which does not reflect the majority of anticipated 21st century conflicts?

 
End Notes

¹   U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan, p. 4.

²   Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski (Ret.), director, Force Transformation, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/t11272001_t1127ceb.html, Nov. 27, 2001.

³  Ibid., referring to Quadrennial Defense Review 2001.

⁴  U.S. Army Transformation Campaign Plan, pp. 8-9, 17.

⁵  USARNG FY02 Posture Statement, p.30-31.

⁶  www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr97/chap22.html.

⁷  Lt Col David Fautua, "Transforming the Reserve Components," Military Review, September-October 2000, and Colonel George D. Shull, "Correcting the Force Structure Mismatch," Military Review, May-June 2000.

⁸  Lt Col David Fautua, "Transforming the Reserve Components," Military Review, September-October 2000, and Colonel George D. Shull, "Correcting the Force Structure Mismatch," Military Review, May-June 2000.

⁹  www.af.mil/news/Jul1999/n19990723_991391.html

¹⁰  William Matthews, "Deployments don't degrade troops' peacekeeping skills: Many Bosnia units performed better, GAO says," Army Times (September 27, 1999), p. 23; and Frederick W. Kagan and David T. Fautua, "Could We Fight A War If We Had To?" Commentary (May 1997), pp. 25-9. in Lt. Col. David Fautua, "Transforming the Reserve Components," Military Review, September-October 2000, www.cgsc.army.mil/MILREV/English/SepOct00/faut.htm.

 

Colin Robinson CDI Research Assistant crobinson@cdi.org

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