The European Union since 1992 has been slowly moving toward a military capability, mainly focused upon anticipated peacekeeping missions.  Since then, debate has raged on both sides of the Atlantic as to whether the concept would remedy major gaps in European armed forces and provide a real fighting force – or create divisions within NATO and further alienate the United States, which is already less interested in European security than during the Cold War.

Introduction

The military force was borne in December 1999, when the European Union adopted its so-called Headline Goal as a way of putting teeth into its new European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).  The concept was to increase the capability of the 15-nation European Union to carry out the so-called Petersberg tasks of humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.[1]  Under the Headline Goal, the European aimed to be able, by 2003, to rapidly deploy and sustain forces capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks, in operations up to a corps level of 50,000-60,000 persons.  The aim was to make those forces self-reliant (without dependence on U.S. support), deployable within 60 days, and sustainable in the field for a year. This means the force would actually have to number around 180,000 troops so as to pr ovide rotating replacements for the initial forces.

The Effect on NATO and Capability Improvements

Since the 1999 Helsinki declaration, the United States has frequently criticized the ESDP and the plans for a EU military force both for the possible effects on NATO, and for the continuing inability of European allies to significantly strengthen their military capabilities despite their lofty promises.  U.S. observers worry that ESDP will create duplicate, and possibly competing, command and planning structures, while failing to close the real capability disparities that exist between Washington and its European allies – as apparent in Kosovo. 

The critics, recently represented by the British Conservative Party’s Defense spokesman at a function in Washington, claim that the newly established EU structures ‘subvert’ NATO, and that ESDP as a whole “destroys the clear relationships between NATO and its member states.”[2]  Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. secretary of defense, has voiced similar concern, telling conference delegates in Munich in February 2001 that he was “a little worried” by the ESDP proposals, because “actions that could reduce NATO’s effectiveness by confusing duplication or perturbing the transatlantic link would not be positive.”[3]  U.S. congressmen have also earlier attacked the plan because it would divert resources from NATO.[4]

The proponents of ESDP argue that the program is unlikely to damage NATO.  Gen. Jean-Pierre Kelche, French chief of Defense Staff, said in March 2001 that “the controversial issue is defense planning.  European politicians … need to be able to select among various options and then conduct operations, both from a military and a political point of view. … I do not see how this can hurt the alliance.”[5]  The British Parliament’s 2000 report on the matter acknowledged the potential problem in “holding together the North American and European wings” of the alliance, but also pointed out that it was not a new problem – trans-Atlantic differences have occurred throughout NATO’s history.[6] Two common agreements on ESDP will help keep the strains to a minimum.  First, NATO remains the collective defense organization; ESDP is purely a crisis-management tool.  NATO alone will deal with any threat to the European homeland.  Second, the European Union will act only if NATO does not wish to react itself.  In practical terms, extensive consultation will occur between the European Union and NATO before any EU operations are launched.   In the end, whether ESDP will strengthen or weaken NATO will be determined by the final arrangement on sharing planning structures and accessing each other’s military resources, which remains under negotiation.  The absence of an agreement already led to the rejection of initial proposals that the European Union assume command of NATO’s Macedonian mission in late 2001.

Ultimately, the reaction to ESDP in the United States hinges on a single key consideration – will the new initiative strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities relative to the United States?  The United States has dominated military operations since the end of the Cold War, partly because the U.S. force structure, unlike Europe’s, was designed for independent global operations, and because the European countries have cut defense budgets faster than the United States.  These cuts delayed and diminished European efforts to re-orientate their armed forces from heavy conventional formations focused on continental defense to lighter rapid-reaction organizations. 

NATO’s own answer to these deficiencies, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), was initiated shortly before the 1999 Kosovo War, but formally announced in the midst of the conflict, during the alliance’s 50th Anniversary Summit in April 1999.  DCI focused on interoperability between allies as well as defense capability.  The DCI has 58 decision areas, colored either green, amber, or red signifying increased difficulties with the issue.  About 70 percent of the DCI issues overlap with the capability shortfalls needed to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goals. [7]  In December 2001, 29 decision areas were coded green, 22 amber, and 11 red.  Fifty of the original hundred Helsinki Headline Goals shortfalls also remain, with the most serious covering strategic decision-making, troop protection, theater ballistic missile defense, and deployability.  Adequate numbers of high-quality deployable ground troops are also an issue, considering the slow European progress toward fully professional forces.  Many of the capability shortfalls will take years to resolve as they require new equipment to be delivered.

The continuing problems with acquisition of European military capabilities led to a change in direction in late April 2002. German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said that NATO members would be asked at the Prague Summit to specialize their defense forces and focus upon a limited number of niche capabilities.[8]  This is more practical that the existing DCI program:  firstly, because some countries do have the ability to carry out certain missions better than others, and, secondly, no European country is spending enough money to achieve all the DCI goals.  Both Scharping and NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson have encouraged the development of role specialization.

Lord Robertson said on April 10 that there is a recognition now that ”there are countries that can do some things better that others,” though U.S. help would be needed in liberalizing export laws to assist some technology transfer.[9]

It is important to remember that EU capabilities improvements need not necessarily hinder efforts to improve NATO forces.  Indeed, two organizations pressuring for more spending on defense capability improvements will probably achieve more success than one – and the resulting improvements will benefit both., as the same national forces, as referred to above, will be tasked with both missions.  The critical issue is not that the EU efforts might hinder or divert attention from NATO improvements (assuming that the two organization come to an agreement on the division of responsibilities), but that European countries, are not willing, in a time of relative peace, to spend more on their militaries to react to crises that do not directly concern them.  Defense spending will have to rise if the full capability to achieve Petersberg Tasks is to eventuate, and then many of the critical capabilities will only be available toward the end of the decade.[10]  This is unlikely – since July 2000, only Greece, Germany, and the Netherlands have increased spending, and then only by 0.1 percent of Gross Domestic Product.[11] 

In summary, it seems that neither of the two arguments – either weakening NATO or the effect on European military capabilities – present a significant enough reason to abandon the evolving European capability.  If either the EU or NATO programs succeeds in persuading European countries to improve their capabilities, both organizations will gain additional resources for crisis response as well as collective defense missions, as unlikely as that latter mission might seem at the present.  In recognition of these realities, President George W. Bush, in a 2001 joint statement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, backed the policy, and recognized that EU capabilities would be developed in a manner that was fully “coordinated, compatible, and transparent” with NATO.[12]

The Way Forward: Capability Improvements and Force First Use

The Helsinki Headline Goal force was declared operational at the Laeken European Council in December 2001.  However, given the existing European force deficiencies, only a ‘limited’ capability was announced.  It is unlikely that the force will be given challenging tasks in the near future, and even by 2003, the planned date for full readiness, continuing shortfalls will probably dissuade European decision-makers from undertaking major, Balkans-style peace support operations that could lead to embarrassing failures. The EU force will not be capable of accomplishing the most difficult missions until theater deployment capabilities are fully in place – and given the European countries’ current programs to achieve those capabilities, that could mean a wait until 2008, when the first A400M transport aircraft enters service.  Germany’s position is crucial here in two ways.  Firstly, German parliamentary obstruction is now the primary obstacle to the further progress of the A400M program.  Secondly, German forces (along with the British and French) will be vital for allowing ESDP to reach its full potential.  Until Germany makes more fundamental reforms such as increasing spending, or giving up wasteful institutions such as conscription and widely scattered small bases, it will not be able to fully contribute, and thus ESDP will not provide the clout it promised.[13]

Up until that point, there is likely to be continuing pressure to use what capability there is in order to assure the political viability of the initiative.  Indeed, despite abortive discussions last year which ended with NATO still running the Macedonian weapons collection and monitoring mission, the Barcelona European Council in mid-March declared the European Union ready to take over the ‘Amber Fox’ mission by September 2002, after legislative elections in Macedonia.[14]  This would be possible, but only if the EU gets agreement on access to NATO support, which has been blocked by Greece since December 2001.  This was due to long-standing distrust between Greece, a member of both the European Union and NATO, and Turkey, only a member of NATO.  Depending on how hard the European Union presses, small missions are likely to be deployed before or soon after the 2003 full capability deadline.

Further on, as EU capabilities rise and remaining problem areas become more distinct, ‘pooled’ forces may be increasingly advocated as a way to increase European-wide efficiencies.  The model is the NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) force, with 18 aircraft funded by all NATO member states, based in Germany and manned by multinational crews.  The aircraft are registered in Luxembourg.  Previously the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy also trained their Tornado attack crew in this way in Cottesmore in Britain.  Suggestions have included a joint European air transport command or joint Eurofighter force, which could build on existing cooperation underway in the Euro Air Group, of which the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands are members.

In summary, the European Union is moving toward a real military capability, albeit so far mostly on paper.  If ESDP achieves its planned capacity, the European Union will be in a position to mount small, but gradually expanding missions.  As foreseen, ESDP need not place unbearable strain on the EU-NATO relationship, but on the contrary might exert increasing pressure on European states to raise defense spending.  If the initiative and EU-U.S. relations are handled with care, the result could be both a lessening of the U.S. burden in Europe and a growing European ability to mount peace support operations both within and beyond its continental boundaries.

Colin Robinson  CDI Research Assistant crobinson@cdi.org

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