The matrix below is a summary of the major flight tests in the Missile Defense
Agency’s ground-based midcourse missile defense system, formerly known as the
national missile defense program’s ground-based intercept.
| Test
No. |
Date |
Intercept? |
Notes |
Decoys |
| IFT-1A |
June
24, 1997 |
n/a |
Non-intercept fly-by
to assess the performance of the Boeing-built EKV seeker, collect target
phenomenological data, and evaluate (post-test) target-modeling and
discrimination algorithms. The
target cluster consisted of 10 objects:
one mock warhead, one bus (the stage of the missile which releases
the warhead and decoys), and eight decoys. Boeing was not chosen as the
NMD EKV contractor. |
Eight decoys: three
that were conical in shape, like the warhead, and five spherical balloons.
One balloon was large – 2.2 meters in diameter – and had a
brighter IR signature than the mock warhead.
The two medium-sized balloons were about as bright as the mock
warhead; they did not deploy as expected and were not reliable parts of
the testing program. The two
small balloons were released via a canister and were much dimmer than the
mock warhead. |
| IFT-2 |
Jan.
16, 1998 |
n/a |
Non-intercept fly-by
to assess the performance of the Raytheon-built EKV seeker, collect target
phenomenological data, and evaluate (post-test) target-modeling and
discrimination algorithms. The
target cluster consisted of 10 objects:
one mock warhead, 0ne bus (the stage of the missile which releases
the warhead and decoys), and eight decoys.
Raytheon was chosen as the NMD EKV contractor. |
The same decoy set
used in IFT-1A was also used in IFT-2. |
| IFT-3 |
Oct.
2, 19
99 |
Yes |
Element test of the
EKV, not an end-to-end system test, which relied on a surrogate booster
vehicle and range assets to define the “deployment basket” and deliver
the EKV to that location. Once
deployed, the EKV operated autonomously to intercept the mock RV.
Due to a malfunctioning Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), which
normally is used to position the EKV for the intercept, a backup method of
locating the target had to be exercised.
The EKV called upon its “step-stare” capabilities (which are
used only during off-nominal circumstances) to extend its field of view
since the target was not where anticipated.
After executing that procedure, the EKV acquired its target.
In a background test parallel with the EKV flight test, the BMC3
and other elements functioned as planned.
The XBR is still in development, so a Ground Based Radar Prototype
(GBR-P) is used in its stead. Because
the radar is in a position where it cannot completely track the missiles,
a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver on the mock warhead emitted
location data; a C-band transponder beacon was used as a backup. |
The only decoy used
in IFT-3 was the large balloon from IFT-1A and IFT-2.
It had an IR signature six times higher than that of the mock
warhead. Because the decoy was
so much brighter than the mock warhead, the EKV saw it first.
Once the EKV realized that the balloon’s IR signature did not
match up with the target data it had received prior to the test, the
interceptor shifted to the nearby target. |
| IFT-4 |
Jan. 18, 2000 |
No |
First end-to-end system test
(intercept attempt) using NMD prototype elements (except the IFICS) and
range assets to approximate the objective system.
The EKV was again successfully delivered by a surrogate booster and
separated into the deployment basket.
The failure to intercept is directly traceable to the cryogenic
cooling system of the EKV, which failed to cool the IR sensors down to
their operating temperatures in time because of an obstructed cooling
line. Again, because of the
GBR-P’s limited tracking abilities, a GPS receiver and a backup C-band
radar beacon on the mock warhead emitted location data. |
The only decoy used was the single
large balloon from the previous tests.
Smaller balloons originally had been planned to be a part of IFT-4,
but were dropped in an attempt to simplify the test (partially because of
the Welch panel recommendations). |
| IFT-5 |
July 8, 2000 |
No |
Second end-to-end system test
(intercept attempt) using NMD prototype elements and range assets to
approximate the objective system. The
IFICS served as the communication link between the BMC3 and EKV.
The failure to intercept is the direct result of the EKV not
separating from the surrogate booster due to an apparent failure in the
1553 data bus in the booster. A
C-band transponder on the mock warhead gave off location information; its
data was compared against its GPS receiver to determine its accuracy. |
The only decoy used was the large
balloon from previous tests. It
did not inflate properly, causing MDA officials to decide to use a
different decoy in the future. |
| IFT-6 |
July 14, 2001 |
Yes |
This test was a repeat of IFT-5.
The prototype X-Band radar (XBR) used in IFT-6 could not process
all the information it was receiving quickly enough, causing it to falsely
report that the interceptor had missed its target.
If that had happened in a non-test situation, more interceptors
would have been needlessly launched at the target to ensure a hit. The
kill was confirmed by sensors on a satellite, a 747 jet, and ground
stations – backups that will not be available to the fully-developed XBR.
A C-band beacon on the mock warhead produced most of the target
location data. Starting in IFT-6, a glitch was identified in the GMD's exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)'s target position estimation data, which is used to monitor and track the target during its flight so that the EKV can make an intercept. According to MDA spokesperson Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, the recurring glitch "never interfered with the effectiveness of the EKV," and could have been attributed to "degraded EKV inertial measurement unit output data." MDA believed the anomaly to have been caused by electromagnetic interference into test-unique cabling. This cabling was also used in IFT-7, IFT-8, and IFT-9. |
One large decoy balloon was used.
This one was 1.7 meters in diameter, so it was slightly smaller
than the large balloon used earlier as a decoy.
This new decoy still had an IR signature much brighter
(approximately three times) than that of the mock warhead. |
| IFT-7 |
Dec. 3, 2001 |
Yes |
The only variable changed from
IFT-6 was the target booster: instead of Lockheed
Martin’s Multi-Service Launch System, Orbital’s Target Launch Vehicle was
used. The target set, a
modified Minuteman ICBM carrying a mock warhead and a single decoy, did
not change. It was not a
substantive modification of the test configuration.
Again, as in IFT-5 and IFT-6, the mock warhead’s C-band beacon
produced most of the target location data.
IFT-7 was designed to see how well the
systems elements would integrate, in addition to attempting to intercept
the target missile. Critics
noted that interceptor received a wealth of targeting information prior to
the test and questioned its operational realism. |
There was only one decoy in IFT-7,
and it was the same one that was used in IFT-6. |
| IFT-8 |
March 15, 2002 |
Yes |
Again, the kill vehicle was given
prior information to help it in discrimination, which may well be
appropriate for an early level of testing but certainly does not indicate
a realistic operational test. The
system still depends on a C-band transponder beacon emitting location data
in order to find the mock warhead. At
least 20 more tests are scheduled to be completed at a pace of roughly one
every four months. |
Three decoy balloons (one large,
two small) were used to increase the difficulty of determining the
target’s location; however, critics pointed out that the
infrared signals of the balloons differed from that of the mock warhead.
The large balloon had a much larger infrared signature than that of
the mock warhead, whereas the two small balloons had much smaller
signatures. |
| IFT-9 |
Oct. 14, 2002 |
Yes |
Used for the first time in a
national missile defense capacity was the Aegis SPY-1 radar.
It tracked the target missile in-flight, and the information it
gathered was passed to the GMD’s battle management system but was not
used to achieve the intercept. Also,
a C-band transponder on the mock warhead provided early flight trajectory
and location data. IFT-9 was
originally planned to take place in August 2002, but was twice delayed.
First it was postponed for about a week while program officials
scrambled to fix a leak in the kill vehicle’s helium tank.
Then it was delayed because of problems with the seals of an engine
nozzle on the booster rocket. |
IFT-9 is said to have
included the same three decoy balloons (one large, two small) in its
target cluster as were used in IFT-8, but the specifics are unknown as MDA
classified decoy details in May 2002. |
| IFT-10 |
Dec. 11, 2002 |
No |
IFT-10 failed when the Raytheon-built exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) did not separate from its booster rocket, a modified Minuteman ICBM that is being used as a surrogate until a more advanced booster rocket can be developed. The failure to separate precluded the EKV from attempting an intercept of the target missile. This was the first night test of the GMD flight test program, but because the intercept failed, the objective of IFT-10 to demonstrate the ability to intercept a target at night was not achieved." Also incorporated into the test process for the first time were the radars of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system and the Airborne Laser, both of which were used to track the target missile after its launch. IFT-10 was supposed to be the last flight test with the surrogate booster rocket. Orbital and Lockheed-Martin are competing to win the contract for a new boost vehicle; Boeing, as the lead systems integrator, plans on announcing its recommendation in March. No new flight tests are scheduled for the GMD program until maybe fall of 2003 as the MDA is presently focusing its energy on meeting the Bush administration's 2004 deployment timeline. |
The increase in target complexity over the entire GMD flight test program has been much slighter than originally planned; for example, IFT-7 initially was to include a tumbling RV, but problems with the GMD technology have prevented that decoy type from being a part of any test target clusters so far. This lag in target complexity, especially when combined with the upcoming test delay after IFT-10, will hinder MDA's chances at demonstrating the GMD technology's targeting discrimination capabilities in more realistic test scenarios. |
Sources:
IFT-1A – IFT-5:
DOT&E FY 00 report; “Decoys
and discrimination in intercept test IFT-8,” DOT&E
Report in Support of National Missile Defense Readiness Review, aka “The
Coyle Report,” Aug. 10, 2000; Union
of Concerned Scientists Technical Working Paper, March 14, 2002;
IFT-6:
“Crucial radar failed missile
defense test. Military:
Although initially called a success, the system's trial run on Saturday had a
troubling glitch, some analysts say,” Los
Angeles Times, July 18, 2001; “Decoys and discrimination in intercept test
IFT-8,” Union of Concerned Scientists Technical Working Paper, March 14, 2002
IFT-7:
“Missile defense hits three out of five,” Space
& Missile, Dec.
6, 2001; “BMDO using new target booster for missile
defense test,” Defense
Daily, Nov. 27, 2001; “Decoys and discrimination in intercept test
IFT-8,” Union of Concerned Scientists Technical Working Paper, March 14, 2002
IFT-8:
“Missile defense hit clears way for more complexity in
countermeasures,” Defense Daily
International,
March
22, 2002
; “Kill vehicle scores a hit with proponents of missile defense.
Weapons: The Pentagon says the successful tests may
restore credibility to the program,” Los
Angeles Times,
March 26, 2002
; “Decoys and discrimination in intercept test
IFT-8,” Union of Concerned Scientists Technical Working Paper,
March 14, 2002
IFT-9:
“US
carries out successful missile defense test over Pacific,” Agence France Presse, Oct. 15, 2002; "The target set for
missile defense intercept test IFT-9,” Union of Concerned Scientists Technical
Working Paper, Oct. 11, 2002; “Helium leak in missile defense interceptor pushes
back test,” Aerospace Daily, August
14, 2002; “MDA delays GMD flight test to replace damaged interceptor nozzle,” Defense
Daily, August 21, 2002
IFT-10: "MDA reports EKV failed to separate from booster in GMD flight test," Defense Daily, Dec. 12, 2002
For more information contact Philip E. Coyle, Martha.krebs@att.net
or Victoria Samson, vsamson@cdi.org.
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