According to Inside the Pentagon (April 24, 2003), the most advanced interceptor of the Patriot missile defense system was rarely used against Iraq's surface-to-surface missiles. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 is thought to have been responsible for only two out of nine reported missile engagements. Different versions of the Patriot did the bulk of the engagements: the Guided Enhanced Munition (GEM) is alleged to have done six of the engagements, while the GEM+ did one. The PAC-2 interceptor, which is the most rudimentary of all the Patriot systems deployed, was out in the field but not used this time around. Why the PAC-3s were involved in such a low number of the engagements is not yet clear. One possibility is that perhaps because there were so few in the U.S. arsenal (around 50) that they were used sparingly. Another is that they were not the best weapons for the intercepts.

In a late March interview, the commander general of the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Brig. Gen. Howard Bromberg, mused that the first two Patriot friendly fire incidents may have resulted from confusion over battlefield electronic signatures. Bromberg said that the British Tornado GR-4, which was shot down by a Patriot battery on March 23, "didn't look like an airplane to the operator." He admitted that human error was a possibility, since "we're mastering the technology but, as we're mastering it, we may not understand all the importance of that technology." Bromberg was vehement in his assertion that the March 24 incident, where a U.S. F-16CJ launched a missile against a Patriot radar, was not a preemptive strike by a nervous pilot: "I'm 100 percent positive he did not believe it was a Patriot radar. I believe he had indications it was a threat radar." In an April 8 interview, Air Force Maj. Gen. Dan Leaf, the senior air component representative to the ground headquarters in Kuwait, explained that the U.S. F/A-18C, apparently shot down by a Patriot battery on April 2, was very close to a cluttered combat environment where lots of Iraqi rockets and artillery were being aimed at Coalition forces. He theorized that "the Patriot may have seen an incoming Iraqi weapon and launched on that, and had the missile 'transfer' potentially to the F-18," or, due to a glutted air picture, the American aircraft may simply have been misidentified. Investigations for all three incidents are on-going.
Inside the Pentagon, April 24, 2003

With the recent cancellation of Integrated Flight Test (IFT-16) of the Ground-based Midcourse missile defense (GMD) program, the Missile Defense Agency only has two more intercept attempts scheduled for the system between now and its October 2004 initial deployment date. The integrated flight tests left in the GMD test calendar now are IFT-13A and IFT-13B, which are supposed to test the new booster design but not attempt a intercept, and IFT-14 and IFT-15, both of which are to include intercept attempts. The reason given for IFT-16's cancellation, according to MDA spokesperson Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, was that its removal from the test program "better meets the program data needs during the summer/fall FY 04 when we are simultaneously installing interceptors at Fort Greely and Vandenberg Air Force Base and doing system integration check-out and testing." Global Security Newswire, April 21, 2003

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) head Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish boasted to the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee on Wednesday, April 9, of the Patriot's performance against Iraqi missiles. Kadish said that the United States "have a pretty good combination and capability against these missiles, and effectively have provided a national missile defense capability, if you will, for Kuwait." Newly-augmenting Kuwait's early missile defense warning systems is a Lockheed radar on an Aegis-class destroyer, the USS Higgins, currently located in the Persian Gulf. This combination of systems is a combat first, and represents what the MDA hopes to achieve on a grander scale for the continental United States. In addition, Kadish said that 24 Patriots have been launched so far: 20 upgraded PAC-2s (PAC-2, GEM, and GEM+), 4 PAC-3s. These Patriots have reportedly intercepted nine Iraqi missiles. Three other missiles were deemed not to be a threat and left alone, a fourth blew itself up shortly after launch, but the fifth (most likely an Iraqi variant of the Seersucker cruise missile) avoided Kuwait's air defenses and hit Kuwait City's harbor on March 29. Overall, Kadish assessed the Patriot as "very, very good" and "very encouraging." However, despite his enthusiasm for the system, he was unable to provide explanations for the three alleged friendly fire incidents the Patriot has been involved with to date. The wreckage from the most recent, the likely shooting down of a USN F/A-18C on April 2, has been found, but the pilot is still missing.
Bloomberg.com, April 9, 2003

U.S. Air Force Secretary James Roche told defense reporters April 1 that coalition air crews will be changing their rules of engagement when hunting for Iraqi missile launchers. This is a direct response to a friendly fire incident on March 24, where a U.S. F-16CJ launched a heat-seeking missile at and damaged a Patriot battery's radar. The new procedure is that pilots flying suppression of enemy air defense missions are to double-check with a second, more discriminatory system to confirm that the source of the radar emissions showing up on their monitors is Iraqi. Roche also portrayed the March 24 incident as merely a lack of familiarity between the Patriot and air crews, explaining that he didn't "think we've operated in the vicinity of Patriot batteries before."
Aerospace Daily April 1, 2003)

According to CENTCOM, Iraq has launched 13 short-range missiles against U.S. and Kuwaiti forces: Eight of the missiles were reported to have been intercepted by the Patriot missile defense system; three of the missiles were on azimuths that did not seem dangerous and were allowed to fall unmolested into the desert or the Persian Gulf; one of the missiles blew itself up shortly after launch. The 13th missile, however, scored a hit, landing near Kuwait City's biggest shopping mall (more about this later in the update). Has the Patriot been performing to the best of its abilities? The short answer is: it's too early to tell. But in "The Patriot: Its Performance So Far," CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson examines what has been reported of the Patriot and explains why we should be leery of jumping to conclusions about its lethality. The analysis is available at http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/patriot-performance.cfm

A tragic friendly fire incident occurred on Sunday, March 23, when a Patriot missile defense battery accidentally shot down a British Tornado fighter returning from a mission in Iraq. An inquiry is being undertaken, but early reports indicate it may have been the result of either a faulty identification friend or foe beacon on the Tornado or a malfunctioning radar in the Patriot battery. The two crew members of the Tornado were killed when a Patriot operator launched an interceptor against the aircraft. The British Royal Air Force detachment commander, Group Capt. Simon Dobb, announced shortly after the blue-on-blue incident, "The Americans have made a rapid and prudent re-evaluation of Patriot rules of engagement. I can categorically assure my crews that there is no danger of inadvertent engagement."
Agence France-Presse, March 26, 2003

A second friendly-fire run-in occurred on Monday, March 24, when an U.S. Air Force fighter shot a missile at a Patriot missile defense radar. About 30 miles south of Najaf, the signals of a Patriot radar led the pilots of a U.S. F-16 jet to believe that a Patriot interceptor was going to be launched at the aircraft. Remembering the previous day's accidental downing of a British Tornado aircraft, the F-16 pilots took no chances and fired a high-speed anti-radiation (HARM) missile against the Patriot's radar, damaging it. No casualties were reported. Coming upon the heels of the previous incident with the Patriot, observers are starting to wonder if there is a software glitch in the system. Again, however, it is too early to determine for sure and a definitive answer probably won't be forthcoming for a while, as investigations are being undertaken in the midst of battlefield conditions.
Washington Post, March 26, 2003

At a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday, startled members questioned the assertion by Pete Aldridge, undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, that the Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) system which is to be deployed starting next year would achieve a 90 percent effectiveness rate against North Korea's ballistic missiles. This came out of a line of questioning by Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind., who also dryly noted that by deploying a system without fully testing it, the United States was following the North Korean model of weapons development. When asked for his reaction to the oddly high number cited by Aldridge, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., commented: "I just think you better go back and check the classified numbers to the probability of success of this '04 system, and I think you ought to correct the record." Instead, at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on Thursday, Aldridge repeated his confidence in the system, but clarified that three of the GMD's interceptors would have to be launched at a single North Korean missile in order to achieve the 90 percent effectiveness rate.

In December 2002, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush directed that the Pentagon roll out a rudimentary missile defense system as soon as possible. From looking at statements by administration officials, however, it seems that even a "marginal defense" may be beyond the reach of MDA's near-term capabilities. By managing expectations of the missile defense programs from the get-go, the Bush administration is hedging its bets that in the next two years something anything may be fielded and claimed as a success, whether or not it is proven to work. CDI has collected a variety of news stories in which government officials downplay what missile defense may be able to accomplish by 2005. For the text, please see "Managing Expectations" at http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/managing-expectations.pdf.

In "Skipping Missile Defense's Operational Testing Is Unwarranted And Could Deliver A Death Blow To Confidence In The U.S.'s Arsenal," CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson holds that, given the poor showing missile defense has had in testing thus far and its largely immature state of development, granting the waiver from operational testing requested by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would not seem reasonable. It also risks setting a precedent where weapons are hurried into production before they have completed their testing, resulting in the fielding of unreliable systems that unnecessarily endanger American lives. Included in this article are links to the waiver in question, U.S. Code regarding operational testing, and the letter Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., wrote to Rumsfeld expressing her concern about the waiver. The text is available at http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2003/issue09.html#2.

According to MDA head Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the MDA has determined the primary cause for the latest failure of the Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) missile defense flight test program. The exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) failed to separate from its booster rocket during IFT-10 in December 2002 because of a faulty computer chip connection. A mechanical break between the pins connecting the computer chips in the EKV to the circuit board resulted in the EKV not getting the "proper signal to where it was going," said Lt. Gen. Kadish. MDA made this discovery via laboratory simulations and is unclear why the pins did not work.
Aerospace Daily, March 4, 2003

Despite having less than half of the needed parts in place, the Airborne Laser (ABL) has already exceeded its weight limit to the point where program engineers are scrambling to make changes to the proposed aircraft and laser. In order for the laser's 14 modules to fit on the modified 747 plane that had been designated to carry the ABL, the modules can weigh at most 175,000 pounds. But the six modules produced to date already weigh over 180,000 pounds. ABL head Col. Ellen Pawlikowski downplays the problem, saying that the 747 "can certainly handle" the excess weight. She blames the weight increase on titanium parts used because the composites that were originally to be part of the aircraft proved not to be strong enough. In an attempt to lessen the strain on the 747, program officials are exploring alternatives, like increasing the existing laser modules' power output. According to Kumar Patel, a physicist at the University of California, the six modules' could only boost their output by 20 percent, which is not enough to cover the disparity. A six-module laser would be weak enough that the 747 would have to fly closer to its target and thus increase its chances of being shot down.
Defense News, March 3, 2003

In light of recent news stories that the Pentagon is hoping to avoid completing operational testing of various missile defense programs before deploying them next year, it is interesting to read the Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E)'s latest report on the programs. In his FY 02 annual report, Thomas Christie determines that the ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) program "has yet to demonstrate significant operational capability," criticizes the GMD test program as needing to "go beyond the typical proof-of-concept demonstrations in order to provide a higher confidence in estimates of operational capability," states that the Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense element still has "significant capabilities yet to be demonstrated before the engagement conditions can be considered operationally realistic," lists at least 23 more flight tests for the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 program, and pointedly clarifies that "there is currently no Airborne Laser emergency capability apart from some passive detection capabilities." The DOT&E report will not be released online but relevant portions can be found on CDI's website at http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/bmds.cfm.

The Los Angeles Times reports (Feb. 25, 2003) that the lawsuit alleging that TRW had faked results during testing of the ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) system has been dropped. The lawsuit had been filed in 1996 by former TRW engineer Dr. Nira Schwartz, who claimed that TRW's sensor did not have the ability to distinguish incoming warheads from decoys. Citing concerns about national security, the government dropped its case against TRW after the company subpoenaed classified documents it argued it needed for its defense. Schwartz has said she will appeal the ruling: "They say it will endanger national security, but I say that if this doesn't go to trial the national security will be in danger."

At a recent hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it was learned that the Department of Defense (DoD) has launched an initiative to skip operational testing for missile defense programs. DoD claims that it would be able to field the program more rapidly minus the operational testing, a claim that is dubious considering that operational testing comes at the end of a program's development cycle. The requirement for a waiver was submitted as part of the FY 04 budget request earlier this month, said Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich. Pentagon law dictates that the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must certify that operational tests have been completed before a weapon system can move into production and, according to Levin, "exists to prevent the production and fielding of a weapon system that doesn't work right."
Aerospace Daily, Feb. 14, 2003

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) may not be able to continually operate the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense (GMD) system, according to senior Defense official. Because a presidential directive called for an early deployment of the still-in-development GMD system, MDA unveiled a plan where 20 interceptors for the GMD program would be deployed by 2005. While briefing Congress about the MDA's FY 04 budget request, a Department of Defense official said that due to the limited number of interceptors being initially deployed, "it is not clear how they will be manned 24 hours a day."
Inside Missile Defense, Feb. 5, 2003

The Pentagon is moving to dismiss a lawsuit alleging a cover-up in the ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) program's development on the grounds of national security, the New York Times reports. Dr. Nira Schwartz filed suit against her former employer, TRW, in 1996 under the False Claims Act, stating that results were faked during testing of the GMD's sensor. TRW subpoenaed 38 military documents it claims are needed to prove it is not guilty. But the Pentagon says some of these documents would jeopardize national security if made public, and on Jan. 15 it invoked the state secrets privilege to keep them under wraps. Schwartz' two biggest supporters in Congress, Sen. Charles Grassley, R-Iowa, and Rep. Howard Berman, D-Calif., argued in a Dec. 3 letter to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft that the documents were not essential to TRW's defense, and they expressed concern that the state secrets privilege "may unnecessarily prevent the facts in this case from ever being tried." A hearing is scheduled for Monday, Feb. 10, to determine whether the privilege can be used in these circumstances or not.
New York Times, Feb. 3, 2003

Canadian officials were in Washington on Tuesday, Jan. 28, to discuss "what role, if any," Canada might have in the proposed U.S. missile defense system. This was strictly a fact-finding mission - no final decisions have been made, nor will any be made until Canada is formally asked, according to Prime Minister Jean Chretien. While some Canadian analysts are leery of getting involved with missile defense, others are worried about the consequences not cooperating would have on Canada's national security arrangements. Canada is part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, which may eventually be used for missile defense tracking.
National Post, Jan. 27, 2003

Testing concerns may challenge President George W. Bush's goal of getting a limited missile defense system operational by Oct. 1, 2004, says Inside Missile Defense (Jan. 22, 2003). The ground-based test bed facilities that are at the heart of the deployment decision are still considered to be research and development efforts, which may affect how the system is tested and what milestones it must pass before it can legally be considered operational. By U.S. law, major defense acquisition programs must successfully undergo operational testing before they can move into full rate production. Officially, a program receives the "major defense acquisition" designation in two ways: by being named so by the secretary of defense; or if it has a Research Development Evaluation and Training program that is estimated to cost over $15 million in constant 1990 dollars. The ground-based missile defense system and test bed upgrades are estimated to cost over $3 billion in the FY 03 and FY 04 budgets. But in the case of the layered missile defense system, which includes the ground-based test bed facilities, it was the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) that gave the designation. Nevertheless, the MDA claims it is only expanding ground-based test bed facilities' capabilities over the next two years, not moving the program into production, and therefore it does not need to seek a waiver for operational testing of the ground-based system. It remains unclear at what point, if ever, the MDA will be legally bound to carry out operational testing.

600 U.S. troops are presently in Israel as part of a training drill held every two years to test Israel's air defense network. The exercise is scheduled to finish on Feb. 2 with a live-fire Patriot test that is thought to simulate a response to an attack by Iraq. U.S. forces are to help determine the Patriot batteries' set-up times and calculate rocket trajectories, while Israeli specialists will do the actual firing of the missiles. Patriot batteries are already deployed around Tel Aviv and Haifa, with two more batteries en route from Germany. These Patriot missiles use blast-fragmentation warheads to intercept enemy missiles. U.S. officials are striving to keep a low profile in an attempt to preclude a further ratcheting up of tension in the region. After the joint exercise is over, the U.S. troops are scheduled to leave for Europe.
Baltimore Sun, Jan. 21, 2003.

No further flight tests are planned for the Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) missile defense program until this fall, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials have announced. After this fall, the MDA wants to hold five intercept tests before the technology is scheduled to be deployed by the end of FY 04, but that ambitious schedule seems fairly unlikely. The MDA has decided to skip the next flight tests, IFT-11 and IFT-12, in order to focus on developing the new booster rocket essential to the GMD program. The next flight tests will include competing booster rocket prototypes by Lockheed Martin and Orbital and will not be intercept attempts. Operational testing of the GMD system may begin in early FY 04, depending on when the services involved (Space Command, U.S. Army, and U.S. Army National Guard) can work out the details
Global Security Newswire, Jan. 7, 2003.

Israeli officials called the Jan. 5 test of the Arrow missile defense "a complete success." In Sunday's test, an Arrow-2 interceptor was launched with other materiel along a trajectory that would simulate the near-simultaneous firing of three other Arrow-2 interceptors. The test - the interceptor's 10th flight test - was to see how the Arrow could handle multiple engagement of Scuds launched from the Mediterranean. The target missiles were completely simulated. The Arrow has never been tested against an actual Scud due to safety concerns stemming from the Palmachim test facility's proximity to residential areas. Program officials hope to test the system against a Scud in the United States this summer
Jerusalem Post and Edmonton Journal, Jan. 6, 2003.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has agreed to investigate whether one of its research centers, the Lincoln Laboratory, has been involved in a cover-up of technical flaws in the Ground-based Midcourse (GMD) missile defense system. The action comes largely in response to repeated efforts over the past 20 months by M.I.T. physicist Dr. Theodore Postol urging the university to look into the matter. M.I.T. officials firmly deny the accusation, stating that "the bedrock principle for all research done at M.I.T. is scientific integrity." However, Postol disputes this, arguing that "[p]otentially, this is the most serious fraud that we've seen at a great American university." The conflict began when TRW scientist Dr. Nira Schwartz accused her company of changing the test results of the sensor then being developed for the GMD system that would discriminate between enemy warheads and associated decoys. A federally-sponsored 1998 report by Lincoln Laboratory backed up TRW's allegation that it had not faked results; it is this report that M.I.T. is now investigating. The 1998 paper was decried by Congress' General Accounting Office (GAO) in a Feb. 28, 2002, report for having relied on TRW-processed data. The GAO also determined that TRW had been "highly misleading" regarding the test performance of the sensor in question
New York Times, Jan. 2, 2003.

Lockheed Martin officials have reported that the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) program is on track for a 2004 flight test. THAAD's last flight test was in 1999 - after failing to achieve an intercept in six out of eight attempts, officials hoped to use the extra time to effectively re-tool the program. Two THAAD missiles will undergo simulated testing in 2003. Also, a new launcher is being developed that officials anticipate could be used for both the THAAD and Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 programs. THAAD currently is in its Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Missile Defense Agency officials intend to make a decision in 2007 on whether to move it to low rate initial production
Defense Daily, Dec. 13. 2002.

On Tuesday Dec. 17, President Bush announced his intention to push for deployment of some sort of missile defense system by 2004/2005. He stated that he has "directed the Secretary of Defense to proceed with fielding an initial set of missile defense capabilities." At a press conference later that day, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) head Lt. Col. Ronald Kadish clarified what this will entail. Building on top of what was known as the "test-bed facility" in Ft. Greely, Alaska, the MDA will put six ground-based interceptors there and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California (which has been involved in the test program as the launch site of the practice target missiles) in 2004. In 2005, 10 more ground-based interceptors will be fielded. By the end of 2005, 10-20 sea-based interceptors — the Standard Missile (SM)-3 — will be fielded on three converted Aegis ships, with another 15 Aegis ships dedicated to surveillance. In addition, the Lake Erie Aegis cruiser that has been on loan from the U.S. Navy for testing of the SM-3 will be handed over to the MDA.

The accelerated production of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile, decided upon during debate of the FY 03 defense appropriation, will continue as planned if Congress can agree on where it will shift the funding from (presently, a large percentage of the PAC-3 acceleration dollars were to come from the ground-based and sea-based interceptors). Radars that will be used by the newly-deployed interceptors are: a sea-based X-Band radar; upgraded Cobra Dane radars on the Aegis cruisers; and, upgraded land-based early warning radars. The latter include radars located in the U.K. (at Fylingsdale) and Denmark (more correctly at Thule in Greenland, whose external affairs Denmark manages), so those two countries were formally asked for their permission on Wednesday for the first time. Administration officials were careful to refer to this latest development as a "modest" increase in U.S. capabilities, painting missile defense as, in the words of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, an "evolutionary program, [that] will evolve over a period of time." However, critics immediately pointed out the program's lack of maturity and wondered why there was a need to rush to a 2004 deployment. CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson explains why this move is questionable in, "Deploying a Missile Defense by 2004: A Sham Defense to Meet an Artificial Deadline," which can be found in this week's issue of CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor - http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2002/issue43.html#1.

The Washington Times reports (Dec. 19) that in addition to the 20 ground-based interceptors to be deployed in Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB in California by the end of 2005, the Pentagon is considering building more interceptor sites. Maine is discussed as a possibility; also mentioned are the U.K., Poland, and Hungary. Theoretically, these additional sites would be used to counter threats from other parts of the world. Again, however, the missile defense ground-based interceptors' raw state of development may preclude them from providing much of a defense.

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) officials announced this week that they are beginning the search for a contractor to develop a ground-based kinetic energy boost phase interceptor (KE-BPI), which possibly may be followed by a space-based KE BPI test bed in 2004. The MDA plans to award up to three firm-fixed price eight-month contracts in April for a total of $10 million. After the concept development time frame is over, one contractor will be selected to develop and test the new KE BPI. This announcement is one of several steps taken recently by the United States toward weaponizing space. $30 million was appropriated for space-based kill vehicles in the FY 03 budget; also, last summer, a miniature space-based kill vehicle research and development program was established. Critics are concerned that this KE BPI program will unsettle those in this country and abroad who are leery of militarizing space. CDI Vice President Theresa Hitchens comments, "Space weaponization is a major controversial issue with almost every other country in the world now calling for a ban on such weaponry. The political fallout from such a decision is likely to be severe."
Defense Daily, Dec. 20, 2002.

The Ground-based Midcourse missile defense (GMD) program underwent a setback recently when its most recent test, Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-10, failed. On Wednesday, Dec. 11, the Raytheon-built exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) did not separate from its booster rocket, a modified Minuteman ICBM that is being used as a surrogate until a more advanced booster rocket can be developed. The failure to separate precluded the EKV from attempting an intercept of the target missile. This is not the first time the GMD's EKV has had difficulty separating from the booster rocket. In IFT-5, on July 8, 2000, the EKV also failed to separate from its booster rocket; later analysis indicated this was a result of the malfunction of the booster rocket's 1553 data bus, which gives commands to the EKV. Wednesday's IFT-10 was the first night test in the GMD flight test program. Also incorporated into the test process for the first time were the radars of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system and the Airborne Laser, both of which were used to track the target missile after its launch.

The Union of Concerned Scientists has come out with a study showing that the MDA has greatly overestimated, and perhaps even exaggerated, the results of its flight test program in statements to Congress. This analysis comes out at a time when the MDA has classified part of the information on its flight test program and overall is reducing the amount of information available for independent oversight assessment. In his testimony to Congress, MDA head Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish argues that most of the test failures could be attributed to quality control issues that prevented the interceptors from reaching their "endgame," or final stages where an interception would occur; with those problems ameliorated, Kadish has repeatedly testified, missile defense has demonstrated that it will work. UCS explains how this is not an accurate evaluation of the flight test program. The report, "An Assessment of the Missile Defense Agency's 'Endgame Success' Argument," by George Lewis and Lisbeth Gronlund, can be found at: http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/missile_defense/page.cfm?pageID=1066

The next test of the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense (GMD) program is scheduled for Wednesday, Dec. 11. Integrated Flight Test (IFT)-10 will be the first night test of the GMD flight test program. It has been timed that way in response to criticism that the flight tests are being kept deceptively simple. Nothing else will have been changed from the previous flight test, IFT-9. IFT-10 also marks the last flight test with the surrogate boost vehicle. After IFT-10, there will be a testing gap of several months - maybe even a year as the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) hurries to get a new interceptor into the test program as well as place hardware components at the Ft. Greely test-bed facility. This delivers a blow to Gen. Ronald Kadish's goal of having a flight test every three to four months and hurts MDA's chances of demonstrating that its intercepts can be reliably replicated before the 2004 goal of an "emergency deployment."
Defense Daily, Nov. 20, 2002

Defense Daily reports (Dec. 6) that the MDA has disclosed anomalies in the GMD program's flight tests. Starting in IFT-6, a glitch was identified in the GMD's exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV)'s target position estimation data, which is used to monitor and track the target during its flight so that the EKV can make an intercept. According to MDA spokesperson Lt. Col. Rick Lehner, the recurring glitch "never interfered with the effectiveness of the EKV," and can be attributed to "degraded EKV inertial measurement unit output data." Specifically, MDA believes the anomaly to be caused by electromagnetic interference into test-unique cabling. This cabling will be not be used in IFT-10 scheduled for Wednesday, Dec. 11. The GMD program has had problems with its inertial measurement unit before. CDI's GMD flight test chart at http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/tests-gmd.cfm explains how the unit's failure affected IFT-3.

Last night, the Sea-based Midcourse Missile Defense (SMD) program had an apparently successful flight test when its Standard Missile (SM)-3 intercepted a target Aries ballistic missile 500,000 feet above sea level. The target missile was launched from the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Kuai, Hawaii. It was tracked by a radar on a USS Lake Erie CG, which had 80 seconds to identify the target and launch the SM-3. The interception occurred under two minutes later while the target was during its ascent phase. The test, Flight Mission (FM)-4, marked the first of six planned flight tests geared toward developing a system that could be used if the administration decided it wanted an emergency deployment. However, it is unclear what sort of situation in which an emergency SMD deployment would be warranted, since missile defense officials have already admitted that the interceptor is too slow for boost phase intercepts. And FM-4, like all of the missile defense flight tests, was based on the interceptor and tracking system being given prior information about the target. AP, Nov. 21, 2002

The fourth intercept flight test of the Sea-based Midcourse Missile Defense (SMD) program is scheduled for today, Nov. 21. In Flight-Mission (FM)-4, a Standard-Missile-3 launched from the Aegis cruiser USS Lake Erie will attempt to intercept a target missile during its ascent phase. Tracking will be provided by the Aegis AN/SPY-1 radar. Also likely to be included in FM-4 is new software that developers hope will increase targeting accuracy of the interceptor.

Due to repeated problems with the booster rocket being developed for the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense (GMD) program, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has changed its flight test schedule to one that more accurately reflects the program's path of development. For now, MDA has been using a surrogate booster rocket in the GMD flight test program since a decision has not been made whether to go with Orbital Sciences or Lockheed-Martin for the final boost vehicle design. The most recent flight test of GMD, IFT-9, was held on Oct. 14 - two months after it originally was scheduled to occur, a delay that was attributed to mechanical problems with the surrogate rocket's motors. The next flight test, IFT-10, is thought to be held in December or January and will probably be the last flight test using the surrogate booster rocket. IFT-11 and IFT-12 were tentatively scheduled to be held this winter but now may be skipped entirely. Instead, MDA may have IFT-13A (May 2003) and IFT-13B (June 2003), tests that would separately test Orbital and Lockheed-Martin's booster rocket designs. Lockheed-Martin's objective boost vehicle would then be tested in October 2003 (IFT-14), while Orbital's objective boost vehicle would be tested in January 2004 (IFT-15). At that point, MDA is presumed to have enough information about the competing boost vehicle designs to make a decision about which company will supply the rocket for the GMD program. IFT-16, now planned to be held in August 2004, would be an intercept attempt and very likely could be a rough cut of the system that MDA hopes to deploy in Ft. Greely later that year.
Inside Missile Defense, Oct. 30, 2002

Defense Daily reports (Oct. 23, 2002) that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is planning to incorporate the Ft. Greely "test bed" facility into the Ground-based Midcourse missile defense (GMD) flight test program. After the next scheduled flight test (IFT-10, in December 2002), hardware being produced for the three flight tests after that will be brought directly to Ft. Greely to become part of the test bed. While MDA officials believe that the two to four flight tests anticipated to be held in 2003 will not be affected by this move, industry insiders think that the preoccupation with Ft. Greely may preclude another flight test from being held until at least next fall. This step taken by MDA is in response to pressure by the Bush administration to get something concrete fielded to meet its 2004 timeline.

In the missile defense debate, it is easy to lose track of how the various missile defense programs are developing. To counter this, CDI created charts detailing the successes and failures of every integrated flight test held by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). Each test's specific characteristics are spelled out, making it easier to determine whether significant progress is occurring. It is readily apparent that while advances have been made, the systems are still many tests and years away from becoming trustworthy national defense assets. Included are charts for the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense System, the Boost Vehicle for the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense System, the Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 Lower Tier Terminal Phase Missile Defense, and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Upper Tier Terminal Phase Missile Defense.
FOR THE COMPLETE TEXT, GO TO: http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/systems.cfm.

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA)'s ground-based midcourse system (GMD) had a successful intercept in its latest flight test on Monday, Oct. 14. In this test - the ninth one for the program (also known as IFT-9) - the GMD used an old booster rocket that is planned to eventually be replaced by a three-stage ICBM currently in development. IFT-9 was the program's fifth successful intercept, which certainly is an achievement. However, it must be emphasized that this test was essentially the same as earlier tests. One added element was using an AEGIS Spy-1 radar to track the missiles in-flight, but this information was extraneous to the test and was not incorporated into the GMD's battle management system. There still is the question of how much prior data was given to the system before the test intercept was attempted. Earlier tests received the flight characteristics of the targets and decoys, something that is understandable in a developmental program but unlikely to be possible during combat. It will be difficult to assess how accurately the test targets reflect actual threats since the MDA classified this portion of the program in May 2002. For an analysis of IFT-9's target set, see the Union of Concerned Scientists' review at www.ucsusa.org/security/IFT9.pdf

The New York Times describes (Oct. 6, 2002) Israel's Arrow theater missile defense system and explains how it differs from the more rudimentary Patriot missile that was used fairly unsuccessfully during the 1991 Gulf War. The Arrow, co-developed by the United States and Israel, has performed satisfactorily during most of its flight tests but has not been challenged under realistic testing situations by the threat it most likely will face in combat: the Scud. The program manager for primary contractor Israel Aircraft Industries, Danny Peretz, admits that "we know in our hearts and put it in the design that this weapon will be tested only in war." Meanwhile, the Jerusalem Post reports (Oct. 8. 2002) that the 2nd Arrow battery at Ein Shemer has been completely fielded. CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson details, in "Israel's Arrow Missile Defense: Not Ready for Prime Time," the greenness of the defensive system and argues that it cannot be considered 100 percent reliable. To read the article, go to http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/arrow.cfm.

In the latest issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, physicist Joel Primack discusses the potential damage missile defense programs could pose to satellites in low earth orbit. He posits that programs like Brilliant Pebbles could possibly create massive amounts of space debris that could irrevocably harm non-military assets in space, and calls for greater awareness of the consequences of weaponizing space. For the op-ed, "Pelted by paint, downed by debris: missile defenses will put valuable satellites at even greater risk," go to http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2002/so02/so02primack.html/

The Washington Post reports (Sept. 3, 2002) that a Defense Science Board (DSB) panel has recommended that the United States limit its missile defense work. The Bush administration has supported exploring a wide variety of technologies, a direction that the DSB panel discourages. Instead, it suggests that efforts should be narrowed in on two programs: the ground-based midcourse missile defense (GMD) and sea-based boost phase intercept. It does caution that the latter program could not be done as quickly or easily as supporters have claimed. The panel was chaired by Gen. Larry Welch and William Graham, both of whom served on the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, better known as the Rumsfeld Commission, that warned in July 1998 of a need to counter what it saw as an encroaching ballistic missile threat.

PBS' Frontline, in cooperation with Azimuth Media, Washington Media Associates, and in association with the New York Times, has created a fascinating one-hour documentary on the politics, science and history behind the U.S. missile defense programs. "Missile Wars" goes behind the scenes to investigate the multibillion dollar -- yet still unproven -- weapons system, explore the current rationale for missile defense, and probe whether it will protect America from the greatest threats it now faces. Included are interviews with supporters and skeptics of missile defense. CDI Senior Advisor Philip E. Coyle III was a technical advisor to the documentary, which will air on your local PBS station this Thursday, Oct. 10, 2002, at 9 PM EST. For more information, see Frontline's website at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/press/2104.html.

The Army's Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) is considering a new miniature kill vehicle (MKV) that could eventually be incorporated into missile defense programs. Next year, one of three competitors (SAIC-Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, or Schafer) will be chosen to begin developing a MKV that would weigh roughly four pounds. Also being explored is a low-cost interceptor, a long-time pet project of SMDC. It will announce in October a booster contract for a missile interceptor that would be used concurrently with another program like the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 to counter low-tech, less-sophisticated threats. Officials hope to at some point manufacture a low-cost interceptor for about $100,000 per missile.
Defense Daily, Aug. 26, 2002

MIT scientist Geoffrey Forden writes in the latest issue of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sept.-Oct. 2002) that the laser boost phase intercept programs being explored by the Missile Defense Agency may have unintended and possibly tragic consequences. He explains that a less-than-complete intercept of a ballistic missile during its boost phase may cause it to fall short of its American target and instead land and detonate in Europe, Turkey, or the Pacific Ocean, depending on where it was launched and how early in its trajectory it was intercepted. Forden argues that the United States and its allies should take this in consideration when looking at missile defense options because, "[it] could well result in the death of many innocent people. In the case of a successful laser intercept, the difference would be that those who were killed would not be among those who had been targeted."

Saturday’s integrated flight test (IFT-9) for ground-based midcourse missile defense has been postponed for at least 30-45 days while engineers attempt to fix problems with the Lockheed Martin booster rocket motor’s nozzle. This booster rocket is scheduled to be used for two more flight tests: a new three-stage booster rocket is supposed to be ready in time for IFT-11. However, Boeing’s boost vehicle program had undergone so many problems that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) awarded a contract to Orbital in March 2002 to develop an alternate vehicle. The delayed IFT-9 is said to include a more complex target than earlier tests, but the specifics are unknown as MDA recently classified decoy details. Also being tested in IFT-9 is a new battle management software that is to be fully integrated in IFT-10.
Defense Daily, Aug. 22, 2002

Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Pete Aldridge announced this week that the Navy is considering improvements to its sea-based missile defense program and is not ruling out developing a new interceptor. The current program, formerly known as Navy Theater Wide, uses a Standard Missile (SM)-3 missile that has been testing well, but is not fast enough to provide defense against long-range ballistic missiles or catch missiles during their boost phase, prompting officials to speculate on building a missile beyond it. The next flight test for the SM-3 is in November. The canceled Navy Area Wide program used a SM-2 Block IVA missile that was intended to provide extended air defense and theater ballistic missile defense. Because extended air defense is still part of the Navy’s mission, the FY 04 budget submission will include a request for a new Extended Range Active Missile.
Defense Daily, Aug. 22, 2002

MDA has announced that the ground-based midcourse (GMD) missile defense system will undergo integrated flight test (IFT)-9 on Saturday, Aug. 24. During this test, the Aegis SPY-1 radar will gather data on the target and interceptor; this will be independent of the radars being used to direct the interceptor to the target missile (an Orbital Suborbital Program long-range missile, which is a modified Minuteman II ICBM with a mock warhead and decoys). IFT-9 was originally planned for mid-August but was pushed back, say sources close to the program, due to a helium leak in Raytheon's Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle that would be tested. The MDA denies that there was a delay in the test schedule, claiming that since no official date had been announced, no delay could officially occur. Aerospace Daily, Aug. 14, 2002

A $900 million floating X-Band Radar (XBR) is to be built off the coast of Alaska. The sea-based radar is to be linked to up to ten ground-based interceptors based in Alaska and is planned to be part of MDA's initial "test bed" missile facility. An initial contract of $31 million has been awarded to Boeing for the preliminary design effort. MDA hopes that the maritime XBR will be in place by 2005 and that the radar will improve the quality of its ground-based missile defense testing. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 5, 2002

The modified 747 airplane that is planned to eventually host the laser for the Missile Defense Agency's Airborne Laser (ABL) program had its first flight test July 18. Held at McDonnell Air Force Base in Kansas, the successful flight lasted 90 minutes. Once all flight testing of the aircraft is completed, the plane (Aircraft 00-0001) will be sent to Edwards Air Force Base in California where an even bigger challenge awaits: getting the laser and its targeting system to fit inside the platform. At present, the developmental laser is at half the power required but already is well over the allotted weight limit.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) was asked by the House Committee on Government Reform's subcommittee on national security to investigate why the Airborne Laser (ABL) program has over-run cost and timeline estimates and whether the new techniques the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is using to correct earlier problems are working. The GAO presented the report, www.gao.gov/new.items/d02631.pdf, on Tuesday, July 16, in a hearing chaired by Rep. Chris Shays, R-Conn.

The GAO determined that the U.S. Air Force, which was in charge of ABL until October 2001, was not cognizant of the extent of the technological challenges facing the program and therefore "underestimated the complexity of the engineering task at hand and misjudged the amount of time and money that the program would need." The GAO remarked further that because some of the needed technologies are still in a very early stage of development, it is hard "even today...for analysts to estimate realistic cost and schedule goals."

As for the second issue, the GAO stated that MDA has incorporated some knowledge-based policies that other successful programs have used, highlighting an increased amount of testing and a supposedly more flexible requirements process. However, ABL program managers have not separated technical development from product development, causing GAO to note that "the agency risks beginning new and more costly activities before it has the knowledge to determine the money and time required to complete the activities." This may be part of the reason why a full system flight test has been delayed over a year until the first quarter of 2005.

Two other points of interest from the report: The GAO pointed out that the laser for the program is operating in a multi-mode during tests, but will have to function in a single-mode in a real-world situation. Thus these test results are not indicative of the laser's power output during an actual intercept attempt. Finally, the GAO remarked on the technical difficulty of accommodating the laser's weight. The current version is a six-module system that weighs 180,000 pounds; however, the original specifications called for a 14-module system that would weigh 175,000 pounds.

The Wall Street Journal (July 12) reports that the proposed space-based missile defense systems may pose a threat to America's space and satellite industries. Known as "Brilliant Pebbles" in the 1980s, space-based systems were dropped for being technologically unfeasible. However, with an administration that strongly supports a layered missile defense, there has been a sharp increase in funding for two kinds of space-based boost-phase interceptors: laser and kinetic kill vehicles. Scientists are concerned that debris caused by test explosions or actively using these systems in combat could, in the words of UC Santa Cruz physicist Joel Primack, "create a battlefield lasting forever, encasing the planet in a shell of whizzing debris that would make space near Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as military purposes."

Boeing plans to have its new boost vehicles ready for a possible 2004 "test-bed" deployment of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, says Defense Daily (July 10, 2002). Boeing's dual-booster program, supported by Lockheed-Martin, had been running so far over schedule that the Missile Defense Agency awarded a contract to Orbital in March 2002 to develop an alternate boost vehicle. The competition has spurred Boeing into restructuring its program and now it believes it can have initial versions of its boost vehicles ready in two years. The program has undergone two flight tests, one of which was a success (April 2001) and one of which was a failure (Dec. 2001).

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters and editors of the Washington Times that DoD has not chosen a timeline for a deployment of a missile defense system. He asserted that because "we're basically in a research and development mode...to put a target date out there, in an R&D, in an uncertain world like that, would not be useful." Rumsfeld would not give an estimate on the earliest a rudimentary missile defense system could be deployed, only saying that development of the various programs is "moving forward."
Washington Times, July 2, 2002

According to Missile Defense Agency head Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the Shemya site for the proposed X-Band Radar (XBR) may not be part of the final deployed missile defense system. Previously pointed to by the Bush administration as the "long pole in the tent" and used by missile defense supporters to illustrate restrictions the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty placed on research and development, the XBR at Shemya has lost its political pull. Now the MDA is looking at other sites for the powerful radar and even is considering putting it on a maritime platform. In the meanwhile, money has been shifted to upgrade the existing Cobra Dane radar, which is much weaker and only points toward Russia, to give it limited ability to monitor a flight test from the United States or a rogue North Korean missile launch.
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, June 27, 2002

Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), stated that he anticipated an increased complexity for some of the upcoming missile defense tests. Many critics of the missile defense program have worried that decisions are being made on the viability of the programs based on the results of unrealistic and undemanding tests. This will not immediately start but will be phased in gradually. For example, the ground-based midcourse (GMD) system is scheduled to have its next flight test - IFT-9 - in August, but it won't see a more technically complex test until IFT-11, which will probably occur sometime in 2003. Meanwhile, the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defense system illustrates the need for more complex testing. The system had been doing very well in developmental testing, but once it got to more difficult operational testing, it had a series of unexpected failures of relatively simple processes that MDA and the Army are still trying to figure out.
Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 24, 2002

Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, head of Missile Defense Agency, clarified in a recent Defense Week article (June 24, 2002) that the United States will not have a sea-based national missile defense by 2004, as some media sources are implying. What was successfully tested earlier this month and had been under development previously as the Navy Theater Wide program is only planned to provide sea-based defense against short-range and possibly medium-range ballistic missiles: its SM-3 missile is not fast enough to engage ICBM targets. Kadish admitted that 2004 is pushing the envelope as a deadline for the deployment of a short-range sea-based missile defense, acknowledging that a rudimentary version would more likely be deployed in 2004-2006.

A sea-based midcourse (SMD) missile defense test is scheduled for today, June 13. The kinetic kill vehicle, a Standard Missile (SM)-3, will be shot from an Aegis guided cruiser and attempt to intercept an Aries ballistic missile target. This flight test is the first designated intercerpt attempt by the SM-3; an earlier flight test in January had a successful but unplanned intercept.

The New York Times reports (June 13, 2002) that many Democrats are criticizing the Missile Defense Agency's "excessive secrecy in reporting on its tests, timetables and cost estimates." Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) worries that "Their instinct seems to be to keep everything close to the vest," while Senator Jack Reed (D-R.I.) comments that "There's a disturbing trend to not being forthcoming." Along those lines, CDI Senior Advisor Philip E. Coyle and Vice President Theresa Hitchens have both written op-eds, expressing concern about new classification rules for the ground-based midcourse missile defense flight test program. FOR COMPLETE TEXTS VISIT: http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/secrecy-shield.cfm; http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/secrecy.cfm.

The fourth and final operational test of the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile on May 30 was a partial success. In an effort to showcase the "ripple firing" doctrine, where two PAC-3s are launched against the same two-stage ballistic missile target, one PAC-3 failed to launch, while the other successfully intercepted the mock "enemy" missile. The Army is still analyzing data to discover why one PAC-3 did not launch. This was the last test before a decision will be made on putting the PAC-3 into full-rate production.
InsideDefense.com, May 30, 2002

The most recent Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 operational test on April 25 was not the successful intercept that the Army and MDA reported. At the time, it was thought that one PAC-3 missile intercepted a Raytheon Patriot being used as a target, while the other PAC-3 missile failed to launch. Said an Army statement, "Subsequent analysis indicates that the PAC-3 made contact with the target but failed to destroy it. Since the warhead wasn't destroyed, it won't be counted as a successful intercept." Two more operational tests are scheduled to take place this month.
Defense Daily, May 14, 2002

CDI Senior Advisor Philip E. Coyle, former head of the Pentagon's Operational Test and Evaluation office, has written a thorough analysis of all the missile defense programs being considered by the current administration. In the May 2002 issue of Arms Control Today, Mr. Coyle's research, "Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush," details the programs' technological development, possible initial deployment, and any problems they might encounter on the way. For complete text visit http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_05/coylemay02.asp?print.
Arms Control Today, May 2002