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When President Reagan unveiled the Strategic Defense Initiative during the early 1980s, he spoke repeatedly about his intent to share missile defense technology with the Soviet Union as a means that could ultimately lead to the elimination of offensive strategic ballistic missiles. President Bush has reiterated that position leading up to the St. Petersburg summit. What few may know is that during the past decade, the U.S. and Russian governments have quietly undertaken a joint effort that could ultimately enable the Reagan-Bush vision to become a reality. In 1992, the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization [BMDO-recently redesignated to be the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)] began discussions with Russian officials about the possibility for a joint technology demonstration program that could assist both nations in developing effective early warning and missile defense technologies. During the next several years, US and Russian officials negotiated details of the proposal, leading to an agreement in 1997 between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to proceed with the Russian American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program.
During the past decade, RAMOS has withstood repeated challenges from a variety of sources within the executive and legislative branches of the US government. This year the program is once again in danger of being terminated. Currently, the MDA is withholding funds authorized and appropriated by the Congress for FY 2002 pending the signing of a new government-to-government agreement between the U.S. and Russia. In the interest of promoting cooperation in meeting important mutual security concerns, the Bush administration and the Congress should take steps to ensure that funding is provided to keep this unique joint program alive and moving forward.
Program Objectives-Cooperation and Building Trust
In May 2001, BMDO officials briefed congressional staffers that a primary policy objective underlying the RAMOS program was to "develop with Russia, mutually beneficial space technologies for defense and civilian applications." BMDO officials further stated their intent that RAMOS would "increase trust between the U.S. and Russia", and would "establish groundwork for future cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation." Early successful scientific joint experiments in space-based observations suggested that such objectives were realistic. During the early phase of the program, the U.S. and Russia conducted the first joint space surveillance experiment in which observation data were exchanged between the two participants. Later, Russians flew an imaging radiometer on a U.S. satellite. The history of the program since 1998, however, belies the goal of cooperation. Mistrust has become rife on both sides and prospects for further cooperation, even during the current post-September 11th period of cooperation, are growing dim.
One important factor underlying the growing mistrust between US and Russian program officials lies in the instability which characterizes the weapons acquisition process. For decades, DoD officials have decried the "instability" which plagues the development and purchase of major weapon systems. Program plans and schedules are constantly revised; funding levels are continually adjusted both within DoD and by the Congress; and program schedules are frequently delayed to reflect those changes. Often, political interests in the Congress serve as the source of instability. RAMOS has a history similar to many other DoD programs in those respects. The important factor distinguishing RAMOS from other defense programs, however, is that RAMOS was conceived as an international "partnership"between former antagonists undertaken in large part to build trust between them.
Since its inception, the US RAMOS program and policy administrators have repeatedly directed significant changes to RAMOS plans, funds, and schedules with little input from their Russian counterparts. As a result, Russian officials and scientists increasingly question the validity of the "partnership" despite their government's repeated official statements supporting the RAMOS program. A brief summary of changes to program plans and objectives illustrates why.
A Summary of RAMOS Program History
The original RAMOS concept called for each country to develop its own observation satellite, both of which would be launched aboard Russian rockets into low earth orbit. The satellites, using short-, mid-, and long-wave infrared sensors, would observe and analyze various military and civilian scientific test objectives, including the firing of short-range test missiles such as SCUD missiles. Technological objectives included whether the polarization of solar glint could be used to mitigate short-wave infrared clutter for use by early warning satellites; whether missile emissions could be observed effectively against the earth's own background radiation; and whether infrared tracking could adequately observe a missile's flight pattern from below to above the horizon. The initial RAMOS plan also called for tests to observe and measure industrial effluents, volcanic plumes, and cyclonic storm activity. Under the original scheme, each nation would be responsible for constructing its own instrumentation and ground control station.
In 1998, BMDO conducted a Concept Design Review of the RAMOS program and determined that the original two-satellite demonstration program did not provide the United States with sufficient additional missile defense technical benefits to warrant moving forward with the original program plan. BMDO concluded that the political benefit of cooperating with Russia in missile defense could be achieved through other, unspecified cooperative programs. In short, without consulting with their Russian partners, DoD unilaterally backed away from the original agreement and shifted the priority of the program from "cooperation" to "operational benefit" for US space assets. Given that the technical objectives of the program are basic elements of effective missile defense not yet fully solved by MDA, the shift in priorities suggests that DoD changed its position on RAMOS for political, not technical, reasons.
The Department of Defense did not, however, abandon the program at that point. Instead, BMDO proposed to restructure it. After examining a broad range of alternatives, the DoD developed two alternative program plans on its own to discuss with the Russian RAMOS team. The first alternative proposed using infrared sensors mounted on either an American or Russian aircraft to measure and simulate mid- and long-wave infrared against atmospheric clutter against the earth's background. The second alternative was simply to provide funding to the Russians to design and test new sensors on their own. Representatives of DoD met with Russian officials in March 1999 to discuss the matter. Although the Russians did not reject those options as additions to the program, they reiterated their support for the initial two-satellite program plan to which, in their view, both Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton had agreed. When Prime Minister Primakov met with Vice President Gore in New York in March 1999, he reiterated Russian support for the two-satellite program.
In July 2000, the Department of Defense proposed a revised plan to the Russians that returned to the two-satellite format of the initial program plan, but contained some important differences. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Jacques Gansler, proposed to the Russians that they be responsible for the design, construction and launch of both satellites and supporting ground station equipment. The US, he offered, would only be responsible for providing the basic sensors, the performance of sensor calibrations, and the integration of the sensors on to Russian satellites. The Russians have not formally accepted Dr. Gansler's proposal for the restructured program, a process that has doubtless been affected by Russian reactions to President Bush's announced intent for the U.S. to withdraw from the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
The Current Situation: RAMOS Funding Being Withheld
In his letter of July 14, 2000 to his Russian counterpart, Dr. Mikhailov, State-Secretary, First Minister of Defense, Dr. Gansler stated the need to "underpin this (revised) program with a government-to-government agreement to underscore the commitment of both our governments to the program and outline our specific roles." BMDO officials have interpreted Dr. Gansler's words to mean that a new government-to-government agreement is required before the program could resume at full throttle. Consequently, BMDO officials determined that the release of Congressionally-authorized and appropriated funding for RAMOS should be withheld pending a new agreement. Of $30 million appropriated to fund Russian participation in the program for FY 2002, MDA has released only $2 million thus far this year.
While BMDO withholds critical funding for the program, the Russian side wrestles with the nature and the form of a new government-to-government agreement. During meetings in Moscow between members of the Russian RAMOS team and representatives of the Center for Defense Information (CDI), Russian scientists and officials in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs stated their view that the government-to-government agreement reached between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin for the initial two-satellite RAMOS program still pertained despite the adjustments proposed by Gansler in July 2000. BMDO officials, however, have taken the view that those adjustments are sufficiently significant that a new agreement is warranted.
Given the disparity in viewpoints on this crucial issue, it is likely to take a significant amount of time for US and Russian officials to negotiate detailed terms of a new government-to-government agreement. Meantime, MDA could effectively kill the program by withholding funds the program needs to continue. During CDI's recent meetings with US and Russian program contract personnel, both sides indicated that the technical teams that have been working side by side on the program for a number of years will soon be dissolved if funding is not made available in coming weeks. The cooperation and trust built among Russian and American technical personnel could soon be lost if the teams are disassembled. Aside from the issue of funding availability, Congressional staff familiar with the program have indicated to CDI that MDA intends to formally discontinue the program this summer if a new government-to-government agreement is not signed in the near future.
Conclusion: RAMOS Is Too Important To Cancel
The RAMOS program represents some very important national security objectives for the United States. First, it is in our interest that Russia's early warning system perform capably, reliably, and accurately. False information from Russia's anti-ballistic missile early warning system could cause an ill-advised decision or automatic response to launch retaliatory strategic missiles armed with nuclear weapons. The RAMOS program is intended, in part, to assist the Russians in meeting this very important objective which serves both nations' security interests.
Second, the RAMOS program may be particularly useful in developing technologies that are also useful in detecting, tracking, and targeting short-range tactical missiles. The dismal US performance regarding SCUD missiles during the Persian Gulf War points to the importance of this high priority goal. Finally, RAMOS provides the U.S. with an important opportunity to build trust and confidence with the nation President Bush refers to as "no longer our enemy." To the extent that the United States government will seek Russian cooperation on a broad menu of foreign policy matters, it could be very useful to point to successful joint programs such as RAMOS as evidence that both countries can work together well to achieve goals of mutual security concern.
It may well be that the troubled history of RAMOS in recent years is more than simply a manifestation of the instabilities generated by defense program management and our annual budgeting system. Despite President Bush's observation that the Cold War is over, there are many involved in the RAMOS program who appear unwilling to cooperate in the spirit of trust intended as a cornerstone to this program. Consequently, bureaucratic actions in recent years which have posed obstacles to the program may in fact reflect a more profound opposition to cooperating with our former enemy. Nevertheless, the program has managed to muddle through despite opposition. The current circumstance, however, may represent a final moment of truth unless immediate actions are taken.
There are a variety of ways to sustain RAMOS in the face of incipient cancellation. First, the Russian government could agree to sign the new agreement drafted by US officials. Russian officials, however, adamantly opposed this solution during meetings with CDI personnel. Alternatively, the Russian government could sign its own version of such an agreement and proceed to negotiate the details. In that event, in order to sustain the program, the US would have to agree to provide sufficient funding on an interim basis. CDI supports the latter as a means to overcome the current hurdle and has encouraged both Russian and American officials and elected personnel to support such an approach. If that approach is adopted, the Congress will be on much firmer footing as it considers funding for RAMOS for FY 2003 during the summer. Beyond FY 2003, however, RAMOS needs to find new procedures to ensure that the program becomes and remains "cooperative".
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