April 8, 2003

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The Patriot missile program used during the 1991 Gulf War was never intended to shoot down ballistic missiles: it was an anti-air defense system. It was created to explode near slow-moving targets like aircraft and was used simply for lack of a better alternative. As a result, the Patriots very often would either not destroy the Iraqi Scuds or only knock them a bit off their paths. As well, the poorly maintained Scuds spiraled in flight, making tracking and intercepting them very difficult. While at the time the U.S. military claimed nearly 100 percent success rate, later analysis showed that probably no Scuds were intercepted.

The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 is an updated version of the 1991 Patriot. The PAC-3's warhead is larger and it is designed to intercept Scuds at a higher altitude than it could back in 1991. The PAC-3's software and hardware is more advanced than earlier versions of the Patriot, which eases the communication between the system's radar and interceptor. Each Patriot launcher can launch 16 of the interceptors. But the biggest change from the Gulf War Patriot is that the PAC-3 is designed to be a hit-to-kill technology where the interceptor attempts to directly hit the enemy missile in flight.

According to Missile Defense Agency (MDA) head Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, the U.S. arsenal of PAC-3 interceptors ranges in the mid-50s. Each PAC-3 costs around $2.5 million. The Pentagon plans to buy 100 more PAC-3 interceptors by the end of FY 03. Primary contractors are Lockheed Martin and Raytheon. Subcontractors include Honeywell, Rockwell Collins, Boeing, ARC, and Longbow.

The military has been working on the PAC-3 program for the better part of a decade after the first Gulf War highlighted the threat short-range ballistic missiles could pose to U.S. troops abroad. While the PAC-3 has never been tested against a Scud, it had done fairly well in developmental testing, causing planners to schedule a perfunctory four operational tests in the spring of 2002, with the confident assumption that a decision could be made in September 2002 to move into low-rate initial production. To be blunt, the PAC-3 bombed operational testing. Sometimes the missiles failed to launch, other times the computer system failed to transmit target information in time, and in still others a shaky interception did not result in the destruction of the target missile. After the last test failure, MDA announced it would hold off on the low-rate initial production decision for at least a year so that follow-on testing could occur. The only thing buoying the PAC-3 presently is the impending war with Iraq. The program has been awash with funding so it can ramp up missile production in time for the expected hostilities. In the meanwhile, no new operational testing has occurred. Whatever problems plagued the PAC-3 last year most likely still exist.

http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/bmds.cfm#pac3 — The Pentagon's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation's assesses the PAC-3 program.

http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/tests-pac3.cfm — CDI's chart detailing the PAC-3 flight test program.

 

By Victoria Samson CDI Research Associate vsamson@cdi.org

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