Republished with permission from The Washington Post, Dec. 12, 2001.

President Bush's decision to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is being called a masterpiece of political timing. Announced while television stations were showing the bin Laden tapes, and with his wartime popularity high, the president's move now puts more pressure on the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization: To justify the president's action it must develop a national missile defense on a foreshortened time scale. Missile defense officials already are asking Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to approve a reorganization that would dramatically bolster their ability to act quickly and autonomously, by giving the office — to be renamed the Missile Defense Agency — wide-ranging new authority and budgetary power.

The new agency would have the authority to set military requirements for a national missile defense system, conduct tests of the system and assess the test results. Moreover, the new agency would have a strong role in determining whether to deploy its assets to achieve an emergency capability. Combining all these responsibilities in a single agency would represent a significant break with normal acquisition practice and regulation, and would eliminate normal Defense Department oversight for this major acquisition program.

Pentagon officials argue that the changes are necessary to allow greater flexibility in the development program and more consistency in its direction. But any weapons program, and especially one as multifaceted as this, faces risks in bypassing the standard development and acquisition oversight process.

First, military requirements are usually set by a body known as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, a team of experienced military leaders representing all the services. It is independent of the service or agency developing the program, and when it sets the operational requirements for new systems it bases them on the real military needs of the user — the war-fighter — rather than on the needs or perceptions of the contractors, developers or service involved. The oversight council determines the "no kidding" requirements that weapons or systems must meet, and they become the standards against which development is measured as testing proceeds.

Second, testing and assessment are usually accomplished by one or more of the services working with the independent developmental and operational test and evaluation offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. These are crucial functions that require independent technical oversight. Modern military systems are highly complex, and the average citizen or member of Congress cannot be expected to know all the details that determine whether a test is adequate, a success or a failure. Congress needs an impartial and independent review of both the adequacy of tests and the interpretation of success or failure.

The proposed reorganization of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization is silent about how independent assessment would be accomplished, saying only that it has yet to be determined. Certainly independent assessment cannot be the responsibility of the developer alone.

Third, the authority to deploy a national missile defense system is a major responsibility with domestic budgetary and international political implications. Again, it should not be left to the developer. During the Clinton administration, a review was held to determine if the missile defense system then under development was ready for deployment. President Clinton correctly came to the conclusion that it was not, and would not be for many years. The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, by contrast, recommended deployment at the time.

Granted, the proposed reorganization gives the responsibility for deciding on emergency or contingency deployment to a new Senior Executive Council, to be chaired by the deputy secretary of defense. But it will be essential for this council to have an independent review of the adequacy of developmental and operational testing, and the ensuing test results.

The draft plan also calls for streamlined decision-making, directing that the deputy secretary of defense ensure that proposed executive decisions on missile defense not take more than 10 days. Ten days is not enough time to analyze the adequacy of a test or its results. Despite eagerness to move forward with missile defense, the Defense Department and the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization must ensure time for proper analysis and review.

Usually Congress does not interfere with the internal, and seemingly interminable, reorganizations of the Defense Department. This case is different, because the move could place the responsibilities for setting requirements, development of the system and assessment of tests together in one agency. Congress should look at this closely. If the Pentagon does not establish adequate oversight mechanisms for the new Missile Defense Agency, Congress will have no choice but to establish its own independent oversight team with the proper security clearances and authority to delve into, and understand, what is real and what isn't in development and testing of a missile defense.

© 2001 The Washington Post Company

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