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Israeli citizens and politicians alike are preparing themselves for a U.S. war with Iraq, knowing that they will most likely be targeted by Saddam Hussein's missile forces. Ratcheting up the heat further was a Sept. 22 story in The New York Times that reported Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has informed the Bush administration of Israel's intent to strike back if attacked.
This departure from Israel's policy of restraint during the 1991 Gulf War can be traced to several reasons; a primary one is that Israel feels confident that its Arrow missile defense program can defend the country against volleys of Iraqi Scud missiles. While the Arrow has tested fairly well, it is a newly deployed system and its efficacy in combat against missiles with chemical or biological warheads is questionable.
The Arrow Weapon System (AWS) is a terminal-phase missile defense program jointly developed by Israel and the United States. It is supposed to provide defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The semi-permanent batteries are composed of a two-stage, blast-fragmentation warhead with a proximity fuse (the interceptor is the Arrow-2), six-canister launchers, Citron Tree fire control, Green Pines radar, and Hazel Nut Tree launcher center. Green Pine's L-band radar can detect missiles launched from as far as 60 miles away and distinguish between warheads, debris, and decoys, while the Citron Tree fire control system is supposed to be able to manage up to 14 intercepts at one time. However, it cannot track an incoming missile that has split its warhead into submunitions, prompting concerns about its possible obsolescence as long ago as 1998.
The AWS differs from other terminal-phase missile defense programs under development by the United States for protecting troops abroad. The U.S. Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 and Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors rely on hit-to-kill technology rather than explosive warheads. AWS's basing is semi-permanent; the PAC-3 and the THAAD are supposed to be rapidly deployable. AWS and THAAD have the same seeker (interestingly enough, it is the same one that was used in the now-defunct Navy Area Wide missile defense program); and AWS flies twice as fast and covers a higher altitude than the PAC-3 does.
The United States and Israel co-developed the Arrow-2 and its launcher; Israel alone developed the rest of the system. Estimates of the total development costs paid by the United States range between 40 percent and 60 percent, depending on the source. Because the United States helped develop the interceptor, Israel must receive Washington's permission to export the missile, for example to India, which has recently requested it (a request that has not yet been granted by the U.S. State Department).
The AWS still has many impediments to its maturation as a program. Over the past year, Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) has been trying to get permission to have Arrow missile components produced in the United States. This is an attempt to meet what the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) sees as an interceptor production capacity shortage; also, by bringing in a co-producer, it might make future exports easier for countries that possibly could be squeamish about conducting arms transactions with Israel. However, the Arrow system falls under Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) limitations as a Category 1, or most sensitive, technology. The MTCR is a strictly voluntary non-proliferation regime but most participants strive to abide by its rules; in this case, that would mean that the United States should not export technologies like the completed Arrow system. An industry-to-industry agreement was finally reached in January 2002 and given U.S. State Department approval in July 2002. At the earliest, U.S.-produced missile parts can be exported to Israel for final integration 20 months after a production order is received by Boeing, so Israel cannot depend on an expanded Arrow arsenal in time for a war with Iraq.
The deployment schedule of the Arrow is uncertain as well. The first battery was fielded in near Tel Aviv in October 2000. A second battery was to be deployed in northern Israel, but that was delayed for several years. Area residents feared electromagnetic radiation from the Arrow's Green Pines radar, forcing a task force by the MOD and the Ministry of Environment to investigate the possibility of carcinogenic effects. The ensuing report stated that outside of a 350-meter radius — which falls well within the bases' borders — no harm would be caused by the radar. Residents are still leery of the system but, given the political climate, have minimized their opposition. Capitalizing on this, MOD deployed a Green Pines radar east of Hadera in northern Israel in June 2002, with the battery becoming fully operational in October 2002. Eventually a third battery is to be stationed in the southern part of the country. Thus the much-vaunted missile defense system currently is composed of two batteries, which is better than nothing but cannot guarantee Israel universal protection against Scud strikes.
After struggling through some difficulties early in its development process, the Arrow has performed fairly well in its tests. However, the Arrow has never gone up against an actual Scud. In September 2000, the Arrow successfully intercepted Rafael's Black Sparrow missile, which was acting like a Scud and was launched from an F-15. A second successful intercept occurred during the ninth flight test in August 2001. An intercept test was to occur in July 2002 but has been delayed. Israeli officials are hoping to have an Arrow flight test on U.S. territory by 2004 because it will allow them to use longer-range target missiles. Right now, the primary Israeli test facility (the Palmachim Test Range) is encroaching some of Tel Aviv's suburbs. In the meanwhile, the Arrow's accuracy in war-time circumstances is uncertain.
The Arrow's intercept altitude is 40 kilometers to 100 kilometers, since it is planned to provide terminal-phase missile defense, would intercept missiles at the end of their trajectories. What this means is that if the AWS hits a warhead with a chemical or biological fill, at best it could disperse the molecules fairly high in the atmosphere. At worst, it could allow the chemical/biological agents to land in Israeli territory. In a Sept. 19 hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee, under questioning by Sen. Ted Kennedy, D-Mass., U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld admitted that the latter scenario "is a possibility."
The AWS program has potential but has not shown that it can stand alone as a defensive system. The other primary weapon that Israel might use against ballistic missiles is not really much of help. Israel does have an earlier version of the PAC-3, known as the PAC-2, but it is significantly less capable and evolved than the PAC-3 and is mostly geared toward an air defense mission. Besides, the PAC-2 was used to practically no avail during the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq's Scuds. Later analysis by Congress' General Accounting Office put the destruction rate at around 10 percent; outside experts question whether any missiles at all were intercepted by the Patriots.
Israel is doing its citizens a great disservice by depending so heavily on a system (like the Arrow) that has not been tested in realistic circumstances against actual Scuds. If Israel's new blustery posture of reprisal is based on an unwarranted faith in its ability to repel all missile attacks, then it also must be ready for the possibility that some warheads or chemical/biological agents may get through.
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