The Patriot: Its Performance So Far One of the many technologies seeing battle for the first time in Operation Iraqi Freedom is the latest version of the Patriot missile defense system. This weapon uses a hit-to-kill warhead to intercept enemy missiles and is being lauded by some as a litmus test for the effectiveness of missile defense in general. In “The Patriot: Its Performance So Far,” CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson examines what has been reported of the Patriot to date and cautions against jumping to conclusions about its lethality. Victoria Samson, CDI Research Associate Last updated April 8, 2003.

 

FACT SHEET: The Patriot The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 is an updated version of the 1991 Patriot. The PAC-3's warhead is larger and it is designed to intercept Scuds at a higher altitude than it could back in 1991. The PAC-3's software and hardware is more advanced than earlier versions of the Patriot, easing communication between the system's radar and interceptor. Each Patriot launcher can launch 16 of the interceptors. But the biggest change from the Gulf War Patriot is that the PAC-3 is designed to be a hit-to-kill technology where the interceptor attempts to directly hit the enemy missile in flight. Victoria Samson, CDI Research Associate March 20, 2003.

 

Skipping Missile Defense’s Operational Testing Is Unwarranted And Could Deliver A Death Blow To Confidence In The U.S.’s Arsenal CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson holds that, given the poor showing missile defense has had in testing thus far and its largely immature state of development, granting the waiver from operational testing requested by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld would not seem reasonable and could set a precedent where weapons are hurried into production before they have completed their testing, resulting in the fielding of unreliable systems that unnecessarily endanger American lives. From the Weekly Defense Monitor Mar. 6, 2003.

 

Managing Expectations Analysis of statements on missile defense made by administration officials and their impact on expectations for the success of missile defense programs. Plain Text Version

 

Letter from the Honorable Dianne Feinstein to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Feb. 19 correspondence from Senator Feinstein to Secretary Rumsfeld regarding a proposed waiver that, if granted, would allow selected missile defense programs to skip operational testing.

 

Misconduct and Missile Defense: How Boeing Engineers Lost the EKV Contract

In a Jan. 27, 2003, letter to Rep. Howard Berman, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that Raytheon’s design for the ground-based midcourse’s exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) was not chosen because it was necessarily the best technologically, but because of Boeing’s misuse of proprietary information. The Department of Defense spent $800 million over eight years to determine whether Boeing or Raytheon would win the EKV contract, only to be forced to hastily call off the competition in December 1998 and award it to Raytheon after discovering Boeing employees had misused proprietary software of Raytheon’s. Boeing’s EKV would be kept on as a “hot back-up” and funded at about $4 million per month until three months after the fourth EKV flight test, held in January 2000. No punitive actions were ever taken against Boeing. CDI Research Associate Victoria Samson looks at the contract’s tortuous history.

 

	Small election: Big consequences? How Greenland may block the United States from fully deploying its missile defense program.
	The unexpectedly strong showing of independence groups in Greenland's recent parliamentary elections may cause the Danish government to become hostile toward incorporating a local radar site into the planned U.S. missile defense system.

 

US Space Policy: Time to Stop and Think

It has now become obvious that the administration of President George W. Bush is rapidly reconsidering U.S. policy regarding weapons in space, moving away from past restraint toward a more aggressive posture. What is missing, however, is a strong strategic rationale for breaking the long-standing international taboo against weaponizing space. U.S. policymakers need to seriously consider whether doing so is worth the long-term economic, political and military costs. From Disarmament Diplomacy, October-November, 2002, opinion and analysis by CDI Vice President Theresa Hitchens.

 

Missile Defense Flight Tests

The following charts detail the successes and failures of all missile defense integrated flight tests held by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). CDI looks at each test, examining its specific characteristics and determining whether it signifies serious progress forward. Included are charts for the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense System, the Boost Vehicle for the Ground-based Midcourse Missile Defense System, the Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 Lower Tier Terminal Phase Missile Defense, and the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Upper Tier Terminal Phase Missile Defense.

 

Israel's Arrow Missile Defense: Not Ready for Prime Time Victoria Samson, CDI Research Associate Last updated Oct. 9, 2002

Israeli citizens and politicians alike are preparing themselves for a U.S. war with Iraq, knowing that they will most likely be targeted by Saddam Hussein's missile forces. Ratcheting up the heat further was a Sept. 22 story in The New York Times that reported Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has informed the Bush administration of Israel's intent to strike back if attacked. This departure from Israel's policy of restraint during the 1991 Gulf War can be traced to several reasons; a primary one is that Israel feels confident that its Arrow missile defense program can defend the country against volleys of Iraqi Scud missiles. While the Arrow has tested fairly well, it is a newly deployed system and its efficacy in combat against missiles with chemical or biological warheads is questionable.

 

Drawing the Line: the Path to Controlling Weapons in Space From Disarmament Diplomacy, Sept. 2002

The United States has more interests in space assets than most countries. If history is any guide, the military will press for strike weapons to defend those assets, control space, and ultimately be able to wage war in space. CDI Senior Advisor Philip E. Coyle and John B. Rhinelander envision the leadership role the United States should play in arms control for space, and hold that the United States would retain a net benefit under an arms control regime prohibiting space weaponisation.

 

UAVs and Boost Phase Intercept Victoria Samson, CDI Research Associate Sept. 13, 2002

The concept of using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to counter ballistic missiles during their boost phase has been floated by the Israelis for the past five years or so. Until recently, the United States was more interested in using other platforms for that mission, prompting Israel to switch its sights to using UAVs to take out launch vehicles on the ground instead. However, the popularity of UAVs in Afghanistan has brought this issue back into the U.S. funding debate over missile defense.

 

Space Weapons: More or Less Security?

U.S. moves to weaponize space would come laden with a wide array of risks across the strategic, military, political, and economic spectra. At the same time, space assets are becoming more important to U.S. military operations and more vulnerable. By Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President. First appeared in Future Security in Space: Commerical, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occaisional Paper #10, published by the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the University of South Hampton. Available in PDF only. July 2002

 

	Coyle Testimony on Missile Defense Testing, June 11, 2002
	Prepared Statement by CDI Senior Advisor and Former head of Pentagon Operational Test and Evaluation Philip E. Coyle III, for his appearance before the House Government Reform Committee, National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee, at its June 11, 2002, Special Investigations Briefing on Missile Defense Testing

 

	Why The Secrecy Shield?
	The Pentagon has made a decision that threatens to keep the American public and Congress in the dark about how things are going with the Bush administration's high-priority missile defense program. Washington Post op-ed by CDI Senior Advisor and Former head of Pentagon Operational Test and Evaluation Philip E. Coyle III. June 11, 2002

 

	A Possible Outlook on the "New Framework" of Strategic Relations Between Russia and the United States
	From CDI Moscow's Views from Moscow, analysis by Maj. Gen (Ret.) P. S. Zolotarev, former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Defense Council

 

	Trust But Verify: What Will New Missile Test Secrecy Hide? Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President First appeared in Defense News May 27, 2002
	As Congress raises concerns about proper oversight of the Pentagon's missile defense program, news that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) will now classify some test results as secret is raising eyebrows.

 

U.S. and Russian Cooperation on Missile Defense: How likely? The Troubling Story of the Russian American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) Program Dr. G. Wayne Glass, CDI Senior Advisor May 29, 2002

President Reagan spoke repeatedly about his intent to share missile defense technology with the Soviet Union as a means that could ultimately lead to the elimination of offensive strategic ballistic missiles, a position reiterated by President Bush leading up to the St. Petersburg summit. What few may know is that during the past decade, the U.S. and Russian governments have quietly undertaken a joint effort that could ultimately enable the Reagan-Bush vision to become a reality. At the same time, RAMOS has had to withstand repeated challenges from a variety of sources within the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. This year the program is once again in danger of being terminated.

 

	Rhetoric or Reality? Missile Defense Under Bush Philip E. Coyle, CDI Senior Advisor Arms Control Today May 2002
	Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President Presentation to the Ballistic Missile Defense and the Weaponization of Space Project, Space Policy Institute and Security Policy Studies Program, Elliott School of International Affairs George Washington University. April 18, 2002
	Nunn-McCurdy Amendment As part of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Representative David McCurdy (D-OK) included language intended to limit cost growth in major weapons programs. Known as the Nunn-McCurdy amendment, the language called for the termination of weapons programs whose total costs grew by more than 25 percent above original estimates, unless they were certified as critical systems by the Secretary of Defense or if the cost growth was attributable to certain specified changes in the program.
	"The Unknown Spiral: Oversight Scheme Threatens Acquisition" Theresa Hitchens, CDI Vice President, argues in this Op Ed that the Pentagon's new approach for speeding weapons acquisition increases the risks that the military will buy faulty, overpriced equipment. The application of spiral development to the Bush administration's revised missile defense development program is especially troubling, as it raises the specter of wasteful spending on unready technology. Defense News — Inside View, March 11-17, 2002
	Assessing the Threats - CDI Monograph Reviewed Review of Accessing the Threats.
	Assessing the Threats, July 2002 A review and comparison of emerging threat perceptions around the world in the wake of the events of Sept. 11, 2001. Assessing the Threats examines strategic thinking in the United States, Western Europe, Russia and Northeast Asia. Edited by CDI senior fellow John Newhouse, the new book features analysis by Newhouse, Thérèse Delpech, Alexei G. Arbatov, Dr. Ivan Safranchuk and Yoichi Funabashi. Evident from the five essays is a global concern about the proliferation of new methods for delivering nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.
	DOT&E FY 2002 Annual Report: Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS); Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
	In January 2002, the Secretary of Defense created the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and consolidated the ballistic missile defense programs under the new agency. The rationale behind this decision was the creation of a comprehensive, integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) that provides a layered defense capable of countering threat missiles in all phases of flight.

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