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U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Final Congressional Approval is
Conditioned on Future Steps by India and Two International Organizations
By George Bunn
Dec. 20, 2006
At their meeting in India in July of 2005, President George W. Bush and Indian
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh agreed that the United States and India should
resume cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy matters. Their cooperation had
ended in 1974 after the Indians conducted a nuclear explosion which the United
States concluded was a nuclear weapon test.
The United States was angered by India’s 1974 test. This was because, starting
in 1964, the United States had provided nuclear technology and equipment to
India not for weapons but for civilian nuclear reactors and other peaceful
purposes. Pursuant to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT), India had been classified as a “non-nuclear-weapon state” because
it had not exploded a nuclear weapon before 1967, the cut-off date in the NPT
for defining what countries that join the NPT are permitted to have nuclear
weapons. Only Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States satisfied the NPT’s definition of “nuclear-weapon state” because they had
tested before 1967.
If India had joined the NPT then, it would have been prohibited by the treaty
from developing nuclear weapons. It did participate in the negotiation of the
treaty, but refused to join when the treaty was opened for signature in 1968.
Instead, in 1974, it exploded a nuclear device.
The adverse U.S. reaction in Congress to this nuclear explosion produced
amendments in 1978 to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These required that a
“non-nuclear-weapon state” that received nuclear assistance from the United
States must promise not to use that assistance to make nuclear explosive
devices, as Congress thought India had done. Pursuant to these 1978 amendments,
India was classified as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Congress had been angered
by the 1974 Indian test because Congress had authorized U.S. nuclear assistance
to India for peaceful purposes, not for weapons. Because of the 1974 test,
Congress prohibited the U.S. Executive Branch from providing further nuclear
assistance to India.
In 2005, however, President Bush offered Indian Prime Minister Singh uranium for
India’s non-military, electric-power-generating, nuclear reactors -- not for its
nuclear weapons. In return, Bush proposed, India would place these reactors
under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) just as the
peaceful reactors of non-nuclear-weapon countries are required by the NPT to be
under IAEA inspection to see that they are not being used, for example, to
produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Under the Bush proposal, India would
also, of course, pay for the uranium. In addition, it would continue its
current moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing and cooperate with the United
States in other ways. After achieving this tentative agreement with Prime
Minister Singh, Bush called upon Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act’s
prohibition on U.S. nuclear assistance to India so that he could carry out the
agreement. Before the end of its 2006 session, Congress did so. It approved a
bill authorizing the negotiation of a new U.S.-India nuclear cooperation
agreement.
President Bush signed the bill into law with a statement that he could, if he
chose, ignore one of the bill’s provisions: In the bill, Congress had asked the President to certify that India was not transferring nuclear material or
technology to Iran. Bush responded to this provision by interpreting it as only advisory.
What this may mean for future implementation of the new statute by the Bush
Administration is unclear.
This new statute amends the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to authorize the U.S
government to supply India with low-enriched uranium for India’s peaceful
nuclear power reactors. Under 1978 amendments to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act,
American nuclear cooperation with another country must be approved by Congress,
either by votes of approval in both houses of Congress followed by approval by
the President, or by submission to Congress of an agreement for nuclear
cooperation authorized by the Act, followed by a waiting period to see if there
is formal objection from either house of Congress.
In the case of the Bush-Singh agreement, the administration did not submit the
text of a formal nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress because none had yet
been negotiated. Moreover the terms for the agreement proposed in the
Bush-Singh talks did not fit the 1978 Atomic Energy Act amendments. Instead,
the administration submitted to Congress draft legislation which would amend the
Atomic Energy Act to permit the kind of nuclear cooperation agreement with India
that Bush and Singh had talked about. The administration’s bill would have
authorized a future agreement with India -- leaving the final terms in
considerable part to the U.S. and Indian governments to negotiate—without any
requirement for final approval of terms of the agreement by Congress.
Members in both houses of Congress, however, objected to providing what some
called a “blank check” for negotiations with India without any review of the
agreement by Congress. Under the Atomic Energy Act, U.S. agreements for
peaceful nuclear cooperation are to be with nations that have no nuclear
weapons. Before they are implemented, they must be submitted to both houses of
Congress to see if there is objection. Unless Congress can find enough time to
review and vote on the agreement, it can (and the agreements often do) go into
effect after a 60-day waiting period without any approval by Congress. But
this statute authorizes such a procedure for agreements with nations not having
nuclear weapons, not with India which has nuclear weapons. Thus, a different
procedure was required if the U.S.-India agreement was to be approved by
Congress. That was what President Bush asked for and Congress provided, but,
with much stricter approval conditions than Bush sought.
In this new statute, Congress insisted upon having an opportunity for reviewing
whatever final agreement the administration negotiates with India. It demanded
that, before it considers whether to give approval to that agreement, the
agreement be submitted for approval to both the IAEA and to the international
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The IAEA would be responsible for inspecting the Indian nuclear reactors used
for peaceful purposes, those that would receive nuclear fuel from the United
States. India must now negotiate an agreement with the IAEA containing
provisions for IAEA inspection of the reactors used by India for peaceful
purposes.
Under the bill passed by Congress in December of 2006, the NSG must also approve
the U.S.-India deal. The NSG must consent to the export of nuclear material to
India that the agreement calls for. Since NSG decisions to approve exports
require consensus, and since some NSG members have already objected to the
U.S.-India agreement, this condition may be difficult to meet. But both the
United States and India have been seeking to persuade NSG members to support the
agreement at their next meeting, now scheduled for April of 2007.
Other provisions of the legislation enacted in December of 2006 are relevant
here. The administration’s proposal to Congress would have given the president
the authority to waive some provisions of the Atomic Energy Act for future
agreements authorized by the current Bush-Singh proposals. The
administration’s bill would have provided that future agreements with India
submitted to Congress pursuant to a new U.S.-India agreement and not acted
upon within 90 days would be considered approved. However, Congress refused
to give the president this much discretion because, said the conference
committee responsible for the final draft, “in practice, it is very difficult to
secure passage of such resolutions within 90 days.”
The conference committee added,
| “[Under the administration’s bill,] a nuclear cooperation
agreement with India would come into force automatically unless both
Houses of Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval. In
effect, the administration’s proposal would have given it excessive
latitude in negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement with India,
leaving Congress with little ability to influence the terms of the
agreement…Both [House and Senate committees responsible for such
agreements] rejected this approach believing that the
administration’s proposal did not provide for appropriate
congressional oversight over what was, by any measure, an
unprecedented nuclear cooperative relationship with India.” |
The House-Senate Conference Committee also agreed to
statutory language against any future nuclear weapon test by India, though it
expressed no opposition to future testing by the United States. Both
countries have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but neither has
ratified that treaty. The administration’s proposed text of legislation to
authorize the U.S.-India deal had not dealt with nuclear-weapon testing. The
conference committee report said:
| [T]he conferees believe that there should be no ambiguity
regarding the legal and policy consequences of any future Indian
test of a nuclear explosive device. In that event, the President
must terminate all export and re-export of U.S.-origin nuclear
materials, nuclear equipment, and sensitive nuclear technology to
India. The conferees expect the President to make full and
immediate use of U.S. rights to demand the return of all
nuclear-related items, materials, and sensitive nuclear technology
that have been exported or re-exported to India if India were to
test or detonate, or otherwise cause the test or detonation of, a
nuclear explosive device for any reason…” |
Along with this warning to India, the conference committee
report expressed what it called the “widely held view in both the House and
Senate that peaceful nuclear cooperation with India can serve multiple U.S.
foreign policy and national security objectives….”, including “ensuring that
NSG guidelines and consensus decision-making are upheld.” The NSG is an
international committee of about 45 industrialized countries that supply nuclear
materials and technology to other countries. Its purpose is to achieve a
consensus on what should and should not be supplied to countries not having
nuclear weapons since many such supplies could contribute to the making of
nuclear weapons. In addition to seeking enforcement of the NSG guidelines by
other countries, the conference committee urged compliance by the Bush
administration in its nuclear export decisions with these guidelines.
Assuming India accepts the terms of this new American law,
the next steps will be to negotiate a formal U.S.-India agreement, and to submit
that agreement to the NSG for approval and to the IAEA for the negotiation of an
inspection agreement for the Indian reactors used for peaceful purposes, the
ones that would be supplied with uranium fuel by the U.S.-India agreement..
Assuming the NSG approves that agreement, its text must also be submitted to
Congress for formal approval.
The new statute’s requirements concerning the NSG could
become a deal-breaker. The statute says that before the U.S. supplies nuclear
materials to India for its civil energy program, the NSG must have “decided by
consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines
of the NSG and [that] such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with
any other non-nuclear-weapon state that does not have IAEA safeguards on all
nuclear materials within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out
under its control anywhere.” India will not be required to have such safeguards
on uranium separated from ore from its own mines, uranium that it uses to make
nuclear weapons.
The statutory language requiring consensus for NSG approval
quoted at the beginning of the preceding paragraph looks impossible to satisfy
by NSG consensus unless some NSG members change positions from those they took
on the proposed deal at an informal NSG-member meeting in March of 2006. At that
meeting, of the over 40 NSG members who were present, only France, Russia, the
U.K. and the U.S. expressed support for accepting India into the NSG and for
approving the Bush-Singh agreement. Several non-nuclear-weapon countries
expressed objections. Many took no position. (All the NSG members are
non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT except for China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom and the United States).
The NSG Guidelines emphasize that their purpose is
to prevent contributions of material and technology to “an unsafeguarded nuclear
fuel-cycle activity.”
In countries having nuclear weapons, that typically includes the nuclear
fuel-cycle activities that are not subject to IAEA inspection because they
are not used “for peaceful purposes,” within the IAEA’s definition of that
term. Though France, Russia and the United Kingdom supported the U.S.
position at the informal NSG meeting in March of 2006, the twenty-seven other
NSG members who were present at the meeting opposed the U.S.-India proposed
agreement, asked questions about it without taking a stand, or remained silent.
Note that the new statute requires that the NSG decide “by consensus” (its usual
decision-making procedure) to permit the supply of the NSG-covered materials to
India by the United States. Judging by the positions some NSG members took
earlier this year, several members must change their views if the U.S.-India
agreement is to be approved. The U.S. and India are presumably negotiating with
NSG members to support the agreement. Much remains to be done before a final
agreement negotiated by the Indian and U.S. governments can be accepted by the
IAEA, the NSG and the U.S. Congress.
George Bunn was the first General Counsel to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and served as the senior U.S. legal advisor during
the drafting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr. Bunn is a
past director and board member of the Lawyers Alliance for World
Security (LAWS), and currently serves as a consulting professor at the
Stanford Institute for International Studies.
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