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Bush Agrees to
Provide Nuclear Assistance to India: Will Congress Approve?
By George Bunn
Sept. 19, 2005
President Bush and Indian Prime
Minister Singh issued a joint statement in July of 2005 which called for a
return to U.S.- Indian cooperation in peaceful nuclear matters. This cooperation
had ended in the 1970s after India conducted a nuclear test, allegedly for
“peaceful purposes.” Starting in1964, and based in part on technology and
equipment provided for peaceful purposes by the United States, Indian scientists
had secretly learned how to create nuclear explosives.1
As a result, India declined to join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1968 (NPT) which would have prohibited it from testing or acquiring nuclear
explosives.
2
Later, in 1974, India exploded a nuclear device, which it said was “for
peaceful purposes.”
3
An adverse U.S. reaction to the 1974
Indian test helped produce amendments to the U.S. Atomic Energy Act in 1978.
These require a non-nuclear-weapon state that receives U.S. nuclear assistance
to guaranty that the assistance will not be used to make a nuclear explosive
device. The statute defines “nuclear-weapon state” to include only the five
nuclear-weapon states of 1967 (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States).4
These are the five permitted by the NPT to have nuclear weapons. Thus, if the
1978 statute is to be followed today, India must be treated as a
non-nuclear-weapon state, and the strict export licensing procedures and
requirements for non-nuclear-weapon states must be applied (including the
submission of a proposed agreement to Congress which can disapprove it or do
nothing -- in which case the agreement can go into effect).
Could President Bush authorize
nuclear exports to India if this procedure was followed and his decision was
submitted for review by Congress for a 60-day period of continuous session, as
the statute requires? The Bush-Singh joint statement, not yet in the form of
an agreement to be submitted to Congress, calls for the United States to
provide important U.S. nuclear exports to India, something that has not happened
since the Indian test of 1974 because of U.S. anger produced by the test which
produced the 1978 statute. Even if Congress accepted India as a
non-nuclear-weapon state
for U.S. export purposes as the1978 statute requires, would the exemption
advance U.S. nonproliferation policy as the statute also requires?5
In their talks, President Bush
promised Prime Minister Singh that he would seek “agreement from Congress to
adjust U.S. laws and policies” to permit the changed nuclear relationship with
India.6 Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said later that “special approval from
the U.S. Congress” will be required.7
The president, he said, promised nuclear cooperation with India, “a responsible
state with advanced nuclear technology,” so that it could “acquire the same
benefits and advantages as other such states.”8 This seems to mean accepting India as a nuclear-weapon state though the 1978
statute, still on the books, says otherwise. Whether the “special approval from
the U.S. Congress” is expected to be in the form of acceptance of the exports
under the existing legislation (under which India would have to be treated as a
non-nuclear-weapon state) or in the form of a new statute approving the exports
to India, is not clear. The first step will probably be consultation with
important members of Congress.
The next step will probably be to
negotiate a formal agreement with India dealing with nuclear cooperation.
Then the formal agreement will have to be authorized by Congress, through the
Atomic Energy Act procedure outlined above, or by enactment of a new statute, or
by putting the agreement in the form of a treaty for submission to the Senate
for a two-thirds vote.
Will
Congress approve President Bush’s proposal? A major debate is likely.
1
Sharon Squassoni, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for
Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (July 29,
2005), p.1.
2
See George Perkovich, “India’s Nuclear Bomb,” (U. of CA. Press 1999),
pp. 104, 115, 118-19, 124, 127, 137-39.
3
See Sharon Squassoni, supra, at p.1.
4
42 U.S. Code Sec. 2153(a) (2). See Squassoni, supra, at p. 5.
5
See Squassoni, supra, pp. 5-7.
6
Text of India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, Indo-Asian News
Service, Washington, DC, July 19, 2005.
7
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns, “Administration to Seek Congress
Support for Nuclear Pact with India,
http://USINFO.STATE.GOV, July 22, 2005.
8
Text of India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, supra.
George Bunn was the first General Counsel to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and served as the senior U.S. legal advisor during
the drafting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr. Bunn is a
past director and board member of the Lawyers Alliance for World
Security (LAWS), and currently serves as a consulting professor at the
Stanford Institute for International Studies.
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