The purpose of
this memorandum is to question President George W. Bush’s reasons for
refusing to follow a number of provisions of the Henry J. Hyde United
States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006 (hereinafter
“U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act”). An earlier
memorandum described the history of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation
agreement.
This memorandum describes President Bush’s written justification for
refusing to follow several provisions of the Act, and our analysis of
that justification.
In his oral
bill-signing statement to reporters and members of the public, President
Bush praised the bill he was signing.
He did not mention his disagreements with Congress on several of the
provisions of the bill. However, in a separate written signing
statement not referred to in his oral statement to the press and public,
he made clear that he, not Congress, conducts foreign policy and
therefore has the greater say on what that policy should be. Referring
to the statute’s §103, entitled “Statements of Policy,” Bush declared:
“Given the Constitution’s commitment to the presidency of the authority
to conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs, the executive branch shall
construe such policy statements as advisory.” Thus, he concluded, he
will not follow some of the provisions of the new statute: “My approval
of the Act [by signing it] does not constitute my adoption of the
statements of foreign policy in the Act as U.S. foreign policy.”
Some of his
disagreements were with initial sections of the Act which were described
by Congress as “Sense of the Congress” and “Statements of Policy.”
President Bush indicated that the executive branch would give these “due
weight” but did not have to follow them.
He described other disagreements with specific requirements of the Act.
For example, the Act contains a long list of international nuclear
policies “which,” the Act says, “shall be the policies of the United
States,” including acting “in a manner fully consistent with the
Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers … developed by the NSG [Nuclear
Suppliers’ Group] and decisions related to these guidelines….”
The NSG was organized by the United States many years ago and has been
important for establishing common export policies of its members in an
attempt to avoid specified nuclear exports to countries likely to use
them to make nuclear weapons.
Based on its list
of nuclear policies Congress said the United States should follow, the
United States should deny U.S. shipments of nuclear fuel to India if the NSG does not first approve the shipments. The president’s written
signing statement indicated his position that he does not have to accept
such an NSG decision if he does not want to. In his view, he, not the
NSG or the Congress, is responsible for U.S. foreign policy in nuclear
matters, and he, therefore, can decide to export uranium and other
nuclear supplies to India even if the NSG fails to approve the
shipments. Construing the Act as requiring approval by the NSG would
raise “a serious question…as to whether the provision unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power to an international body [the NSG],”
President Bush’s written signing statement said. It added: “In order to
avoid this constitutional question, the executive branch will give [this
and provisions of the new law prescribing foreign policy only the] due
weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should
require to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy.” According
to the President, the foreign policy of the United States is set by the
president and his executive branch, not by the Congress.
In addition,
President Bush’s written signing statement said, “the executive branch
shall construe this and other provisions of the Act that mandate,
regulate, or prohibit submission of information to the Congress … or the
public, … in a manner consistent with the President’s constitutional
authority to protect and control information that could impair foreign
relations, national security, the deliberative processess of the
Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s constitutional duties.”
In other words, the President not the Congress sets foreign policy, and
the President not the Congress decides what information can be disclosed
consistent with that foreign policy as well as with the national
security and other policies of the executive branch. Note that in this
broadly inclusive statement, the President also said that he
might not have to provide even Congress with some of the information
about U.S.-India nuclear cooperation that his administration possessed.
Another provision
of the new statute is designed to prevent nuclear weapon testing by
India. It is more than a statement of policy. It says that benefits to
India from the statute “shall cease to be effective if the President
determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the
date of the enactment of this [Act]”
Like the United
States, India has not tested for some years, and Congress wanted to be
sure that this moratorium on nuclear testing continued. A leading
Indian Member of Parliament, not of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s
party, replied that India already had a “self-imposed moratorium on
nuclear testing in perpetuity.” But, said Prime Minister Singh, India
would not accept a prohibition on testing from the United States.
President Bush, in his signing statement, did not say what he would do
if India tested nuclear weapons.
As mentioned
above, in his signing statement, the president indicated that the
executive branch would “construe,” presumably as being ineffective, some
provisions of the Act that call for, or prohibit, submission of
information to Congress, to an international organization or to the
public. In his view, apparently, control of information on nuclear
affairs is his responsibility, not that of Congress. He said he would
control the relevant information “in a manner consistent with the
President’s constitutional authority to protect and control information
that could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s
constitutional duties.” This
limitation on the statute’s requirement that the Executive provide
information to Congress would seem to give the president authority to
withhold information important to the establishment and governance of
U.S. foreign policy -- not just from the public but from the Congress.
In past practice,
much information kept from the public by the executive’s classification
policies has nevertheless been supplied to congressional committees
(which typically observe the executive’s classification policies). Is
the president planning to cut back on the information supplied to those
committees?
Going beyond the
provision regarding the submission of information to Congress, can the
U.S. president now pick and choose which provisions of the new law
enacted by Congress to govern U.S.-India nuclear relations are to be
observed by the executive branch, and which are not? Is this consistent
with the U.S. Constitution? An expert panel of the American Bar
Association (ABA) said recently:
| The original
intent of the framers [of the Constitution] was to require the President
to either sign or veto a bill presented by Congress in its entirety.…
The plain language of Article I, §7, clause 2 (Presentment Clause) [of
[the] Constitution] compels this conclusion. …There is not even a hint
that the President could sign or veto part of a bill and elect to
enforce a law that differed from the one passed by Congress. ….
President George Washington confirmed the clear understanding of the
[bill-signing] clause when he declared that a bill must be approved in
all its parts or rejected in toto. |
But
what of the president’s supposed primacy in foreign affairs, looked to
for justification of the apparent attempt to now pick and choose which
provisions of a new law, enacted by Congress to govern U.S.-India
nuclear relations, are to be observed by the executive branch, and which
are not? This, too, is certainly not what the drafters of the
Constitution intended, according to an expert who has examined historic
records of our Constitutional Convention and its predecessor:
| Any examination
of the Articles of Confederation [that preceded the Constitution] and
the records of the constitutional convention [that drafted the
Constitution] makes clear the almost universal agreement [on the meaning
of the text of the Constitution relating to U.S. foreign policy] among
the Founding Fathers that the control of foreign affairs was a
legislative, not an executive, function. |
Executive practice in making and implementing foreign policy, and the
frequent acceptance by Congress of that practice, have modified this
broadly stated conclusion, but have certainly not gone as far as
President Bush has gone in this and other bill signing statements.
An
American president typically now has more to do with foreign policy than
does the Congress. This is clearly true of the implementation of
foreign policy. It is less true for the creation of foreign
policy.
Often, but not always, the creation of foreign policy is in the hands of
the executive branch. But Congress still has ultimate authority over
major issues of foreign policy. Defiance of the will of Congress (as
that will is expressed in a statute) while negotiating agreements with
foreign governments is certainly unusual. Indeed, the anticipated
U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement will be submitted to Congress
for approval if President Bush follows the statute just passed by
Congress and signed by him. If the U.S.-India agreement is clearly
inconsistent with the statute that has just been enacted to authorize
its negotiation, that could well make approval by Congress unlikely --
unless the U.S.-India agreement is modified or the decision of Congress
is modified. Will the President simply refuse to submit such an
agreement negotiated with India to the Congress for approval, and then
authorize, without congressional approval, the implementation of the
U.S. obligations created by the agreement? That would be clear defiance
of the will of Congress.
The
purpose of the U. S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act is to
provide congressional authority for the president to negotiate an
agreement with India that would otherwise have been prohibited by an
earlier statute. As mentioned above, the anticipated U.S.-India
agreement will probably be what is classed as a “congressional-executive
agreement” if it fits the statute just enacted to authorize it. Under
past State Department practice, the President may conclude such an
agreement on the basis of existing legislation.
The new statute provides the legislation. But it says that the
agreement to be negotiated with India can come into effect “only if both
Houses of Congress pass a joint resolution of approval within 90 days”
of the submission of the agreement to Congress.
To
use its provisions as authority to carry out his negotiations, the
president must observe those provisions.
This
requires that the negotiated agreement be submitted to Congress for a
stated period while Congress decides whether to accept it without more,
or to hold hearings to gain further information -- including other views
than those of Executive Branch. If Congress decides to hold
further hearings, the agreement cannot go into effect under the Act
until Congress authorizes the president to put it into effect.
Will
President Bush comply with these requirements?
* George Bunn was the first General Counsel to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and served as the senior U.S. legal advisor during
the drafting of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Mr. Bunn is a
past director and board member of the Lawyers Alliance for World
Security (LAWS), and currently serves as a consulting professor at the
Stanford Institute for International Studies. Professor Bunn is
co-editor and a contributing author of the recently released U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy:
Confronting Today's Threats, published by Brookings Institution Press
and Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperations (CISAC), available through
http://fsi.stanford.edu/publications/
us_nuclear_weapons_policy_confronting_todays_threats/.
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