Introduction
~
Key elements of Resolution 1696
~
In-depth highlights and key passages
~
EU-3, P5+1 and the vote/ current UNSC
membership
~
Links
Introduction
Addressing the Iranian nuclear matter,
expressing concerns about proliferation
risks, gaps in knowledge, and a lack of
sufficient cooperation and compliance
from Iran, the UN Security Council (UNSC)
on July 31, 2006, adopted UNSC
Resolution 1696 (2006) by a vote of
14-1. Resolution 1696 demands a
suspension of Iranian uranium
reprocessing and enrichment and full
compliance with steps required of Iran
by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors,
including transparency measures that
could go well beyond anything required
by traditional safeguards. Resolution
1696 takes the historically rare step of
explicitly invoking Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, under which it is believed
the UNSC can legislate international law
by imposing requirements legally binding
on UN member states.
Click here to read Resolution 1696 in
PDF format.
Rather
than UNSC involvement being an
“either-or” proposition as compared with
other efforts to resolve the matter,
Resolution 1696 continues to reinforce
International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)-based efforts as well as
multilateral diplomatic initiatives
spearheaded by Europe’s “EU-3,” Britain,
France and Germany, in consultation with
the United States, Russia and China as
well as the European Union (EU) itself.
Under
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
there have been concerns about gaps in
the inspections regime. Some effort has
been made to provide for moderately more
aggressive inspections under the
Additional Protocol, which in Iran’s
case has been signed but not ratified.
With Resolution 1696, however, at the
request of the IAEA Board of Governors
the UNSC is using its authority under
the UN Charter to require Iran, as a
matter of international law, to submit
to whatever transparency measures are
deemed necessary by the IAEA.
Technically Iran could be required to
submit even to unannounced snap
inspections, as well as IAEA demands to
visit facilities, obtain documents or
interview individuals not currently
subject to safeguards. As a legal,
political and practical matter this move
is an important step forward to subject
proliferation-sensitive situations to
rule of law and provide for much more
robust nonmilitary options to “nip”
potential threats “in the bud” before
they arise to a more potent level of
threat. Such a move is therefore not
simply preemptive, but rather preventive
and proactive.
The UN
Charter grants the UNSC broad discretion
to investigate and address even emerging
matters impacting international peace
and security, or in some cases even mere
potential sources of international
friction. UNSC authority exists
independent of arrangements under the
NPT or Statute of the IAEA. In
addition, the IAEA Statute envisions the
IAEA working in partnership with the
UNSC to report matters impacting peace
and security, in addition to reporting
safeguards noncompliance. While
isolated voices have attempted to argue
that the second, noncompliance-reporting
requirement, is limited to IAEA
projects, the IAEA Statute mandates such
reporting in instances of noncompliance
with safeguards under arrangements
requested by the parties to the IAEA
Statute. The NPT and the entire NPT
safeguards regime is such an
arrangement. In any event, as
mentioned above, in addition to
noncompliance reporting, under the IAEA
Statute UNSC notification by the IAEA is
mandated for matters impacting peace and
security. And, as mentioned above, the
UN Charter grants the UNSC broad
discretion to investigate and address
even emerging matters impacting
international peace and security,
authority that would apply even to
states not parties, or no longer
parties, to the NPT.
As the
Iranian matter has unfolded in the past
several years the IAEA Board and UNSC
have moved incrementally. For example,
in the fall of 2005 the IAEA Board made
findings that UNSC referral was required
under both IAEA Statute bases for
referral but delayed considering
the timing of the referral. In the
spring of 2006 the IAEA Board began the
process of reporting the matter to the
UNSC, and spelled out steps it requires
from Iran, including steps over and
beyond the bare minimums required by NPT
safeguards. But the IAEA Board deferred
a full-fledged referral for another
month to await an additional IAEA report
and provide Iran more time to cooperate.
When a
full referral was made, that referral
incorporated by reference past reports
and IAEA Board resolutions, including
the findings of the existence of a
matter impacting peace and security as
well as safeguards noncompliance. This
past spring the UNSC first spoke by
consensus with
a March 29, 2006, Presidential statement
(a non-binding statement of policy by
the rotating UNSC Presidency on behalf
of a consensus of the entire UNSC) that
embraced the IAEA and the IAEA Board’s
position. Now, with Resolution 1696 the
UNSC has spoken with the full force of
international law.
The way
forward has included both the IAEA and
UNSC remaining seized of the matter, and
has been taken in parallel with a
multilateral diplomatic initiative
involving the EU-3, Britain, France and
Germany, leading the way in consultation
with the United States, Russia and
China, as well as to some extent the
European Union (EU) itself. The G8 also
spoke to the issue at the recent G8
summit, reinforcing the stance and role
of the P5+1, the IAEA and the UNSC.
Economic
sanctions would place Iran between a
rock and a hard place. Threats to cut
off oil may backfire, given Iran’s
dependence on oil revenue, and,
astonishingly, Iran is itself dependent
on the West for gasoline, because of a
lack of Iranian refinery capacity and
problems with how Iran regulates its own
domestic gasoline consumption.
Of
greater concern for Iran, however, may
be Israeli action against Iranian proxy
Hizbollah in Lebanon. While past debate
over military action against Iran has
centered around notions of preemptive
war and strikes against nuclear
facilities, the legal situation has
always been more complex, with
accusations of a possible Iranian
connection to violence inside Iraq, the
“house arrest” harboring of senior
al-Qaeda figures inside Iran, and
Iranian support for terrorist groups
like Hizbollah. Whether Israel has ever
thought the road to Tehran leads through
the Bekka Valley is not known, but given
unlawful, indiscriminate rocket attacks
on Israeli civilian targets by
Hizbollah, proliferation concerns
surrounding Iran may be focusing as
strongly on Iranian rockets and missiles
as on the Iranian nuclear program.
In any
event, now is the time for diplomatic
engagement and comformity by all parties
to rule of law. While the NPT speaks of
a right to develop nuclear energy, that
right is conditioned by a commitment to
nonproliferation and cooperation with
safeguards. The NPT does not address
whether a right to nuclear energy
includes the entire nuclear fuel cycle,
including weapons-sensitive components.
In any event, UNSC authority to address
matters of international peace and
security transcends any NPT right to
develop nuclear energy.
Key
elements of Resolution 1696:
-
invokes Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, making its provisions
mandatory as a matter of
international law
-
declares the intention to impose
economic sanctions on Iran under UN
Charter Article 41 in the event Iran
has not complied with UNSC
Resolution 1696 by Aug. 31, 2006
-
demands Iran suspend uranium
reprocessing and enrichment and
carry out other steps required of it
by the IAEA Board of Governors
-
essentially requires Iran to submit
to whatever transparency measures
are requested by the IAEA
-
requires member states to halt or
refrain from trade with Iran, with
respect to sales to Iran relating to
uranium reprocessing or enrichment,
or ballistic missile technology
-
endorses the EU-3-led,
P5+1/EU-backed diplomatic effort,
including the incentives package
Iran supposedly still is considering
-
further endorses the work of the
IAEA and IAEA Board of Governors,
and directs the IAEA
Director-General to continue to
report to both the UNSC and IAEA
Board in parallel, requesting he
submit a report Aug. 31, 2006, to
follow up on Iran’s compliance or
noncompliance with this resolution
-
notes
that the Iranian nuclear program
presents proliferation concerns,
including gaps in knowledge and a
lack of sufficient Iranian
cooperation, and that the UNSC has
responsibility for international
peace and security, and that there
is an NPT-based right to nuclear
energy conditioned on conformity
with nonproliferation requirements
Highlights:
Invoking Chapter VII for mandatory
impact
~
Sanctions
~
Endorsing IAEA required steps, including
enrichment suspension
~
Steps required of third parties
~
Diplomatic initiative
~IAEA
key
~
Aug. 31 deadline
~
Proliferation risks/ UNSC role/ NPT
right to energy conditional/
Transparency gaps
Invoking UN Charter Chapter VII to make
requirements mandatory
The UNSC
invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
declaring it was:
“Acting under Article 40 of Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations
in order to make mandatory the
suspension required by the IAEA …”
Note that
while the text specifies a motivation to
make mandatory a suspension of uranium
enrichment and processing, when the UNSC
indicates it is acting under Chapter VII
the resolution also leads into a broader
series of demands.
Enforcement teeth: economic sanctions
for Iranian noncompliance
UNSC
resolution 1696 warns that Iranian
noncompliance by Aug. 31, 2006, will
result in economic sanctions under UN
Charter Article 41:
8.
Expresses its intention, in the
event that Iran has not by that date
[Aug. 31, 2006] complied with this
resolution, then to adopt appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations to
persuade Iran to comply with this
resolution and the requirements of the
IAEA, and underlines that further
decisions will be required should such
additional measures be necessary
Endorsing IAEA required steps and
suspension of key nuclear fuel cycle
activities
The UNSC
is demanding Iranian compliance with
steps required of it by the IAEA Board
of Governors, including suspension of
uranium processing and enrichment:
“1. Calls upon Iran
without further delay to take
the steps required by the IAEA
Board of Governors in its
resolution GOV/2006/14, which
are essential to build
confidence in the exclusively
peaceful purpose of its nuclear
programme and to resolve
outstanding questions,
“2. Demands, in this
context, that Iran shall suspend
all enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities,
including research and
development, to be verified by
the IAEA,
Those
required steps are quoted below; the
following quote is from an IAEA Board of
Governors resolution of Feb. 4, 2006,
which UNSC Resolution 1696 incorporates
by reference, in the process throwing
the weight of the UNSC behind it and,
under the circumstances and nature of
the UNSC resolution, according the
required steps the full weight of
international law:
[the IAEA Board of Governors:]
1. Underlines that outstanding
questions can best be resolved
and confidence built in the
exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran's programme by Iran
responding positively to the
calls for confidence building
measures which the Board has
made on Iran, and in this
context deems itnecessary for
Iran to:
-
re-establish full and
sustained suspension of all
enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities,
including research and
development, to be verified
by the Agency;
-
reconsider the construction
of a research reactor
moderated by heavy water;
-
ratify promptly and
implement in full the
Additional Protocol;
-
pending ratification,
continue to act in
accordance with the
provisions of the Additional
Protocol which Iran signed
on 18 December 2003;
-
implement transparency
measures, as requested by
the Director General,
including in GOV/2005/67,
which extend beyond the
formal requirements of the
Safeguards Agreement and
Additional Protocol, and
include such access to
individuals, documentation
relating to procurement,
dual use equipment, certain
military-owned workshops and
research and development as
the Agency may request in
support of its ongoing
investigations
“Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran: Resolution adopted on 4 February
2006,” International Atomic Energy Board
of Governors resolution, GOV/2006/14,
Feb. 4, 2006,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf
Note that
the UNSC has essentially required
inspections on demand, requiring Iran to
“implement transparency measures, as
requested by the Director General …which
extend beyond the formal requirements of
the Safeguards Agreement and Additional
Protocol, and include such access … as
the Agency may request.”
Endorsing Diplomatic Efforts
UNSC
Resolution 1696 explicitly supports the
diplomatic efforts of the EU-3, working
in cooperation with UNSC permanent
members the United States, China and
Russia (together forming the P5+1, the
UNSC veto-wielding permanent five
members plus Germany) along with the
European Union (EU), of which the EU-3
are also components:
Endorses, in this regard, the
proposals of China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom
and the United States, with the support
of the European Union’s High
Representative, for a long-term
comprehensive arrangement which would
allow for the development of relations
and cooperation with Iran based on
mutual respect and the establishment of
international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s
nuclear programme….
Resolution 1696 encourages Iran to
re-engage with the international
community, supports a diplomatic
solution, but indicates such a solution
should guarantee that Iran’s nuclear
program is peaceful, and that Iranian
compliance with the above-mentioned
steps, especially suspension of
proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel
cycle activities, would represent
necessary progress.
Steps
required of other states: trade embargo
of proliferation-sensitive items
UNSC
resolution 1696 also imposes obligations
on other states, to halt trade with Iran
in the area of reprocessing, enrichment,
and ballistic missile technology:
“5.
Calls upon all States, in accordance
with their national legal authorities
and legislation and consistent with
international law, to exercise vigilance
and prevent the transfer of any items,
materials, goods and technology that
could contribute to Iran’s
enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities and ballistic missile
programmes,
IAEA
still key
Rather
than UNSC involvement and IAEA
investigations being an “either-or”
proposition, Resolution 1696 makes clear
the two partners within the UN system
continue to work in synergy:
6.
Expresses its determination to
reinforce the authority of the IAEA
process, strongly supports the role of
the IAEA Board of Governors, commends
and encourages the Director General
of the IAEA and its Secretariat for
their ongoing professional and impartial
efforts to resolve all remaining
outstanding issues in Iran within the
framework of the Agency, underlines
the necessity of the IAEA continuing its
work to clarify all outstanding issues
relating to Iran’s nuclear programme,
and calls upon Iran to act in
accordance with the provisions of the
Additional Protocol and to implement
without delay all transparency measures
as the IAEA may request in support of
its ongoing investigations
Aug.
31 deadline
Resolution 1696 sets an Aug. 31, 2006,
deadline for IAEA Director-General
Mohamed ElBaradei to report back on
Iranian compliance or noncompliance:
7.
Requests by 31 August a report from
the Director General of the IAEA
primarily on whether Iran has
established full and sustained
suspension of all activities mentioned
in this resolution, as well as on the
process of Iranian compliance with all
the steps required by the IAEA Board and
with the above provisions of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of
Governors and in parallel to the
Security Council for its consideration
Proliferation risks, UNSC responsibility
for peace and security, NPT nuclear
energy right conditional, gaps in
transparency
Among its
prefatory remarks the UNSC also:
-
expressed concern about
proliferation risks presented by the
Iranian nuclear program
-
noted
the UNSC’s primary responsibility
under the UN Charter for the
maintenance of international peace
and security
-
reaffirmed a commitment to the NPT
and an NPT-based right to nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes for
those states in conformity with NPT
requirements
-
noted
with serious concern IAEA reports
and board resolutions citing
outstanding issues, concerns and
gaps in knowledge about the Iranian
nuclear program, including issues
with a possible military nuclear
dimension, and that the IAEA is
unable to conclude that there are no
undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in Iran
EU-3,
P5+1 and the Vote
Resolution 1696 was proposed by UNSC
permanent members France and the United
Kingdom (UK), plus Germany. Note that
Germany is not currently a UNSC member
but has been mentioned as a possible
future permanent member, along with
Japan. (Interestingly, it was Japan
that provided leadership on a recent
UNSC resolution dealing with North
Korean missile tests.) At the same
time, France, the UK and Germany
represent three of the most important
countries in the European Union (EU).
Those three form the EU-3 spearheading
the diplomatic initiative with Iran,
with input from UNSC veto-wielding
permanent members the United States,
Russia and China. The five permanent
members and Germany together are
referred to as the P5+1, and apparently
EU officials also are weighing in on the
process.
The vote
results for Resolution 1696, setting out
the current UNSC membership, follow,
with each state’s name linking to the
web site for its UN mission. For
non-permanent members, the year
following in parenthesis is the year the
members UNSC term expires.
Voting
for Resolution 1696:
Permanent, veto-holding members:
United States
Russian Federation
China
France
United Kingdom
Non-permanent members
Japan
(2006)
Greece(2006)
Slovakia
(2007)
Denmark
(2006)
Argentina
(2006)
Peru
(2007)
Congo (Republic of the)
(2007)
United Republic of Tanzania
(2006)
Ghana
(2007)
Voting
Against
Non-permanent member
Qatar
(2007)
(the only Arab state currently on
the UNSC)
Links
and further reading:
Evelyn
Leopold, “UN
says Iran must suspend nuclear program
by August 31,” Reuters, July 31, 2006,
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=
topNews&storyID=2006-07-31T223540Z_01_N20226640
_RTRUKOC_0_US-NUCLEAR-IRAN-UN.xml
“Security
Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium
Enrichment by 31 August, or Face
Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions:
Resolution 1696 (2006) Adopted by Vote
of 14 - 1 ( Qatar), Iran Says Peaceful
Programme No Threat, Council’s
Consideration Unwarranted,” UN Security
Council news release SC/8792, July 31,
2006,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm
“Statement by the President of the
Security Council,” March 29, 2006,
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N06/290/88/PDF/N0629088.pdf?OpenElement
“UN
Security Council Resolution on Iran,”
State Department press statement, July
31, 2006,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/69755.htm
“UN
Security Council demands that Iran
suspend nuclear activities,” UN News
Centre, July 31, 2006,
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=
19353&Cr=iran&Cr1=
Marc
Wolfensberger, “Iran's
Threat to Cut Oil Flow in Nuclear
Dispute May Backfire,” Bloomberg, Aug.
2, 2006,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601070&sid=ayxk6vSDx2ik&refer=home
