Stockpile Stewardship

On September 24, 1996, President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Addressing the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations, he outlined the treaty's spirit and intentions and described it as "the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history...."(1) Indeed, calls for a CTBT have been a mainstay since the 1950's through numerous United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, as well as preambular language in the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Calls for a CTBT were even a campaign issue in the the 1956 presidential elections.

The CTBT was envisioned as a means of capping horizontal and vertical proliferation. It was also to serve as a stepping stone to successive arms control agreements. This is reflected in the Treaty's Preamble, "Recognizing that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects."(2)

By specifically stating that the CTBT "constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament," the nuclear weapon states (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China) can argue that they are fulfilling their NPT commitments. Article VI of the NPT obligates the nuclear weapon states "to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."(3) Throughout the Cold War the nuclear weapon states largely ignored these commitments. Pressure from nonnuclear weapon states, however, has steadily grown in recent years to finally make true on the NPT.

This pressure was clearly evident at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT. To secure nonnuclear weapon states' support for the Treaty's indefinite extension, the nuclear weapons states were obligated to adopt the document "Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." This paper reaffirmed the nuclear weapon states commitments to disarmament in much stronger language, "The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination. In this regard, the nuclear-weapon states reaffirm their commitment, as stated in article VI, to pursue in food faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament."(4) Although such word play may seem inconsequential to the lay reader, in the diplomatic realm, it is a very important step forward.

Now, forty years after the initial calls were raised, progress towards a CTBT and nuclear disarmament appear to be being made. Although the CTBT today is not a disarmament treaty, enthusiasm is still warranted. It will significantly constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons while protecting the environment. However, the CTBT still has formidable hurdles to overcome before it can enter into force.(5) Moreover, its effectiveness and long term viability is threatened by the United States multi-billion dollar Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program (SBSS) whose purpose is a polar opposite to the goals espoused in the CTBT and the NPT.

What is Stockpile Stewardship?

To secure support for a CTBT, President Clinton made what many see as a Faustian bargain with the Departments of Defense and Energy. In a July 3, 1993 radio address, he announced "to assure that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, the reliability, and performance of our own weapons."(6) Through a November 1993 Presidential Decision Directive and Congressional Resolution (P.L. 103-160), the Department of Energy (DoE) was directed "to establish a stewardship program to ensure the preservation of the core intellectual and technical competence of the U.S. in nuclear weapons."(7) It is classified as science based as opposed to the traditional test based approach to nuclear weapons testing.(8) In other words, a program to keep the nuclear weapon designers active in a post CTBT environment.

The stated goal of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is to ensure the "safety and reliability" of the United States nuclear forces through hydrodynamics tests, computer simulations and predictive modeling, and tests on nuclear weapon components. Its companion program, Stockpile Management, will preserve the U.S. ability to rapidly remanufacture nuclear weapons and ensure an adequate supply of tritium.(9)

A Department of Energy report explains, "Because the world is uncertain and global nuclear threats persist, the program [SBSS] must provide: The ability to reconstitute U.S. nuclear testing and weapon production capacities (consistent with Presidential directives and the Nuclear Posture Review), should national security so demand in the future."(10) As a result, the Nevada Test Site will remain operational and able to resume full scale nuclear testing at the push of a button.

DoE rhetoric touting safety and reliability is a smokescreen crafted to blur the real intentions of SBSS: maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal indefinitely with continued improvements. Documents from the Department of Energy and the National Laboratories emphasize that nuclear weapons are permanent fixtures and that there will be no further reductions or moves toward elimination. A report from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory states current plans "to enhance the structural integrity of the W87 [warhead] so that it may remain part of the enduring stockpile beyond the year 2025 and will meet anticipated future requirements for the system."(11) Indeed, one would be pressed to find a single reference to a world free of nuclear weapons even as an "ultimate goal."

President Clinton further underscored the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons in a 1995 written statement, "As part of out national security strategy, the United States must and will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against out vital interest and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In this regard I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States."(12)

Clinton further explained that each year DoE was to certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear forces. If "a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type… critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, I would be prepared… to exercise our supreme national interest rights under the CTBT in order to conduct whatever testing might be required."(13) Giving the National Laboratories, who have a vested interest in the design and development of new nuclear weapons, an authoritative say in whether the U.S. should succeed from the CTBT raises serious questions over conflicts of interest.

The right to abrogate all constraints on nuclear weapon design, development, and production is key to SBSS. DoE argues, "This [SBSS] strategy must allow for a weapons complex (design, development, and production) to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile and support the nation's nuclear deterrent in the future.... This long-range strategy should protect the national security option to develop new nuclear weapons."(14)

By keeping the Nevada Test Site operational and nuclear weapon design specialists active, the United States announces to the world that it is not committed to the spirit of the CTBT, Article VI, or nuclear disarmament. The U.S. should follow the French lead and permanently shut down its testing facilities. This, however, does not appear likely. In 1995, DoE awarded a $1.5 billion five year contract to the Bechtel Nevada Corporation to manage and operate the test site.(15)

Funding for SBSS is estimated at three to four billion dollars each year for the next ten years. It entails nine new programs with the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT), and the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) being of primary importance. It also entail a series of "sub-critical" tests to be conducted underground at the Nevada Test Site.

DoE argues that these programs are essential to determine safety and reliability. These terms are often used interchangeably, but there are profound differences that must be understood. Safety refers to measures to prevent the unexpected release of large amounts of nuclear energy from the warheads. Reliability, however, is a question of whether a nuclear weapon will detonate at its advertised yield. If a 1 megaton nuclear weapon were to explode at 950 kilotons, for example, it would be classified as unreliable.

Guaranteeing the safety of U.S. nuclear forces from accidental or unauthorized detonation or radioactive dispersal should be rigorously maintained. Insurance through multibillion dollar facilities and conduction of "subcritical tests," however, is specious. In testimony before Congress, Dr. Harold Smith, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy stated,

I am please to report the stockpile today is safe, secure, reliable, and meets current military requirements. We make that statement with confidence today for the immediate future.... Our stockpile is becoming safer and more reliable simply because we are retiring older weapons.... Thus, we should enter the 21st century with a modern, sage, and reliable stockpile consistent with the demands of START I and with anticipated military requirements.(16)

The assurance was given in the absence of SBSS. Maintaining the safety of our nuclear forces is not contingent upon the proposed facilities.

Some have justified SBSS by arguing that increases in the knowledge of nuclear physics will spin off to safety enhancements. While there are grains of truth to this position, any marginal gains to future safety must be weighed against the immense cost of building new facilities and potential detriments to antiproliferation efforts. The United States nuclear arsenal has already been thoroughly tested. Safety can be insured through rigorous monitoring. New facilities are not needed.

Classification systems over reliability raise questions over what the role of nuclear weapons in the post Cold War are. If their fundamental role is to deter other nuclear weapons, such accurate measurements of reliability are unnecessary. An "unreliable" nuclear weapon would still be capable of horrific destruction. Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western States Legal Foundation argues, "High confidence in the precise performance of nuclear weapons is unnecessary for purposes of deterrence, that is, the threat of second use to prevent another State's first use. No country on earth doubts that a U.S. nuclear weapon would probably explode and do major damage if dropped on its territory."(17) Greg Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group adds, "perfect reliability is not essential to deterrence. The technical—as opposed to the political and psychological — requirements of deterrence consists only of providing any aggressor with enough confidence that U.S. weapons might explode to deter his attack" (emphasis original).(18)

Demanding high confidence in reliability is only necessary if the purpose of nuclear weapons is to perform devastating first strikes on an opponents "hardened" targets. It has been observed that neither the Pentagon nor the Energy Department has clearly explained what the role or purpose of nuclear weapons are in the post Cold War.(19) Any role beyond strict deterrence would be a violation of Article VI commitments.

The National Ignition Facility

The National Ignition Facility will be located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California. Its primary purpose is to maintain core teams of weapons designers. Inside a football-sized complex, the NIF will simulate conditions, temperatures, and pressures experienced during the first milliseconds of a nuclear detonation. Tests would involve firing 192 simultaneous laser beams at a pellet of tritium and deuterium, heating it to 200 million degrees Fahrenheit, compressing the pellet to 20 times the density of lead, fusing the atoms, and releasing energy much as the sun does. For three one-billionths of a second, the 192 lasers will be able to generate 500,000 billion watts of energy. It is estimated to cost $1.8 billion to construct and operate the lasers over their 15 year lifetime.(20)

Laser fusion from the NIF would mimic processes found in the "secondary" stage of boosted thermonuclear weapons. These experiments will do little to preserve or enhance the safety of nuclear weapons, but will advance weapon designers knowledge of nuclear physics substantially. Principally, it will demonstrate the effects of radiation released from a nuclear explosions on various weapon components, materials and systems.(21) This data could be used to design nuclear weapons with greater reliability, survivability, and lethality.

A draft study by the Department of Energy's Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation sought to alleviate concerns over the NIF. It began,

Any ICF [Internal Confinement Fusion] facility raises generic issues of proliferation because some of the computer codes that are used to predict behavior of an ICF target have much in common with codes used to design boosted primaries and secondaries and because ICF activity increases the size of the community of international scientists who are knowledgeable about some of the basic physics processes that occur in nuclear weapons.(22)

The Energy report correctly identifies concerns, but fails miserably to persuade skeptics that NIF is not a threat to proliferation. It continues, "Two factors will mitigate the risk of horizontal proliferation from NIF for all countries: U.S. classification restrictions will preclude access to information from NIF that could be specifically useful for weapons development. ICF data is of substantially less value for weapons purposes to states not having access to full-scale nuclear weapon test data."(23)

Concerns about proliferation have little to do with the security surrounding data generated by the NIF. States pursuing nuclear weapons will not be seeking the advanced designs derived from NIF information, but rudimentary nuclear weapons. The concern is that conducting NIF experiments perpetuates the sentiment that the U.S. is ignoring its Article VI commitments. Such a message complicates U.S. efforts to roll back nuclear weapon programs of the "threshold three"—Israel, India, and Pakistan.

It sends the message that the strongest nation in the world views nuclear weapons as indispensable to its national security. If the most powerful state in the world needs them, many smaller powers might conclude that they do as well. Second, despite DoE assertions, restrictions on data exchange are unlikely to be enforced. The U.S. has offered to share data with France and Great Britain in the past, and will likely continue this policy. These states do not have the resources or technological infrastructure to maintain advanced laboratory testing facilities. Thus to ensure their continued support for the CTBT, the U.S. will likely share data with them.

India has been a vocal critic of the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation policies which divides the world into "nuclear haves" and "nuclear havenots." New Deli has denounced SBSS and the CTBT as a western ploy to move nuclear testing into complex laboratories that only the rich industrial nations can afford. The 184 states who have signed the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states suggests that the majority of the international community is not troubled by the two tier category, and India has found little backing for its position. Yet if the U.S. continues to ignore its NPT commitments, this sentiment could easily change. If anything, the U.S. should refrain from policies that lend credence to India's position.

Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility

Another ambitious undertaking of the SBSS program is construction of the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at Los Alamos National Laboratory. Estimates for construction are $48 million.(24) Hydrodynamic tests, commonly referred to as "subcritical" nuclear explosions, study the characteristics of materials in motion under severe compression, but do not entail the release of energy. They are called 'hydrodynamic' because in these experiments solids and metals seem to flow like liquids.

In a nuclear explosion, the fissile core, composed of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium-239, is uniformly compressed until a critical mass is reached. At this point, there is a tremendous release of energy. In hydrodynamic tests, a critical mass is prevented by replacing the core with either depleted uranium or plutonium-242. Data collected from these tests then allow weapon designers to study how components of a nuclear weapon react up to the very point that a nuclear explosion would occur.

DARHT will study how nuclear weapons behave at high temperatures and pressures. By using Pu-242 or other non-fissile material, exact replicas of existing nuclear weapons will be manufactured and exploded without fear of a nuclear reaction. This way, the United States can successfully argue that it is not violating the letter of the CTBT.

If completed (further construction has been blocked by court action), DARHT "would produce radiographic images with significantly higher spatial resolution and illumination intensity than are possible with present facilities. The dual-axis capability of DARHT would provide data on implosion symmetry as a function of time."(25) Data collected will then be compared with computer predictions, enabling designers to improve computer models. This will give weapons designers more precise information about implosion than has been available before by taking X-ray pictures at two directions and significantly advance the accuracy of computer models.

Subcritical testing at the Nevada Test Site

Six subcritical tests, akin to those conducted by DARHT, are slated for the Nevada Test Site's Low-Yield Nuclear Explosions Research (LYNER) facility. The first, code named "Rebound" was originally scheduled for June 18, 1996, during the height of the CTBT negotiations in Geneva. Public and diplomatic protest, however, convinced President Clinton to postpone the 1996 tests, but not to cancel them.

The tests will be conducted over 900 feet below ground using 50 to 500 pounds of explosives to blow apart plutonium or uranium. The purpose is to determine how these materials react as solids, liquids and gases under various temperatures, pressures, and densities.(26) The tests are estimated to cost $20 million each. The data collected would be of interests only to nuclear weapon designers. Because these tests are conducted underground they complicate CTBT verification. They are also seen as highly suspect by the international community.

By conducting subcritical tests, the United States threatens to institute a dangerous precedent. Specifically, since these tests may involve plutonium-239, they open doors to further proliferation. Other states, who are prohibited from conducting nuclear explosion tests under the CTBT and NPT, will have the right to conduct subcriticals as well. Furthermore, as Greenpeace's Bruce Hall comments, "Experiments designed to assess the long-term reliability of the plutonium in the United States' nuclear weapons tell the world that—disarmament rhetoric aside—our nuclear weapons are here to stay."(27)

Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative

In the absence of explosive nuclear testing, weapon designers will depend on high speed computational models, simulations, and projections incorporating data from previous full scale nuclear test explosions and data generated from other SBSS programs. The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI), a collaborative program with other governmental agencies and the private sector, is estimated to cost $2 billion.(28) ASCI will contribute little to ensuring safety of nuclear weapons, but will contribute much to research into new designs. A DoE report comments, "Nuclear simulation and computer models, bench marked with historical nuclear test data and results from laboratory experiments, will be the principal tools for assuring stockpile performance in the future" (emphasis added).(29)

ASCI will develop computers capable of performing 1.8 trillion operations per second. The ability of ASCI to assist in the development of new nuclear weapons is reflected in concerns expressed by the General Accounting Office and various Republican officials over proposed exports of similar computers to Russia.(30) They are upset that these computers would be used to design new and more destructive nuclear weapons—precisely what the U.S. will likely do.

Whether or not transfer of high speed computers would be detrimental to U.S. security is beyond the scope of this paper. The United States ability to design new weapons, however, could complicate further disarmament arrangements with Russia and China. These states lack the technical infrastructure to compete with the U.S. in "laboratory designed" nuclear weapons.

During the CTBT negotiations, China lobbied hard for a treaty exempting "peaceful nuclear explosions," (PNE) which are indistinguishable from weapon tests, in order to compensate for their lack of advanced facilities. On June 6, China announced that it was dropping its calls for PNE, but only with the understanding that the issue will be revisited in a treaty review conference scheduled for 2006.(31) If Chinese and Russian strategists believe that SBSS is giving the U.S. a strategic edge, they are likely to demand the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. Or, they may see the U.S. continued advances in nuclear weapon design as a situation representing a threat to their supreme national interest and decide to withdraw from the treaty. Such a scenario cannot be ruled out.

The Future

SBSS is designed to perpetuate U.S. nuclear forces through a strategy of using past nuclear test data in combination with future, nonexplosive nuclear tests and aggressive application of computer modeling, experimental facilities, and simulators. Proponents argue that SBSS does not violate the letter of the CTBT and comment that, in accordance with the Pentagon's 1994 Nuclear Posture Review, there will be "no new design warhead production." They further reason that since the national laboratories cannot test nuclear weapons, there will be little incentive to design new ones.

One must be wary of DoE assurances that SBSS facilities are incapable of designing weapons that the DoD would accept into the arsenal without nuclear testing. Obviously, facilities do not design nuclear weapons, people do. The concern is not so much with the facilities, but the temptations they will present to scientists, the DoE, and the DoD. Although 100% confidence in new weapons cannot be assured without full scale nuclear testing, SBSS facilities will enable scientists to come remarkable close. If the U.S. should withdraw from the CTBT, certification would be possible after only a few explosive tests.(32) It would be naive to think that research in this area will not be pursued.

Assertions over what constitutes "new design warhead production," is very ambiguous. The Nuclear Posture Review never defines what constitutes a new nuclear weapon design, leaving it open to wide interpretation. Consecutive modifications of an existing warhead, for example, could significantly enhance its capabilities and still not be considered a new weapon design.(33) Such a loophole will likely be exploited.

A multi-billion dollar SBSS program in violation of U.S. NPT obligations is not necessary. Deterrence could be preserved by simply remanufacturing nuclear weapons of existing designs if necessary. This is the purpose of SBSS companion program, stockpile management. Substantial modifications of nuclear weapons are only necessary if their purpose is to wage a nuclear war.

The Department of Energy, however, adamantly denies the feasibility of insuring the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons by simply remanufacturing components. A DoE report states, in part,

Precise replication would not always be possible because deviations from original specifications would occur as a result of interrupted commercial supply bases for specific materials and products. Changes in commercial technology, such as electronics, are frequent, and previously available parts and devices are discontinued. Materials and manufacturing processes are modified to meet more stringent environment, safety, and health standards. In addition, remanufacturing alone would not permit stockpile improvements to address reliability or safety concerns. Perhaps most important, remanufacturing would not retain the required breadth and depth of nuclear weapon expertise and judgment that will be needed to address future concerns about the safety and reliability of an aging stockpile. Therefore, we conclude that remanufacturing alone is not sufficient to maintain and manage the enduring U.S. stockpile.(34)

The DoE arguments against remanufacturing are based almost exclusively on the constraints it would present on new designs. Moreover, their assertions that replicating nuclear weapons when safety or reliability concerns arise is not feasible are belied by a 1987 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory report examining the effects a CTBT would have on deterrence policy,

There is only one example in the history of the U.S. stockpile in which the production of a nuclear warhead was terminated and then it was subsequently remanufactured. Although some difficulty was experienced in remanufacture as a result of the unavailability of certain materials, these difficulties were successfully overcome. Confidence in the efficacy of remanufacture was such that the replicated warheads were certified for stockpile without requiring a nuclear test.(35)

The report continued that, "if one starts with a warhead design that has been thoroughly tested (including underground nuclear testing), the design and product specifications will normally contain sufficient information to permit successful production."(36) Admittedly, one must be careful of conclusions drawn from these accounts. The warhead referred to is never identified nor does a single case provide conclusive evidence that remanufacturing of warheads is appropriate for all designs. It does, however, serve as strong evidence to counter the DoE's blanket rejection of ensuring safety and reliability by remanufacturing components.

The overall conclusion of the report stated, "It is found that a high degree of confidence in the reliability of the existing stockpile is justified, and that it is sufficiently robust to permit confidence in the reliability of remanufactured warheads in the absence of nuclear explosive proof-tests."(37) As Greg Mello emphasizes, confidence in the stockpile was assured in 1987 without the multibillion dollar facilities proposed under SBSS.(38)

As long as the U.S. maintains a nuclear arsenal, its safety needs to be insured. This can be achieved, however, through existing means—multibillion dollar facilities are not necessary. Our nuclear arsenal has undergone rigorous nuclear explosive testing over the past 51 years. We do not need SBSS to maintain a nuclear deterrent. The U.S. already has the technical capacity to remanufacture critical components. Warhead safety and reliability can be insured by dismantling nuclear weapons and inspecting the individual parts. If any element has degraded to such a point that concerns are raised, they can simply be replaced. Furthering design capabilities is not necessary in a stewardship program. The only function that would serve is for creating new weapons.(39)

What is needed now is a serious debate on the role of nuclear weapons in the post Cold War era. Much of the justifications for SBSS revolving around deterring future hostile nations armed with strategic weapons. Such a policy ignores the more realistic threats of a nuclear attack—terrorist use of a nuclear device. The money spent on SBSS would be better spent on securing fissile material in Russia, enhancing dual use control regimes, and taking the problems of proliferation serious.

It is time we shut the door on the nuclear age, close the testing facilities, and implement both the word and spirit of our arm control agreements.

Footnotes

1. "Remarks by the President in Address to the 51st General Assembly of the United Nations," September 24, 1996.
2. "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, September 10, 1996.
3. "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of the Negotiations 1996 Edition, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996.
4. "Resolutions Adopted at the NPT Extension Conference," Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 5, June 1995, p. 30.
5. The entry into force arrangement requires ratification from 44 nuclear capable nations who belong to the Conference on Disarmament. India, one of those states, has announced that it will never sign or ratify the Treaty.
6. "The National Ignition Facility and the Issue of Nonproliferation," Draft Study Prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, (NN-40), August 23, 1995.
7. "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile," U.S. Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, May 1995, p. 1.
8. William B. Scott, "Aging Arsenal Poses Dilemma," Aviation Week & Space Technology, vol. 143, no. 3, July 17, 1995, p. 24.
9. Tritium, a hydrogen isotope used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons, has a half life of 12.5 years. The U.S. halted production of tritium in 1988 after the Savannah River reactors were shut down because of safety problems.
10. "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile," U.S. Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, May 1995, p. 3.
11. "Stockpile Stewardship and Management," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, March 13, 1996.
12. "Press Briefing by Special Assistant to the President for Defense Policy Robert Bell," The White Office of the Press Secretary, August 11, 1995.
13. Ibid.
14. "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile," U.S. Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, May 1995, p. 4.
15. "Test Site Contract Signed," Las Vegas Review Journal, October 28, 1995 cited by Frank von Hippel and Suzanne Jones, "Take a Hard Look at Subcritical Tests," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 6, November/December 1996, p. 45.
16. "Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee," Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1995, Part 6, March 15, 1994 cited in Greg Mello, "Nuclear Weapons Safety: No Design Changes Are Warranted," Tri-Valley CAREs, July 1, 1995, p. 3.
17. Jacqueline Cabasso and Patrice Sutton, "Nuclear Weapons: Now and Forever? The Role of Laboratory-Based Testing in Maintaining Nuclear Weapons," Western States Legal Foundation, December 1995, p. 4.
18. Greg Mello, "No Serious Problems: Reliability Issues and Stockpile Management," Tri-Valley CAREs, February 6, 1995, p. 5.
19. Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, "The Stewardship Smokescreen," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5, September/October 1996, p. 24.
20. William J. Broad, "U.S. Will Build Laser to Create Nuclear Fusion," The New York Times, October 21, 1994.
21. Hugh Gusterson, "NIF-ty Exercise Machine," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 51, no. 5, September/October 1995, p. 23.
22. "The National Ignition Facility and the Issue of Nonproliferation," Draft Study Prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, (NN-40), August 23, 1995.
23. Ibid.
24. Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, "The Stewardship Smokescreen," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5, September/October 1996, p. 25.
25. "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of the Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile," U.S. Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, May 1995, p. 14.
26. Keith Rogers, "Critics Assail New Nuclear Testing," Las Vegas Review Journal, December 11, 1995.
27. Bruce Hall, "Nevada Test Site Experiments Could Thwart Test Ban Effort, " Greenpeace Action Alert, March 4, 1996.
28. Hisham Zerriffi and Arjun Makhijani, "The Stewardship Smokescreen," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 52, no. 5, September/October 1996, p. 25.
29. "Stockpile Stewardship and Management," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, March 12, 1996.
30. Kevin M. Baerson, "U.S.-Russian Supercomputer Bid Revives Cold War Suspicions," Defense Week, vol. 17, no. 42, October 21, 1996, p. 1.
31. "CD Nears Deadline on CTBT; Entry into Force Still Unresolved," Arms Control Today, vol. 26, no. 4, May/June 1996, p. 17.
32. "Potential Strategic Consequences of the SBSS Program," Institute for Energy and Environmental Research.
33. Elaine M. Grossman, "Scientists Say Policy Barring New Nuclear weapon Designs is Unclear," Inside the Pentagon, August 15, 1996.
34. "The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of the Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapon Stockpile," U.S. Department of Energy Office of Defense Programs, May 1995, p. 8.
35. R.E. Kidder, "Maintaining the U.S. Stockpile of Nuclear Weapons During a Low-Threshold or Comprehensive Test Ban," Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, October 1987, pp. 6-7.
36. Ibid., p. 7.
37. Ibid., p. 1.
38. Greg Mello, "No Serious Problems: Reliability Issues and Stockpile Management," Tri-Valley CAREs, February 6, 1995, p. 5.
39. "Stockpile Stewardship: Maintaining the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile," Council for a Livable World Education Fund, August 1995, p. 2.

    
    

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