The U.S. military is now in the process of upgrading its fleet of tactical aircraft -- aircraft designed for direct combat in air-to-air or air-to-surface (ground or sea) battles. Three aircraft are now in various stages of development or production: the Navy's F/A-18E/F "Super Hornet," the Air Force's F-22 "Raptor," and the Joint Strike Fighter. In all, the military services plan to purchase nearly 4,500 aircraft at an estimated total cost of $350 Billion.

"These three programs...will result in a huge bow wave of annual costs and annual production numbers."

Congressman Curt Weldon (R-PA)
Chairman, House Research and Development Subcommittee
Congressional Hearing on Tactical Aircraft
March 5, 1997

Critics of the various programs are concerned by the monumental costs the aircraft, which, given the advanced technologies yet to be developed, are likely to increase. The cost of the F-22, for example, may already exceed the original $71 billion estimate by as much as $15 billion. The justification for these huge expenditures has been called into question, particularly given the superiority of the existing fleet of U.S. aircraft to those deployed by foreign countries.

A study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) concluded that during the development of these new aircraft, aircraft in the current fleet would have to be kept in service well beyond the twenty years that the Pentagon had planned to operate them. Meanwhile, the General Accounting Office, in a 1993 study, stated that F-22 production could be delayed until 2010 without undue risk to U.S. air superiority. Thus, the Pentagon could continue to purchase new models of existing, proven aircraft, at a lower cost, while maintaining U.S. air dominance and insuring the air-worthiness of the current fleet.

In a 1997 study the CBO also concluded that the three programs have already exceeded the projected $350 Billion price tag by $7 billion. Further, CBO said that buying all three aircraft will cost between $14 billion and $18 billion each year from 2008 to 2014. This would consume up to 35 percent of the Pentagon's current annual budget for all weapons purchases, including ships, tanks, rifles, etc. Tactical aircraft purchases now total only about 6 percent of the procurement budget.

In addition to these programs, the Pentagon is already discussing the "next-next generation" of tactical aircraft. Not yet determined are the cost and number of the aircraft, which is still in the concept stage. Known only as the "replacement interdiction aircraft," it would replace the Air Force's remaining F-15Es and F-117 "Stealth" fighters by 2030.

Creating a Market: Overseas Sales of U.S. Tactical Aircraft

Several years ago McDonnell-Douglas, a company then bidding on the F-22 contract, included in its briefing materials a world map which indicated those countries operating high-tech fighter aircraft. Labeled "Foreign Countries With Advanced Fighter Aircraft," the map showed 46 countries armed with fighters capable of challenging U.S. aircraft and necessitating the development of the F-22. The map failed to point out, however, that 54 percent of these countries operated aircraft sold to them by the United States, and that 46 percent operated only U.S.-made aircraft. Ironically, in an effort to bring down the "per-unit" cost of the F-22, the Pentagon and the aircraft's contractors are already discussing overseas sales of the fighter, thus necessitating the development of the "next-next generation" of even more costly aircraft.

The United States is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the world's dominant air power. Rather than committing our nation to huge expenditures for unneeded aircraft, we should continue to purchase new models of current aircraft, while continuing to develop the technologies which will be incorporated into the aircraft of the future.

TACAIR RESOURCES

CDI RESOURCES

• "Do We Really Need Three New Fighters?" -- Article by Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr. USN (Ret.), Deputy Director, The Center for Defense Information, from "America's Defense Monitor," Volume XXVIII, Number 2, 1999.
• Fighter Jet Fix -- America's Defense Monitor television show transcript, April 25, 1999.
• Marketing Tomorrow's Weapons -- America's Defense Monitor television show transcript, September 28, 1997.

OTHER RESOURCES

• CBO: Testimony on Modernizing Tactical Aircraft, March 10, 1999.
• CBO: A Look at Tomorrow's Tactical Air Forces, January 1997. Only available in print. Visit the CBO website for ordering information.
• GAO: Defense Aircraft Investments: Major Program Commitments Based on Optimistic Budget Projections, by Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisitions, before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee, House Committee on National Security, and Military Procurement Subcommittee, House Committee on National Security, Mar. 5, 1997 (14 pages), T-NSIAD-97-103.
• GAO: Combat Air Power: Funding Priority for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses May Be Too Low, April 10, 1996, (16 pages), NSIAD-96-128.
• GAO: U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions, May 13, 1996, (60 pages), NSIAD-96-72.
• GAO: Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions, June 27, 1996, (17 pages), T-NSIAD-96-196.
• DoD Testimony: "Modernizing U.S. Tactical Aviation for Air Dominance," prepared joint statement of Paul G. Kaminski, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and Gen. Joseph W. Ralston, USAF, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Research and Development and Procurement Subcommittees, House National Security Committee, June 27, 1996, (24 pages).
• GAO: Combat Air Power: Assessment of Joint Close Support Requirements and Capabilities Is Needed, June 28, 1996, (36 pages), NSIAD-96-45.
• GAO: Operation Desert Storm: Operation Desert Storm Air War, July 2, 1996, (26 pages), PEMD-96-10.
• GAO: Cruise Missiles: Proven Capability Should Affect Aircraft and Force Structure Requirements, April, 1995 (60 pages), NSIAD-95-116.

For more information, e-mail Christopher Hellman.

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