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The F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter

The F-22, known as the "Raptor," is an air-superiority fighter intended to replace a portion of the Air Force's fleet of F-15s. The aircraft will utilize "stealth" technologies, and be able to cruise at supersonic speed without afterburners, thus saving fuel. Lockheed-Martin is the prime contractor, while Boeing (airframes) and Pratt & Whitney (engines) are major subcontractors. The F-22 has become the centerpiece of the debate over the U.S. aircraft modernization program due to a number of factors, including the cost of the program and the lack of a threat to U.S. air superiority.

PROGRAM COSTS – Originally the Air Force had planned to buy 438 F-22s at a total cost of $71 billion, for an average cost of $159 million per plane, making it the most expensive fighter aircraft in history. However, the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in May 1997, recommended reducing the total number of aircraft purchased to 339.

In an interview with "Defense Daily" (July 8, 1997), Air Force acquisition chief Arthur Money indicated that plans to cut the number of F-22s purchased by 99 would reduce costs of the production phase, originally estimated at $48 billion, by $5 billion. Serious concerns have been raised, however, about the ability of the Air Force and the plane's builders, Lockheed-Martin and Boeing, to control production costs.

In June 1996 The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition put together a Joint Estimating Team (JET) made up of USAF, DoD and private industry to do a cost estimate for the F-22.  They found that the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program (the phase before procurement) would cost $18.688, billion, an increase of about $1.45 billion over the previous Air Force estimates. The FY'98 DoD Authorization bill capped this portion of the program at $18.939 billion, or $251 million more than even the JET estimate. Total increases to EMD program to date are $1.7 billion. The procurement phase is capped at $43.4 billion dollars. All told, the cost of the F-22 program is currently capped at $62.7 billion for 339 aircraft, or $187 million apiece.

PROGRAM STATUS – Despite the fact that less than 4% of planned tests had been completed, two "pre-production models were ordered in 1998 and a decision to begin initial low-rate production was expected in November, 1999, when fewer than 600 hours (14%) of a 4,300 hour program of required tests will have been completed. However, this decision was delayed by Congress in October, 1999 (See Below). A decision is now expected in December, 2000.

Congressional Action for Fiscal Year 2000 -- One of the most surprising outcomes of this year's budget season was the decision by the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to eliminate the $1.8 billion request for the first six production models of the F-22. The full House adopted the recommendation in July, which shifted the funds to purchase eight F-15 aircraft, spare parts, and training. While the legislation kept the $1.2 billion requested for additional F-22 Research and Development, supporters of the program felt that any efforts to delay the program would result in its termination. Since the Authorization Act and the Senate's Appropriations bill contained full funding for the F-22, it became clear a showdown was unavoidable.

Lobbying by both sides was intense. In the end, House and Senate conferees agreed to reduce the total appropriation by $500 million, fully fund the research and development program, defer aircraft production in FY'00, create a $1 billion account for additional test aircraft and advanced procurement, and set aside $300 million for liability payments to the program's contractors should any of the aircraft currently under contract or contracted this year be canceled.

CDI RESOURCES

  • "The Fighter Jet That Doesn't Need to Be Resurrected," New York Times Op-Ed by Senator Dale Bumpers, Director of the Center for Defense Information, September 4, 1999, page A25.
  • F-22 Fact Sheet -- Updated July 19, 1999.
  • Selling the F-22 -- America's Defense Monitor television show transcript, May 11, 1997.
  • Cancel F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter -- Kathryn Schultz, CDI, From the 1996 Top Ten and Dirty Dozen, Military Spending Working Group, Spring 1996.
  • The F-22 Controversy -- America's Defense Monitor television show transcript, June 13, 1993.

CDI's Weekly Defense Monitor

OTHER RESOURCES

  • GAO: Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded Congressional Limitation, August 15, 2000, (19 pages plus 3 appendices), NSAID-00-178.
  • GAO: Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating F-22 Total Production Costs, June 15, 2000, (11 pages plus 1 appendix), T-NSIAD-00-200.
  • GAO: F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are Avoided, March 14, 2000, (22 pages plus 4 appendices), NSIAD-00-68.
  • GAO: Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals, December 7, 1999, (9 pages), T-NSIAD-00-58.
  • Provisions of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-79) restructuring the F-22 program and setting conditions for DoD's decision to begin F-22 production, October, 1999.
  • Letters by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commanders to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, July 28, 1999.
  • Defense Secretary William Cohen's Letter to the House Appropriations Committee, July 15, 1999.
  • House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Jerry Lewis's Statement on the F-22 Program, July 12, 1999.
  • GAO: F-22 Aircraft: Issues in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals, Mar. 15, 1999 (32 pages), NSIAD-99-55.
  • GAO: Defense Acquisition: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering and Manufacturing Development Programs, by Louis J. Rodrigues, Director of Defense Acquisitions Issues, before the Subcommittee on Airland Forces, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 17, 1999 (20 pages), T-NSIAD-99-113
  • GAO: F-22 Aircraft: Progress of the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Program, by Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisition Issues, before the Airland Forces Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Mar. 25, 1998 (7 pages), Abstract. T-NSIAD-98-137.
  • GAO: F-22 Aircraft: Progress in Achieving Engineering and Manufacturing Development Goals, March 10, 1998 (32 pages), NSIAD-98-67.
  • Provisions of the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85) which capped the costs for research and development (RDT&E) and procurement of the F-22, October, 1997.
  • GAO: Tactical Aircraft: Restructuring of the Air Force F-22 Fighter Program, June 4, 1997 (22 pages), NSIAD-97-156.
  • GAO: Tactical Aircraft: Concurrency in Development and Production of F-22 Aircraft Should Be Reduced, April 19,1995, (32 pages), NSIAD-95-59.
  • GAO: Tactical Aircraft: F-15 Replacement Is Premature as Currently Planned, March 25, 1994, NSIAD-94-118.

LINKS TO RELATED SITES



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