U.S. Nuclear Posture:
 

The fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union prompted the United States to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review. Released in September 1994, the Nuclear Posture Review essentially accepted the numbers established by the START II Treaty. The only change in force structure called for under the NPR was that the U.S. submarine force under START II consist of 14 submarines all with D-5 missiles, rather than the 18 submarines with a mixture of C-4 and D-5 missiles as originally planned. The NPR also recommended that the United States not pursue deeper cuts until it eliminates delivery systems under START I, gets START II ratified, and gets moving on implementing START II.
 

The United States has reduced its nuclear weapons stockpile significantly. From a Cold War high of approximately 32,000 weapons in 1966, the United States today maintains roughly 15,000 deployed and stored, long- and short-range nuclear weapons.
 

In September 1991, President George Bush, in a successful bid to prompt the return of all Soviet short-range nuclear weapons to Russian territory, ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from overseas with the exception of Air Force bombs deployed in Europe. The majority of these tactical nuclear weapons have been destroyed. As a result, the Army is now nuclear free. The only U.S. nuclear weapons based overseas are the roughly 480 U.S. tactical B-61 nuclear bombs deployed in Europe. These bombs are believed to be based in 7 European countries (Germany, UK, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Netherlands, and Belgium), with half of the weapons in Germany.
 

The number of targets in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) has also been reduced, but the actual number of targets is classified. We do know, however, that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have ordered that their nuclear weapons no longer target each other. These weapons now target the Atlantic Ocean. There are no provisions, however, to verify the retargeting of weapons and targets can quickly be changed.
 

The United States is in the process of complying with the START I Treaty. All 450 Minuteman II ICBMs have been removed and silos are being destroyed in accord with the START I Treaty. In 1990, the United States had 32 ballistic missile submarines in the operational stockpile. Today, that number is down to 16 and will, under START II, be reduced to 14. The B-52 bomber fleet has been halved due to the retirement of the older -G models. Bombers no longer stand with their engines running, fully loaded with nuclear weapons. The alert status of all weapons to be eliminated under START II is to be reduced once the Russian Duma ratifies the START II Treaty.
 

Assuming that the START II Treaty is ratified by the Russian Duma and both START Treaties are fully implemented, the total U.S. nuclear arsenal will shrink from 15,000 today to some 10,000 nuclear weapons (including 3,500 deployed strategic, 950 operational tactical, 2,500 "hedge", and 2,500 "inactive reserve" -- tritium removed but intact ). The huge numbers of weapons in the "hedge" stockpile and in "inactive reserve" are planned in the event of a reversal of free market and democratic reforms in Russia. Although Undersecretary of Defense Paul Kaminski has stated that "we do not see an intent (on the part of the Chinese or the Russians) that goes with the (nuclear) capability," the Pentagon plans, in the words of Defense Secretary William Perry, to "maintain a hedge to return to a more robust nuclear posture should that be necessary." [Dark Clouds of Nuclear War Threat Fading, But Not Gone, Prepared remarks by Paul G. Kaminski, undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, to the Military Research and Development and Military Procurement subcommittees, House National Security Committee, Sept. 27, 1996.]No proposals for deeper cuts beyond START II have been offered. The Administration's position is that START III negotiations must wait until after START II has been ratified by the Russian Duma.
 

When the Cold War ended, the United States was spending about $70 Billion to prepare to fight a nuclear war. Today, that number is down to roughly $27 Billion annually. These figures include stockpile stewardship activities and the procurement, operations, and maintenance of weapons systems. In contrast, the United States spends only $2.2 Billion (roughly the price of one B-2 bomber) to prevent nuclear war. These preventive measures include funding for arms control and nonproliferation agreements, support for the International Atomic Energy Agency, and assistance to the former Soviet Republics to dismantle nuclear weapons and safeguard nuclear materials.
 

The principal reason for the reduction in spending to prepare to fight a nuclear war is that research, development, and production of new nuclear weapons delivery systems has been greatly reduced. The U.S. is only finishing the planned buys of B-2 bombers, Trident II submarines, and Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The last B-2 bomber is scheduled to roll off the assembly line in 1997 and enter the fleet in 2000, bringing the total number of B-2s to 21. We can, however, expect the Republican-controlled Congress to once again try to resurrect the program in 1997 and force the Administration into procuring additional bombers that even the Pentagon does not want or need. The D-5 missiles currently being built will be used to replace the 10-year old C-4 missiles currently deployed on four Trident submarines. The D-5s will use the same W-76 warheads as the C-4s they will replace.
 

There has not been much of a reduction in the amount of money spent by the Department of Energy on nuclear weapons activities. Although the United States no longer makes nuclear warheads and, with the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September, has given up nuclear explosive testing, DOE nuclear weapons activities will cost taxpayers some $40 Billion over the next ten years. As part of its Science Based Stockpile Stewardship (SBSS) program, the Department of Energy plans to maintain the Nevada Test Site and construct nine new facilities, all of which have nuclear weapons design capabilities. One such program is the National Ignition Facility (NIF). Scientists plan to bombard tritium and deuterium with laser beams in this football-sized complex to learn more about the effects of radiation which could be used to help scientists design new nuclear weapons with greater reliability, survivability, and lethality.
 

Scientists also plan to conduct subcritical tests in the Nevada desert. In these underground nuclear tests, the fissile material pit is replaced by a mechanically-equivalent hollow sphere with very low levels of nuclear material so that a self-sustaining chain reaction will not start. Although neither NIF nor subcritical tests will violate the letter of the CTBT because no explosive yield will be generated, SBSS activities are widely viewed as a violation of the spirit of the treaty. While most nations would need to conduct explosive tests in order to improve their nuclear arsenals, those nations with sophisticated nuclear weapons technology could use these types of laboratory and computer-simulated tests not only to maintain first-strike confidence in an aging arsenal, but also to design new nuclear weapons.
 

U.S. Nuclear Doctrine:
 

The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review asserted that nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence and contribute positively to the security of the United States and its allies. This was reaffirmed in the Secretary of Defense's 1996 Annual Report which states that "U.S. nuclear forces remain an important deterrent. In order to deter any hostile nuclear state and to convince potential aggressors that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile, the United States will retain strategic nuclear forces sufficient to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially hostile political and military leaders. This requirement is fully consistent with meeting America's current arms control obligations." [Chapter 1, U.S. Defense Strategy, 1996 Annual Defense Report, 30 July 1996.] The only difference from previous reports is the addition of the last sentence, which is less a result of the end of the Cold War than the pressure by the nonnuclear weapons states and the threshold nuclear weapons states to hold the United States and other members of the nuclear club to the commitments made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Principles and Objectives Statement of May 1995.
 

In April 1996, the Pentagon released its successor to the Cold War era report, Soviet Military Power. This new report, Proliferation: Threat and Response, outlines the United States three fold strategy to deal with the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to other nations or subnational groups. The three key words are prevent, deter, and defend. "Prevent" includes arms control measures, export controls, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the agreement with North Korea, and the like. "Defend" includes passive defense (inoculations, gas masks, etc.) and active defense such as ballistic missile defense. "Deter"includes the maintenance of nuclear weapons. According to Secretary Perry, "in deterring this threat, we depend both on a strong conventional military force and a smaller but still powerful nuclear force. In our nuclear posture review, we reaffirmed the importance of maintaining nuclear weapons as a deterrent. But I would like to point out that both our conventional and nuclear force, as deterrents, not only must be strong, but they must be perceived that the United States has the will power to use that strength." [William J. Perry 16:00-16:34 (34) April 11, 1996 DoD News Briefing, emphasis added.]
 

The when, where, and why of the potential use of nuclear weapons remains deliberately unclear. In the Spring of 1995, in their successful bid to ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT, the nuclear weapons states promised not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states who were party to the treaty. However, upon signing the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Pelindaba in April 1996, Bob Bell of the National Security Council stated that its pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any party to the treaty "will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANFZ party using weapons of mass destruction." [Bob Bell, White House Press Briefing, 11 April 1996] This caveat relies on the principle in international law known as "belligerent reprisal." Other Administration officials have backed away from Bell's statement, but not at very high levels, in part due to the fear that, if pushed, the Republican-controlled Congress could insist that the United States back away from any agreements which would in any way limit nuclear use options.
 

Bell's statement appears to have been prompted by concerns that Libya was building a facility near Tarhunah which the United States believed could be used to manufacture chemical weapons. One week after Bell's statement, Secretary Perry, in an 18 April speech, warned that if anyone used a weapon of mass destruction against the United States or one of its allies, the U.S. response "would be both overwhelming and devastating." Mr. Perry would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. [The Washington Times, 19 April 1996] A new bunker-busting, low-yield nuclear weapon could be used for just such a mission. The nuclear warhead under development is a modification of the B-61 nuclear bomb, for which no explosive tests were necessary and should be completed by the end of 1996. A conventional earth-penetrating warhead is also planned as a part of its counterproliferation plans. It will take at least two years before it can be fielded. [Robert Burns for AP, 23 April 1996]
 

The nuclear umbrella continues to have a place in the hearts and plans of the United States government and its NATO allies. In the 29 November 1995 communique following the meetings of NATO's Defense Planning Committee (DPC) and Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the NATO members asserted that "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance." The members also "reaffirm[ed] that Alliance nuclear forces continue to play a unique and essential role in the Alliance's strategy of war prevention, while recognizing that NATO has been able to reduce its reliance on them in the new security environment" [Disarmament Diplomacy, January 1996, p. 29-30] New members of NATO would enjoy the same benefits of the nuclear umbrella and the same potential hazards. NATO's September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement maintained that "it is important for NATO's force structure that other Allies' forces can be deployed, when and if appropriate, on the territory of new members."
 

Pressures to Change U.S. Nuclear Posture and Doctrine:
 

There are pressures from both sides on the Clinton Administration to change U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine. The chorus of those advocating a change in U.S. Nuclear Posture and Doctrine was strengthened by the Canberra Commission and the comments of retired Admirals and Generals working in partnership with former Senator Allan Cranston, the State of the World Forum, and the Gorbachev Foundation. CDI's director, Vice Admiral John J. Shanahan and deputy director, Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll both worked with Senator Cranston and signed onto the letter in support of the elimination of nuclear weapons.
 

Perhaps the most influential of the retired military officers is General Lee Butler, Former Commander of Strategic Air Command. According to Butler, "Is it possible to forge a global consensus on the propositions that nuclear weapons have no defensible role, that the broader consequences of their employment transcend any asserted military utility, and that as true weapons of mass destruction, the case for their elimination is a thousand-fold stronger and more urgent (than) that for deadly chemicals and viruses already widely declared immoral, illegitimate, subject to destruction and prohibited from any future production? I am persuaded that such a consensus is not only possible, it is imperative." He closed by urging "that the United States make unequivocal its commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, and take the lead in setting an agenda for moving forthrightly toward that objective." [General Lee Butler, speech at the National Press Club, Washington, DC 4 December 1996.]
 

Congressman Floyd Spence (R-SC), chair of the House National Security Committee, also wants to see the Clinton Administration alter U.S. nuclear posture and doctrine. His recommendations are completely at odds with those of General Butler. In October 1996, Spence released a committee report entitled The Clinton Administration and Stockpile Stewardship: Erosion by Design. The report attacks the Administration for its support of a CTBT, claiming that it "is clearly threatening the nation's long-term ability to maintain a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile." The report also criticizes the Clinton Administration for the lack of concrete plans to resume the production of tritium, for the shrinking size of the nuclear weapons complex, and for the United States' inability to produce plutonium pits on a large scale. According to Congressman Spence, "In my mind, it's no longer a question of the Administration's benign neglect of our nation's nuclear forces, but instead, a compelling case can be made that it is a matter of erosion by design."[NSC Press Release, October 30, 1996]
 

The Future:
 

The Administration has the opportunity to reconsider nuclear posture and doctrine. At the beginning of this month, the Pentagon's Quadrennial Defense Review process began. As established by Congress, every Administration is required to conduct "a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies...." Nuclear posture and doctrine will be considered by the strategy and force structure subpanels. Their work will be completed by the Spring of 1997. The Secretary of Defense is to submit the final reports and assessments to Congress by 15 December 1997. In true Pentagon fashion, little change in current plans and strategies is expected. Various organizations in Washington, including the Center for Defense Information, are closely monitoring the QDR.
 

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