New Attack Submarine

Displacement, tons: 7300 (submerged)
Dimensions, feet: 377 x 34
Weapons Systems: 12 VLS tubes for SLCMs, up to 26 torpedoes and anti-ship missiles.
Speed, knots: 28 (submerged)
(Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-1997.)

The U.S. Navy began advance design and procurement for the first two New Attack submarines (NSSNs) in FY1996. The first NSSN was funded at $678.8 million and the second was funded at $96.4 million in the FY96 Defense Authorization Bill. A total of four NSSNs have been planned so far, with construction beginning on the first in 1998, the second in 1999, the third in 2000, and the fourth in 2001. The first and third NSSNs will be built by Electric Boat, and the second and fourth by Newport News. Any remaining work will be up for competition between the two shipyards. (Source: Mark Walsh. "Pentagon Says Another Next Generation Submarine Not Affordable." Defense Week, July 15, 1996.) The Navy plans to eventually buy a total of 30 NSSNs. The current total program cost is $64.8914 Billion, or $2.1635 Billion per sub. (Source: Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Reports, Program Acquisition Cost Summary, 31 March 1996.) The NSSNs are designed with Seawolf-level quieting, but, in general, will be less capable than Seawolf, and should be somewhat less expensive.

As it currently stands, and for the foreseeable future, the Russian submarine fleet poses no significant challenge to the U.S. Navy. First, only the "Improved Akula / Akula II and the new Severodvinsk SSNs have capabilities comparable with the U.S. Los Angeles and Seawolf attack submarines. All other Russian subs possess significantly weaker capabilities. (Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-1997.)

Second, a large portion of the Russian sub fleet is approaching block obsolescence, and will have to be retired early next century. As an example, the Victor III class currently makes up a major portion of the Russian SSN fleet. The Navy has, in past projections, assumed a service life of 25 years for the Victor III. A more realistic service life estimate is 20-22 years. Ten of the current 26 Victor IIIs were built before 1980, and 21 were built by 1985. By 2003, a maximum of eight Victor IIIs will still be in service (possibly as few as five). (Source: International Center for Technology Assessment, 1996 estimate.) Given current Russian financial trends, it seems very unlikely that these losses can be replaced. Further cuts in the Russian defense budget are inevitable. These cuts will undoubtedly affect both the force structure and future procurement in the submarine fleet.

The Chinese submarine fleet also poses no threat to the U.S. Navy. The Chinese currently have only five SSNs, and an additional 55 conventional subs, all outdated by U.S. standards. (Source: Jane's Fighting Ships, 1996-1997.) None even come close to approaching U.S. sub capability.

The Navy's ...From the Sea White Paper recognizes that the strategic landscape in the post-Cold war era has changed and that the Navy will be increasingly involved in operations in the littoral or "near land" areas of the world, like the Persian Gulf. The littoral is characterized by a number of unique challenges: shallow, congested waterways, well-known to the adversary; mines; coastal missile and artillery batteries; sea-skimming cruise missiles; and tactical ballistic missiles. As ...From the Sea states, these littoral threats "tax the capabilities of our current systems and force structure. Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from command of the seas."

Like the Seawolf, the NSSN has not been designed to operate in this environment, nor was the NSSN designed to perform against small, advanced diesel subs in these difficult conditions. The NSSN is not the kind of submarine that should be designed in the post-Cold War era for post-Cold War missions. The U.S. Navy should work toward constructing an inexpensive sub specifically designed to operate primarily in the littoral, against the advanced diesel subs that are proliferating in the developing world.

Given current and near-term Navy procurement needs, preserving two shipyards (Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding) is unrealistic. There simply is insufficient new construction to support two shipyards. This redundancy does not currently provide competition because competition for NSSN contracts is not permitted until well into the next century when (and if) the fifth NSSN is produced. Newport News has the capacity to produce four nuclear subs per year. With an average service life of 30 years, Newport News could support a fleet of 120 subs, well above the 45-55 attack subs called for in the "Bottom Up Review." Also, the Navy has been content to allow a single shipyard to produce nuclear aircraft carriers. A similar policy for nuclear submarines can, and should, be adopted. (Source: Statement of Cindy Williams, Assistant Director of the National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office, on Attack Submarine Programs, before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 16 May 1995.)

And, it is not true that most of the skills needed for nuclear submarine construction would "wither away" and have to be reconstituted if no more subs were produced until construction on a post-NSSN class of submarines begins. Overhauls and repair work on existing subs, along with "drawing out" existing sub construction, could provide much of the practice and experience needed in these critical skills. In addition, nearly 80% of the skills needed for working on nuclear subs can be found in nuclear aircraft workers. (Source: Kay van der Horst, Research Director, International Center for Technology Assessment, 7 August 1995 Letter to the Editor, St. Louis Dispatch.)

The Bottom Up Review called for an attack submarine force of 45-55 vessels. To achieve this force level, the Navy's current plan is to retire all pre-Los Angeles class subs, and then retire the first ten Los Angeles class subs when they are due for their first overhauls, at about the 15 year mark of their 30 year service life cycles. Thereafter, Los Angeles class subs will be retired early, and the Seawolf and NSSN classes will be constructed, to maintain the attack fleet at approximately 55 vessels.

There are other, more readily available, and less expensive options for enhancing the size and capabilities of the attack submarine fleet, without building the NSSN. The Los Angeles class is, arguably, the best and most cost-effective nuclear attack sub in the world, and relying on this proven technology for a few more years would not decrease U.S. sub superiority. The Navy should, first, use the Los Angeles vessels for their entire life cycles, instead of retiring them after they have served only half of their useful service lives. Deferring production of the NSSNs while retaining all the Los Angeles for their full service lives (or even extending the service lives of the Los Angeles class) would save the Navy billions of dollars without sacrificing U.S. submarine superiority. The Ohio class ballistic missile submarines' service life of 30 years was extended to 40 years, and it is not unreasonable to expect that the Los Angeles class could undergo a similar program.

Research and development for the next generation of attack subs should continue. New submarine hulls, however, are not currently needed. These can be developed early in the next century when the Los Angeles class approaches block obsolescence. In effect, a generation of submarine technology (SSN-23 / the NSSN) can be "skipped," with little detriment to U.S. sub superiority. When that next generation of sub is designed, the Navy must seek a sub design that is smaller, cheaper, and geared more toward littoral warfare than either the Seawolf or the NSSN. The Navy cannot continue to design and produce subs that cost more than $4.4 Billion (Seawolf) or even $2.2 Billion (NSSN) each.

The Navy should seriously consider designing an inexpensive, diesel-powered class of attack subs that would be dedicated to littoral operations. With the emergence of the so-called "air-independent propulsion" (AIP) systems now being developed, the main military objection to conventionally-powered subs will soon disappear. These AIP systems will allow nonnuclear subs to remain submerged for long periods of time without norkeling. Conventionally-powered subs are easily detectable by ASW techniques while they are snorkeling.) A diesel-powered AIP class of subs would provide a low-cost sub that is specifically designed for the operations that the Navy is most likely to be involved in.

NSSN is not currently needed to satisfy force structure requirements or to counter any threats. There are a variety of options for maintaining the U.S. attack sub fleet at 45-55 high-quality subs without constructing the NSSN. It cannot be justified militarily, given the threats that the U.S. will be facing in the foreseeable future. Nor is it necessary to maintain the nuclear submarine industrial base. Without the NSSN, the proposed U.S. attack submarine fleet will consist of three Seawolf class and 57 Los Angeles class. Five more Los Angeles class subs are currently in production, and the lead vessel in the class need not be retired until 2006. NSSN is unnecessary to maintain U.S. submarine superiority. The U.S.' submarine fleet is, by far, the most powerful in the world, and it will continue to be well into the twenty-first century, even without the NSSN.

Compiled by J. Andrew Byers
Last updated 2 August 1996

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