Arsenal Ship

Armaments: 500-cell Vertical Launch System (VLS), employing conventional Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAMs); possibly additional weapons systems (like a variant of the Army Tactical Missile System).
Crew: Zero to 50; designed to be highly automated; ship could be controlled from remote locations.
Design: Low radar signature ("stealthy"); double hull; possible size of 500-800 feet.
Estimated Number, Cost: Six vessels, $550 Million each (500 Tomahawk missiles will cost approximately an additional $400 Million).
Production Time: Five years (first arsenal ship will be operational in 2001).

(Sources: "The Arsenal Ship: Massive Firepower Support from the Sea," Navy News Service, July 18, 1996 and Scott C. Truver, "Tomorrow's Fleet -- Part II," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, August 1996.)

The U.S. Navy is designing a new class of vessels, called the "arsenal ships," that it claims will revolutionize maritime warfare. The arsenal ship has been designed to essentially be a floating, 500-cell Vertical Launch System (VLS) platform. The exact design specifications have yet to be chosen, but the arsenal ships will be highly automated, having a crew of zero to 50. They will likely be permanently deployed to world hot spots, including the Pacific near Korea, the Persian Gulf, and the Mediterranean Sea.

The Navy and the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) are pursuing a fast-track design and production for the arsenal ship that is intended to save both time and money. The five competing contractors have been given only seven weeks to prepare and submit designs. The best design will be chosen in 1998, the first sea trials have been scheduled for 2000, and the first arsenal ship is scheduled to be operational in 2001, a five-year turnaround.

The Navy believes the arsenal ship will greatly enhance its deep interdiction / strike warfare capability -- the ability to strike targets at long range deep within enemy-held territory. Possible missions of this type would include slowing invasions by either Iraq or North Korea long enough for other U.S. forces to arrive in theater. The Navy is currently in fierce competition with the Air Force for deep interdiction / strike warfare missions, and the Navy is concerned about the limitations of its carrier-based deep interdiction capabilities. The Navy believes the arsenal ship would go a long way toward addressing these concerns.

But there are already a large number of weapons systems and platforms capable of performing long-range precision strikes. These include Air Force long-range bombers, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), and other Navy precision-strike platforms (like those warships already capable of launching SLCMs). There simply is not a shortage of weapons systems and platforms capable of performing deep interdiction / strike warfare missions.

Because of its total lack of defensive systems, the arsenal ship is a tremendously vulnerable weapons platform. This makes it an extremely lucrative target for potential adversaries. Despite its double hull, the arsenal ship will be extremely vulnerable to mines, attacks by special operations forces, torpedoes (including those launched from the diesel submarines common to the areas where the arsenal ship will be stationed), and a variety of other threats. The arsenal ship would have to be escorted at all times to ensure its survivability. In addition, the arsenal ship need not be destroyed to be rendered worthless as a weapons platform. The VLS that makes up the arsenal ship's primary weapons system is extremely susceptible to damage; for example, the hydrostatic shock from the detonation of a nearby mine that fails to sink an arsenal ship would still be likely to make the VLS unusable.

Given the high cost of the arsenal ship and its missile load, the benefits of the arsenal ship must be seriously called into question. The cost of each of the 500 Tomahawk missiles that the arsenal ship will stock is roughly $800,000 (for a total magazine cost of approximately $400 Million). The maximum payload for each of these missiles is 1000 lbs. The ability to put a mere 500 1000-lbs. missile payloads on target, no matter how precisely guided those missiles are, is insufficient to accomplish its deep interdiction mission. Also, the arsenal ship lacks capability to target mobile targets, like mobile SCUD missile launchers or the tank columns that the arsenal ship's proponents consistently mention. There does not currently exist any intelligence loop or sensor / targeting system that could continually redirect the arsenal ship's missiles to strike such mobile targets. It is simply salesmanship to claim that the arsenal ship would be capable of halting Iraqi or North Korean tank columns in their tracks in the event of an invasion.

The arsenal ship is also severely limited in its ability to force entry into a combat zone because of its vulnerabilities, lack of defenses, and limited speed. The arsenal ship will not be a very usable weapons platform for combat in those areas where it is not pre-positioned and it will be highly exposed to defensive measures at the start of hostilities if it is pre-positioned.

Many critics of the arsenal ship propose that Iowa-class battleships be reactivated to fill the strike warfare "gap" in the U.S. Navy instead of the arsenal ships. Reactivating the battleships is no solution for several reasons.

First, there are only two Iowa-class battleships potentially available. Two warships would not be enough to cover all the potential "hotspots" (Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Korea) where the Navy intends to deploy the arsenal ships.

Second, annual upkeep and maintenance for the aging (fifty year old) battleships would be substantially higher than for the arsenal ships. The battleships have crews of approximately 1900; the manpower costs associated with keeping two battleships active in the fleet would be thirteen times greater than the manpower costs for the six arsenal ships.

Third, as mentioned previously, the battleships are over fifty years old. They could have, at most, another ten to twenty years of service life available in them after undergoing an extensive (and expensive) modernization program. New warships are designed with at least a thirty year service life in mind.

Fourth, while the battleships do not suffer from all the same vulnerabilities that the arsenal ships do, they do have serious weaknesses. The battleships have no anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability, and no effective anti-air capability. Like the arsenal ships, the battleships could not function independently; they would have to be escorted and would function as part of a naval task force.

Fifth, the battleships were designed for a completely different role than the arsenal ships. The battleships were designed as naval surface gunfire support platforms. Their nine sixteen-inch guns have a maximum range of 27 miles -- hardly sufficient for conducting deep interdiction / strike warfare missions.

Sixth, and most importantly, the naval surface gunfire support missions for which the battleships were designed are no longer valid. The amphibious landings of past wars cannot be contemplated seriously given the broad range of threats an amphibious landing force would face: for example, both cruise and ballistic missiles, potentially armed with chemical or biological warheads, and advanced anti-personnel and anti-ship mines. Desert Storm provides a glimpse into the future for amphibious warfare -- when an opponent seriously contests an amphibious landing enormous casualties will be the result, and so amphibious missions and operations will wither away.

The arsenal ship has also been envisaged as a potential platform for theater ballistic missile defense (TMD). While U.S. troops operating in hostile environments are entitled to all the protection against ballistic missiles we can provide them, the arsenal ship is not the right platform for TMD. TMD systems can be retrofitted and deployed on other warships; the arsenal ship need not be built and specifically dedicated to this purpose. The proponents of the arsenal ship have included TMD in the list of "wonders" the arsenal ship can accomplish, but this seems more of an attempt to garner additional support for the arsenal ship than a realistic assessment of the arsenal ship's capabilities.

The development of the arsenal ship is more related to the Navy-Air Force rivalry over future deep interdiction roles and missions than any valid military requirement that is not being met with current Air Force / Navy forces. The arsenal ship's weaknesses (extreme vulnerability, limited benefit from its weapons system for a high cost, and lack of ability to force entry into a combat zone) vastly overshadow its limited potential capabilities. There simply is no gap in current U.S. military capabilities that the arsenal ship (or the battleship alternative) is needed to fill.

Compiled by J. Andrew Byers
Last updated 28 August 1996

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