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I. Introduction Predicting the future nature of conflict borders on an impossible task if history is any guide. The evolution of warfare has progressed over centuries (with technology accelerating the process markedly in the 20th century) but one characteristic remained constant. No one foresaw the coming of the longbow, gunpowder, machine guns, tanks, aircraft, guided missiles, reconnaissance satellites, real time global communications and all of the other developments which have profoundly changed preparations for the conduct of warfare. As a result, the focus has always been on preparing for the last war just as we do today. All of the most costly systems in today's U.S. modernization programs are legacy weapons intended to perfect our ability to fight and win World War III against highly visible adversaries armed with comparable weapons and engaged in attempting to capture or hold contested territory. Even if this study fails to identify the actual changes which will shape the conflicts of the 21st century, it can still be a great success by challenging the wisdom and value of spending a national treasure improving our capabilities to fight the last war. Before addressing Trends, Givens and Uncertainties, it is useful to state four principles governing the future nature of conflict which will shape U.S. security measures. - Nuclear weapons cannot be employed for any useful purpose other than to deter a nuclear armed adversary. - For the foreseeable future (15-20 years) the U.S. will not face a peer power or have need for capabilities to wage a major force- on-force war in the manner of WW II. - Conflicts in the next 15-20 years will be small scale, small force actions incident to regional disputes over economic, political, ethnic and historic issues. They will more resemble civil wars or guerilla actions than major 20th century wars. - Because the nature of future conflict cannot be foreseen with a certainty that dictates specific weapon system developments, people must take precedence over hardware in planning. People determine military capabilities far more than weapons. Trends: - Many nations will continue to move toward some form of democratic government and open markets. - National minorities within states created during the colonial era will demand a more equitable share of economic and political power; or, they will pursue measures to gain independence. - The U.S. will encounter greater resistance to permanent stationing and forward deployments of U.S. forces abroad. - Potential adversaries will move further away from classic force-on-force confrontations with the U.S. and its allies. - Computer-based information gathering, data storage, and distribution will increase, and greater familiarity with computer techniques will enhance the possibilities for cyber warfare and the need for cyber defense. - The 19th and 20th century concept of absolute national sovereignty
will be challenged by the growing power inherent in non-state transnational
finance and trade organizations, the growth in treaties regulating or allocating
the distribution of resources, and other agreements embodying international
norms and standards; e.g., human and political rights.
Givens: - U.S. vital interests – protection of U.S. territory; safety of U.S. citizens abroad; assisting allies as needed; contributing to multinational efforts to lessen violence – will remain although the means of achieving these goals will change. - Intelligence will be the key to identifying the emergence of any significant threat to U.S. vital interests. - Nuclear weapons will remain the overriding threat to U.S. and world survival. - In spite of its current diplomatic, economic, and military dominance, the U.S. will squander an unparalleled opportunity to lead the world toward multinational institutions capable of dealing with current and future international problems. - The U.S. military will attempt to retain foreign bases in Europe and the Pacific and a forward deployed posture. - Competition for key natural resources will be sharper, particularly
for petroleum-based energy sources upon which the U.S. is becoming increasingly
dependent, and vulnerable.
Uncertainties: While trends and givens are reasonably identifiable,
uncertainties are infinite. Among the most significant and challenging
are:
- Competition for control of natural resources will lead to realignments of Cold-War and early post-Cold War political and military blocs. The growing Israeli-Turkish cooperation is but the first of these possibilities. - The political evolution of the Russian Federation and its economic and military strength. - The status and geographic extent of Europe's political, economic, monetary, and security union. Will Europe have a new dividing line? Will Russia be included or excluded? - The nature and extent of "asymmetrical military threats" to U.S. interests, exacerbated by the continued permanent presence of U.S. forces abroad. - The effectiveness of multinational bodies (e.g., U.N., regional security bodies, international courts) in assuming responsibilities for enforcing international norms and standards. - Pace at which the U.S. military will transition from its current
preoccupation with 20th century force-on-force warfighting doctrine, tactics,
and equipment into a new force structure needed to execute 21st century
missions that advance U.S. objectives.
Conclusions: From the four principles and the listed Trends, Givens and Uncertainties, several conclusions can be drawn concerning the character of defense programs in the foreseeable future. Because the nature of future conflicts is uncertain, emphasis must be given to Research and Development and Personnel. Because of the current and foreseeable (twenty years) technological dominance in military equipment which the U.S. now enjoys, it is not only reasonable, it is the most responsible course of action to fund these two critical areas through reduced investment in Procurement and Readiness. We cannot continue to pour more and more billions into the military without putting at risk those domestic programs that make America a land of justice and opportunity. Resources must be applied to investigate imaginatively various possible forms of warfare and to design the tools required both offensively and defensively. They need not be produced beyond prototypes and engineering development models unless and until specific threats emerge. Meanwhile, priority must also be given to maintaining the highest quality professional military personnel structure. However the nature of conflict evolves, good people will be needed before hardware can be employed effectively. The resources to pursue R & D and maintain high quality personnel must come from reduced investment in modernization of legacy weapons systems; e.g., 4000 new tactical aircraft, 30 new attack submarines, 1254 Comanche helicopters, 455 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft. This shift of priorities would necessarily entail restructuring and redeploying U.S. forces in ways that would reduce readiness to fight two major regional conflicts simultaneously. But I suggest that, in spite of uncertainties, the U.S. will not be faced with a two-war requirement – as the NDP clearly stated in its December 1997 report. Another source of funding is to revisit Presidential Decision Directive #60 and eliminate the requirement to make nuclear weapons the cornerstone of U.S. security indefinitely. In truth, they are not and cannot serve that purpose but the annual cost to pursue the goal is approximately $25 billion per year. Stripping down to a pure deterrent force with no more than 1000 nuclear weapons would save the majority of that money. Observations The nature and scope of warfare which may be conducted
by the United States in the next 15-20 years will be heavily influenced
by the places we fight and the objectives to be achieved. It is almost
too simple to say that we should commit forces and American lives only
when our vital interests are at stake.
The decision to fight must rest on a clear definition of America's vital interests as distinct from those which are less important. Dr. Michael Roskin, in an article in the U.S. Army War College magazine Parameters, ("National Security: From Abstraction to Strategy,") provides a useful distinction between vital and important national interests: "[V]ital national interests are relatively easy to define: security as a free and independent nation and protection of institutions, people, and fundamental values....Secondary interests, those over which one may seek to compromise...typically...are somewhat removed from your borders and represent no threat to your sovereignty." As always in military affairs, however, nothing is quite that simple. What politicians might interpret as vital national interests at any given time can be biased by ideology, convictions of the elite, "common wisdom," policy inertia, and the general state of global affairs -- particularly when nations experience internal dislocations as they shift from authoritarian rule and central command economies to democracy and free markets. Furthermore, history suggests that a nation which unnecessarily retains larger than needed military forces has a propensity to see every challenge as an assault on its vital interests. Such a posture cannot be sustained in terms of national will and public support, let alone economically. If the power, the will, or the public support for using force is absent, threats to use force become hollow until, in frustration, the military is set a task that involves not vital but distant, less important interests simply to "prove a point." Thus, nations risk being drawn into more and more conflicts costing more and more blood and national treasure whenever politicians declare current, but transitory, issues as "vital" to the nation. As the world's only superpower, America is prone to such assertions with the result that we are embroiled too often and in too many places where our vital interests are clearly not involved. This process of being on guard everywhere spreads our forces too thinly and renders them subject to terrorist acts and sustained low intensity conflict. American public opinion soon rejects the risks and costs of such seemingly pointless involvement. Witness our humiliating withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia in 1995. A clear distinction must be drawn between change and instability as the U.S. seeks to lead globally in the 21st century. Change is inevitable while instability may well result if the U.S. seeks to maintain the status quo as the world's only military superpower. Today we seek to carry out our leadership through a self-assigned responsibility to act militarily anywhere in the world if we see it in our interests. This is already creating growing resistance politically and can, if continued indefinitely, lead to confrontational relationships with present allies. There is a growing need to seek a more constructive, cooperative leadership role through international organizations and institutions such as the U.N., the International Court of Justice and the World Trade Organization. We must be more active in establishing international norms and procedures through ratification of Conventions such as the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the establishment of the International Criminal court. The U.S. is now isolating itself from the majority of the world community in too many of these efforts. This is the only practical alternative if we hope to bring about the non-violent resolution of such critical problems as international shortages of food, fresh water and above all, the sharing of petroleum supplies as they become a shrinking resource in the 21st century. Global environmental controls on pollution of the sea and the atmosphere must be developed cooperatively – they cannot be dictated through military power. In short, the United States must decide soon that it cannot continue indefinitely to base its security on confrontation with superior military power but must lead the way to world order based on cooperation under the rule of law.
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