by Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)
"It was almost as if he knew...It was real close."
Once again Saddam Hussein has - for now - dodged a military strike. The time lines during this confrontation, however, were much shorter than in February. Then, President Clinton publicly stood down U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf while the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, traveled to Baghdad and obtained a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) from the Iraqi government. This time, the missiles and planes were loaded and aimed - and that is worrisome for the future.
The cause of this latest crisis is familiar as so many times before, Saddam failed to fully abide by UN resolutions and promises made by Iraq – this time the February 23rd MOU. In early August the Iraqis suspended cooperation on field inspections by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This noncompliance with Security Council Resolution 687 (April 1991) was compounded by Hussein's decision at the end of October to prevent even routine monitoring. But unlike in February, this time Iraq had no sympathetic ears either among any Arab states or on the UN Security Council whose November 5th Resolution 1205 demanded that Iraq "provide immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA."
The absence of sympathy for Saddam's defiance may reasonably be attributed to two factors. First, the UN and especially the Security Council had put itself on the line in agreeing to accept Iraqi promises of compliance as spelled out in the February MOU. Second, after agreeing not to conduct military strikes in February, the U.S. undertook constructive efforts to build international support to require Iraq to fulfill its obligations in return for a comprehensive review of sanctions. When Iraq cut off monitoring by UNSCOM and the IAEA in October, it stepped beyond what even its most sympathetic defenders could justify.
When he returned with the MOU in February, Mr. Annan credited the U.S. military build-up with providing leverage for his dealings with Saddam. Subsequent indications left little doubt that President Clinton would have authorized the use of force had the Secretary General failed. In this latest crisis, however, there was to be no waiting. Even though the White House knew that the Secretary General had sent a letter Friday night (November 13th) to Baghdad, the President was not willing to see if any response would be made. Moreover, even after he was informed that a response had been received, the President did not stop the countdown for launching missiles until less than an hour remained, and then did so only for 24 hours.
The world now waits to see if Saddam will follow through this time. UNSCOM and the IAEA are back. The U.S. armada of ships and planes in the Persian Gulf stands by, and a second aircraft carrier battle group and Marine Amphibious Group continue toward the Gulf. President Clinton has warned that should Iraq renege on its commitments again, the U.S. will not wait for any new diplomatic efforts but will strike with no further warnings at suspected Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile research and production facilities.
After seven years this continuing seesaw between the UN and Iraq has frustrated just about everyone. But frustration is the worst reason to undertake the use of force. President Clinton himself made the point that the most effective, long-term approach to eliminating Iraq's stocks of prohibited weapons is through UNSCOM and the IAEA, not missiles and bombs. He also acknowledged that using military force would mean the end of UNSCOM and any chance of future ongoing monitoring (as called for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of Resolution 687) of Iraqi attempts to rebuild prohibited weapons. If this is what he believes, then the threat to abandon diplomacy for immediate use of force would be self-defeating.
There is an alternative series of non-military steps that could be initiated now that might reinforce the current diplomatic unity against Iraq. Under Article XVIII of the UN Charter, the General Assembly can suspend any member of the UN. Such a suspension could be voted to be effective if and when the Secretary General reports to the Security Council that Iraq is not complying with UN Resolutions. (Such a suspension was used against South Africa during the apartheid era and, with an economic embargo, increased that country's isolation.)
Second, with the exception of the current "food and medicine-for-oil" program, the economic embargo ought to be strengthened. Iraq's neighbors should be enjoined to renew their efforts to stop the smuggling of contraband into Iraq.
First, the Security Council should continue to insist on unfettered access to all suspect sites by the UN weapons monitors. This was a fundamental condition to which Iraq agreed at the end of the 1990-1991 war. In the meantime, the inspection teams should continue their work to the fullest extent possible: no slack, no drift on this point.
Third, all countries should more carefully review applications for exports of materials that, if diverted, might be useful to Iraq in reconstituting its forbidden weapons. Simultaneously, UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors would expand their unannounced inspections and monitoring programs to include more "dual use" facilities in Iraq.
Fourth, the U.S. must not allow the dispute to move from a UN vs. Iraq to a U.S. vs. Saddam Hussein confrontation. The rhetoric about "looking forward to working with a successor regime" and "what we will work for is a government in Iraq that represents and respects its people" should be muted in favor of working through the UN to alleviate the hardships of ordinary Iraqis.
This combination of steps could go far to maintain the current diplomatic pressure on Iraq to comply fully with UN resolutions and the February MOU. If in fact the combination of a united front and the threat of force really made Saddam back down this time, it is important to maintain both pressure points so that Saddam understands unequivocally that both remain very much in play.
Above all, the nation and the world would not drift into a new round of war.
Colonel Daniel M. Smith, US Army (Ret.), is a West Point graduate, Vietnam veteran, and was a career intelligence officer.