Two justifications for U.S. military training programs with nations in Latin America and Asia are that the militaries of these countries are exposed to U.S. ideas about human rights and civilian control of the military, and that these exchanges forge relationships that could be useful in future contingencies.

Fearing a possible bloodbath if Indonesian authorities used military force to subdue demonstrations by students and others opposed to President Suharto, U.S. officials sought to capitalize on their "relationships" to encourage a non-violent resolution to the crisis.

Publically, the Clinton Administration emphasized that only Indonesians could solve their problems and called on them to do so peacefully. Privately, as revealed by Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, senior U.S. military officials were urging their Indonesian counterparts to avoid repeating the violence that left six students dead.

U.S. military assistance to Indonesia has been restricted since 1992. That year, responding to continuing violations of human rights in East Timor by the Indonesian military, Congress banned all funds for training assistance and new weapons sales to Indonesia under the Pentagon's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

Nonetheless, military equipment and training for Indonesian forces did not end. Even as IMET was cut off, the Pentagon continued to fund training for Indonesian special forces under the Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) program. IMET pays for Indonesians to come to the U.S. for training whereas JCET training is performed in the designated "recipient" country.

JCET proponents say this program benefits U.S. forces since they can practice skills such as handling and detonating explosives and employing special infiltration techniques that would not be tolerated in other locales. In fact, according to the Pentagon, the "fundamental requirement" for any JCET mission is that U.S. troops "derive the majority of benefits from the training as opposed to the host country."

Twenty-eight JCET exercises have been conducted with Indonesian troops since 1992. Ten exercises with a program cost of $3.5 million had been scheduled for FY1998. The fourth in the series was being held when the unrest in Indonesia broke out; it was cut short.

In addition to JCET, some IMET funding was restored in 1995 for human-rights, "accountability," and civil control of the military training for Indonesian officers in the U.S. Furthermore, deliveries of military equipment did not stop. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, deliveries of U.S. military equipment to Indonesia in 1993-1995 totaled $70 million. In FY1997, the most recent year for which figures are available, the U.S. delivered equipment worth $13.4 million, concluded new government-to-government (Foreign Military Sales) agreements of $793,000, and approved new commercial military licenses worth $66.1 million. For FY1999, the Administration is seeking $400,000 to train 27 Indonesian officers.

The Administration remains interested in selling nine F-16s to Indonesia, but the ongoing economic crisis has rendered this improbable. A ban against the sale of small arms, helicopter armaments, and armored personnel carriers, imposed in 1996, remains in effect.

While JCET activities in Indonesia do not violate U.S. laws, they do seem to contradict the intent of Congress to cut off military support to Indonesian forces until their human rights record improves. What incensed some in Congress is that the Indonesian unit benefitting from JCET is the same one accused of many recent human rights violations - including the deaths of the six students.
 

Holding exercises with allies to sharpen military skills and improve coordination makes sense. Yet we fool ourselves if we believe that intermittent contact impresses American views about human rights and civilian control of the military on foreign soldiers whose traditions do not include such ideas. To be sure, education and example count and should not be neglected. But circumventing Congress' intent does not seem to be an example that Indonesia needs.

CDI opposes excessive expenditures for weapons and policies that increase the danger of war.

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