Known Smuggling of Russian Nuclear Materials
|
|
When |
Amount/Type |
Suspected Source |
| Podolsk, Russia | October 1992 | 1.5 kg UO2 (80%+ U-235 | Russian research lab |
| Vilnius, Lithuania | May 1993 | "small quantity" HEU alloy | unknown |
| Andreeva Guba, Russia | July 1993 | 1.8 kg HEU (36% U-235) | Russian naval fuel |
| Sevmorput Shipyard, Russia | November 1993 | 4.5 kg HEU (20% U-235) | Russian submarine fuel |
| Tengen, Germany | May 1994 | 5.6 g Pu-239 | Russian weapon lab |
| Lanshut, Germany | June 1994 | 800 mg HEU (87.7% U-235 | naval/reactor fuel |
| St. Petersburg, Russia | June 1994 | 3.05 g HEU (90%+ U-235) | Russian factory |
| Munich, Germany | August 1994 | 363 g Pu-239 | Russian research lab |
| Prague, Czech Republic | December 1994 | 2.72 kg HEU (87.7% U-235) | naval/research reactor |
| Electrostal, Russia | January 1995 | 1 plutonium "pellet" (? g) | Russian factory |
| Kiev, Ukraine | March 19955 | 6 kg HEU (20% U-235) | suspected naval fuel |
Key:
HEU = highly-enriched uranium (20%+ enrichment of U-235)
U-235 = uranium isotope critical for weapons -- 90%+ enrichment is weapon grade, roughly 15-20 kg at this grade is needed for a weapon, though a primitive terrorist weapon might require twice as much.. 20% enriched U-235 could also be used for a small bomb, but something like 250 k g would be neccessary.
P-239 = plutonium isotope critical for weapons, only 3-5 kg are needed for a bomb, though according to the National Resources Defence Council. as little as 1 kg could be used to create a "small" weapon.
Source:
William C. Potter, Nuclear Leakage from the Post-Soviet States (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies) Oral Presentation Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (March 13, 1996)
Compiled by Ted Flaherty
19 September 1996
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