On April 24, 1997 the Senate ratified
the landmark Chemical Weapons Convention. In the wake of the treaty's passage
in Congress, numerous countries joined the U.S. in ratifying the convention
before its entry into force on April 29, 1997. The convention, as of January
16, 1998, has 169 signatories
and 126 ratifiers
(state parties).
State parties to the Convention
are required to destroy all existing chemical weapon stockpiles, production,
and other related facilities within ten years of the convention's entry
into force. Parties are also required to declare all of its CW facilities--both
commercial and public--to the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The OPCW is responsible for
the implementation and verification of the convention. The OPCW consists
of three parts: the Conference of State Parties, the Executive Council,
and the Technical Secretariat.
The creators of the OPCW, the Preparatory
Commission, explored innovative ways to give the convention sharper teeth
than previous arms control treaties. Consequently, the organization developed
challenge inspections to augment the effectiveness of the convention. Challenge
inspections are caused by a state party's allegation of non-compliance
by another member state. As a result, inspectors can arrive at an alleged
chemical site on short notice; thereby limiting the ability of the inspected
state to hide or destroy existing chemical weapon stockpiles. Moreover,
some chemicals are subject to routine inspections by OPCW investigators.
The OPCW divides chemicals into
three disparate groups, each of which is treated differently under the
CWC. Schedule One chemicals are most likely to be used in a chemical weapon,
while Schedule Three chemicals are likely to be used for legitimate research.
The OPCW also uses this scheduling system as a framework to regulate the
trade of chemical agents.
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IMPLEMENTATION OBJECTIVES
AND REQUIREMENTS
The Chemical Weapons Convention
requires state parties to declare all of their chemical weapons and related
facilities--both commercial (above certain thresholds) and governmental--within
30 days after the treaty enters into force. Furthermore, state parties
must submit a general plan for destruction of these facilities. These declarations
must include the location of the chemical weapon facilities, specifying
the amount and type of chemicals involved.
The treaty also calls for commercial
industries that produce discrete organic chemicals with phosphorus, sulphur,
or fluorine that are unscheduled (not categorized) to declare the firm's
location. In addition, state parties are responsible for any chemical weapons
abandoned after 1925 on the territory of another state party without consent.
The CWC also requires signatories
to destroy all existing chemical weapon stockpiles, production, and other
related CW facilities within ten years of entry into force. The chemicals
are to be destroyed in an environmentally sound manner at the expense of
the state party. In exceptional cases, five year extensions will be granted
with the approval of two-thirds of the state's parties.
This destruction is to occur in
a "leveling out" process by which all signatories will destroy their existing
chemical weapons and related facilities at the same rate.
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Within five years, 20% of all Category
One weapons will be destroyed, and all Category Two and Three must be eliminated.
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Within seven years, 45% of all Category
One weapons must be destroyed.
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Within ten years, all Category One
weapons must be destroyed.
In sum, the CWC implements a series
of steps that call for the destruction of the most toxic
chemical agents by the year 2007 by state parties.
CHEMICAL RATING SYSTEM
Schedule 1 Chemicals
-
Nerve and blister agents and other
highly toxic chemicals; also includes nerve agent precursors. Examples
include Sarin gas, Mustard gas, Tabun and VX.
Schedule 2 Chemicals
-
These are chemicals that could be used
in weapons or could be used as key weapons ingredients. These are dual
use chemicals of limited use. Examples include Amiton, an insecticide,
and BZ, a chemical used in minute quantities as a biochemical research
tool.
Schedule 3 Chemicals
-
These chemicals are the least toxic
and make products ranging from carpets, textiles, dyes, medicine, ink etc.
These are dual use chemicals of extensive use. They include phosgene, an intermediate
in the preparation of many organic materials, and hydrogen cyanide, which
is used as a pesticide.
ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS (OPCW)
The United Nations Secretary General
convened the Preparatory Commission to create the framework of the OPCW
at the Hague. The Preparatory Commission established the OPCW to oversee
the implementation of the CWC.
The OPCW is composed of three major
bodies: the Conference of States Parties (CSP), the Executive Council (EC),
and the Technical Secretariat (TS).
Conference of States Parties
The CSP consists of one representative
from each state party. This representative is allowed one vote in the CSP.
The democratic nature of the CSP is unprecedented, since voting processes
were never implemented in previous arms limitation treaties.
The CSP meets in annual sessions
to approve a program of work for the EC and the OPCW budget. They are also
responsible for overseeing the implementation of the CWC. This includes
issues brought up by member states regarding compliance to the treaty.
Lastly, the CSP monitors, and can alter if necessary, the powers of the
Executive Council and Technical Secretariat.
Executive Council
The EC is responsible for the day
to day activities of the OPCW. It consists of a 41 member body with five
regional groups represented. The allocation of seats in the EC is based
on geographical quotas to ensure equitable geographical distribution. There
is one rotating seat that alternates between the Latin America/Carribean
region and the Asian region every two years. The seat is currently assigned
to Latin America and the Carribean. Next year, the seat will go to Asia.
The regional areas include: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe/
other states, and Latin America. Industrial seats are given to countries
with the most significant chemical industries. These seats virtually guarantee
that the United States will continue to have a representative on the EC
in the future.
African Region Group Members:
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Elected for one year (1997-1998): Algeria,
Kenya, Morocco and South Africa
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Elected for two years (1997-1999):
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Zimbabwe
Asian Region Group Members:
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Elected for one year (1997-1998): Bangladesh,
Oman, Phillipines and Sri Lanka
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Elected for two years (1997-1999):
China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and Saudi Arabia
Eastern Region Group Members:
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Elected for one year (1997-1998): Belarus,
Bulgaria and Romaina
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Elected for two years (1997-1999):
Hungary and Poland
Western European and other states
Region Group Members:
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Elected for one year (1997-1998): Australia,
Malta, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain
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Elected for two years (1997-1999):
France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and the United States
Latin American and Carribean Group
Members:
-
Elected for one year (1997-1998): Ecuador,
Peru, Suriname and Uruguay
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Elected for two years (1997-1999):
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico
The EC is responsible for approving
arrangement for implementation of verification activities by the TS. The
EC also reviews the draft program and budget that is presented before the
CSP.
Most importantly, the EC handles
claims of noncompliance by member parties. The EC negotiates with the state
parties involved and brings the claims and consequent recommendations to
the CSP; thus, the EC acts as a liaison between the National Authorities
(NA) and the OPCW. In addition, the EC also concludes agreements with international
organizations on behalf of the OPCW.
Technical Secretariat and Director
General
The TS consists of 250 people from
which 100 work in the inspectors corps. The TS is responsible for carrying
out the verification procedures as established by the CWC. Under the rubric
of the treaty, the TS is to provide assistance to state parties who have
been victims of a chemical weapons attack. The United States is represented
in the TS by David Clement, Director of Administration.
The inspector corps plays an integral
role in the verification process. During inspections, the IC can interview
personnel, examine documents, request samples from reactor vessels, effluent
streams, and storage tanks. There are two types of inspection teams. The
first is a Chemical Weapons Inspection Team that evaluates chemical weapons
destruction facilities. This team consists of personnel that range from
munition specialists to chemical production technologists. The second inspection
team is the industry inspection team. This team is responsible for inspecting
Schedule 2 and 3 chemical facilities. It consists of eight personnel ranging
from product logisticians to chemical production technologists. Both teams
carry up to date technology, like gas chromatographs, to investigate alleged
chemical facilities.
Director General
The DG is the head of the TS and
is appointed by the CSP for a term of four years, renewable only once.
The Director General's responsibilities include verification matters, administration,
legal issues, external relations, and technical cooperation and assistance.
The first DG is Jose Mauricio Bustani of Brazil.
The National Authority
The NA is not a part of the OPCW
but it is an important aspect of the CWC. Each state party must have a
NA which acts as a liaison between the state party, the OPCW, and other
member states. The NA is required to collect all relevant information regarding
civilian and military facilities that produce scheduled chemicals. This
information is then given to the TS in the declaration process as outlined
by the CWC. This is crucial in establishing a basis for the verification
process.
In addition, the NA acts as a contact
and host for inspection teams entering a country. It is most likely that
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will act as the NA for the United
States.
IN THE FUTURE....The Director General
will create a Scientific Advisory Board that will provide
specialized advice in the areas of science and technology.
BUDGET
UNITED STATES
Estimates indicated that the expected
cost of the OPCW Technical Secretariat's activities would be 165 million
per year, of which 41 million would be paid by the United States. It is
estimated that the United States will pay approximately 25% of the total
cost of the OPCW. Congress, however, would continue to exercise oversight
on budget arrangements through appropriations and the legislative process.
From the OPCW web site:
The activities of the Preparatory
Commission and its Secretariat were funded by Member States, based on the
UN scale of assessments. The financial contributions of the Member States
varied from 25 % (US) to 0.01 % (68 Member States).
The Commission started off with
a budget of US$ 9 million in 1993. Beginning in 1994, the Commission adopted
its budget in two stages. The first stage supported the activities of an
initial staff of 123, before 65 ratifications were deposited.
The second stage of the budget began
on 31 October 1996 after 65 notices of ratifications had been deposited,
and the Secretariat staff strength began to expand to about 370. The budget
for Part 1 in 1994 and 1995 was 17.6 million and 13.9 million respectively.
In 1995 a separate amount of 3.63
million was earmarked for procurement of inspection equipment.
The approved 1996 budget amounted
to 12.9 million in Part I, increasing to 28.6 million in Part
I when 65 Member States had deposited their ratification instruments.
VERIFICATION REGIME
Declared chemical weapon facilities-
both commercial and governmental producers, consumers, and stockpilers-
are subject to routine inspections during the production and destruction
of scheduled chemicals. The number and extensiveness of routine inspections
is guided by the risk associated with each schedule of chemicals. For example,
Schedule 1 sites will be subject to more visits and scrutiny by inspectors.
Routine verification is also applied
to chemical industry facilities that produce, process, or consume, above
certain thresholds, chemicals outlined by the treaty. In addition, firms
that produce unscheduled chemicals that contain phosphorus, sulphur, or
fluorine will be subject to routine inspections four years after entry
into force of the convention.
The Secretariat's working estimate
of the total number of facilities, worldwide, is:
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Schedule 1 facilities <100
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Schedule 2 plants > 300
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Schedule 3 Plants > 400
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DOC plants > 5000
National trial inspections
CHALLENGE INSPECTION
State parties can request and are
obliged to receive challenge inspections, at any site, declared or undeclared.
According to the OPCW, the sole purpose of the challenge inspection is
to clarify and resolve questions in relation to a possible non-compliance
with the provisions of the convention. Challenge inspections can be conducted
at any facility or location in the territory of the inspected state party.
They can also be conducted in any place under the jurisdiction or control
of a state party.
The inspection team can arrive at
the perimeter of the chemical facility 48 hours after notification is given
to the national authority of the state party. Host officials must allow
inspectors access to the alleged CW facility within 72 hours of notification.
In addition, they are required to give the inspection team 84 hours to
investigate.
Mutual agreement on these inspections
between the TS and the state is guided by the process of "managed access."
As stated in the treaty, "managed access" gives the OPCW inspectors the
right to sufficiently investigate the facility while assuring the inspected
country that it can protect its sensitive installations and confidential
information unrelated to the convention. The inspected state is also given
the option to invoke delays on the inspection party for a 24 hour period
during which the state may shut down computers, and take other measures
that protect its national security.
ROLE OF THE EC DURING A CHALLENGE
INSPECTION
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Within 12 hours after a submission
of a request, the EC may abort the inspection preparations by a 3/4 majority
decision if it decides the request is abusive or inconsistent with the
convention.
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After completion, the EC will address
the issues of possible non-compliance by the inspected state party, possible
abuse of the right to request a challenge inspection by the requesting
state party and inspection cost if that was abused.
ROLE OF THE DG DURING A CHALLENGE
INSPECTION
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Make sure the request was submitted
in a technically correct form.
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Assemble and dispatch inspection team
as soon as possible.
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Notify the inspected State party- not
later than twelve hours before their arrival at the point of entry (to
the country).
Summary of Reporting and Inspection Requirements under the Chemical Weapons Convention
(From the OPCW website)
| Chemical
Reporting |
Threshold |
Inspection
Threshold |
Firm Affected |
| Schedule 2 A |
100 kg |
1 tonne |
Producers,processors,consumers,
importers, exporters |
| Schedule A |
1 kg |
10 kg |
Producers, processors,
consumers, importers, exporters |
| Schedule 2 B |
1 tonne |
10 tonnes |
Producers, processors,consumers,
importers,exporters |
| Schedule 3 |
30 tonnes |
200 tonnes |
Producers, importers,exporters |
| Unscheduled DOCs |
200 tonnes |
200 tonnes* |
Producers |
| PSF Chemicals |
30 tonnes |
200 tonnes* |
Producers |
No inspections will occur in the
first 3 years after entry into force of the Convention.
(All amounts are per annum. Production
is to be calculated over an entire plant site, chemical-by-chemical, except
for unscheduled DOCs, for which all unscheduled DOCs produced at a plant
site should be aggregated. Initial reports by ratifying States to the OPCW
will be due 30 days after the Convention enters into force; reporting by
industrial facilities to national governments will therefore occur significantly
earlier.)
Criteria of "managed access" (Taken from OPCW web site)
| Inspection
Team |
Inspected
State Party |
| Inspection mandate as
basis for any inspection activity (i.e., defining the scope of the inspection) |
Option of proposing
an alternative perimeter before access is given into the requested parameter |
| Obligation to "use only
those method necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to clarify
the concern of possible non-compliance" |
May "take measures to
protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential
information and data not related to chemical weapons" |
| Guided by the principle
of "conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive manner possible" |
Managed access: option
to limit and/or control the extent of access and the inspection activities,
including sampling |
| Take into account suggested
modifications and proposals "to ensure that sensitive equipment, information
or areas, not related to chemical weapons, are protected" |
Right to propose measures
alternative to requested inspection activities or access to particular
structures/areas, to demonstrate compliance |
| Equipment specification
include option of Yes/No indiction only for identification of inspection-relevant
chemicals |
Right to restrict sample
analysis to presence or absence of scheduled chemicals and their appropriate
degradation product |
| Classification
of the level of confidentiality is the prerogative of the inspected State
Party. While it is the right of the inspection team to take away information
it has collected and included in its preliminary findings, procedures have
been developed and provisionally agreed to remove unrelated information
if identified as such. |
A POSSIBLE CHALLENGE INSPECTION SCENARIO
11:30 AM, June 12
During an Executive Council meeting,
Country X alleges that through aerial reconnaissance it has learned that
a supposed baby food factory in Country Y is actually a Schedule 1 chemical
weapons producer. Country X shows satellite pictures that sufficiently
indicate that there is possible non-compliance with the convention by Country
Y.
1:00 PM, June 12
The Director General obtains the
request and makes sure that it was submitted in a technically correct form.
Noting that the evidence indicates it is a Schedule 1 producer, the Director
General assembles a CW Inspection team. The Director General notifies the
inspected state party representative.
12 Hours later, 1:00 AM, June 13
The CW inspection team arrives at
the border of Country Y and is met by members of the National Authority.
Understanding that they have 36 hours until they can arrive at the perimeter
of the alleged CW facility, the inspection team gets a hotel and negotiates
with the NA from Country Y regarding the details of the inspection procedures.
2:00 AM, June 13
The inspection team contacts the
EC to update their situation and receive any pertinent information that
has been discussed between the EC, the NA and Country Y.
3:00 AM, June 13- 11:00 AM, June 14
Country Y sends in a task force
to the alleged site to shut down computers, lock file cabinets, and block
off parts of the complex that are not relevant to the inspection.
1:00 PM, June 14
The CW inspection team arrives at
the perimeter of the facility. Details of the inspection are still being
negotiated. They are refused entry until the following day.
1:00 PM, June 15 (72 hours after notification)
The inspection team is allowed to
enter. Using gas chromatographs, the team determines that no Schedule 1,2,
or 3 chemicals are being produced or stockpiled in the facility.
11:00 AM, June 16
The Executive Council concludes
that there was sufficient evidence to indicate possible non- compliance
by Country Y and that there was not an abuse of the challenge inspection
privilege. They also conclude that the cost of the inspection was not abused
and that the team investigated the facility
thoroughly.
EFFORTS OF CWC TO LIMIT PROLIFERATION
-
S1 chemicals can be transferred between
two states parties only for purposes of research medicine and pharmaceutical
use, and only in specified quantities; these chemicals cannot be re-transferred
to a new state.
-
S2 chemicals may be traded with non-signatories
for only three years afer the convention enters into force.
-
S3 chemical have no quantitative limits
on trading within state parties; an end use certificateis required when
trading with non-state companies. Five years after entry into force restrictions on
the transfer of S3 chemicals to non-state parties will be considered.
ENFORCEMENT/PENALTIES FOR
NON-COMPLIANCE
The question of enforcement, and
specifically sanctions, is still being negotiated by OPCW. The lack of
specificity in the CWC regarding punitive measures shows that the creation
of enforcement mechanisms will be a ongoing process for the OPCW. Penalties
would most likely be waged through international embargoes placed on nations
not complying with the convention.
EVALUATION
The CSP will conduct a special review
conference in five and ten years after entry into force to discuss the
overall operation of the CWC and the progress of destruction of facilities.
Also, in five years, the CSP will meet to consider other measures regarding
the transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-parties.
The above summaries were writen by Chris Dishman.
This web page was designed by Laura Beers.
Last updated November 15, 2000.
Please email any comments or questions to Chris
Hellman.
