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The Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) was drafted in 1972 and entered into force 3 years later, in 1975.
THe Convetnion is intended to prevent the development, production, and
stockpiling of biological weapons. According to the convention, pathogens
and toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective, or other peaceful services are to be eliminated. The BWC also
seeks to abolish delivery systems, munitions, and other equipment used
to launch biological weapons. To date, 159 countries have
signed
the Convention, and 141 have ratified
it.
Since its entry into force, the
BWC has convened four review conferences at five year intervals, the most
recent of which occurred in November 1996. These conferences grappled with
problems arising from non-compliance with the convention. The BWC does
not have a verification regime to determine if state parties are complying
with the provisions of the convention. Member states are encouraged to
abide by numerous confidence building measures (CBM) prescribed by state
parties at various review conferences. Often these measures are not effective
in deterring member states from producing biological weapons.
After the Gulf War member states
began to look closer at the problems associated with verification by appointing
a special Ad Hoc Commission of scientists (VEREX). This commission of governmental
experts was responsible for presenting a list of verification measures
that could be adopted by the state parties. In 2001, the Ad Hoc committee
will report to state parties at the Fifth Review conference regarding verification
protocol.
The United States, through the United
Nations Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, discussed the possibility
of an international agreement with the Soviet Union. On August 5, 1971,
the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to a revised draft of the
convention and a vote in the General Assembly resulted in 110 for the treaty,
and 0 against. The United States Senate ratified the convention in 1974
during the Ford administration.
The framework of the BWC has developed
through numerous Review Conferences. Article XII calls for a review conference
to convene every five years with the approval of the states parties. These
conferences are responsible for developing convention protocol and resolving
issues and problems that arise between state parties.
The history of CBM measures in the
BWC has produced mixed results. In 1987, 13 states submitted CBM information.
This figure increased to 36 in 1990. As a voluntary measure CBM's lack
the rigidity necessary to foster compliance with convention. The small
percentage of countries following CBM's indicate this.
CBM's do, however, foster a general
awareness of steps that need to be incorporated into the verification process,
and they have provided a framework for committees exploring verification
measures to use.
In September 1991, the third conference
convened in a global environment much different than the previous. The
Cold War was over, and in February the United States and coalition forces
defeated Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War.
The end of the Cold War created
the need for a new focus for the BWC. Prior to the Third Conference, the
primary role of the BWC was to prevent biological weapons from being used
in a military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.
For this reason, the creators of the treaty never envisaged the convention
having verification measures such as on site inspections. Moreover, the
Soviet Union and the United States were the only two countries thought
to possess biological weapons when the treaty was created; thus, the conference
explored ways to create a more inclusive approach towards verification.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait also
impacted the agenda of the third conference ( It is interesting to note
that Iraq signed the BWC on May 11, 1972, and deposited their notice of
ratification on March 18, 1991 after the Gulf War). As a consequence of
Saddam Hussein's threats to use biological weapons, state parties of the
BWC sought a comprehensive and effective means of verifying the treaty's
provisions. They tasked an Ad Hoc committee of scientists and technical
experts (VEREX) to seek possible verification measures for enforcing the
BWC.
At the Third Conference, Ambassador
Ronald Lehman from the United States claimed that unlike the production
of chemical weapons, there are no precursors or equipment used solely for
the production of inimical biological agents. Lehman also stated that any
country with a modest pharmaceutical industry can make a biological weapon;
thus, the United States did not believe that a verification regime for
the BWC was possible.
In addition to creating VEREX, the
Third Conference expanded a previous CBM to include the exchange
of information on national biological defense research programs. The conference
also established another CBM that encouraged state parties to declare past
activities on offensive and/or defensive biological
research and development programs. Further, the conference created a new
CBM in which state parties were asked to declare facilities that produced
vaccines for humans.
As mentioned previously, VEREX was
tasked with examining "potential verification measures" for the convention.
In particular, the mandate listed a set of criteria that VEREX should use
when developing these measures: strengths and weaknesses based on the amount
of information they provide, the ability to differentiate between prohibited
and permitted activities, the ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance,
the financial, legal, and/or safety implications of the measures, and their
impact on scientific research, industrial development other permitted activities.
VEREX convened four sessions between
March 1992 and September 1993. The committee consisted solely of governmental
experts -- NGO's, media and other organizations were not allowed to participate.
In VEREX I, less than 40% of the state parties participated, and in VEREX
IV, participation decreased to less than 30% of all state parties. Nevertheless,
VEREX produced positive results. VEREX I explored 21 possible measures
for verification, both off and on site. Some examples include surveillance
on publications and legislation, scheduled declarations of activities,
visual inspection from both remote distances and on site, medical examination
of the work force, identification of key equipment and continuous monitoring
by instruments and personnel.
Although the committee consisted
of only governmental experts, various groups and organizations were allowed
to brief VEREX on issues regarding verification. From the United States,
the Federation of American Scientists and the US biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industry trade association briefed VEREX on various verification topics.
The Federation of American
Scientists has done extensive work on the creation of a verification
regime.
The next session, VEREX II reviewed
state of the art technologies applicable to each measure aforementioned.
For example, satellite photos could produce intelligence on covert CB plants.
The committee also included the limitations of each technology, which in
the case of aerial photography is the inability of the picture to explicate
the activities inside the plant.
VEREX III focused on evaluating
the pros and cons of each measure and specifically on the limitations and
advantages of combining various measures. In some instances a combination
of measures created more limitations, while in others it obviated their
shortcomings.
The conclusions of VEREX was threefold.
First, VEREX determined that each measure could contribute something to
the verification process. Second, the committee felt that no one measure
was a panacea for preventing non-compliance to the BWC, and third, VEREX
concluded that some combinations of measures would produce positive results
while others would produce negative ones. VEREX reported their results
at a Special Conference in convened on September 1994.
This conference agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group "to consider possible
verification measures and draft proposals to strengthen the convention."
The delegates hoped the committee would complete their deliberations by
the 1996 review conference.
Click on the following topics to receive a more detailed
analysis:
BACKGROUND TO THE CONVENTION
U.S. efforts
to eliminate biological weapons began in earnest under the Nixon administration.
On November 25, 1969, President Nixon declared that the United States would
not use chemical weapons in a first instance, and he renounced the use
of biological weapons in any situation. Future biological weapons research
was confined to defensive measures such as immunization, detection and
safety. Consequently, the Department of Defense destroyed large stockpiles
of biological weapons. Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom followed suit
and began to abolish their BW stockpiles as well.
SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE
In September 1986, state parties met
to discuss ways to further implement and verify the BWC. They adopted a
series of CBM's designed to improve openness by providing data on national
activities related to biological weapons. In particular, state parties
encouraged data exchange measures to promote cooperation in the areas of
permitted technologies. They also encouraged the
publication of biological research directly related to the convention and
vowed to exchange information on outbreaks and infectious diseases. Member
states tasked an Ad Hoc committee to develop procedures for implementing
these exchanges.
CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES
THIRD REVIEW CONFERENCE
VEREX
This conference was held in November, 1996 in Geneva. At this convention, 138 state parties reaffirmed their support for the BWC. In their final declaration, member states suggested that state parties should apply the BWC to both biology and biotechnology. Moreover, state parties emphasized that the BWC applies to all biological advances that have occurred since the entry into force of the BWC in 1975.
The Fourth Conference tasked the 1994 Ad Hoc committee to create a draft verification protocol before the Fifth Review Conference to be held in 2001. A press release issued by the Fourth Review Conference stated that the delegates wanted the Ad Hoc Committee to "review its working methods, and move more into a negotiating format." The committee is expected to hold three sessions in 1997.
As Ambassador Lehman stated at the Third Conference, it is difficult to create a verification regime for the BWC because any nation with a developed pharmaceutical industry has the potential to make biological weapons. Moreover, the small amount of biological agent needed to create a biological weapon makes verification of the BWC difficult. Small facilities with minimal amounts of biological agents can do severe damage with the proper delivery system. These facilities are easier to camouflage than the larger facilities required to make materials for other WMD's, for example, highly enriched uranium. In addition, among the 11 countries pursuing a biological program, little is known about the amount, types, and toxicity of the biological agents each is pursuing
Compounding these difficulties, biological weapons can be made from materials that are difficult to monitor. Unlike chemical weapons that require salient nerve agent precursors, many of the base elements of BW's are dual use technologies that can be used legitimately for pharmaceutical purposes. Moreover, the rapid development of biotechnology in recent years increases the possibility that a country will obtain biological weapons. Technological obstacles to creating biological weapons will diminish as biotechnology continues to develop.
Perhaps one of the greatest difficulties in verifying the production of biological weapons is the ability of a verification regime to gain the support and participation of the biological industry. Unlike its chemical counterpart, the biotechnology industry is unlikely to give commercial information to a verification regime. Due to the competitive nature of biotechnology research and development, firms are reluctant to volunteer information that could compromise their economic edge. It is possible, however, that an agreement could be reached with the biotechnology industry that would alleviate their concerns; inspectors can be screened to ensure they are credible; international copyright laws could be modified to ensure the facilities' research and development will not be breached; the state party would have time to prepare for an inspection so that it could hide any sensitive biotechnological information. Regardless, participation by the pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries is critical if strengthening the BWC's verification and enforcement regimes is to be successful.
The growing threat of BW's also hinders the verification process. In the aftermath of the Cold War, some countries have pursued biological weapon's programs in order to strengthen a military that might be susceptible to external or internal threats. These militaries are more likely to acquire biological weapons in a post Cold War environment where transnational criminal activity has flourished; thus, countries will be more likely to obtain BW's and less likely to abide by the provisions of the convention. In addition, the emergence of non-state actors makes it difficult to develop effective verification measures. Many of these groups seek to acquire BW's, and it is difficult for a verification regime to monitor them.
During the Third Conference, the Bush administration outlined many of these difficulties and concerns in their objection to the establishment of a verification regime. First, the Bush administration claimed that BWC facilities cannot be located or monitored effectively with a verification regime because biological weapons do not leave distinctive "signatures." The lack of "signatures" of a biological agent diminishes the ability of a verification team to determine if a facility produces biological weapons. Compounding this problem is the ability of a biological weapons producer to open and close a BW facility within months. The Bush administration also claimed that a verification regime could not detect a covert BW program, thereby creating a false sense of confidence that a particular country is not developing biological weapons. Lastly, the Bush administration believed that inspection teams would expose countries to foreign espionage in the biotechnology industry. Many critics of the BWC share these same views.
Proponents of establishing a verification regime argue that imposing the risk of discovery and increasing the cost and difficulty of clandestine programs makes a verification regime worthwhile. Furthermore, proponents believe that a verification regime will provide opportunities for parties to demonstrate compliance while enhancing confidence in the compliance of others. Lastly, a verification regime will create an international legal norm against biological weapons and can be used in the future as a mechanism for preventing the production of BW's.
It is important that the Ad Hoc committee that will report to the Fifth Review Conference in 2001 focuses on establishing basic priorities for a nascent verification regime. As tasked by the final declaration of the Fourth Review Conference, the committee is moving towards a negotiating stage with state parties. The priorities of this stage and verification regime development should stem from the tenets of the Organization for the Prohibition for Chemical Weapons, the verification regime for the CWC. While specific provisions cannot be translated from the OPCW into a BWC verification regime, there are fundamental principles which could be applied. First, biological agents can be "scheduled" or categorized, as chemical agents are in the OPCW. Since many biological agents are dual use technologies, state parties will need to negotiate what schedules will receive priority for destruction. Second, challenge inspections should be implemented as a verification measure. Although challenge inspections will be more difficult in the BWC than in the CWC due to the size of biological production facilities, they will still aid in locating and monitoring BW production sites. Third, the BWC could incorporate a threshold for different biological agents, albeit at a different level than chemical thresholds. Lastly, the BWC can engage biotechnology industries in further negotiations regarding the categorization of various biological agents. The dual use nature of biotechnology mandates that the BWC gain the cooperation of the biotechnological industries in limiting proliferation of biological agents. Some possible steps to further this relationship were mentioned previously.
Regardless of the verification difficulties of the BWC, the convention will continue to evolve and provide a mechanism for preventing the production of biological weapons. Unlike the CWC, both the United States and the Russian Federation are state parties to the convention; thus the 138 signatories comprise most of the countries in the world that stockpile and produce biological weapons. If member states can agree on measures of verification as prescribed by the Ad Hoc Committee, then the BWC would encompass a majority of the world's biological weapons.
The above summaries were writen by Chris Dishman.
This web page was designed by Laura Beers.
Last updated November 15, 2000.
Please send any comments or questions to Chris
Hellman.