THE REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION

The Rebuttable Presumption is an Objective Planning Process

The Rebuttable Presumption is a force structure planning process that places all required military forces in the National Guard and Reserves unless an adequate rebuttal can be made that a specific military organization must be in the active component force to meet a clearly defined immediate national defense requirement.

This presumption was first developed by the Senate Armed Services Committee staff in the 1980s and the Adjutants General believe if properly implemented it will serve the nation well into the 21st century.

Since the end of the Cold War, many reasons have been offered to justify armed forces in general, and active forces in particular. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union constituted more than sufficient rationale for large standing regular forces and substantial forces in the Guard and Reserve components.

The three most prominent reasons are:

--To respond to regional threats by maintaining the capability to conduct two major theater wars which may overlap; and
--To maintain military presence overseas to deter aggression and to support other strategic objectives; and
--To engage with other nations sharing democratic values and to conduct peace operations throughout the world.

This is no longer the case. Certainly all of these are good reasons for having military forces, as well as the need to hedge against the uncertainty of the future. However, in the institutional American defense establishment and in this model, the actual division of labor between the active, Guard and Reserve has been and must continue to be based upon these national considerations:

1. The day-to-day need to maintain armed forces in peacetime,
2. The urgency of the initial need for a massive, lightning-like military response in a crisis, and
3. Where a particular military force is positioned within our national framework.

The greater need in either of the first two criteria listed above may justify larger active forces. But only to the extent that such roles would unnecessarily distract Guard and Reserve members from their civilian enterprises. However, there are many variables within the Rebuttable Presumption.

A good example of how these variables apply is to view how the basis of U.S. military presence in Europe has changed since the end of Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States kept large active component formations stationed in Western Europe to help NATO absorb a Soviet attack and, ideally, deter such an event from occurring. (Totally Active Requirement)

GEN Colin Powell's post-Cold War Base Force retained about 65,000 Army soldiers in Western Europe, so the nation could reconstitute US military capability in Western Europe should democracy fail and totalitarianism prevail. (Totally Active Requirement)

Today, while we still have the same forces in Western Europe as called for by the Base Force, US forces are now engaged in the militaries of the longstanding as well as the emerging European nations; thereby, enlarging the understanding of basic democratic values and institutions throughout Europe. The task is more demanding on our units and soldiers than simply training for a Cold War force. That is why much of this work is being accomplished through periodic deployments of active, Guard and Reserve forces from the US. (Large Active Forces No Longer Required)

The third criteria -- reduced necessity for a standing military force in the national framework -- covers an enduring function in the Constitution that belongs to a specific armed force such as the Naval forces (Navy and Marine Corps) or the Militia (National Guard). These organizations must be recognized as a constant within the Rebuttable Presumption.

The enduring functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are designed (1) to ensure our freedom of access to commerce around the world and (2) to defend our shores to preclude the need for large garrisons. (Remains Largely Active Requirement) The National Guard -- in addition to its statutory role as a reserve of the Army and Air Force -- has federal Militia responsibility to repel invasions, suppress domestic rebellion, and enact the laws of the Union. In addition, the National Guard retains its original common law role to protect the American people against all domestic dangers and threats. (Totally National Guard)

The enduring institutional roles can be disconcerting to those who don't understand them because they set one service apart to the disadvantage of the other services. This is the current situation, where the Army, a temporary force, institutionally is claiming roles of the Militia (National Guard) to justify a larger than needed Army. However, these roles are constitutionally based and acknowledging them correctly gives the strategy legitimacy.

In providing a baseline that is removed from the current forces which it does the Rebuttable Presumption can give the Department of Defense a more objective process for balancing the force and enhancing the likelihood of a successful partnership.

The Rebuttable Presumption is the Formula for Balance and PartnershipReady Reserve land forces cost substantially less than active forces; about 25 cents on the dollar compared to active forces. While they're cheaper, they are disproportionally more effective for a number of reasons which justifies this approach.

The first level for rebuttal on behalf of the active forces must be related to major theater wars (MTWs). Specifically, the measure is, the capability commanders-in-chief (CinC) need and how long it will take the United States to provide the transportation to start moving the units having this capability. Anywhere Guard and Reserve units can meet this test, the forces for that requirement must be in the Guard or the Reserve.

History and recent analysis convinces the Adjutants General that every unit in the Army National Guard can be made ready to deploy, without qualification, in less than 120 days after being mobilized. The two variables that could preclude this are: (1) the resources provided in peacetime and (2) required length of post-mobilization training; both statutory responsibilities of the active Army.

Experience in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the post-Desert Storm debates and extensive analysis demonstrates that Army National Guard units can generally be ready to deploy overseas relatively quickly following their mobilization when compared to available lift.

--Combat Service Support (CSS) units can be ready in 30 days.
--Combat Support (CS) units can go in 60 days; and
--Combat (maneuver) units can go in 90 days.

These time frames are adequate for discussing the public policy aspects of the Rebuttable Presumption. With less peacetime support these periods could increase significantly and thereby increase the need for larger active forces. With slightly more investment, like 30 cents on the dollar, for increased full-time support personnel, a small number of additional training assemblies to allow key individuals to maintain their critical skills like we do today for pilots, air crews and tank master gunners, these times could be reduced by up to one-third and obviously decrease the need for larger active forces.

The major theater war scenarios envisioned in the National Military Strategy and the availability time-frames listed above would allow Guard and Reserve forces to occupy a major portion of the U.S. response in the first contingency and most of the combat units in the second overlapping-contingency. The actual degree is only a financial variable.

Overseas presence is the second level of analysis from which a rebuttal could be crafted. In the current strategic environment the basis of forward presence has changed dramatically, both in the Pacific Basin and in Europe, making this type of rebuttal much more difficult than it would have been in the Cold War. Except for Korea, good arguments exist for accomplishing most of our land forces presence demands through periodic deployments from the US, rather than permanent stationing overseas.

Further, good reasons exist for some of the presence requirements, like scheduled exercises that could be better accomplished through periodic Guard and Reserve unit deployments. In some cases, such as engagement in Eastern Europe, the use of Guard and Reserve forces are preferred. The National Guard State Partnership Program is a functional model for US presence in Eastern Europe.

From our Post-Cold War experience today, a successful rebuttal could be made to maintain some forces in the Active Army to provide quick response to a peacekeeping or peace enforcement contingency. Sufficient force structure, adequately manned, could be maintained in the active force to allow an initial Bosnia type response to occur without mobilization of the National Guard or Reserve.

However, rotation forces required to sustain this type of commitment beyond the first six months should all be in the Guard and Reserve for several reasons, including: (1) insuring the National Strategic Partnership is intact before the contingency transitions to a sustained military activity, and (2) that Adjutants General believe that any Army National Guard unit can be successfully mobilized, trained and available in the six months before the end of the first rotation.

The Adjutants General believe the third level of analysis, Engagement and Enlargements, are the toughest missions for the active services to successfully rebut. This Cold War concept has been and continues to be successfully conducted in Central and South America by the Guard and Reserve forces since the decade preceding the end of the Cold War. The results speak for themselves. Today, every country, save one, south of the Rio Grande is a democracy. The Adjutants General believe the conclusion is simple: The best way to communicate democratic values is the do it with men and women who understand the military but also practice and live in democracy everyday -- our citizen soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors.

The Rebuttable Presumption Gives America's National Defense Strategy LifeThe total involvement of the Adjutants General, along with other Reserve leaders, in the National Military Strategy development secures many benefits for the United States.

It assures our friends and potential adversaries that the American people, not just its army, are committed to accomplish what they say and do.
It generates support for the strategy from the community, up through the state to the Congress.
It also assures that we provide the required standing Army we need with the reasonable assurance that it will be adequately supported and resourced.

Dr. William Perry, as the Secretary of Defense, recognized the importance of this involvement in his remarks and letters to the Adjutants General throughout his tenure:

--"I consider your input vital as we tackle the challenges facing us now and into the 21st Century."
--"The Adjutants General of the states and territories have a unique role that transcends many governmental boundaries; as a result, you and your colleagues have an important perspective on a wide range of defense issues. I value your input, collectively and individually."
--"I look forward to your advice and counsel...."

CONCLUSION

The Adjutants General of the United States and the National Guard Association of the Untied States believe America is faced with two problems: (1) an army it cannot afford and (2) an army that "cannot win its nation's wars." Adoption of the Rebuttable Presumption is clearly an important first step toward solving these problems.

For more information contact: National Guard Association http://www.ngaus.org
For full text, go to National Military Strategy and the Rebuttable Presumption http://www.ngaus.org/rebutable.html