By Timothy Barnes

Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) is intended to provide early warning for ballistic missile launches and overall missile detection capabilities. It is being developed as a successor to the “early warning” satellite Defense Support Program (DSP). Since its creation, SBIRS has been beset by underdeveloped technologies, software development glitches, shoddy acquisition plans and lax oversight. These problems have resulted in skyrocketing costs and repeated scheduling delays.

SBIRS is supposed to contribute to the proposed missile defense system by detecting the launching of ballistic missiles. It would accomplish this mission by utilizing high speed scanning sensors to observe ICBMs and both scanning and staring sensors to detect low signature, short-burn-duration theater missiles. Initially, SBIRS was planned to have four satellites in geosynchronous orbit (GEO), two infrared sensors on separate host satellites in highly elliptical orbit (HEO), and a ground-based component that would be used for data processing and control. The Air Force also sought to have a fifth GEO satellite that would serve as a spare.

Development of SBIRS began in 1996, with Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman jointly securing the initial $2.16 billion contract. Six years later, the Department of Defense (DOD) increased the contract to $4.18 billion, which excluded the costs of three of the proposed five GEO satellites.

Originally, SBIRS was to have high and low-orbiting components known as SBIRS High and SBIRS Low. But in 2001, SBIRS Low was transferred from the Air Force to the Missile Defense Agency and renamed the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) in order to better match its missile defense responsibilities and to distinguish it from the struggling SBIRS High program, now known simply as SBIRS.    

Currently, the HEO payload of SBIRS is exceeding specifications in on-orbit performance and 100 percent of one of its GEO satellite (GEO I) payload components has been fully integrated. The GEO I has also completed initial acoustic testing. In addition, 95 percent of GEO I bus components have been integrated and in August 2006 spacecraft functional testing was completed; this was followed by first-time thermal vacuum testing in December of that same year. In September 2007, the GEO I bus component was successfully mated with the payload for the first time. These successes, however, have been hampered by the significant hardware and software design problems of SBIRS which include sensor jitter, inadequate infrared sensitivity, and stray sunlight. In early October 2007 a spacecraft with design features similar to those found in SBIRS failed in testing. This development will push back the launch of the first GEO satellite at least a year. Many of the specifics regarding technical problems remain classified.

This is not the first time SBIRS has run into problems. In 2001, DOD made the first of what would be several so-called Nunn-McCurdy notifications to Congress, which signal that a program has significantly busted its budget. Nunn-McCurdy growth limits have two thresholds: a 15 percent Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) increase limit and a 25 percent PAUC limit. When a developing program hits those growth limits, Congress must be notified and further action may be taken.[i] The first SBIRS Nunn-McCurdy breach was of the 25 percent variety, after which the Air Force restructured the program and planned to pay for the first two GEO satellites using funds allocated for research, development, testing, and evaluation. The three remaining satellites would then have been purchased with procurement funds over the next two years. A May 2003 joint Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board report criticized this restructuring, and in October 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concurred, warning of future scheduling delays and increased costs. Between June 2004 and December 2005, four more Nunn-McCurdy violations were identified, three exceeding the 15 percent limit and one exceeding the 25 percent threshold. The program was also restructured twice more during this same time frame, the latest plan calling for the acquisition of only three GEO satellites. However, this latest acquisition plan excludes required components of the program in order to meet immediate cost and schedule goals. A breakdown of program costs not accounted for is below.

SBIRS Program Costs Not Fully Accounted For ($ Millions)[ii]

Congress has yet to hold any specific hearings addressing SBIRS despite the numerous reports that have questioned the excessive costs and technical feasibility of the program. Due to the numerous technical difficulties that have resulted in severe cost overruns, Congress has occasionally cut the budget of SBIRS. In fiscal year 2002 (FY 02), Congress denied all procurement funding ($94 million) arguing that more research and development was needed. More recently, in FY 06, Congress cut $50 million from the program, citing its extreme growth limits; however, it appears that the program will receive full funding ($587 million) for FY 08.

Following the latest restructuring, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics ordered the Air Force to undertake efforts to develop a competing capability for SBIRS. In 2006, the Air Force unveiled plans for the Alternative Infrared Satellite System (AIRSS). At first, AIRSS was seen as a near-term replacement for SBIRS that would provide continuity of coverage. However, when it appeared that the prospects for SBIRS had improved, the Air Force morphed AIRSS into a follow on program that would use even more advanced technologies than those currently being attempted for SBIRS.

In November 2006, the Defense Contract Management Agency issued a report highlighting the continuing fiscal problems of SBIRS. Most alarmingly, management reserve funds - scheduled to last until 2012 - have decreased from $232 million to $168 million in one year. SBIRS is now seven years behind schedule and its expected total cost is now well over $11 billion, a 300 percent increase from the original cost estimate. The first satellite launch is tentatively scheduled for 2009-2010. In the meantime, the DOD has commissioned a study known as ARGUS, which will examine options to fill coverage gaps should DSP satellites fall out of orbit before SBIRS satellites are fully operational. 

General Information on the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

U.S. Air Force

http://www.afspc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3675

Lockheed Martin

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/SpaceBasedInfraredSystemHigh/

Global Security.org

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/sbir.htm

Reports

Congressional Research Service Reports

·        “Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs,”

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS21148.pdf.

·        “U.S. Military Space Programs: An Overview of Appropriations and Current Issues,”

        http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/space/RL33601.pdf.

Government Accountability Office

·         “Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns,”

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0448.pdf.

·        “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07406sp.pdf.

·        “Space Based Infrared System High System and Its Alternative,” http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071088r.pdf.

Other

·        “Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/space.pdf.