friendly printed version:Fact Sheet on the JSF F-35

Straus Military Reform Project

August 6, 2007

Fact Sheet on the JSF F-35

F-35 Lightning II

The F-35 Lightning II is a family of multi-role aircraft developed under a multinational acquisition program known as the Joint Strike Fighter (previously the Joint Advanced Strike Technology) program.

The JSF program is an attempt to develop and produce an affordable, joint-service fighter/attack plane with a high degree of commonality and low life-cycle costs to replace existing aircraft in the American and British armed forces.

Other JSF partner governments include Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Australia, Norway, Denmark, and Canada. They and other allied governments, including Israel and Singapore, will have the opportunity to purchase the F-35.

All JSF F-35 variants are single-engine, single-seat aircraft and are described to have supersonic and reduced radar and infra-red detectibility (“stealth”) characteristics. Three variants of the F-35 are being built: a Conventional Take-Off and Landing (CTOL) aircraft for the U.S. Air Force (USAF), a Carrier Variant (CV) for the U.S. Navy and a more complicated Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing version for the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and UK Royal Navy. The USAF F-35A strike fighter will replace or complement F-15E, F-117, F-16 and A-10 aircraft. The USMC F-35B strike fighter will replace F/A-18C/D and AV-8B aircraft. The U.S. Navy F-35C strike fighter will complement F/A-18E/F aircraft and replace earlier C/D models. The UK Royal Navy F-35C will replace Sea Harrier aircraft.

The F-35 is currently under development and production by Lockheed Martin in cooperation with BAE Systems and Northrop Grumman. Lockheed Martin was selected by the Department of Defense (DOD) on October 26, 2001 after beating out competition from McDonnell Douglas and then Boeing in the design and demonstration phases of the program (1994-2001). The aircraft will be powered by the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine.

The United States is the primary financial backer of the JSF program, having contributed almost $36 billion to System Development and Demonstration (SDD). A breakdown of partner government financial contributions to SDD is provided in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Financial contributions to Joint Strike Fighter System Development and Demonstration (SDD)

U.S. dollars

in billions

United States

$35.97

United Kingdom

$2.056

Italy

$1.028

Netherlands

$0.800

Turkey

$0.175

Australia

$0.144

Norway

$0.122

Denmark

$0.110

Canada

$0.100

DOD most recently estimated the cost of the JSF program at just over $299 billion for 2,458 aircraft; this calculates to a total program unit cost of $122 million at this time.

Initial operational testing is expected to run through 2013, at which point a planned 275 production aircraft will have been acquired by DOD. The current plan to fund significant numbers of production aircraft well before the completion of operational testing has been the subject of significant criticism by various parties, most prominently the Government Accountability Office (GAO). It is possible that the test phase may be truncated even further, thereby exacerbating these criticisms.

The Defense Department requested $5.3 billion for the JSF program in FY 2007 and $6.1 billion in FY 2008. DOD budget requests in FY 2007 and 2008 eliminated funding for a second F136 Alternate Engine, produced by General Electric. Congress rejected the elimination, adding $340 million in FY 2007 and $480 million in FY 2008 defense bills to continue the Alternative Engine program. While some discount as “pork” the efforts in Congress to continue this second engine program, it is also notable that the history of engine development for the F-14, F-15, and F-16 shows an advantage to having a competing design available.

Summary Analytical Comments from CDI’s Straus Military Reform Project

At $122 million per copy for a total program unit cost at this stage of development, the F-35 has already failed to achieve one of its primary objectives: low cost. Moreover, as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and others have already pointed out, observers should expect the unit cost of the program to grow substantially and the total procurement buy to shrink further. Performance characteristics can also be expected to be compromised as the program progresses into flight testing. Were the F-35 program to avoid further cost growth and procurement and performance compromises, it would be the first US combat aircraft to do so in modern history. Given the complexity of the F-35 and the early stage of its development, the cost growth and performance and production compromises yet to be expected are significant.

As a multi-role aircraft, observers can expect the F-35 to be a “jack of all trades but a master of none,” a performance characteristic typical of multi-role aircraft. Performance compromises in specialized roles are already quite obvious in the role of close air support (CAS) where the F-35 purports to replace the A-10. As a fighter-bomber design, the F-35 is inherently too fast to find targets on the ground independently (that is, without being cued directly to the intended target with external assistance), too limited in “fuel fraction” and weapons payload to persist on the battlefield, and too thin skinned and delicate to survive tactical air defenses typical on the conventional battlefield. The absence of a more serious air to ground cannon, such as the A-10’s GAU-8, even further limits the F-35 in the close air support role.

F-35 performance in comparison to existing aircraft in the fighter or bomber roles will remain fundamentally unknown unless and until there are serious side by side flight test comparisons in specific mission tasks with existing aircraft such as the F-117, F-15E, F-16 and F-18.

The absence of any known major counter-air fighter threat from a competing air force suggests that the value of the F-35 program is that of a technology demonstrator, for which production of more than a very small number of test samples is unnecessary.

For more information on the JSF F-35 Lightning II, reports, and analysis, see the links provided below.

General Information on the F-35 Lightning II and the Joint Strike Fighter program

Airforce-Technology.com

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/jsf/

Defense Industry Daily

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/f35-joint-strike-fighter-events-contracts-2007-updated-02992/

Defense Update

http://www.defense-update.com/products/f/F-35.htm

GlobalSecurity.org

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-35.htm

Reports/Statements

Assistant Director of the Institute for Defense Analyses

· on the IDA Cost Estimate for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program

http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/JointALSPEF032207/Woolsey_Testimony032207.pdf

Deputy Secretary of Defense

· on the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine

http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/March/England%2003-15-06.pdf

Congressional Research Service (CRS):

· “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues”

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf

· “Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress”

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33543.pdf

· “Proposed Termination of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F136 Alternate Engine”

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33390.pdf

Government Accountability Office (GAO):

· “Defense Acquisitions: Analysis of Costs for the Joint Strike Fighter Engine Program”

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07656t.pdf

· Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management on Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Cancellation of the Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Program Was Not Based on a Comprehensive Analysis, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06717r.pdf

· “Joint Strike Fighter: DOD Plans to Enter Production before Testing Demonstrates Acceptable Performance,”http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06356.pdf.

· “Joint Strike Fighter: Management of the Technology Transfer Process”

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06364.pdf

· “Joint Strike Fighter: Progress Made and Challenges Remain”

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07360.pdf

· “Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy”

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07415.pdf

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Industrial Policy):

· “JSF International Industrial Participation: A Study of Country Approaches and Financial Impacts on Foreign Suppliers”

http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/jsf_international_industrial_participation_study.pdf

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics):

· “CAIG Analysis of Joint Strike Fighter Engine Alternatives”