On Dec. 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group released its highly anticipated report on the way forward in Iraq. While the report highlighted strategies for protecting U.S. forces from escalating violence in Iraq, minimizing the deadly violence, missing from the report is a comprehensive strategy to address the millions of weapons being used to perpetrate this violence. Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, CDI has highlighted the threat that uncontrolled small arms and light weapons pose to successful reconstruction and lasting peace and security in Iraq.  Articles published by the Challenging Conventional Threats Project during the early stages of the invasion drew attention to the vast stockpiles of weapons abandoned by Saddam’s forces and promptly looted by civilians seeking to protect themselves, militias and insurgents seeking to arm themselves, and those seeking to profit off of the war by selling weapons to civilians, insurgents, and militia members alike.[1] 

These uncontrolled weapons have had devastating effects on the people of Iraq. Tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians and countless others have been victimized by the widespread availability and use of small arms. Between January and August 2004, researchers found that Baghdad alone had 3,000 gun-shot related deaths.[2]  Iraqi businesses have suffered as well, claiming that small arms proliferation and violence have made it impossible for them to conduct normal business. Reports in January 2004 highlighted the problem for many Iraqi businesses. News reports estimated that 90 percent of the 24,000 Iraqi businesses that had been opened in the previous nine months were inoperative because they were unable to secure a workforce and supplies.

Few successful programs have been undertaken to deal with the weapons in Iraq. Weapons collection programs conducted by U.S. forces met with limited success, and despite ultimately collecting a wide array of weapons, it is questionable whether or not the programs substantively reduced the volume of weapons available on the streets of Iraq.  A thriving black market for weapons has existed throughout the three years of the U.S. occupation and weapons are becoming more and more plentiful as violence and insecurity continues. Indeed, news reports found that black market sales of weapons have increased in Iraq, most noticeably right before the 2005 elections.[3]

Now, as the situation in Iraq has grown more complex, so has the small arms problem. Saddam’s former stockpiles are not the only sources of the weapons fuelling insecurity in Iraq today.  Prior to the onset of war in 2003, Iraqi citizens began to stockpile guns and ammunition to prepare for the ensuing chaos and Saddam’s regime is reported to have distributed weapons to citizens. The U.S. military has estimated that anywhere from 1 million to 7 million weapons were already in private hands at the time of the invasion.  Weapons are currently being smuggled into Iraq through poorly secured borders with Iran and Syria.  The U.S. military has also noted that weapons originally supplied by the U.S. and its allies to the Iraqi police have been showing up on the streets and on the black market, likely diverted by theft, loss, or by officers who kept their weapons after quitting the police force.

The newest troubling development is the November 2006 release of an audit, conducted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, revealing that of more than half a million U.S. weapons legally transferred to Iraq, the serial numbers of only 2 percent of these weapons were recorded, resulting in “major discrepancies” in records of the weapons’ whereabouts.  According to the Inspector General’s report, the United States purchased 370,000 weapons at a total cost of $133 million. These weapons range from pistols and assault rifles to heavy machine guns and rocket launchers. But the Special Inspector General’s report highlights a problem the U.S. is now facing: the United States has no idea what happened to the majority of weapons it brought into the country. What we do know, however, is that these weapons are being used to perpetuate the violence and continued instability throughout Iraq.

Terrorism experts have estimated that small arms and light weapons have been used in over half of all terrorist attacks on civilians in Iraq.  And according to CDI’s own analysis, more than 20 percent of all U.S. troop casualties since the beginning of the invasion were caused by small arms attacks, which include all small arms and light weapons, such as grenades, mortars, or even landmines.  Ninety-one small arms-related deaths have already occurred in 2006, making up 17 percent of all casualties so far this year, and 23 of these deaths occurred in October 2006 alone, making up 22 percent of all fatalities in that month.  Although small arms attacks caused fewer deaths in 2006 than in the three prior years of the invasion, these casualties have been more than made up for by the dramatic and horrific increase of casualties caused by roadside bombs, which are up from 14 percent of all 2003 casualties to 45 percent of 2006 casualties.  The combined effects of small arms and roadside bombs claimed more lives in 2006 than in 2003 and accounted for a steadily increasing percentage of total casualties during the first three years of the invasion.  As of November 2006, 60 percent of U.S. casualties are the result of small arms and roadside bombs attacks, indicating that it is clearly time to combine anti-IED efforts with small arms control efforts, in order to save our soldier’s lives and ensure the security of Iraqi civilians.

The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Iraq is an issue that has not been fully addressed by either U.S. or Iraqi policymakers.  When the U.S. invasion began in March 2003, U.S. and coalition forces had no plan for securing and destroying abandoned stockpiles of weapons and ordnance to accompany their plans for taking Baghdad. For months, these weapons were taken by fleeing Iraqi soldiers and would-be criminals and insurgents with impunity. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has included disarming Iraq’s many militias as part of his national reconciliation plan, but so far no concrete measures have been drawn up as a means to actually address this challenge.  In the meantime, sectarian militias armed with a variety of small arms and light weapons continue to kill civilians and soldiers every day, and now, these in addition to previous sources of weapons, these deadly tools were possibly supplied by the United States.

In a Sept. 27, 2006, Federal Register notice, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) issued a notification to Congress about a proposed sale of $750 million worth of weaponry to Iraq, including over 100,000 new small arms and light weapons.  In its policy justification, DSCA stated that the sale, “will contribute to the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a friendly country.”  However, small arms and light weapons are undermining both the security of Iraq and the security of U.S. and coalition soldiers and making rebuilding of Iraq increasingly difficult.  

The small arms issue in Iraq is becoming gradually more complex. Due to sustained violence and insecurity, families are keeping and acquiring weapons to protect themselves. And, as sectarian violence rages on, communities are loathe to turn in their weapons for fear of becoming more vulnerable to attacks. Something must be done about the unaccounted and uncontrolled weapons in Iraq. First, new weapons supplies must be secured and new policies must be put in place to keep track of future weapons distributed to police and security forces. Weapons supplied by the United States must be regulated and controlled, including keeping track of serial numbers and recipients of weapons. Second, policies that address the large amount of weapons currently in circulation must be implemented by both U.S. forces and the Iraqi government. For example, community incentive programs that collect weapons contributing to instability, reward communities with rebuilding projects, and then symbolically destroy them must be pursued. Third, policies that address why citizens and insurgents are trying to acquire weapons must be developed. These kinds of strategies cannot be developed by U.S. and coalition forces – the Iraqi government, in cooperation with the Iraqi people, must determine the best way to ensure the security of Iraqis that does not involve violence.