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During the recent 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, G8 leaders, heads of state of the United States, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Russia, issued a “Statement on Non-Proliferation” declaring, “The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, together with international terrorism remain the pre-eminent threat to international peace and security.” “Statement on Non-Proliferation,” G8 Summit, July 16, 2006, http://en.g8russia.ru/docs/20.html
The G8 leaders reaffirmed a commitment to work multilaterally to fight WMD proliferation and the acquisition of WMD by terrorists, highlighting the importance of fulfilling arms control agreements and revitalizing international fora starting with the Conference on Disarmament.
Among the key highlights are included:
• renewing past pledges of tens of billions of dollars towards nuclear threat reduction, starting with efforts inside Russia
• extending a pledge to not provide a nuclear fuel cycle to countries not already having one
• supporting having the Iranian nuclear matter taken up again by the UN Security Council (UNSC), essentially endorsing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and UNSC actions taken to date, including the call for Iran to give up an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle, while still encouraging diplomatic initiatives and endorsing multilateral diplomatic efforts by the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) working in conjunction or some degree of consultation with the rest of the P5+1 (the United States, Russia and China)
• echoing the unanimous UNSC resolution condemning North Korean missile launches, endorsing the goal of denuclearizing the Korean peninsula, calling for a return to the Six Party Talks and implementation of commitments previously made by North Korea
• calling for a strengthened IAEA-NPT framework, including the Additional Protocol, while also raising the prospect of international nuclear fuel services with guaranteed access
• promoting stronger legal frameworks in the form of treaties and, where necessary, revisions to domestic law to help further the goals of treaties or UNSC resolutions, such as UNSC resolution 1540 against nuclear proliferation
• promoting robust multilateral cooperation against WMD proliferation, inside and outside of the UN
Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
The G8 leaders:
• highlighted progress by the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction towards achieving the goals set out at the Kananaskis G8 summit and looked for greater efficiency in cooperation
• renewed pledges made in Kananaskis to raise up to $20 billion through 2012 for the Global Partnership, initially in Russia, to address priority areas
• reaffirmed a commitment to full implementation of all G8 Global Partnership objectives
• reaffirmed a willingness to consider expanding the Partnership to other recipient countries and donor states, noting work with Ukraine and expressing appreciation for contributions from 13 non-G8 states who had joined the Global Partnership
WMD Treaties and Other Frameworks
In addition to other frameworks and standards mentioned below, the G8 leaders called on states to join the following if they had not already done so:
• the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
• the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
• the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol
• subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
• strictly observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions
Iran
The G8 leaders:
• expressed support for a the P5+1 decision to resume UN Security Council (UNSC) consideration of the Iranian nuclear matter
• expressed support for a July 12, 2006, statement by P5+1 foreign ministers plus the European Union (EU) indicating Iran had not responded sufficiently to a diplomatic initiative, including failing to suspend indigenous nuclear fuel cycle activities and calling for Iran to respond to the diplomatic initiative
• noted also that suspension of enrichment and uranium processing had been requested by both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors and a UNSC Presidential Statement
• stood behind the June 6, 2006, proposals made to Iran on behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States with the support of the High Representative of the European Union (the diplomatic initiative offering various benefits in exchange for Iran giving up an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle and cooperation with nonproliferation efforts)
• expressed serious concern over the proliferation implications of Iran's “advanced” nuclear program and unity over commitment to resolve the matter
North Korea
The G8 leaders:
• welcomed the unanimous UNSC Resolution 1695 and stated it which represents the clear and strong will of the international community
• echoing language in the UNSC resolution, the G8 leaders condemned North Korea’s multiple ballistic missiles launches of July 5, 2006, (July 4, 2006, in the United States), which they stated
o jeopardize peace, stability and security
o violated a North Korean pledge to maintain a missile launch moratorium
o were inconsistent with the purposes of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of Sept. 19, 2005
• called on North Korea reestablish its preexisting commitments to a missile launch moratorium and refrain from missile proliferation
• pledged to follow UNSC Resolution 1695 by preventing cooperation with North Korean missile or WMD programs
• called for North Korea to return to the NPT
• urged North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs
• supported for the Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the Six-Party talks and called for North Korea to return to the talks without precondition
• supported efforts towards a verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful means
Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Energy Generally
NPT and Related Safeguards
The G8 leaders:
• called on all states to comply with NPT obligations, including IAEA safeguards and the need to develop effective measures against trafficking in nuclear equipment, technology and materials
• stated they seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements for the effective implementation of Article III of the NPT and the Additional Protocol, which provides for more aggressive inspections than traditional safeguards
• urged all states to sign, ratify and implement the NPT, safeguards agreements, and the Additional Protocol, declaring: “We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, with a view to make comprehensive safeguards agreements together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard.” The G8 leaders have set a goal of making such standards part of nuclear supply arrangements.
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540
The G8 leaders:
• reaffirmed a key role for the UNSC addressing nuclear proliferation
• urged all states to implement UNSC Resolution 1540, which involves acting domestically to set up laws and enforcement mechanisms to fight nuclear proliferation, and report on their implementation of the resolution
• welcomed UNSC Resolution 1673 extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee, which promotes the full implementation of Resolution 1540
• offered to consider requests for assistance towards implementation
Enrichment and Reprocessing
Cut-off of nuclear energy exports to new customers while non-proliferation standards are ironed out
The G8 leaders noted that at the Sea Island G8 Summit in 2004, the G8 agreed that the export of nuclear equipment, material, or technology should be constrained by global non-proliferation norms, and sold only to states committed to those norms. Two years has been spent developing such criteria, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group has committed to continue progress towards reaching a consensus by 2007.
The G8 leaders:
• extended by another year an agreement made at Sea Island in 2004 and Gleneagles in 2005, to refrain from starting any new initiatives involving the transfer of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies to any additional states, and called for universal adherence to this strategy
• supported measures to prevent sensitive nuclear equipment, materials and technologies from being transferred to states seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists' hands
• promised to “exercise enhanced vigilance” over transfers of nuclear technology, equipment and material that could contribute to enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and to be especially vigilant against attempts to acquire sensitive technology and material in a covert, illicit manner
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)
The G8 leaders supported the early start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
Nuclear Energy and International Nuclear Fuel Services
The G8 leaders:
• wished to promote the expanded use of nuclear energy consistent with nonproliferation: “An expansion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy must be carried forward in a manner consistent with nuclear non-proliferation commitments and standards.” The G8 leaders noted that the NPT provides for a right to develop nuclear energy, albeit for peaceful purposes, and in a manner consistent with the nonproliferation requirements of the treaty.
• wished to promote the prospect of nuclear fuel services as an alternative to indigenous nuclear fuel cycle activities, citing as possible models:
o the Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centers to provide nuclear fuel cycle services
o the Initiative of the President of the United States on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
o an IAEA-based initiative proposed by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a multilateral mechanism to provide reliable nuclear fuel enrichment services
• indicated they would continue to review the idea of international centers providing nuclear fuel cycle services, with IAEA involvement, and to review “relevant practical, legal and organizational solutions,” with one key issue being assurance of access
• cited additional concerns that nuclear energy be
o safe
o efficient
o environmentally friendly
o more proliferation resistant, including with respect to the nuclear fuel cycle
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The G8 leaders reaffirmed a commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative to counter trafficking of WMD and WMD delivery systems.
Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)
The G8 leaders wished to work towards making the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and its confidence-building measures universal
India
The G8 leaders stated they would like to reinforce a partnership with India, addressing India’s energy requirements with India also taking further steps.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The G8 leaders highlighted an upcoming sixth BTWC Review Conference and pledged to facilitate a successful convention strengthening BTWC implementation.
They called for domestic action, including the creation of new laws where necessary, to provide for domestic legal enforcement to counter BTW proliferation and offered to consider requests for assistance.
They also highlighted the 2006 EU Joint Action in support of the BTWC as a positive measure.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The G8 leaders expressed support for full implementation of the CWC, acknowledged obligations under the treaty to destroy chemical weapons and destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities within CWC time limits, and noted that ongoing destruction of chemical weapons by chemical weapons states was still underway. They also highlighted the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Action Plan and indicated they stood ready to provide appropriate assistance.
Libya
The G8 leaders pointed to the international community's positive response to Libya's renunciation of WMD as demonstrating the benefits of cooperation with the international community and compliance with the global nonproliferation mainstream. | 
