Theresa Hitchens

Vice President, Center for Defense Information

Presentation to:

“Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”

Sponsored by:

The People’s Republic of China

The Russian Federation

The Simons Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, Canada

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

March 21-22, 2005

Council Chamber, Palais des Nations, Geneva

It has now become crystal clear that the United States under the administration of President George W. Bush will not be persuaded to participate in any discussions, even indirect, of a treaty barring the weaponization of space.  Indeed, with the expected release of a new National Space Policy this spring, the strategy of conducting warfare “in, from and through space” as already envisioned by the U.S. Defense Department and the Air Force, will be codified at the highest level of national policy.  The White House rewrite of U.S. National Space Policy is expected to promote an aggressive pursuit by the military of the “space control” mission; in contrast to the previous U.S. policy’s promotion of space control as a mission of last resort.  And while the new policy is expected to put a priority on the use of “temporary and reversible” means of accomplishing this mission, it is not expected to rule out the possible use, even preemptively, of destructive methods of attacking satellites during hostilities, whether they be military, civil or commercial assets.

That said, it will take some time – decades even – for the United States to be able to implement such a policy.  A major obstacle is the fact that technology for space warfare remains in the research and development stage; a second major obstacle is likely to be the costs associated with development, deployment and maintenance of space weapon systems.  This means that there is still time for an international effort aimed at limiting erosion of the norm against space weapons, and perhaps even to block the advent of the most destructive and dangerous types of weaponry – namely, destructive measures that would create space debris and put at risk the global use of space for future generations.

Such an international effort must focus in the near-term on engaging the United States in areas where it is most directly and undeniably in the U.S. national interest to cooperate with other space-faring powers in the near-term – in hopes of sowing the seeds of understanding regarding the value of a multilateral approach to space security.  Concerted diplomatic and scientific effort needs to be put forth in particular in efforts designed to discourage the United States from pursuing destructive anti-space capabilities – from a perspective that such weaponry will also endanger U.S. interests.

The immediate opportunity for constructive engagement is in the arena of space debris mitigation.  Space debris is a known hazard to operations in space.  Even tiny pieces of debris can destroy a satellite.  And space debris recognizes no nationality; it does not distinguish between military and commercial satellites nor between enemy and friendly assets.  Already the international community, under the auspices of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordinating Committee (IADC), is seeking to implement a set of voluntary guidelines for all space-faring powers.  There is some hope that the guidelines could be accepted by COPUOS by 2007. 

NASA has been a key player in developing and pushing for the international guidelines; and both NASA and the U.S. Federal Communications Commission have instituted strong debris mitigation regulations governing U.S. satellite operations.  Even the U.S. Air Force expresses concern about space debris, hence the service’s declared priority for achieving space control via “temporary and reversible” means, and vocal U.S. Air Force opposition to the Army’s ongoing Kinetic Energy Anti-Satellite project.  Further, NASA regulations are well complied with by the U.S. Air Force despite loopholes in the regulations that would allow them to be waived for military efforts. 

More encouragingly, some U.S. Air Force officials further suggest that there might be room for discussions of multilateral methods or agreements to prevent the development, testing and use of debris-creating weapons. For example, the chief legal counsel for international air operations for North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command, Air Force Lt. Col. Christopher Petras, is a 2003 paper, wrote: “a cursory review of relevant provisions of the law of armed conflict suggests that there is at least a foundation for dialogue with respect to an agreement that would prohibit the use of weapons that cause widespread, long-term and severe (author emphasis) contamination of the commons of space with debris.”[1]  He bases his arguments on provisions such as whether a weapon system is “discriminatory” in its effects; and questions relating to damage to non-combatants.

Thus, it seems that engaging the U.S. government and military in discussions about debris-creating weapons and testing that might create dangerous debris is an open pathway.  Such a dialogue on the military side might be spearheaded by the government of Canada, given the relationship between the two governments with regard to NORAD; NASA and European Space Agency (ESA) officials responsible for debris observation and mitigation already routinely work together.  While a regime preventing the testing and usage of debris-creating weaponry obviously would be fraught with complexity (one sticky issue might be U.S. pursuit of space-based missile defenses, for example), such a regime would go a long way toward ensuring the continued security of space operations by all space stakeholders and would address some of the most egregious negative repercussions of space weaponization.  The members of the Conference on Disarmament could, and should, begin to explore the legal issues surrounding whether debris-creating weapons are consistent with the laws of armed conflict, and begin – perhaps simply in expert panels – examining the potential impacts of conflict debris.

Constructive U.S. multilateral engagement also might be fostered in the related area of space surveillance.  The U.S. military and NASA both recognize that improvements need to be made in the capabilities of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network, managed by the U.S. Air Force.  Efforts at improving sensor technology for finding and tracking space objects are ongoing, as are efforts to improve modeling and data manipulation to provide better analyses of the available space surveillance data are ongoing in the United States. The need for better, more reliable space surveillance data to monitor debris and help enable improved space collision avoidance – as well as to monitor asteroid approaches -- is also well recognized at the international level and is the subject of  international discussions in many fora including the International Standards Organization. 

 At the same time, security concerns have resulted in a new U.S. process for sharing basic orbital data that previously were provided to the international community of space stakeholders for free by NASA via the Internet.  The data-sharing process has been shifted to Air Force management under a program called SpaceTrak, and concerns have been raised about restrictions implemented under that new program.  In particular, there are worrying signs with regard to limitations being placed upon how that basic data – and the scientific analysis enabled by it – is redistributed and shared. The U.S. community of scientists and space-watching hobbyists already has raised protests regarding the process.  It is currently unclear how the new restrictions will affect international users of the data – spurring an urgent need for those users to begin discussing the issues with the U.S. Air Force officials responsible for the process.   The U.S. Air Force is the only consistent provider of such data, moreover.  Russia operates a similar, though less capable, space surveillance system and data bank but does not routinely make its data publicly available; Europe has some space surveillance assets but does not have an integrated network at the moment; China has a fledging program but to my knowledge it is reliant on U.S. orbital data as a starting input. Therefore, it is difficult to see how continued improvement in surveillance techniques and capabilities at the international level can be achieved if the U.S. data is significantly restricted. 

Furthermore, there is widespread interest in improving satellite registration and launch data sharing as a way to underpin efforts to avoid collisions and ensure better tracking of space objects, both satellites and debris.  All space-faring powers recognize the inadequacies of the United Nation satellite registry.  For example, there currently is no requirement for operators to notify the registry when a satellite has been maneuvered out of its initial insertion orbit – essentially meaning that the satellite can be lost to observers.  The Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS began in 2003 a four-year process to address registration problems and improve the processes efficiency[2] – in part spurred by U.S. efforts to overhaul and improve its own national process that began in 2002.[3]

Therefore, it seems that possibilities exist for dialogue with the United States about space surveillance requirements and efforts to improve capabilities.  One goal of such dialogue might be the development of an international data bank that provides all users with necessary baseline data but allows the United States (or any other entity) to preserve sensitive data.  Certainly, improving transparency in space is of interest to all space-faring nations as well.  In addition, an improved – and impartial – space surveillance network will be required in order to verify any future agreements on space weaponization or dangerous behavior in outer space. 

Finally, there are already ongoing discussions in various international industry and scientific fora – and interest in U.S. industry – about possible new approaches to establishing rules of the road in space, particularly in the area of space traffic management.  Several NGOs, including the Henry L. Stimson Center, have also laid out recommendations for measures to prevent dangerous military practices in space during peacetime.  Indeed, the 2001 Space Commission, initially chaired by current U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, actually recommended that the United States explore rules of road concepts for guiding international behavior in space.  Policy-makers in space-faring nations should be encouraging these efforts and attempting to find ways to wrap industry concerns, and NGO efforts, into multilateral political and military discussions about ensuring space security.  Again, this is an area where U.S. national security interests coincide with those of the larger community of space stakeholders, and an area where there are avenues to promote dialogue.

The key point is that now is the time for launching concerted and constructive dialogue among the space-faring powers – as well as constructive criticism of emergent activities that could threaten the security of global space assets.  While the United States may be unwilling to work toward a ban on space weapons, it remains a major – and for the most part responsible – player in space.  Isolating the United States because of its position on space weaponization is simply a waste of time; or worse, attempts to do so may well backfire by promoting the views of those in the United States who see unilateral approaches to security as the only approaches.  Meanwhile, other space-faring nations need to be discouraged from treading down similarly destructive paths.  This brings even more urgency to undertaking initiatives that promote cooperation amongst the space-faring powers in areas where they have mutual interests.  There is little time to waste.