Over 700,000 Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) are thought to have been produced in the past thirty years.  These shoulder-launched missiles have been used in many conflicts against both military and civilian targets and are considered to be readily accessible and fairly cheap in the black market.  But as is the case these days, it was not until their attractiveness to terrorists became apparent that the public recognized their danger.  This happened this week when a British national was arrested in New Jersey after he tried to sell what he thought was a Russian shoulder-launched missile to undercover FBI agents.  During the course of the sting operation which eventually snared Hemant Lakhani, tapes were made of the alleged arms dealer praising Osama Bin Laden; implicit was the idea that the shoulder-launched missile involved in the operation would be used against commercial aircraft.  This frightens homeland defense officials, as there is no practical, cost-effective technology existing at present which could be installed into civilian aircraft to counter MANPADS.  But they should also take heart, since this week has proven the efficacy of international cooperation against weapons proliferation and, indirectly, against terrorism as a whole. 

The weapon at the center of this week’s controversy is Russia’s SA-18, also known as the Grouse or Igla.  This system is composed of a launcher and missile, was first fielded in 1983, and has been known to be proliferated in at least four countries.  The launcher takes ten seconds to reload, has a six second reaction time, and needs sixteen seconds between launches.  The missile has a maximum range of six kilometers, can reach altitudes of up to three and a half kilometers, flies at Mach 2, and uses a solid-fuel booster, dual-thrust solid fuel sustainer rocket motor and passive infrared homing to hit its targets.  The SA-18 is more resistant to jamming than the SA-7, two of which were used in November 2002 against an Arkia Airlines jet leaving the airport in Mombasa, Kenya. The SA-7 (Grail/Strela) has a shorter range (four kilometers), reaches a lower altitude (2300 meters), and flies slower (at best, Mach 1.75) than the SA-18.  Because the SA-7s have been in service for over thirty years, they may be reaching the end of their lifecycle; on the other hand, that also means that they have had three decades to be spread across the world and into the hands of state and non-state actors. 

Governments are starting to fully perceive the danger that MANPADS pose to civilians.  The United States quietly established earlier this year an office in the Department of Homeland Security that will specifically deal with shoulder-launched missiles.  Plus, besides starting patrols around major airports in the continental United States, U.S. inspection teams have been sent to ten cities around the world where terrorist attacks on civilian airliners are considered most likely.  These cities have not all been publicly identified but are reported to include Athens, Baghdad, Basra, Istanbul, and Manila.  Another government which is extremely worried about MANPADS is Russia.  In November 2002, Russian experts said that “tens of thousands” of its shoulder-launched missiles may have been stolen from its arsenal during the 1990s.  In June of this year, MANPADS were discussed at an emergency session of the former Soviet republics, the Confederation of Independent States.  Russian defense minister Sergei Ivanov warned that an international watchdog agency was needed to be created to monitor the proliferation of shoulder-launched missiles “not only because the threat of such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists is real but also because this is already happening."

Military aircraft have a host of countermeasures available to them when attempting to evade MANPADS. These include chaff (which reflects a strong radar signal to override the target’s radar signal, pulling the missile away), flares (which create a misleading heat source away from the target), decoys, jamming, and evasive flight maneuvers.  Unfortunately, these do not translate very well for civilian aircraft since dispersing burning flares and the like around airports would endanger local residents on the ground, while flight maneuvers are very difficult for civilian aircraft to carry out during their most vulnerable points, their departure and landings.  This isn’t to mention the discomfiture that air passengers would most likely feel if their airplane suddenly started dipping and rolling and it turned out to be a false alarm.  The airline industry is very leery about losing more passenger confidence than it already has and thus is hesitant to incorporate procedures which it feels may not be necessary or cause undue alarm.

A technology is in its nascent phase which might at some point prove useful against MANPADS.  The U.S. Air Force established five years ago its Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) program.  LAIRCM would use lasers to track and then jam shoulder-launched missiles.  Right now, it is intended to be installed on the C-17, C-130, and KC-135 aircraft, but some believe that it could be brought over to protect civilian airplanes.  Israel has already installed a less-advanced version called Directed Infrared Countermeasures (DIRCM) onto its El Al fleet.  In February, Rep. Steve Israel (D-New York) and Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) co-sponsored a bill that would have required all 6,800 registered civilian aircraft in the United States to receive missile defense systems.  This could have cost $10 billion at an optimistic cap of about $1.5 million per plane.  This resolution did not pass but the original sponsors are likely to try again during the next budget cycle.  The cost of the program could prove prohibitively expensive, especially if it falls to the already-struggling airline industry to put in the countermeasures.

It is unclear, however, if the technological fix may be the best one in the short-term.  According to a March report by the non-partisan Congressional Research Service, “Procedural improvements such as specific flight crew training, altering air traffic procedures to minimize exposure to the threat, and improved security near airports may be less costly than countermeasures and could more immediately help deter domestic terrorist attacks.”  This is because technologies like the LAIRCM are still in their testing phase, would undoubtedly be very costly to carry out, and would require a lengthy implementation period.  One needs only to see how long it has taken airports to install luggage x-ray machines to get an inkling of the problems that could be incurred while taking this approach to homeland defense.

What is encouraging is that this week’s arrest has also shown how well international cooperation can work against proliferation and consequently terrorism.  The sting operation that came to fruition Tuesday was the result of an eighteen-month collaboration between U.S., U.K., and Russian law enforcement agencies.  Involved in this operation were videos and audiotapes of meetings, financial arrangements to pay for the missile, and the mockup of a missile that would be used to fool Lakhani into thinking that he was seeing a working SA-18 system.  This was an exceeding complex collaboration which bodes well for future efforts of intelligence-sharing and law enforcement.  Questions are being raised about the length of the operation and if it was warranted.  But the important thing to take from this is that three intelligence agencies were able to share information and collaborate together on what was perceived to be a threat to security.  Particularly impressive is the data-sharing between U.S. and Russian intelligence agencies, which would have been unheard of just a few years ago.  Multilateral efforts can be used to great success in the war against terrorism, something this administration would do well to remember. 

Of related interest: CDI Terrorism Report:
Al Qaeda Attempts to Widen War (re: al Qaeda missile attack in Kenya)