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ISSN # 0195-6450 • Volume XXXI, Number 9 • November/December 2002

Victory At An Unknown Cost

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THROUGHOUT THE SPRING, SUMMER and fall of this year thousands of U.S. military planners have worked on the various contingencies and strategies concerning a possible invasion of Iraq.

The groundwork has been laid to maximize the odds of a military victory. However, what will be the cost of such a victory?

There is no way to know at this stage of a showdown with Iraq. The problem is that there are some criti-

cal questions that just cannot be answered ahead of time.

True, the Iraqi military is far less capable today than they were in Desert Storm. True, the U.S. military is far more capable today than they were in Desert Storm.

The fact remains that there are some risks the United States will take in an invasion of Iraq that are quite high, and in some cases these risks could be even higher than those that existed 12 years ago. The Ameri-

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The situation regarding Iraq, the UN inspections regime and U.S. preparations for a possible future war is changing nearly every day. Under these circumstances, CDI staff acknowledges that some articles in this issue may be taken over by events on the ground. That said, the goal of this special issue is to highlight some of the continuing questions about U.S. policy regarding Iraq, and we are hopeful that the analysis provided here is useful for informing and enlightening the ongoing debate.

A General Speaks on War With Iraq

Retired Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni, a CDI Distinguished Military Fellow, headed the U.S. Central Command, which commands U.S. forces in much of the Middle East and Central Asia, from 1997 to 2000. He also served as deputy commanding general of forces conducting Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq. On Oct. 10, 2002, he spoke before the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. about a new war with Iraq. Brief extracts from his speech and Q&A follow. For copies of the full text, contact CDI.

What would have to happen to make any military action turn out in the best possible way? I wrote 10 conditions for this war that would have to happen.

Condition 1: The coalition is "in." Anything we do in this region requires that regional coalition, support, and partnership to work. The number one ingredient that makes it work — I heard this term time and time again — is consult, consult, consult. Understand what is going on, on the ground. Listen to your partners. . . . We definitely have to approach this with global partners and international legitimacy, or whatever we do on the ground is going to be tainted from the beginning.

Condition 2: The war is short. Generals can't walk in and predict, when you roll the dice, the friction and fog of war. . . . You can be lucky.

You can be good. You can be unlucky and at the wrong time be not so good. If this war drags on, if the combat drags on, it's going to become messy. There will be more opportunity for more bad things to happen inside the country where the combat is taking place and outside in many different areas, in relationships and in politics. Street reaction could disrupt any good that might come out of this.

Condition 3: Destruction is light. Civilian casualties, collateral damage, destruction of the infrastructure, and the images that could be created regardless of who causes this

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The Baghdad Proving Grounds

Will Iraq become the first test of the new preemptive war strategy of the Bush administration?

OPPOSITION TO THE POSSIBLE U.S.-led war on Iraq springs from a number of ideological and philosophical sources as well as more mundane business and security considerations. U.S. allies and foes alike worry about oil supply disruptions, a new Arab-Israeli war, and the frightening possibility of a biological or even a nuclear weapons use. But lurking in the background is another key concern: the United States produced a new national security strategy in September 2002 that advocates the use of preemptive military strikes to deny terrorists and rogue states a chance to attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The U.S. case against Iraq laid out in speeches by President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard Cheney echoes the preemptive strike clauses of the new national security strategy almost word-for-word. Europe, Russia, China and others must therefore look beyond the immediate war plans and ask themselves: are we safer or at more risk, in the long run, in a world where preemption has become an accepted way of addressing external threats?

The New, Old Preemptive Strategy

Preemption has long lurked in the pages of military strategy books as a scenario reserved for the direst of circumstances, usually associated with irrevocable evidence of an imminent enemy attack. But the latest U.S. national security strategy published in September 2002 assigns preemption a far more expansive

role than it has ever played in modern history, one based on the destructive nature of modern weapons and the newly available means of delivery such as missiles or terrorist groups. The paper breaks with past U.S. policy of deterring WMD attack by threatening massive, possibly nuclear, retaliation. "The United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past." Citing the difficulties inherent in deterring a suicidal terrorist

group from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States, the national security strategy writes: "to forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively."

The key new development lies in lowering the threshold for launching a preemptive strike, from a clear and present danger usually defined as enemy military buildup on the

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CHILD SOLDIERS IN IRAQ

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During the decades of war in Iraq, the images of suffering children have become commonplace. But children are not only suffering the effects of war from sanctions and landmine injuries. Many children are also directly involved in the ongoing fighting in Iraq. Iraqi law allows voluntary recruits at age 15, and during war allows conscription of those younger than age 18. Iraq has not signed the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. Currently, approximately 1,000 children are believed to be in the Iraqi armed forces. Iraq has several military training programs to prepare youths for war. Boys and girls participate in these programs, some as young as 10. Some of the best known of these programs include: "Raad" and "Al Anfal," which have trained over 23,000 children, and "Saddam Cubs;" military training camps for 8,000 Iraqi children. In these three-week programs for children aged 10 to 15, children are trained to rappel from helicopters, take part in hand-to-hand combat, infantry tactics, and small arms use, for up to 14 hours a day.

Armed opposition groups within Iraq are also known to use child soldiers. In 1998, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was believed to have 3,000 child soldiers in its forces. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is believed to have children as young as 10 serving in its opposition groups.

U.S. military forces may come into contact with child soldiers in the course of military operations in Iraq, as the number of children in the Iraqi military and opposition groups will increase during times of active fighting. The U.S. military needs to provide training to its soldiers before deploying to Iraq to help troops prepare for the reality of facing children in combat.

BAGHDAD

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country's borders to a far more vague and murky intelligence assessment of distant countries' missile and WMD capabilities. In erasing the distinction between non-state terrorists groups and countries from which they operate, the national security strategy also leaves open the option of striking regimes whose links to terrorism are again determined only by often malleable and rarely publicly aired intelligence assessments. The vast potential implications of this new approach have not been lost on U.S. allies.

Russia

The views of the *realpolitik*-minded Moscow government are actually much closer to the Washington administration than those of many of America's traditional European allies. Nevertheless, Russia's Iraq policy is hamstrung by two competing goals: Moscow is trying to contain the power of the United States while at the same time seeking to preserve the same freedom of action demanded by Washington in Iraq for interventions in its own neighborhood. Moscow, wrote CDI's Russia analyst Ivan Safranchuk, sees the threat of war against Iraq "as demonstration of U.S. 'world gendarme' ambitions and U.S. hegemonism." On the other hand, he adds, Russia believes it "has the right to do anything the United States has the right to do." Not surprisingly, the result is a foreign policy course fraught with contradictions. Moscow is resisting Washington's plans to secure an explicit UN Security Council blessing for use of force against Iraq, while simultaneously threatening Georgia with military intervention

over the latter's alleged support of Chechen terrorists in Russia.

Russia's policy vis-à-vis neighboring Georgia embodies the inherent and unexplored implications of Washington's on-and-off-again attempts to link Iraq to al Qaeda. What degree of closeness/separation constitutes state sponsorship of a terrorist group? Does the (disputed) presence of Chechen fighters in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge qualify as sponsorship by the Tbilisi government of terrorist forces that were responsible for the recent hostage-taking in Moscow? Should the Georgian government be removed from power just as the Taliban in Afghanistan? Or is Georgia willing but incapable to cope with the problem, in which case assistance, rather than attack, may be required? And who decides whether there actually are Chechen fighters in Pankisi, as Russia claims, and the nature of their relationship to the Georgian government — Russian intelligence sources, the Georgian government, or a third party?

China

The Beijing government's criticism of U.S. plans for a preemptive strike on Iraq has a distinctly regional flavor. Bush has branded China's neighbor, North Korea, a part of the "axis of evil" because of the brutal nature of the communist regime ruling the country. More recently, in October 2002, North Korea was also forced to admit that it was actively trying to build a nuclear weapon and that it might, in fact, already possess some. The combined U.S.-Japanese-South Korean policy of containing North Korea's WMD ambitions has apparently failed.

The analogies with Iraq are haunting. Although for the time being the

U.S. administration vows to pursue a peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, China is clearly worried about a possible application of the preemptive doctrine in its backyard. Besides a devastating scenario that includes a North Korean attack on South Korea and massive refugee flow into China, Beijing is also worried about its ability to continue the robust economic growth that has already turned China into a regional superpower. "The Chinese believe that a peaceful and stable international situation is critical to the economic and social development in China. The wars resulting from a widespread adoption of such a preemption policy could hurt Chinese development," wrote CDI's China analyst, Li Bin.

Europe

Europe is exceptional among international actors in that it constitutes neither a nation-state nor (yet) a federation of states with a single foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, the countries on the continent form a unique and to a great extent coordinated (under the European Union umbrella) society that is far more rules- and institutions-oriented than the United States, Russia, or China.

This key difference also flavors European views of U.S. policy toward Iraq. Where, many Europeans wonder, would preemption fit under international law? Europeans credit the emergence of the system of global laws and institutions in the post WW II period with ending Europe's cycle of violence and bringing an era of peace and prosperity. "The bloody experience of centuries of war has left us profoundly un-

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Guilty by Non-Association: Selling the Threat of Saddam Hussein

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JUST HOW MUCH OF A THREAT is Saddam Hussein? It has proven to be a contentious question. As is often the case in Washington, the answer varies according to whom you ask. Few argue that Saddam poses no threat at all. But Iraq doves insist that the dictator can be contained, deterred, and eventually disarmed. Iraq hawks believe that containment and deterrence are the outmoded policies of the Cold War, and no longer represent sustainable approaches to Saddam's Iraq.

Remarkably, in an effort to enlist popular support for an invasion of Iraq, the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush has repeatedly stressed the one threat Saddam Hussein does not pose—an imminent threat stemming from an alleged link between Saddam and al Qaeda. It is an association most informed observers, including the president's own intelligence advisors, doubt exists.

There were plenty of people in Washington prior to the Sept. 11, 2001, tragedy who wanted to oust Saddam Hussein. But the lack of clear evidence of Iraqi complicity in the events of that day left many Iraq hawks frustrated in the search for a *casus belli*. Despite Iraq's record of intransigent behavior, there is little to suggest that Saddam represents a looming threat to the region or the U.S. homeland. Undoubtedly, Saddam would like to reassert Iraq's claim to regional preeminence and compete once again for the mantle of Arab leadership. Even a small nuclear arsenal would serve to advance his

grandiose ambitions, and one shudders to think how reckless he might become once emboldened by such weapons. But these designs are years away and dependent on the erosion of an international consensus determined to prevent such eventualities. They hardly constitute an imminent threat.

For months, the Bush administration has nonetheless marketed the threat in the context of the Sept. 11 tragedy, insisting that "you can't distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror." In October, Bush asserted that Saddam was "a man who we know has had connections with al Qaeda. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army." According to this logic, al Qaeda is interested in inflicting mass casualties in the United States, but lacks the required weapons. Likewise, Saddam is interested at striking at the U.S. homeland, but lacks the force projection capabilities. A marriage between the two, if not exactly made in heaven, would indeed represent an imminent danger to the United States.

Bush is correct in offering that al Qaeda and Saddam are "equally as bad, equally as evil and equally as destructive." What the two are not, however, are allies — indeed, a good deal of enmity is known to exist between them. Saddam's secularism and self-serving nods toward Islam are abhorrent to Osama bin Laden and his fellow Islamists. Likewise, the evangelical fervor of the Islamists is totally alien to Saddam's crude

calculus of power. Saddam is a nationalist leader in the mold of Gamal Abdel Nasser rather than the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. And like Nasser, he has ruthlessly suppressed Islamist competition to his cult of personality. Unlike Khomeini, Saddam has supported Islamic terrorism, most notably the Palestinian rejectionists, for tactical rather than ideological reasons. Bin Laden is known to have viewed Saddam as an apostate. Islamic law holds only one law for apostasy.

Not surprisingly then, Saddam has been reluctant to associate with al Qaeda and other Islamist groups, an argument that the U.S. intelligence community has reportedly been making for several years. Last month, CIA Director George Tenet sent a letter to Congress suggesting that Saddam would probably stop short of "the extreme step" of supplying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists for the purposes of striking at America precisely because he does not wish to furnish Washington with a *casus belli*. According to the letter, the likelihood of Saddam attacking the United States in the foreseeable future is low. Implicit in the statement is the affirmation that, at least for the time being, containment and deterrence are viable policies for dealing with Saddam. More startling, however, is the suggestion that should "Saddam conclude that a U.S.-led attack could no longer be deterred," he may "decide that the extreme step of assisting Islamist terrorists in conducting

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Military Challenges of Post-War Iraq

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If it comes to war, Iraq cannot prevent a U.S. military victory. But unlike the 1991 Gulf War, a new conflict could be long and costly, particularly if Iraq adopts a strategy of urban warfare and utilizes even a very limited amount of its suspected chemical or biological weapons arsenal. Also unlike 1991, U.S. troops will not be withdrawn immediately after the end of hostilities, and will be confronted by any of a wide range of challenging issues.

A key issue is which nations will contribute troops to the follow-on force. There are hopes in Washington that other nations, despite their opposition to the use of force, will recognize the need for, and contribute resources to, post-war efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Iraq politically, economically, and militarily, including peacekeeping forces. This is not an unreasonable hope, but it is also not a certainty.

A second issue is how will U.S. forces be received in Iraq. Again, there are those in Washington who believe that the U.S. military will be greeted as liberators by the civilian population and that the Iraqi military will surrender by the thousands. And while the experience of the 1991 Gulf War would lead one to believe that the Iraqi military may well collapse, this does not imply that Iraqis will welcome a U.S. presence, particularly a large, long-term military presence. Many analysts feel that while the majority of Iraqis oppose Saddam Hussein and would be pleased by his removal, they dislike the United States even more, and question its ambitions in the

region, which they view as anti-Islam, pro-Israel, and dominated by efforts to control Middle East oil. This view will be reinforced if the military campaign is protracted, is conducted in a manner that destroys civilian housing or infrastructure such as bridges and power plants, or results in large numbers of civilian casualties.

While overseas deployments are potentially dangerous under any conditions, the U.S. military takes numerous precautions to reduce the risk of American casualties, including when forces deployed in war zones are not directly engaged in combat operations. As witnessed in Afghanistan, force protection is a central concern for U.S. commanders where ever U.S. troops are stationed. For both tactical and political reasons, considerable resources are expended in personnel and material to ensure the safety of U.S. troops in the field, and tactics are employed to minimize their exposure in combat areas. A hostile Iraqi civilian population would require even larger numbers of U.S. troops to be deployed.

Ironically, the exact scenario for which the United States hoped in 1991 – a popular uprising against Saddam or a successor regime – may this time come to pass if the Iraqi army is rendered impotent and no replacement force is present to maintain stability. For example, Shiites represent the majority of the country, but have never had a piece of power, and will certainly demand representation in any future government, if not outright control. There

is a distinct possibility that ethnic violence may erupt involving the Kurds. Factions of the regular military may not surrender, resorting instead to fighting a war of insurgency against the U.S. military or any follow-on forces. Thus, while the United States hoped for a civil war in Iraq in 1991, such would be a disaster once Saddam's regime is toppled.

One option being considered by the administration of President George W. Bush is some form of occupation modeled on the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II, where a U.S. military officer ruled while a national government was formed. This model has the advantage of ensuring that the follow-on government is 'suitable' to the United States. Such a model would likely require a large and long-term deployment of foreign troops to maintain stability, and might breed indemnity, if not outright resistance to the national government, which would likely be viewed as a puppet of the United States. Foreign troops would likely have to remain in Iraq long after the national government assumed full authority.

One way to possibly reduce the size and duration of a foreign occupation would be the immediate organization of an Iraqi provisional government that could claim at least minimal support in the country, and could be quickly installed after the cessation of hostilities. Unless such a government could make viable claims of support of a cross-section of Iraqi society, it too would suffer

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POST-WAR IRAQ

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from attacks on its legitimacy, possibly military, which would again require maintaining a foreign force in the country for some duration.

It is also possible, that, left to its own devices, Iraq will evolve towards a more representative and open government, and will be able to maintain its own stability during this time. But this seems a remote outcome, given the presence of large, well armed factions in the country and the likelihood that some group within the armed forces would attempt to replace Saddam's regime

with a new set of military rulers. Nor are other countries in the region likely to be willing to risk even temporary instability in Iraq, for fear that Iran, or some other power seeking to expand its control, would seize this opportunity to pursue their own interests.

In addition to providing stability and deterring internecine warfare, follow-on forces will have to provide border security until a national army is trained and under civilian control. Security will also have to be provided for Iraqi oil fields, which will likely be targets of terrorists or factional troops.

It therefore seems inevitable that

a significant and potentially long-term presence of follow-on forces will be required in Iraq. How large a force will be required? In August, Col. Scott Feil, USA, (Ret.), who is co-directing a project on this issue for the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the Senate International Relations Committee it would take a force of 75,000. Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, puts the figure at 100,000. It remains to be seen if the United States has the political will to sustain and support such a force over the long term. ■

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will not sit well in the region, will cause problems in the long run and will add to the difficulty in the aftermath.

Condition 4: Israel is "out."

Every attempt will be made to drag Israel into this war, not just by Saddam but by all those who may see this as an opportunity – the extremist groups and those that support extremist groups. The image they will want is a forced Israeli reaction, whether it's inside Iraq, in the West Bank, or in Gaza. Those images on Al Jazeera, Abu Dhabi TV and elsewhere would be explosive.

Condition 5: The "street" is quiet.

Anti-Americanism, doubt about this war, concern about the damage that may happen, political issues, economic issues, social issues have all caused the [Arab] "street" to become extremely volatile. I'm amazed at

people that say that there is no street and that it won't react. I'm not sure which planet they live on, because it isn't the one that I travel. I've been out in the Middle East, and it is explosive; it is the worst I've ever seen it in over a dozen years of working in this area in some concentrated way. Almost anything could touch it off.

Condition 6: Order is kept.

If we think there is a fast solution to changing the governance of Iraq, then we don't understand history, the nature of the country, the divisions, or the underneath-suppressed passions that could rise up. God help us if we think this transition will occur easily. We are going to need a period of order. We're going to need to have people come together. We're going to have to lower the passion, and we're going to have to control events in some way. That's going to be extremely difficult.

Condition 7: The burden is shared.

The burden has to be shared not only

in cost and resources but also on the ground, in who inherits this problem and who brings order. The burden is going to have to be shared in working with the people on the ground to create something different and new. The burden is going to have to be shared in terms of responsibility of patching up whatever damage is left, not only physical but also political or societal. Those are the kinds of things we are going to need help and allies to make sure happen.

Condition 8: The change is orderly.

The attempts I've seen to install democracy in short periods of time where there is no history and no roots have failed. Take it back to Somalia and other places where we've tried. It's not an easy concept. It's not an easy form of governance to put in place and to be understood. Remember it happened well for us. We had a revolution of elites in this country,

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which is the exception. Every place else where this has happened, it's been bloody, difficult, and long-term with a lot of friction. We can ill afford that in this part of the region.

Condition 9: The military is not stuck.

We have to help countries not fail, not become endangered, not become potential sanctuaries for extremism, and not end up in a chaotic state. That doesn't help us; it breeds the kinds of problems we are facing now. If our military, resources, government agencies, those that are working and cooperating with us, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], PVOs [private volunteer organizations], IO's [international organizations] around the world are sucked into this one issue and drawn away from those others, we will end up with bigger problems.

Condition 10: Other commitments are met.

Terrorism is a manifestation of something greater. There is extremism out there that is manifesting itself in the violent way of terrorism.

What are the root causes of this extremism? Why are young people flocking to these causes? Could the issues be political, economic and social? Could disenfranchisement or oppression be what drives them rather than the religious fanaticism that may be the core element to only a few? How do we cooperate to fix these problems? How do we help a part of the world that's trying to come to grips with modernity? . . .

I'm not convinced we need to do this now. I am convinced that we need

*The attempts I've seen
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to deal with Saddam down the road, but I think that the time is difficult because of the conditions in the region and all the other events that are going on. I believe that he can be deterred and is containable at this moment. As a matter of fact, I think the containment can be ratcheted up in a way that is acceptable to everybody. . . .

If I were to give you my priority of things that can change for the better in this region, it is first and foremost the Middle East peace process and getting it back on track. Second, it is ensuring that Iran's reformation or moderation continues on track and trying to help and support the people who are trying to make that change in the best way we can. That's going to take a lot of intelligence and careful work. The third is to make sure those countries to which we have now committed ourselves to change, like Afghanistan and those in central Asia, we invest what we need to in the way of resources there to make that change happen. Fourth is to patch up these relationships that have become strained, and fifth is to reconnect to the people. We are talking past each other. The dialogue is heated. We have based this in things that are tough to compromise on, like religion and politics, and we need to reconnect in a different way.

I would take those priorities before this one [war with Iraq]. My personal view, and this is just personal, is that I think this isn't number one. It's maybe six or seven, and the affordability line may be drawn around five. . . .

I have a couple of heroes. One is George C. Marshall, a great general that led us through a great war to victory. Look what that general did after the war. He didn't look to fight more wars; he didn't look to leave the situation in the condition in a place where those wars would re-breed themselves.

Look at General MacArthur in Japan. He was a man who suffered through Bataan and Corregidor and lost his troops to a horrific enemy. He reached out to the Japanese people and used other means to recreate stability and prosperity.

Look at Generals Grant and Lee, where Grant wanted the mildest of surrenders where dignity was maintained and where friendship and connection could happen, where Robert E. Lee did not want to go into the hills and fight guerilla wars. He knew it was a time to heal and to do it at the best level.

Look at General George Washington who avoided a second war with England, despite everybody pressing him to go to war a second time. He had been through the pain of the fighting with the Continental Army.

Look at General Eisenhower that didn't see the solution at Indochina [as] getting involved when the French were engaged with the Viet Minh. He saw that as a loser strategy, despite everybody clamoring about the dominoes that would fall.

Like those generals who were far greater than I am, I don't think that violence and war is the solution. ■

A Decade of U.S. Policy Towards Iraq

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AMERICAN POLICY IN THE GULF — a decades-old legacy from the British — is simple and straightforward: no regional power can be allowed to control the oil there. Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, therefore, posed an unacceptable threat. The 'Bush I' administration's reaction to it was in many ways as prompt and tactically masterful as its reaction to the fall of the Berlin Wall had been. But except for driving Saddam from Kuwait, Bush I never defined any broader goals and purposes in the affair.

The hope was that this first post-Cold War crisis could become a blueprint for the future; America couldn't resolve it alone, needed help, would continue to put a premium on cooperation with Moscow

and on strict coordination of policy within the United Nations.

Most countries saw the choice that Saddam Hussein had unwittingly offered them — himself or the United Nations — as hardly a real choice. His pathology captured the rage and frustration, the dreams and fantasies of the Arab street, which has a need for heroes. He struck officials from other countries as artful but reckless, however; as keenly attuned to the politics of the Arab world but otherwise unworldly, a poor judge of where the main political currents were headed.

Saddam has always shown a fondness for going to the brink and an inability to recognize it when he got there. After seizing Kuwait, he could have changed the govern-

ment, withdrawn, and then been seen throughout the Gulf as the dominant player. By going beyond the brink, the world surprised him with its seamless rejection of his action and his claim.

What then should the victors have done in 1991 when the shooting stopped? At the time, there was very little support for sending forces on to Baghdad. Any such action would have broken apart the coalition on whose support Washington had relied in waging war and smacking Iraq with the toughest set of sanctions within memory; the UN Security Council resolutions under which the administration acted provided only for the liberation of Kuwait, not for changing the regime in Iraq. More

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LANDMINES IN IRAQ

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Iraq is not a state party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it is plagued by landmines, as well as unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the Iran-Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf War, and years of internal conflict. Iraq has the capacity to produce anti-personnel landmines, but the level of production and the status of mine exports are unknown. Experts believe Iraq has a significant stockpile of landmines in the country, but the condition and locations are unknown. Mine awareness programs in Iraq exist on a very limited basis and the status of mine clearance is unknown. The number of landmines casualties in Iraq is unclear, but at least 21 people were killed by mines and UXO in 2001. Survivor assistance programs are offered through the government and NGOs.

The autonomous northern region of Iraq has addressed the landmine situation in the country in greater depth. In September 2002, the two main

Kurdish factions in Northern Iraq, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), pledged not to use anti-personnel landmines. Mine impact surveys have been completed in northern Iraq, and mine clearance, mine risk and awareness programs are being undertaken. According to a PUK official, 2,500 people have died and 3,200 have been injured in northern Iraq since the 1991 Gulf War. Monthly levels of casualties are believed to be decreasing, however, and survivor assistance to the northern regions continues.

Any U.S. operation in Iraq will have to contend with landmines, both those already in the ground and any new mines that are laid. Moreover, from an operational standpoint, the United States will have to determine if landmines will be used as part of the military operations in Iraq. The last time the United States used landmines was against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War.

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over, the United States was not prepared to govern Iraq for an indefinite period or take on the thankless job of keeping its disparate communities from each other's throats.

Also, Washington and various Arab capitals, relying on their intelligence, fully expected to see Saddam collapse within six months of his defeat, in part because he would have been enfeebled militarily. But he wasn't enfeebled, not sufficiently. Various senior officials in Washington and London worried at the time that ending the war after just 100 hours could allow Saddam to reestablish himself militarily. And he did; several divisions of Republican Guards and most of Iraq's tanks were allowed to leave Kuwait intact.

What the first Bush administration strangely failed to do was connect the military campaign to a post-ceasefire strategy. It had talked about a regional security structure for the Persian Gulf countries. And upon the victors in the war there did lie a heavy responsibility — and a unique opportunity — to create just such a

Washington and various Arab capitals... fully expected to see Saddam collapse within six months of his defeat.

structure. But the administration turned away from this task.

For a time, President George W. Bush took an approach to Iraq that diverged from his father's. He sought a military solution with or without help from allies or a fresh mandate from the UN Security Council. But his speech to the United Nations on Sept. 12, 2002, changed the terms of the debate. Signs of relief followed Bush's declared willingness to align U.S. policy with a tough Security Council resolution.

Although a compromise on a new resolution regarding inspections in Iraq was reached after much wrangling, it is still unclear whether France and Russia will accept the overall

thrust of U.S. policy or whether the U.S. interpretation of inspection results will be acceptable to other key players. The current resolution requires Iraq to accept the "any time, any place" approach to inspections. If Saddam does not cooperate or fails to disarm, a second resolution could lead to the use of force. However, Europeans are anxious to keep the stress on disarming Iraq, and many capitals remain concerned that talk in Washington of regime change and a new U.S. national security strategy reflect an intention among U.S. policymakers to reorder the world on American terms.

Within and beyond the national security bureaucracy there are voices expressing support for removing Saddam, while limiting the political damage that could ensue. Before the shooting starts, they think, the world should see signs that the Middle East is becoming less volatile and unstable. Some mix of active support and acquiescence from countries within the region and in Europe should have emerged. And the administration, they insist, must have a credible and reassuring answer to the question, who or what will control and stabilize Iraq in the years to come? ■

CDI RESOURCES ON IRAQ

"Eye on Iraq"

CDI's website for all events related to the situation in Iraq, updated frequently with up-to-the minute analysis by CDI staff and comprehensive resources. See it at <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/eye-on-iraq.cfm>

"Military Action In Iraq: 1990-2002"

A chronology of U.S. military presence and operations in the Gulf region since before the 1991 war. Updated frequently at: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/iraqaction.cfm>

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As the U.S. military prepares for possible military action, CDI tracks the build-up of U.S. forces in the region. Updated as needed at: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/forces-centcom.cfm>

"America's Defense Monitor"

During 1990-91, "America's Defense Monitor" did a series of television shows related to Iraq. They are excellent background materials on issues regarding war against Iraq. Find out more about "Oil, Arms, and the Gulf," (episode #412), "Alternatives to War in the Middle East" (#417), "Treating the Casualties of War with Iraq" (#433), "Sandstorm in the Gulf: Digging Out" (#426) and "Consequences of War in the Middle East" (#420) at: <http://www.cdi.org/adm/>

VICTORY

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can public should understand the dangers of these risks just as much as the dangers of inaction. A lot has been said by the administration of President George W. Bush concerning the urgency of responding to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. There has been little frank discussion about the perils of a new war. For example:

A U.S. offensive turns out to be the one catalyst that causes Iraqi biological or chemical weapons to be launched into Israel or friendly coalition forces.

- Saddam Hussein may be profiled as a calculating, stubborn man, but he is also an irrational high-risk taker as well. It is appropriate to believe the latest CIA reports and defector statements that Iraq has biological/chemical weapons on hand. Blister agents, mustard gas, VX gas, anthrax, weaponized aflatoxin and the nerve agents Sarin and Tabun are all possibilities. It is also appropriate to lend some credence to intelligence analysts that say Saddam is most dangerous when he is cornered, that he would sacrifice his life to secure his legacy and that he would try to wreak maximum destruction on his foes

if attacked. For such reasons, it is hard to rule out the possibility of his first use of chemical/biological weapons in any future conflict if he feels it is to his advantage. Of particular note, the CIA has just recently released a threat assessment letter asserting that Saddam is unlikely to use his lethal arsenal against the United States *unless he comes under military attack.*

U.S. forces become bogged down in urban street fighting and only slowly prevail as the rest of the world watches a messy and lengthy campaign. Heavy casualties result on both sides, as well as in the civilian community.

- There have been numerous reports that say Saddam's aim is to thwart an invasion by avoiding open desert fighting and massing his military in major cities where civilians are used as human shields and American casualties would be highest. Certainly, part of his strategy could be to ensure that civilians get killed and that images of U.S.-caused civilian carnage — pictures of weeping Iraqi mothers and children who have been maimed or killed — are transmitted by the satellite television network Al Jazeera, all over the world.

At the onset of an invasion Saddam sees that he cannot win and with

nothing to lose, resorts to his long-standing pattern of lashing out at other targets.

- Cornered and realizing an inevitable defeat, death or trial as a war criminal, Saddam torches his own oil fields, the world's second largest, in order to keep them out of the hands of American occupiers. He targets Saudi oil fields with biological agents requiring years of painstaking sanitization efforts. He blows the dams along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, flooding the southern Iraq desert with billions of gallons of water. He launches most of his Scuds into Israel to evoke a horrendous response from that country. The Iraq war is transformed into a regional American-Israeli war against Islam. The Shiite population in southern Iraq is targeted with biological weapons creating a tremendous humanitarian disaster for coalition forces to deal with.

War planners attempt to tailor tactics to prevent, circumvent or minimize involvement with all of the "worst-case" scenarios mentioned above. Nonetheless, the fact remains that a lot of wild cards have to be considered involving any conflict with Iraq. The risks are out there that may turn an inevitable "victory" into a relative term that few will savor. ■

GUILTY

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

a WMD attack against the United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him."

Such reporting is anathema to

Iraq hawks inside the administration, and allegations of political meddling in the intelligence process have begun to surface. Intelligence analysts are reportedly subjected to continual criticisms and calls for revisions of their work. Recent media reports indicate that senior officials

in the Bush administration reacted contemptuously to CIA reporting on alleged al Qaeda – Iraq ties, or lack thereof. It appears that a marriage of the two may be one of convenience, but only from the standpoint of Iraq hawks in Washington. ■

UNITED NATIONS INSPECTIONS — AN OPTION SHORT OF WAR

Rear Adm. Stephen H. Baker, Senior Fellow, sbaker@cdi.org

The success of UN inspections in Iraq is possibly the only step left to staving off a U.S. military offensive, and the tremendous short- and long-term risks involved with such an operation. The inspections have the potential to contain Iraq's weapons programs, divert execution of a massive military strike, and give the world a peek under the tent at what threat to global security Iraq really does pose. Washington therefore must give Iraq a chance to cooperate before the use of force is contemplated.

The United Nations successfully hammered out a compromise resolution on inspections. And it seems that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein is now more willing to accede to the UN demands, although how complete his compliance will be remains to be seen. Still, it is ludicrous for anyone that understands the realities of a military conflict with Iraq not to insist that the inspectors be given a chance to do their job in Iraq.

Hans Blix's UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) has twice the international representation as the previous commission, their inspection and monitoring equipment is state-of-the-art and supplemented by color, overhead national imagery. They will be aided with new information from recent defectors and the detailed intelligence analysis of several countries as to inspection sites. They will also have the entire world watching and inevitably analyzing their efforts. The impact of the inspections on both the Iraqi public and U.S. troops can only be described as negligible compared to an unrestrained war using overwhelming lethality and every conventional asset in the U.S. arsenal.

It is true that if inspectors are allowed into Iraq in an "unfettered, no-notice, anywhere/anytime" environment, the situation could evolve into an impasse — or a "discovery" that creates a "material breach" that would result in military action. Still, there are chances that a beefed-up UN inspection regime could achieve most of the goals achievable by any U.S. military action.

While the international community up to now has rejected U.S. calls for allowing armed inspections, that option, too, might have a future depending on Saddam's compliance with Blix's demands. The concept of armed inspections was developed as a potential alternative to war in Iraq by a recent Carnegie Endowment for International Peace workshop — a workshop in which CDI President Bruce Blair and I participated. The workshop outlined a plan for a radical strengthening of the inspection system, based on the existing UN inspection commission. The plan, entitled "Iraq: A New Approach" is available to download at <http://www.ceip.org/files/Publications/Iraq-Report.asp?from=pubdate>.

The report envisions inspectors backed up by a robust implementation force positioned in neighboring countries (to include some parts of Iraq). The United States would forswear unilateral military action against Iraq as long as inspections worked unhindered. This "comply or else" tactic would place the burden of choosing war squarely on Saddam. Such a multinational force, under an American commander, could be put together with a significant portion of the forces already in the area.

The new UN resolution requires Saddam to open political, national security and religious buildings to no-notice challenge inspections, including all presidential palaces and mosques. Any obstruction by Iraq still might be met with military reaction, although a second UN resolution to do so will be required. The consideration of armed inspectors, however, should not be ruled out. It remains a viable option short of a full-scale invasion of Iraq, which could save the lives of many and not pose such a high risk to the stability of the region. It only makes sense to exploit and exhaust every option available before a call to arms is made. It should not be hard to decide whether to aggressively back UN inspectors or to unilaterally undertake a massive invasion into Iraq. One could take a recent quotation from U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld out of context and apply it here; "a trained ape knows the answer."

BAGHDAD

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 3

comfortable with fervent nationalism," wrote EU External Affairs Commissioner Christopher Patten. "We tend to prize consensus over conviction." To abandon the system now - and the preemptive doctrine

stresses its legal foundation to its limit - risks inviting instability in Europe and beyond the continent, follows the logic.

But other Europeans point out that Sept. 11, 2001, changed the world, and the laws must be adjusted accordingly. While the case for a preemptive attack against Iraq

is generally viewed in Europe as weak, if a terrorist link is established and proven, Europe would find it difficult to disapprove. ■

Compiled by Tomas Valasek, Director, CDI Brussels, tvalasek@cdi.org with help from CDI Moscow, and CDI-Tsinghua (China).



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For a single copy of this issue, send \$1.00. CDI's publication, *The Defense Monitor*, is sent without charge to all donors of \$45 or more. CDI receives no funds from the Pentagon or from military contractors. The Center is financed by voluntary tax-deductible contributions from individuals and grants from foundations. Contributions may be mailed to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington D.C. 20036-2109.

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