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The Afghan Campaign One Year On

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An Afghan Blitzkrieg?

SEPT. 11, 2001, transformed Afghanistan even more than it did America. The pariah state which harbored Osama bin Laden, and was the base camp for his al Qaeda network, immediately became the focus of the U.S. war against terrorism. The Afghan campaign began amid dire warnings of the dangers historically faced by foreign interlopers in the country that was center stage of central Asia's "great game" during the 19th and 20th centuries and that would become the first battlefield of an even greater one during the first year of the 21st. The experience of the British and the Soviets was held up as an example of what fate potentially awaited any American intervention in Afghanistan. A year later, such warnings seem overstated. Al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan have been destroyed, the Taliban ousted, and an Afghan Transitional Government rules in their place. Meanwhile, life for the average Afghan is a considerably less nasty and brutish affair than it was a little over a year ago — all in short order and at a relatively low cost in human life. Such successes notwithstanding, the Afghan campaign is not yet over. It has not been without failings, some of which may return to haunt ongoing operations there. Similarly, some of the methods used to achieve this success, while effective in the short term, may yet prove polemical.

The Remarkable Trinity

America's success in Afghanistan was brought about primarily through a combination of airpower, Special Operations Forces (SOFs) and the use of the existing Afghan resistance as a proxy ground force. Of this trinity, airpower has been cited as the principal factor.[1] To a degree this is true. In April the Pentagon described the Afghan air campaign as the most accurate ever, with preliminary evaluations showing that 75 percent to 80 percent of the 22,000 bombs and missiles dropped by that point had hit their intended targets.[2] Some commentators argue that the limitations of Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) methods call into question the accuracy of this estimate, especially given that it came relatively early during the campaign and before there was time to verifiably distinguish between near misses and limited and critical damage.[3] This problem is not new — after the Gulf War, the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency discovered that the initial BDA of Iraqi forces was at least 30 percent too high. Conversely, Air Forces officials argue that SOFs and Air Force controllers on the ground in Afghanistan not only allowed for quicker, more "effects-based" BDA, but helped ensure that no more bombs were dropped on a target than needed.[4] Moreover, if the accuracy of U.S. airpower in Afghanistan cannot yet be universally agreed upon, its generally high efficiency against Taliban and al Qaeda forces is less debatable.

However, air-power alone could not deliver victory. Rather, in a tactic reminiscent of that used in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Northern Alliance took on an infantry role (one fulfilled by Croats and Albanian Kosovars respectively in the Balkan conflicts) while U.S. airpower took on that of aerial artillery. America was thus able to avoid the specter of a local backlash against too large a U.S. "footprint" in Afghanistan, while simultaneously avoiding the prospect of large-scale U.S. casualties and defeating an estimated enemy force over 60,000 strong — this with a quarter of that number of Northern Alliance fighters, 300 to 500 Western Special Forces, and no more than a few thousand Western conventional troops.[5]

SOFs were the fulcrum on which this use of proxy forces and especially airpower were hinged. Indeed, without SOFs the latent potential of U.S. airpower would not have been as fully realized as it was in Afghanistan. This use of Special Forces alongside indigenous allies was not new. It had been used in Vietnam for in-

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stance, where local tribes were often trained and led by American Green Berets. However, by the time of the Afghan campaign technology had evolved to allow such forces to call up American airpower in support of their proxies with an accuracy that was hitherto unachievable. Special Forces spotters, armed with little more than laptop computers and targeting systems using global positioning system satellites, worked as force multipliers for Northern Alliance ground forces. Such technology enabled aircraft to drop "smart bombs" — most of which were conventional bombs upgraded into Joint Direct Attack Munitions via a kit that turned them into precision-guided weapons. At $18,000 apiece, these upgrade kits were not only relatively cheap (as opposed to the $1 million price tag for a Tomahawk cruise missile), but allowed even the venerable B-52 to drop ordnance with unprecedented accuracy. About 60 percent of the munitions dropped in Afghanistan were smart bombs — as opposed to the 5 percent used during the Gulf War — with the Air Force reporting 90 percent accuracy.[6]

However, smart bomb technology had its limitations, and there were several instances of "friendly fire" involving both allied forces and Afghan civilians. By June, almost 35 percent of coalition "hostile casualties" (as defined by the Defense Department) in Afghanistan had been caused by fratricide. Afghan civilian casualties, while probably not as many as the 3,500-plus estimated by one commentator, were also undeniably high.[7] The problem of avoiding civilian casualties became especially salient after the Taliban's fall from power, when suitable targets — always rare in underdeveloped countries like Afghanistan — became increasingly scarce. Ironically, airpower — the very means by which U.S. forces had sought to avoid mobilizing anti-American sentiment among ordinary Afghans — risked doing exactly that, as the public outcry over the inadvertent bombing of a wedding celebration on July 1 highlighted.

The use of proxy forces also had drawbacks, with rival factions sometimes suspected of feeding American forces misinformation and using U.S. airpower to prosecute factional disputes.[8] A notable example of this occurred on Dec. 21, when American planes bombed allied Afghan tribal leaders traveling to Kabul for the inauguration of the country's interim authority. Moreover, the practice of arming, paying and legitimizing the country's regional warlords in return for their support against Taliban and al Qaeda forces may yet prove shortsighted. Many of these same warlords, strengthened by their powerful U.S. sponsor, would later feature in the factional power struggles that continue to threaten Afghanistan, and that have led to calls for the expansion of the International Security

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CDI Welcomes New Visiting Fellow

Renowned former congressional staffer Winslow Wheeler is now affiliated with CDI as a visiting fellow. For three decades, Wheeler, often writing under the pen name Spartacus, has been a tireless advocate for improved national security policies and military reform as a drafter of legislation, producer of analytical and oversight reports, and investigator of actual conditions in the field. His reports have become well known for going beyond the conventional wisdom or the official story, and looking at what the actual data and people on the front lines have to say. It is a sign of the effectiveness of his well-researched analyses that he earned foes on Capitol Hill.

Wheeler worked for Sen. Jacob Javits in the 1970s, then Sens. Nancy Kassebaum and David Pryor (the last two, a Republican and Democrat, at the same time!), before conducting oversight in the General Accounting Office as assistant director for defense. For the past six years, he has served on the staff of the Senate Budget Committee. Some of the issues he has been involved with include the War Powers Act, arms sales, establishing the Pentagon's weapon testing office, procurement reform, weapon performance in the Gulf War and the readiness of forces. He coordinated the influential Military Reform Caucus in Congress during the 1980s.

As well as advising on staff projects related to military transformation and defense budgets, Wheeler will prepare a book for CDI on the deep problems in the current congressional process of overseeing and funding national security.

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Assistance Force (ISAF) — calls America has been slow to endorse. America's newly-found allies also proved militarily unreliable on occasion, being accustomed to a much more limited way of war than that being fought by the United States. The limitations of allied Afghan fighters were particularly apparent at Tora Bora in December and during the later Anaconda operation, where they were compounded by an American over-reliance on their proxy fighters, a misapplication of conventional forces, and a failure to seal off enemy escape routes. The latter was impossible to do fully, but could have, arguably, been undertaken more efficiently and, given its importance, should have been. Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden may well have escaped as a result — leaving one of the biggest aims of the Afghan campaign unrealized. Almost certainly, many of the al Qaeda/Taliban rank and file did escape, and cannot realistically be expected to offer such a concentrated target again, raising the prospect of a prolonged anti-guerilla-type operation to rout them out.

From Lightning War to Small War

The U.S. effort has turned into just such an operation since the inconclusive end of Operation Anaconda on March 18. Searches by a 1,700-strong British Royal Marine taskforce in the aftermath of this operation found no enemy forces, although the discovery of freshly laid booby traps points to al Qaeda and Taliban fighters having accessed the area since Anaconda ended, later retreating into Pakistani tribal areas. By comparison, there was little evidence of the high numbers of enemy dead claimed by the Pentagon.[9] Subsequent searches by Canadian and U.S. forces also found few enemy forces, although extensive arms caches were uncovered throughout this period and since.

The absence of enemy forces may have been a "tactical pause" in operations until the hunt for them lessened in intensity. It may also have resulted from their need to regroup and re-supply after what was a significant, if not decisive, series of defeats by American and coalition forces. Certainly, since Anaconda, enemy forces have avoided regrouping in large numbers and are unlikely to do so, even if they still can, lest they incur U.S. and allied air strikes. As such, American forces had no significant contacts between the end of Anaconda and July 27, when a joint Afghan-U.S. patrol was attacked seven miles east of Khost by suspected al Qaeda/Taliban fighters. Since then, small guerilla-type attacks on American forces have intensified — something that may yet indicate the start of a new low-intensity warfare phase of the campaign.

This type of fighting is less matched to the particular mix of proxy forces, SOFs and, most especially, the extensive use of airpower, which proved so successful in the beginning of the Afghan campaign. Indeed, the situation in Afghanistan has long resembled a complex emergency rather than a war, with the rule of law of the Afghan Transitional Government largely confined to Kabul (and guaranteed there mainly by ISAF's presence), an assassination attempt on its president (who has to be guarded by Americans), one minister and vice president already assassinated, and warlords still vying for power in the outlying provinces — all against the backdrop of a continuing manhunt for al Qaeda/Taliban leaders and their followers, and a terrorist bombing campaign of increasing intensity in the Afghan capital.

As the commander of U.S. Central Command acknowledged recently, American troops will be in Afghanistan for a long time yet.[10] Moreover, as the Afghan campaign continues, the methods which proved so effective in its opening days will prove less so. Recent remarks by Paul Wolfowitz, the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, indicate that the Pentagon's stance toward the peace support operations and so-called "nation-building" that it has so disdained in the past is softening.[11] It will have to soften more if the significant, if imperfect, victory achieved in Afghanistan in the last year is to be built upon in the next. ■

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Operation Enduring Freedom and Military Transformation

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A YEAR AFTER the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the U.S. campaign to eliminate Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, what lessons has the military taken from the experience and how have military "transformation" plans been altered as a result? Broadly, OEF has reinforced the pre-Sept. 11 thrust of the Bush administration's transformation efforts, which intended to further increase the U.S. lead in technology over any other military and threat.

Although OEF can be taken as one exemplar of likely 21st century challenges for the military, future operations will by no means duplicate those in Afghanistan. The Defense Department appears to have taken care not to give too much emphasis to OEF as a model for future conflict — to prepare "to fight the last war" again. The primary limitation of drawing excessively sharp conclusions from the OEF experience is clear: the Taliban was a weak opponent in military terms, having little functional heavy equipment, particularly air defenses, a relatively small core of skilled troops defending a large territory and a civil war on its hands. In addition, their political hold was shaky since they had alienated many in the population, therein precluding them from initiating a guerrilla war, and making them vulnerable to traditional Afghan factional allegiance-shifting.

Nevertheless, OEF has provided useful insights into new opportunities for the U.S. military. The operation was conducted not by massed heavy armored divisions, but by a handful of special operations troops in combination with air power and local ground troops, which broke the morale of the ruling regime's forces. Innovative use of existing forces, weapons and emerging communications equipment proved effective in the Afghan situation. Specific transformation thrusts of the Defense Department and the military services are examined below.

Department of Defense

In his annual report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated the primary operational lesson learned in OEF: "The ability of forces to communicate and operate seamlessly on the battlefield will be critical to our success in future wars. The victories in Afghanistan were won by 'composite' teams of U.S. Special Forces on the ground, working with Navy, Air Force and Marine pilots in the sky. Special Forces identified targets, communicated targeting information, and coordinated timing of air strikes through interoperable data links — with devastating consequences for the enemy." Other transformation themes highlighted by the Defense Department after OEF include:

- A new focus on non-traditional opponents and conflicts such as in Afghanistan, rather than conventional combat with a future superpower such as China.
- Countering weapons of mass destruction.
- Continued increases in ability to hit targets accurately and quickly, including in unwarned preemptive strikes.
- Continued improvements in the ability of U.S. forces to operate jointly and with other nations, particularly in the areas of command and communications.

If OEF has created a shift within the administration's overall transformation thrust, it is that the primary enemy envisioned is no longer a "peer" superpower with large, technically advanced forces. Less traditional enemies, including terrorist groups and the weak states that often support them, have gained equal or greater status as notional opponents. Fortunately for the prior transformation thrust, which was mostly focused on future superpowers, OEF showed that many of the technologies needed to fight a superpower can also be useful against far smaller military challenges.

The drive for more high-tech equipment is focused on improved sensors for detecting targets, and communications for transmitting that and other information. These played a central role in the Afghanistan combat model of airstrikes, guided by ground spotters and air reconnaissance in support of local allies. Particular areas of emphasis in the administration's transformation plans include:

- Unmanned vehicles, including ones that will be armed.
- Weapons to conduct reconnaissance and airstrikes at very long ranges, including intercontinental ranges.
- Space hardware.

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- Stealthy weapons.
- Equipment in high demand but low availability, usually aircraft involved in reconnaissance, control, electronic warfare and intelligence gathering; suppression of enemy air defenses; special operations; search and rescue; and aerial refueling.
- Ballistic and cruise missile defenses.
- Rapid deployability and smaller supply needs for combat units.
- "Interoperability" of equipment among services.
- Enabling essentially all "shooters," weapon systems and commanders to be connected to all battlefield "sensors," intelligence and data.

Army

The Army has seen its decades of investment in special operations forces validated in Afghanistan by their effective collaboration with local forces to defeat the Taliban regime. Appropriately, the Army did ***not*** learn the wrong lesson from OEF: that local allies in cooperation with U.S. Special Forces can do everything needed militarily in other scenarios, and the Army does not need conventional forces. If the Defense Department was beginning to learn the wrong lesson, it was quickly brought back by the operations in Tora Bora and Shah-i-Kot, where smaller numbers of U.S. troops combined with allied forces failed to capture significant al Qaeda members.

Other deployment situations in the future may share few similarities with OEF and require different forces — most obviously an invasion of Iraq, which could require a far larger and more conventional U.S. force than was used in Afghanistan.

Areas the Army will focus on improving include:

- Special Forces and working with indigenous forces.
- Mobility. Most forces and supplies had to be moved by air into and within Afghanistan.
- Medium-weight, agile forces. The first large units deployed into Afghanistan were not Army but Marine Corps forces, because of their greater suitability and deployability — despite the distance from the sea.
- Infantry gear and tactics. Improvements and wider availability of the latest basic equipment are still needed, for example body armor, radios, boots, flashlights, water carriers, gloves, binoculars and backpacks.

Navy

The Navy relearned the value of flexibility in military operations, and of having forces and weapons that can be given new or unplanned roles and missions. For example, some of its reequipped P-3 aircraft — originally designed for anti-submarine warfare but now reconfigured with other visual and electronic sensor and communication equipment — were reportedly effective in reconnaissance and control of airstrikes working with Navy SEAL special forces and other ground spotters. In another case, the Navy took an aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, out of its normal role of launching air strikes against land or sea targets, and used it as an offshore base for special operations forces.

Similarly, a high proportion of bomber sorties launched from aircraft carriers did not have a target already set when they launched, a novel way of operating. Improvements in sensors and communications allowed them to be given targets after takeoff when they were near the combat area.

Major thrusts for Navy transformation coming out of OEF include:

- Special Forces – Navy SEALs were very active and their skills were useful even in landlocked Afghanistan.
- Enhancing "sea-basing," including launching, planning, supporting and supplying a variety of missions from the sea, beyond the traditional focus on airstrikes and amphibious assaults.
- Increasing the quantity and capabilities of precision-guided munitions.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps earned plaudits for deploying troops far inland to Afghanistan but it found some areas that were stressed by OEF. It is looking at improving these areas:

- Logistics – getting the specific supplies needed to the right place, rather than transporting more things than are required.
- Close air support – further reducing the possibility of fratricide and civilian casualties.
- Intelligence – rapidly disseminating the important information to those who need to use it.

Air Force

The Air Force played a major role in the airstrikes along with the Navy. Its "lessons learned" task force notes the usefulness of having ground-based reconnaissance and targeting rather than solely operating from aircraft (Air Force personnel were on the ground as well as SOFs from

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Funding for Counterterrorism: Who Gets What?

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SINCE THE SEPT. 11 attacks Congress has approved $68.9 billion in emergency assistance, to fund military operations, and improve security. A recent report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that of this, roughly $37 billion has already been spent, and that the federal government could spend more than $400 billion over the next decade.

On Sept. 14, 2001, Congress approved a $40 billion emergency supplemental appropriations bill — H.R. 2888, the Emergency Response Fund (ERF). This was widely viewed as merely the first installment in the government's anti-terrorism campaign.

The $40 billion was initially broken down as follows: $10 billion was immediately available to the president for costs associated with a military response to the terrorist attacks, intelligence, transportation, security improvements and defense; $10 billion was to be used at the president's discretion, subject to his submission to Congress and its approval of an official request, which Congress would have 15 days to respond to; the remaining $20 billion was to be spent through the normal budgetary process as part of the fiscal year 2002 (FY 02) budget request. The original legislation specified that no less than $20 billion of the total would go to disaster assistance in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania.

On Oct. 17, 2001, the Bush administration submitted its request to Congress for the second $20 billion in emergency funds, and Congress began consideration of the request as part of the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002, which was already working its way through the annual budget process. But while Capitol Hill simply accepted the administration's spending plan for the initial $20 billion, more than half of which ($13.7 billion) went to the military, Congress made significant changes in the administration's proposed spending for the second $20 billion, choosing to focus funding on disaster recovery programs and homeland security at the Pentagon's expense.

Congress Questions Administration's Priorities

While the administration requested $7.3 billion for the Pentagon as part of the second $20 billion, Congress approved only $3.5 billion, more than a 50 percent decrease. For homeland security the administration requested $4.4 billion, but Congress approved $8.3 billion, a 75 percent increase. Likewise, Congress significantly increased the administration's $6.3 billion request for assistance to New York, Virginia, and other states impacted by the Sept. 11 attacks to $8.2 billion, a 30 percent boost.

Some members were poised to go further, looking to add significantly to the $20 billion request, despite veto threats from the White House. The administration argued that fiscal pressures called for more modest expenditures at that time, and assured members that it would request significant additional funds for homeland security in its FY 03 budget request, or as part of an additional supplemental spending plan already being put together by the administration. As he unveiled the administration's proposal for the second $20 billion, the White House budget director, Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., told Congress in October that the $40 billion was "ample for months to come."

Leading Democrats disagreed. Sen. Robert Byrd, D-W.Va., chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, added $15 billion to the Senate's version of the bill, half for homeland security and half for emergency response to impacted communities.

Rep. David Obey, D-Wis., top Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, said that he believed the federal government needed an immediate increase of over $18 billion, but proposed a more modest increase of $7 billion. "It was made clear many times over by [both Democrats and Republicans] that $40 billion was just a down payment, not a ceiling," said Obey.

Some Republicans also felt the pressure to boost domestic anti-ter-

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FRONTLINE:
"Missile Wars"

The FRONTLINE /Azimuth Media co-production of "Missile Wars" (in cooperation with *The New York Times)* is scheduled to broadcast nationally on PBS on Thursday, Oct. 10, at 9 p.m. (check local listings). "Missile Wars" tells the riveting story of the behind-the-scenes battle over national missile defense.

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rorism spending. At a November White House meeting, top Democrat and Republican appropriators tried to press their case personally with President George W. Bush, who, according to press accounts, walked out after an hour in what members of Congress bitterly described as a scripted appearance. In the end, appropriators bowed to bipartisan pressure from the House and Senate leadership, which, in an effort to maintain unity in difficult times, chose to go along with the White House rather than force the president to veto an emergency spending bill.

The Second Supplemental

The administration's budget request for FY 03, released in February, 2002, included $38 billion for homeland defense, a 50 percent increase over the previous year. It also included a $48 billion boost for the Pentagon. Yet almost immediately, the White House announced its plans to request substantial amounts of emergency funding in a new supplemental spending package. On March 22, the administration submitted its FY 02 emergency supplemental request to Congress. It included $27.1 billion in new funds, including $14 billion for the military and intelligence community.

Congress responded equally fast, again seeking to boost overall spending. Democratic and Republican House appropriators compromised on an almost $30 billion package that included $17.5 billion for the Pentagon, $5.8 billion for homeland security ($522 million above the administration's request), and matched the White House's $5.5 billion request for assistance to New York. The Senate took similar steps, adopting a $31 billion package, with $4 billion of the new funding going to homeland security.

Once again, the White House threatened a veto, citing fiscal concerns. In the end, Congress adopted a compromise $28.9 billion package that included $14.4 billion for the military, $6.7 billion for homeland security, and $5.5 billion for New York. It also included an additional $5.1 billion in emergency funds not requested by the administration, and gave the president "all-or-nothing" authority to accept the additional funds or reject them as a whole. In early August, Bush announced that he would not spend the additional $5.1 billion, which included nearly $1 billion for the Pentagon and $2.5 billion for homeland security.

Spending to Date

A September 2002 study by the CBO reported that the federal government had spent nearly $37 billion in response to the attacks of Sept.11, and could spend as much as $443 billion

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other services). Like the Navy, the Air Force has appreciated the value of invigorating older weapons and giving them alternative missions by adding new technology — heavy bombers were all designed to drop nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union but have found new roles bombing with conventional precision-guided munitions.

The Air Force will re-emphasize these areas in its transformation efforts following its experiences in OEF:

- Unmanned aerial vehicles (while recognizing that costs to duplicate human capabilities can get too high in some cases).
- "Sensor fusion" – improving the ability to communicate data from a variety of sensors to a network of pilots, other weapon system operators, and commanders.
- Aircraft that can perform multiple types of missions – for example, putting communications equipment aboard tanker aircraft so they can do more than just refuel other aircraft.

Summary

The Secretary of Defense's 2002 Annual Report concisely notes the capabilities that all these transformation elements are intended to provide, supplying a snapshot of the Bush administration's vision of military transformation:

"Ground forces will be lighter, more lethal, and highly mobile. They will be capable of insertion far from traditional ports and air bases and will be networked with long-range precision-strike systems. Naval and amphibious forces will be able to overcome anti-access and area-denial threats, operate close to an enemy's shores, and project power deep inland. Aerospace forces will be able to locate and track mobile enemy targets over vast areas, and in combination with land and sea forces, strike them rapidly at long ranges without warning. The joint force will be networked in order to conduct highly complex and distributed operations over vast distances and in space." ■

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more over the next 10 years. The figures were based on actual spending since Sept. 11, 2001, and assumed that funding for counterterrorism that were requested by the administration for FY 03 would be accepted by Congress, and would continue to be funded at levels that keep place with inflation over the next decade.

CBO estimated that of the new spending, $24 billion went to the military. According to the Pentagon, costs of military operations in Afghanistan, which accounts for the vast majority of this new spending, are running at roughly $2.4 billion a month.

Meanwhile, a report prepared earlier that month by the Democratic majority staff of the Senate Budget Committee put the figure for spending to date at approximately $34 billion. The report did not make similar assumptions about future federal spending as were included in the CBO study, but instead looked primarily at spending to date.

Impact on the Federal Deficit

Another CBO report, released in early September 2002, dramatically revised downward budget projections made earlier that year. While CBO's March estimates projected a modest $5 billion surplus for FY 02, the newer figures forecast a $157 billion deficit. The projections also showed continued deficits in each of the next three fiscal years — $145 billion in 2003, $111 billion in 2004 and $39 billion in 2005. CBO projected a cumulative surplus of $1.015 trillion between 2002 and 2012, but most of that ($845 billion) is not realized until after 2010, when newly enacted tax breaks are set to expire. The March CBO report estimated a cumulative surplus of $5.6 trillion.

Bush administration officials have argued that the efforts to combat terrorism and a weak economy are driving future deficits. Meanwhile, Democrats have blamed the White House's tax cuts enacted last year for the drop in projected surpluses.

According to the Senate report, spending related to the Sept. 11 attacks accounted for 11 percent of the decrease in projected surpluses for the 2002-2011 period. Yet tax cuts enacted since January 2001 reduced projected surpluses by 34 percent.

An analysis of the CBO report by ***The New York Times*** (Sept. 6, 2002) showed similar results. Based on CBO's spending estimates, the paper reported that "about 10 percent of the decline in the surplus through 2001 would be directly attributable to the costs of fighting terrorism. The tax cut, at $1.3 trillion over 10 years, would account for about a quarter of the drop in the surplus." ■