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The Security Environment in Asia
Dr. Nicholas Berry, CDI Senior Analyst
The security environment in Asia has become highly complex since the end of the Cold War. A legacy from that superpower struggle still affects security relations, but what is surprising is the re-emergence of issues associated with World War II and before. Asians have long memories. Their injuries are not forgotten. Past history is just yesterday.
What emerges from this historical memory is an environment loaded with latent hostility that makes the region's international security relations a fragmented array of bilateral ties. In effect, the widespread latent hostility in the region inhibits multilateral initiatives, security coalitions, and cooperative ventures which the United States sought under President Bill Clinton. "Peace is in pieces," as one academic phrased it in a different context.
China, as the most assertive, rising power in this fractured environment, will play an ever-increasing role in determining the level of tension in the region. China is challenging American pre-eminence in Asia. It is not an overstatement to say that how well Beijing and Washington handle this competition will be the big story in the early decades of the 21st century.
Much of the latent hostility remains in the background, only occasionally bursting forth into public disputes. Thus, major war remains unlikely. Nevertheless, security cooperation in this setting will be difficult.
The security environment in Asia has the following characteristics:
LATENT HOSTILITY
AND FRAGMENTATION
The Koreas.
North Korea sees South Korea as a puppet of the Americans and thus
not representing bone fide Korean nationalism. South Korea portrays
North Korea as a militaristic, controlled society, which in still-living
memory inflicted enormous damage on the South. Both Koreas distrust
Japan and remain resentful over Japan's 35-year brutal occupation
(1910-1945). Earlier history is also not forgotten. A prominently
displayed diorama in South Korea's War Memorial museum shows the
heroic effort of Korean forces to defeat Japan's 16th century invasion.
Both Koreas recently expressed considerable anger over Japanese
textbooks that ignore Tokyo's wartime criminal record, including
the forced recruitment of Korean "comfort women."
Japan.
Japan, in turn, is tired of hearing demands that it apologize once again for its behavior three generations ago, especially after all its post-war efforts to provide overseas development assistance to its neighbors and generous financial loans during currency crises.
China, too, has not forgotten Japan's 1937 rape of Nanjing (Nanking) and has protested the distorted history in Japan's textbooks. Beijing worries about a revival of Japanese militarism, as recently signaled by Japan's new defense guidelines expanding its supportive role for U.S. forces and its cooperation with the United States in developing missile defense systems. Upon his selection as the new Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi added a new concern for Beijing when he suggested he may seek the modification of the pacifist Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution.
Japan witnesses China's switch from communism to nationalism with some alarm and is especially concerned about the 17.7 percent increase in China's current military budget. It is also not pleased by being targeted by China's ballistic missiles. Article 9 of Japan's constitution, however, prohibits Japan from joining multilateral military alliances. Prior to Koizumi's accession to power, Tokyo wanted to keep latent the residual hostility from its wartime behavior in order to maintain access to its former enemies' markets. As a result, Japan has had perhaps the lowest-key, non-militarist foreign policy of any major power. That may change under Koizumi, although only incrementally.
Singapore's national museum graphically displays its people's suffering under
four years of Japanese occupation in World War II. The museum's
3-D film, This Is Singapore, actually shows an actor portraying
a Japanese soldier firing into the audience, producing screams from
school children usually in attendance.
Japan resists investments in Russia, not only because of inadequate legal safeguards, but also because of Russia's continual occupation of the Northern Territories (the four southern Kuril islands).
China.
Mainland China and Taiwan maintain a long-standing family feud over Chinese sovereignty which focuses on the question: What is China and who has political jurisdiction over what? Taiwan, the world's second largest purchaser of arms, will receive $4 billion worth from the United States in the latest sales agreement, including eight diesel submarines. The sale of these offensive arms elicited a strong protest from Beijing. China also buys advanced weaponry, such as Sovremenny-class destroyers and Su-27 and Su-30 warplanes from Russia. Beijing now points 300 ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait.
India harbors an historic wariness of China going back to their nasty 1962 border war. A former Indian defense minister in a moment of candor identified China as the primary target of India's developing ballistic missile program. One Indian defense analyst explained India's silence over the EP-3E/F-8 collision by stating that U.S. hostility to China is welcomed in New Delhi as a force opposing Chinese hegemony.
Vietnam, in spite of border and trade agreements in the past few years with China, may well have arranged President Clinton's visit in 2000 to send a message to Beijing not to be heavy-handed towards Hanoi if it wants to maintain good relations. China was Vietnam's enemy in its last (1979) war.
Other Disputes.
No love is lost between India and Pakistan, a national sentiment that is larger than their historic conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. Both conducted multiple underground nuclear tests in May 1998 and continue developing medium-range ballistic missiles. India even has trouble with another neighbor, one it helped create. Indian and Bangladeshi troops clashed in April 2001 over a disputed section of their common border.
Other latent hostilities exist, such as those between Singapore and its neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia over ethnic rivalries, between New Zealand and Australia (however polite) over military ties to the United States, between Myanmar and Thailand over drug trafficking and interdiction, and between Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and China over territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Nobody likes
anybody else very much.
When a region is loaded with multiple bilateral disputes, the situation favors the state(s) whose behavior would most influence the outcome of these disputes. China has a stake in virtually all the disputes mentioned above and has the assertiveness to stay involved. Japan, China's only regional competitor for the influential top spot, suffers from the great latent hostility and is still constrained by a strong internal anti-militarist public opinion, even under Koizumi – a combination that produces an extraordinarily tepid foreign policy. This means that the players in the region, including the United States, must pay primary attention to Chinese foreign policy intentions and actions. It also means that the United States will be hard pressed to change the situation, a factor that leaves China in a position of strength.
IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. EFFORTS TO CREATE AN
ASIAN SECURITY COMMUNITY
Unlike Europe, no multilateral security organizations exist in
Asia. The ubiquitous latent hostilities account for some of this
condition. But so does China's oft-stated preference for what it
calls "multipolarity," which is an explicit statement that it favors
no multilateral alliance structure for Asia. All the rest of the
Asian countries are aware of China's opposition to alliances and
have avoided challenging Beijing's preference for two main reasons:
preserving their foreign direct investment and trade relations with
China and preventing an escalation of tensions an alliance without
Chinese membership would inevitably provoke. No one wants a cold
war in Asia – China versus the rest – including the United States.
Thus the United States has sought to create fully-inclusive, multilateral economic and security structures in Asia. The Clinton administration began this effort early, with the President championing the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and supporting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, with 23 Asia-Pacific member states). Clinton personally worked hard to raise the profile of both organizations and attended every annual meeting. Clinton's policy towards China favored engagement, integration into international organizations and regimes such as the World Trade Organization, and concluding mutually beneficial deals with Beijing, including steps to demilitarize North Korea. China is active in both APEC and ARF because they are inclusive multipolar fora, not alliances, and Beijing employs their multipolarity to help advance Chinese foreign policies (keeping Taiwan diplomatically isolated, checking U.S. "hegemony," and integrating the Chinese market into the global economy).
With the fora functioning smoothly, Washington initiated a plan to begin multilateral military initiatives on the same fully-inclusive format. The ideas of Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, fit perfectly into Clinton's design. Upon taking command in February 1999, Admiral Blair began promoting what he called "a security community" for the Asia-Pacific region. Blair speaks frequently, promoting multilateral exchanges and initiatives such as peacekeeping, piracy prevention, drug interdiction, and disaster relief. He has arranged multilateral military exercises. The latest, the Cobra Gold exercises, includes Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, and Singapore, with invitations to China and Vietnam to send observers. He enthusiastically supports the Pentagon's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in Hawaii, which brings together military officers, defense officials, and scholars from the Asia-Pacific region to study security issues – with U.S. participants limited to 20 percent of each class. He was the driving force behind the March 2001 Pacific Symposium sponsored by APCSS, Pacific Command, and the National Defense University, "Enhancing Regional Cooperation Through New Multilateral Initiatives." Clinton employed military signals via Blair that explicitly opposed policies favoring the containment of China.
Alas, with the possible exceptions of the Four Party Talks (United
States, China, and the two Koreas) over the security situation on
the Korean peninsula (although North Korea continues to impede this
multilateral arrangement), the very loose Five Power Defense Arrangements
(FPDA) among Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain,
and UN peacekeepers in East Timor, none of the parties to the bilateral
disputes mentioned above welcome multilateral participation. Relations
between the United States and Japan, the United States and Taiwan,
China and Taiwan, Russia and Japan, Japan and China, China and India,
and India and Pakistan have remained bilateral. Again, latent hostility,
sensitivity over sovereignty, and strong national determination
to maintain national control over security policy prevent the emergence
of an Asia-Pacific security community.
DOMESTIC PROBLEMS
IN ASIA THAT INHIBIT
FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES
Another factor inhibiting security cooperation in Asia is the existence of major internal problems that detract from or weaken foreign policy initiatives of the principal players.
Asia is undoubtedly on the move, but compared to Europe and the Americas, Asia is home to weak states (although nowhere near the weaknesses apparent in Africa). A long list of problems weaken Asian states.
Financial.
Although recovery from the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis has been steady, the continuing Japanese economic stagnation and the recent slowdown in the American economy have depressed growth rates throughout the region. Unemployment is a growing problem in Indonesia and the Philippines. Heavy rural taxation and corrupt local officials have produced violent rural protests in China. In fact, the growing rich-poor gap is apparent not only in China but also in Vietnam, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, and Pakistan. Nepal faces a left-wing rural insurgency. Class struggles loom, ironically, as Marxism fades. Economic modernization is a challenge, even to Japan.
Civil Unrest.
Ethnic and religious clashes wrack many Asian states. Chinese authorities face unrest by Uyghurs in Xinjaing, Tibetan separatists, dissident Christians, and protests by the Falun Gong spiritual movement. Indonesia struggles with separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and has difficulty stopping ethnic cleansing by native Dayaks of newly-arrived settlers in Borneo. The Philippine armed forces battle perennial Muslim warrior separatists. Burma has had trouble pacifying, often brutally, the Karen, Mon, and other ethnic groups in its north. India combats separatists in Assam and Jammu and Kashmir (where Islamists and Kashmiri nationalists receive support from Pakistan and Afghanistan). Islamists dominate Afghanistan (the Taliban) and form guerrillas movements in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In short, with the exception of Japan and South Korea, the major populated states in Asia suffer from moderate to severe domestic strife.
Environmental concerns are also ubiquitous. Pollution damages the health of many city dwellers in South Korea, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan. Access to water plagues Mongolia, Northern China, and even Singapore. Population pressures are notable in China, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Politics.
The shaky political legitimacy of most ruling parties in Asia
is perhaps the prime domestic problem inhibiting foreign policy
initiatives. The Chinese Communist Party must rely on nationalism
and continued economic progress to keep itself in power. Koizumi
may energize the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, but he
is constrained by his party's numerous factions and by its Komeito
coalition partner whose more pacifist foreign-policy orientation
supports Article 9. The Philippine legislature and political establishment
forced the resignation of Joseph Estrada from the presidency, and
his successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, soon faced massive pro-Estrada
protests. The same phenomenon may be repeated in Indonesia. South
Korean President Kim Dae Jung, after being rebuffed by Bush's failure
to support Kim's "Sunshine Policy" with North Korea, has seen his
popularity plummet and his country's economy slow. General Pervez
Musharraf in Pakistan, who took power in a 1999 coup, faces stiff
opposition from Islamists and from a coalition of the old political
parties. Similar political weakness can be found in Bangladesh,
Burma, and Laos.
A NEGATIVE CULTURAL
ATTITUDE TOWARDS WAR
Although a general attitude towards war is not a domestic weakness, it does affect foreign policy, which in this case definitely enhances the region's security environment.
Put simply, no population in Asia has a favorable attitude towards war. This factor is frequently overlooked when U.S. officials designate parts of Asia "the most dangerous area on earth," "home of three major flashpoints," or "the likely major theater for future military operations." War has not served Asia well. As mentioned, national museums in the region have introduced World War II exhibitions, none of which glorify a struggle that killed perhaps 20 million Asians and saw the atomic bomb create a new era of warfare. Neither Korea can claim success in their war. The civil wars in Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia are not fondly remembered. Even with Vietnam, we forget that half the country lost the war and the victorious North paid the price of over a million dead. The current wars in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka seem endless, with civilians suffering most. One doesn't have to fully subscribe to the UN Charter's preamble that "wars begin in the minds of men" to accept that the cultural distaste for war does keep the minds of men off the subject.
It must be added that the United States also harbors negative attitudes towards its wars in the Asia-Pacific region as seen in U.S. films such as Apocalypse Now, The Killing Fields, Platoon, The Thin Red Line, and the forthcoming Pearl Harbor.
Finally, the United States, a major, even decisive factor in Asia's
security environment, has substantial politico-military ties throughout
Asia.
THE UBIQUITOUS UNITED
STATES
The United States is present in virtually all international relations
and disputes in the region. The Pacific Rim dominates U.S. trade.
Early reports on the strategic review and the inter-agency review
of nuclear strategy and weaponry ordered by Secretary of Defense
Donald H. Rumsfeld — both still in progress — indicate
that China will be the prime security focus in a shift to an Asian
orientation. In addition, many of Bush's advisors have an Asia-Pacific
policy background, including Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
and Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage.
Some 100,000 U.S. troops are based in Japan (48,000) and South Korea (37,000), with the rest in Guam, afloat, or on various attachments. Formal bilateral military alliances exist with the Philippines, Thailand, Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Singapore grants the U.S. Navy docking and logistics facilities. The recently approved $4 billion weapons sale to Taiwan includes eight diesel-electric submarines, four Kidd-class destroyers, and twelve P-3 patrol/anti-submarine aircraft. U.S. training with Taiwan's armed forces will increase. Bush followed his arms sale decision by saying that the United States would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself." And this was followed by the President indicating his intention to proceed as soon as possible with a multi-layered missile defense system, one that would neutralize China's current deterrent capability of less than twenty liquid-fueled DF-5 ICBMs. Such a prospect prompted China's senior arms control official, Sha Zukang, to lament that "Once the United States believes it has both a strong spear and a strong shield, it could lead them to conclude that nobody can harm the United States and they can harm anyone they like anywhere in the world."
While Sha undoubtedly overstated U.S. intentions, the United States
sees itself as the global power, responsible for essential
international stability, and willing to use its enormous military
capabilities when it deems necessary. Americans tend to forget that
the rest of the world sees the United States as the country that
in the 20th century used military force with greater frequency and
intensity than any other country. Memories of the awesome destructive
force employed by America in World War II, as well as in Korea,
Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf, remain vivid.
CONCLUSIONS
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The Asian security environment is not organized for major war.
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An aggressive China could transform the security environment into one more conducive to major war.
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Only an aggressive China could end Japanese pacifism.
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The challenge for the United States is to keep China from becoming aggressive, a foreign policy posture that China itself wants desperately to avoid.
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The United States must constrain Taiwan's policy towards the mainland and not allow Taiwan to manage Washington's policy towards Beijing.
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The challenge for China is to keep the United States from forcing China to be aggressive over Taiwan.
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Multilateral cooperation is required to contain and eventually resolve the myriad bilateral disputes in Asia that could explode out of control.
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Taking each in turn:
1. The Asian security environment is not
organized for war.
So far, widespread latent hostilities, absent a serious regional
aggressor, have prevented the region's multipolar structure from
becoming bipolar and thus organized for war. Security relations
in Asia are fragmented. In particular, China lacks allies. If Japan
is the most resented, China is the most feared as the power on the
rise and infused with enthusiastic nationalism. Erstwhile imperialist
powers, Japan and Russia, are constrained by history. All states
are economically interdependent, harbor anti-war sentiments, and
have major domestic problems, including maintaining government legitimacy.
War is not a rational foreign policy option for anyone. The strongest
power in Asia, the United States, is determined to prevent war in
the region, but if one occurs, the United States has the capability
to determine the outcome to its advantage (albeit at great cost).
Under the Powell Doctrine, there will be no more Koreas or Vietnams.
Any Asian aggressor will suffer huge losses and defeat. No state
will willingly confront the United States militarily. The United
States has the capacity to be the inhibitor of war.
2. An aggressive China could transform
the security environment to one more conducive to major war.
A Chinese attack on Taiwan, without being provoked by Taiwan's
move towards formal independence, would set in motion a dramatic
transformation of the Asian security environment. China has indicated
repeatedly that Taiwan is part of China and the issue of reunification
is of the highest priority for China's national interest of "sovereignty
and territorial integrity." Once Beijing proceeds upon the path
of forceful re-integration of Taiwan, it can not abandon the effort.
Too much national pride would be at stake. The United States would
be compelled to act in the spirit of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
which states that the security of Taiwan is a "grave concern" of
the United States and that the United States must maintain "the
capacity" to protect that island. China's effort could be checked
by a combination of U.S. actions: economic sanctions, arms transfers
to Taiwan, and even by air and sea protection. India, concerned
about China's intentions, would also move closer to the United States.
In response, China would seek allies in North Korea and Russia.
The bipolarization of Asia would begin.
3. Only an aggressive China could end Japanese
pacifism.
Japan, alarmed by China and perhaps facing a hostile Russia and
North Korea, would cement its alliance with the United States and
expand its military role. Because an aggressive China would also
worry South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore, the
hostility of these countries would shift from Japan to China. Tokyo
would find less regional opposition to becoming a "normal state"
militarily. The bipolarization of Asia would advance further.
4. The challenge for the United States
is to keep China from becoming aggressive, a foreign policy posture
that China itself wants desperately to avoid.
China, of course, has no intention of attacking Taiwan. Doing so
would create a confrontation with the United States, kill fellow
Chinese, bolster Taiwan nationalism, incur huge economic costs,
and most likely fail. Yet, Beijing has repeatedly stated that if
Taiwan does any of three "ifs" — formally declares independence,
accepts foreign troops on its soil, or indefinitely postpones negotiations
on reunification — China would use armed force to counter
such action. The climate of crisis would be exacerbated if the United
States proceeds with a national missile defense targeting China.
Any U.S. demand on China backed by the threat of military force
would appear to Beijing as nuclear blackmail, a condition it has
stated would not be tolerated as it was over the Quemoy and Matsu
confrontations in the 1950s. Thus, it is absolutely essential that
U.S. NMD not be directed at China and that an agreement preserving
China's nuclear deterrent be negotiated. Furthermore, Clinton's
policy of engagement, integration, and of making mutually beneficial
agreements with China needs to be restored to lessen the U.S.-China
rivalry. Even more important, U.S. arms sales of offensive weapons
to Taiwan, such as submarines, tend to infuriate Beijing and delude
Taipei into thinking that the United States is an ally. These arms
sales are dangerous in that they encourage those Taiwanese pressing
for independence. Taiwan, therefore, has to be the focus of U.S.
foreign policy as the key that can keep China from self-destructive
behavior.
5. The United States must constrain Taiwan's
policy towards the mainland and not allow Taiwan to manage Washington's
policy towards Beijing.
With its 200-member office in Washington and its army of paid lobbyists,
Taiwan uses a three-pronged strategy to maintain a moderate level
of hostility between the United States and China. A moderate level
of hostility encourages Taiwan's friends in Washington to continue
their support. Taiwan propagandizes about the threat from the mainland,
its human rights abuses, and lack of democracy compared to Taiwan.
Congress is Taipei's prime target. Taiwan uses the mainland threat
to win approval for U.S. arms sales and closer U.S.-Taiwan military
ties. (Taiwan ranks second to Saudi Arabia in the purchase of foreign
arms.) This courtship of America is designed as much to arouse and
direct Beijing's anger at Washington as to protect the island. Taiwan
seeks the same result by requesting visas for officials to come
to the United States, thereby creating de facto diplomatic relations
with the United States. The Bush administration granted visa requests
for President Chen Shui-bian to stopover in New York on his way
to Latin America and one for Houston on his way home. The visas
are guaranteed to bring strong protests from China. The United States
should not play this game. Cooperative U.S.-China relations would
serve to defuse the Taiwan issue. Arrogant lectures on Beijing's
sins only tend to induce China to defend its sins and arrest trends
in China towards more freedom, a growing middle class, and developing
civil action.
6. The challenge for China is to keep the
United States from forcing China to be aggressive over Taiwan.
China's national exuberance over its emerging great-power status
plays poorly in America. Its continual bluster over Taiwan and deployment
of increasing numbers of ballistic missiles opposite the island
make China seem committed to the use of military force. China's
constant propaganda over U.S. "hegemony" and unfriendly acts, such
as instantly blaming the U.S. EP-3 for the collision with its F-8,
demanding a full apology, and holding the crew for eleven days,
only serve to strengthen anti-Chinese sentiment in the United States.
China still insists the 1999 U.S. bombing of its embassy in Belgrade
was intentional, in effect accusing the U.S. government of lying.
China seems to go out of its way to appear to be hostile and uncooperative.
Its petulance at not being accorded its proper status has become
a habit. China in recent memory has not suggested cooperative ventures
with the United States, such as controlling pollution and greenhouse
gasses, or promoting water conservation. Unlike the Clinton administration
with its set policy towards China, the Bush administration has a
variable policy of returning hostility with hostility and cooperation
with cooperation. This gives Beijing an opportunity to greatly influence
Bush's foreign policy if only the Chinese would emphasize the positive.
7. Multilateral cooperation is required
to contain and eventually resolve the myriad bilateral disputes
in Asia that could explode out of control.
Russia and Japan could join the Four Party Talks on Korea. U.S.-North
Korea missile talks, put on hold by Bush, could be resumed, thereby
allowing progress between the two Koreas on cooperative relations.
Multilateral track II (non-official) talks could plot how Taiwan
and the mainland could converge their economic and political systems.
The same process could generate plans to resolve territorial disputes
in the South China Sea and between India and Pakistan over Jammu
and Kashmir. The benefits of general arms control agreements remain
unrealized, particularly on the growing naval arms race throughout
Asia where deadly submarine and anti-ship missile forces grow annually
and threaten maritime commerce. Admiral Blair's push for multilateral
initiatives in dealing with piracy, the drug trade, disaster relief,
and search and rescue could be given strong endorsements by government
leaders throughout the region. The security environment of any region
depends more on cooperative ventures than on avoiding confrontations.
Without cooperation, hardliners can always create confrontations
by insisting that the lack of cooperation from a state means that
state is an enemy. Trite it may sound, as in personal relations
where to create a friend one must be a friend, creating an environment
of mutual security requires promoting the security of others. This
notion is especially apt in a security environment so unstructured
as that of Asia.
Finally, for the sake of tranquility, it is time to put behind the hatreds of World War II.
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