Even before winning the White House, members of the future Bush administration proposed that NMD coverage be extended to America’s European allies. In October 2000, Richard Armitage, then an advisor to Gov. George W. Bush and currently No. 2 at the State Department, proposed that the program be renamed Allied Missile Defense to better reflect its new scope.
More recently, President Bush himself has stressed that NMD should also protect U.S. “friends and allies.” In March, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld quipped that he stopped using the word “national” when discussing missile defense. 1 Thus, conceptually, the Bush administration already has begun to erase the line between a strictly national system designed to protect the U.S. homeland and a wider international, multi-tiered missile defense, one clearly designed with European reservations in mind.
Even Moscow, after initially questioning the need for missile defenses, proposed to NATO in February 2001 to jointly build a missile defense system for all of Europe. The closely held proposal is vague on technical specifications, but it appears to be based on future upgrades of Russia’s successful S-300 surface-to-air missile.
At first glance, Europe appears to be a solid sales prospect for a new missile defense system. Although skeptical about NMD, European countries long have been pursuing TMD-type systems to protect their troops deployed in areas of conflict. NATO is currently accepting bids for a feasibility study designed to study the potential for an alliance-wide TMD system that could be deployed around 2010. Italy and Germany are working with the United States to build a Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) designed to guard against short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy are in consultations with the United States about building a ship-borne TMD system to protect their fleets.
From a technical standpoint, a European TMD system could perform many of the tasks for which the United States is designing NMD. Europe is much closer to the countries most likely to threaten the West with ballistic missiles, such as Iraq or Iran. A missile fired from the Middle East against Europe would follow a much shorter and shallower trajectory than one aimed at the United States. An intercept would thus have to be attempted not at 100 miles above sea level (as NMD proposes to do), but at altitudes within the reach of future TMD systems, such as MEADS, or the U.S. Army’s Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).
It follows that Europe’s future TMD systems could offer protection, albeit limited, to not only deployed forces but also static targets such as cities and ports — targets the United States now envisions as protected under an NMD system. Does that mean that, in pursuing a TMD system, the European nations have already embraced the missile defense concept embodied in NMD?
Not necessarily. European interest in shorter-range missile defense projects is driven by a different rationale — the need to protect troops deployed in areas of conflict. There is no disagreement that such protection is needed — the Iraqi Scud missile campaign against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War is just one example of the vulnerability of troops on the battlefield. A missile defense system protecting European troops would also be capable, in a limited form, of protecting cities and other civilian targets, but here the similarities with U.S. NMD proposals end. The set of considerations driving NMD efforts in the United States is much more complex — and it cannot be completely applied to Europe.
The U.S. decision to build a missile defense network rests on five assumptions:
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The ‘rogue’ states have, or soon will have, missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads capable of reaching the United States.
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There is a likelihood that these missiles will be used against the United States.
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Missile defense is a necessary, if not crucial, part of the response to this threat.
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The benefits, in security terms, of deploying missile defense will outweigh the costs associated with the demise of existing arms limitations and a possible nuclear weapons buildup in other countries.
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Missile defense is technologically possible.
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However, when applied to Europe, most European leaders would disagree – to differing degrees – with a number of these assumptions. The first question – whether countries of concern such as Iraq or Iran possess warheads and missiles with sufficient range– is perhaps the least controversial. Unlike the United States, separated from its potential enemies by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, Europe lies well within reach of relatively unsophisticated, medium-range missiles that could be fired from the Persian Gulf.
The U.K. Ministry of Defence recently concluded that “one or more of these countries” likely would acquire ballistic missiles with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, capable of reaching British territory, “well before 2030.” 2
A report by the German intelligence agency, BND, sounded an even more urgent note. The BND concluded that by 2005, Iraq would have a missile capable of reaching Berlin with a warhead capable of carrying up to 1 kilogram of anthrax. 3
But possession itself does not necessarily imply intention to use the weapons. On this second point, the United States and Europe often part company. Because of its high profile and its military and diplomatic involvement in conflicts around the world, the United States may be at a much higher risk of attack than European countries. As a recent article in the Strategic Review points out, “[European] governments do not anticipate using force anytime soon against states that already or will soon possess long-range ballistic missiles, and thus may believe they are unlikely to be targets of such strategic weapons.” 4 In fact, European governments often have active political and trade relations with countries that the United States brands ‘rogue nations.’ British oil companies are actively pursuing deals with Iran, while Italy emerged in recent years as Libya’s largest trading partner.
On the other hand, there is growing realization among European governments that if they intend to continue cooperating with the United States in NATO they may not be able to isolate themselves from the threat. “If NATO is involved,” said a European military official in Washington, DC, “Europe will be as much a target as the United States…. If the allies are not safe but the United States is, it could prevent NATO from getting involved.” 5
However, even if Europe and the United States agreed that the so-called ‘rogue countries’ have both the capability and the intention to mount a missile attack on their territory, they would likely disagree on the proper response. Allied governments in general prefer a broader approach to missile threats, involving less emphasis on missile defense and more on prevention. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in a joint communiqué with President Bush, urged a strategy that “encompasses both offensive and defensive systems, continues nuclear arms reductions where possible, and strengthens WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and missile proliferation controls and counter-proliferation measures.” 6
Similarly, in a study entitled “European Views of National Missile Defense,” the Atlantic Council of the United States pointed out that European governments “emphasize the importance of engagement rather than isolation of countries of concern,” 7 as evidenced by the business ties mentioned above.
The fourth point — the relative importance of missile defense vis-à-vis existing arms control agreements — has spawned the strongest tensions between Europe and the United States but holds little significance in the context of a European missile defense system. There is no doubt that the European allies wish to see the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty preserved. This 1972 document banned the deployment of more than one, limited missile defense system in either signatory country, the United States and the U.S.S.R. By removing the incentive to build more offensive missiles to overcome missile defenses, the ABM treaty has played a significant role in slowing down the global nuclear arms race. President Bush made it clear that he would not let the ABM treaty stand in the way of NMD deployment. In contrast, U.K. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook said that it was important that NMD does not proceed in a way which undermines the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.” 8
European allies also seem far more concerned about the response to NMD from countries such as Russia and China. French President Jacques Chirac said: “In our opinion, NMD cannot fail to re-launch the arms race in the world.” 9
But European worries about NMD’s impact on arms control agreements do not necessarily apply to a potential European missile defense system. The ABM treaty, a U.S.-Soviet agreement (with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan replacing U.S.S.R. as successors to the treaty) to which Europe is not a party, also excludes Theater Missile Defense systems as such. Thus, the deployment of a European version of NMD would have a far less destabilizing impact on nuclear stability.
Theoretically, under ideal conditions, a European missile defense system — just as NMD — could take away China’s (and possibly Russia’s) capability to retaliate for a nuclear attack. 10 However, Europe, in which only two countries possess nuclear weapons in relatively small arsenals, represents much less of an offensive threat to Moscow or Beijing than the United States, with its 5,500 nuclear warheads deployed on almost 1,000 land- and submarine-based missiles.
Finally, both the United States and Europe stand years, and possibly decades, away from deploying a fully functioning missile defense system. Theater missile defense technology, albeit further along in development than the proposed NMD components, remains largely unproven. Of the two so-called upper-tier 11 systems under development, the U.S. Army’s THAAD failed in six of eight intercept tries, and the U.S. Navy has yet to begin flight testing its proposed Theater-Wide Defense system.
To the extent that technological challenges can be overcome with sufficient resources, Europe seems even less likely to develop a working Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 12 system than the United States. The United States spent $4.2 billion dollars on missile defense development in 2000, which is more than the entire defense budget of 8 of the other 18 NATO allies. Many European allies are in the midst of costly transitions from Cold War-era stationary (territorial defense) militaries to more expeditionary-type armed forces better suited to conflicts such as the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo. At the same time, European Union integration has imposed constraints on government spending that all but rule out any near-term increases in defense spending in most European countries.
Missile defense also figures low on most European governments’ list of defense priorities. Typical of the view of many allies, Britain’s 1998 Strategic Defense Review concluded that “technologies in this area are changing rapidly and it would, at this stage, be premature to decide on acquiring such a capability.” 13 Similarly, a European military official in Washington, DC told CDI that “there is a feeling [in Europe] that we need not hurry. The technology is not there and the governments have yet to decide on what type of missile defense they want.” 14
Despite the challenges outlined above, interest in a European missile defense system persists. Besides its potential use in protecting troops, two other reasons drive BMD considerations in Europe.
There is a growing interest among European defense companies in the commercial potential of developing missile technologies. Business considerations seemed to drive recent statements by German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who in March 2001 retreated from his previously critical stance on missile defense and emphasized instead that Germany would have a “vital economic interest” in helping to develop technology for the project. Schröder added that he wanted to ensure that “we are not excluded” from the most important technological and scientific work in the defense field. 15
As an added impetus, there are fears in Europe of falling further behind the United States in military technology. Participation in developing a BMD system could strengthen domestic industrial bases in various European nations and open doors to greater technology sharing with the United States. “Our industry tells us they want to be a part of it [missile defense technology development],” said a European military official. “We hope that given how important missile defense is to the United States, there will be more willingness to enter into a partnership [with European defense companies],” he added. 16
The role of business interests was further strengthened by the recent wave of consolidation in European defense industries. The mergers are transforming the European defense industry scene from a patchwork of state-based (and often state-owned) manufacturers to a landscape completely dominated by two super-national conglomerates, BAE Systems and the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS). The two companies now have pooled their missile capabilities in an expanded Matra BAE Dynamics (MBD, formerly a joint venture between British Aerospace and French giant Lagardère Group) that is the largest missile manufacturer in Europe and a potential No. 2 in the world. MBD is developing its own version of a medium-range missile defense system, the Aster 15. Although developed as a self-defense system for naval forces, it would have potential application in protecting civilian targets. If the MBD consortium succeeds in converting its commercial dominance to political muscle, it could provide an additional push for a European BMD system.
Yet another variable in the European BMD decision is the U.S. NMD program itself. It relies on participation by at least two European countries – Denmark and the United Kingdom – that would have to approve upgrades to U.S. radar facilities on their territory. Correspondingly, a U.S. decision to deploy NMD could increase the threat to European countries participating in the program and indirectly give an additional impetus to deploying a BMD shield over their territories.
Moscow threatened in June 2000 to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty if the United States, with help from its European allies, deploys the NMD system. 17 The INF treaty bans missiles with ranges from 500 km to 5,500 km, which removed Moscow’s ability to threaten Western Europe with nuclear-armed missiles. Moscow’s hints at withdrawing from the INF thus represent a potential missile threat to Europe.
In response, the United Kingdom and Norway (also suspected by Moscow of having a role in NMD plans) 18 have publicly explored the option of seeking NMD coverage of their territories. U.K. Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon is said to have raised the possibility of coverage by NMD during his visit to Washington in January 2000. 19 Norwegian Defense Minister Sigurd Frisvold expressed similar interest in July 2000. 20
As the Atlantic Council of the United States pointed out, NMD participation, but with no actual coverage, would put the European countries in a situation of “having to rely solely on a retaliatory threat as a deterrent when the United States, for its part, would at least arguably have shown a lack of confidence in such a deterrent by deploying NMD.” 21 The solution, at least in the United Kingdom and Norway, is predictably the effort to acquire missile defense protection for themselves. While this logic would apply directly only to countries participating in NMD, it may provide impetus for other countries as well, since any European state embarking on a missile defense project will have a strong incentive to economize by advocating a continent-wide system.
Whether Europe will ever field a ballistic missile defense system remains an open question, but the contours of such a potential system are emerging. The nature and the scope of the technological challenges involved would dictate a collective approach. The most likely forum for coordinating such efforts would be NATO. The alliance remains Europe’s primary organization for common defense. Moreover, U.S. participation in NATO holds out the potential for Europe to benefit from U.S. missile technologies as a European BMD system most likely would develop from one of the planned TMD systems. Although several candidates, mentioned earlier, are in contention, NATO likely will pick a winner from among the consortia bidding for the alliance’s TMD study.
Ultimately, whether Europe embarks on building a missile defense system for the continent will be decided by the governments involved and not by pressure from the United States or Russia. The European allies themselves will have to make a determination, along the lines of the five criteria outlined earlier, whether such a system is needed and affordable. The U.S.-Russian row over NMD has had an indirect bearing on the European deliberations by moving missile defense higher on the European governments’ agenda. “The United States put the issue on the table,” said a European official in Washington, DC familiar with U.S.-European NMD talks, “but for the U.S. to ask ‘What system do you want?’ is not reasonable….The debate [about missile defense] in Europe is just beginning and not many in the European countries are ready to engage in the debate.” 22
Conversely, European deliberations are having an effect on the NMD debate in the United States itself. The Bush administration’s decision to drop ‘national’ from National Missile Defense can be directly attributed to European objections to the title as a symbol of a ‘Fortress America’ attitude. Many European governments now hope to use their influence to emphasize a wider approach to the missile proliferation threat, one focusing less on missile defense and more on political and economic tools. “Missile defense is not the problem but an answer to a [missile and WMD] proliferation problem,” said the European official. 23
It follows that the current missile defense debate in Europe and in the United States will also likely lead to the revision of the non-proliferation regime. Missile defense, by its very nature, reflects a growing belief in the United States that the regime does not work sufficiently well to remove the threat. While many European governments would agree that the system is imperfect, few are willing to abandon it and focus on missile defense instead. “It is important for Europe to stress to the United States that regimes matter,” said the European official, “but we must also acknowledge that they don’t completely solve the problem.” 24
