The composition of the nation’s military forces and how much we spend on them are, in theory, determined by the nation’s military strategy. In practice, of course, politics and campaign contributions to politicians determine more than they would in the ideal model. Nevertheless, each year the Defense Department and the individual armed services ultimately have to justify to Congress their decisions and programs in terms of the nation’s military strategy.

Currently the military goes through a major review of strategy every four years. The next “Quadrennial Defense Review” (QDR) will take place in 2001. Coinciding with the arrival of a new administration, QDR ’01 will provide a key opportunity to either substantially reshape the U.S. military or to lock old approaches and programs in place for another four years.
 

MANY POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC REVIEWS

A tradition of conducting major defense reviews has taken hold since the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately none of them have deeply revised strategy in response to the new shape of international relations, instead opting to merely cut forces — moreover, without a proportional cut in spending.

The first of the reviews took place under President Bush and came up with the “Base Force” in 1992, a cautious trimming of forces without major realignment. The newly-arrived Clinton administration conducted a “Bottom-Up Review” that was completed in 1993. Congress mandated the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, which was followed by the first Quadrennial Defense Review completed in 1997.

Despite frequent use of the military in very different ways than envisaged during the Cold War
— for peacekeeping and other humanitarian operations in areas that did not involve vital U.S. national interests — the Clinton administration did not take advantage of the major reviews to fully reorient the military. Rather, the new modes of operation were simply piled on top of the old preparations for Cold War-style “force-on-force” heavy armored air-ground battle — the high-tech major theater war scenario. The result was multiplying stories of inadequately supplied, trained, or rested units — the so-called “readiness crisis.”

The 1997 QDR was mandated in congressional legislation in response to concerns that the Administration was not retooling the military to deal with a changed world. Congress also mandated a small “National Defense Panel” (NDP) to conduct an independent review of defense strategy and to comment on the official QDR.

The panel criticized the QDR modestly for the official review’s timid approach to transformation of the military and for supporting the allocation of significant resources to the “low-probability scenario” of fighting two major wars at once. The panel noted that for some the two war construct “has become a means of justifying current forces.”

In its own review the NDP focused heavily on developing new generations of high-tech weapons, communications, and reconnaissance equipment — perhaps unsurprisingly given the strong defense contractor representation on the panel. After the National Defense Panel, Congress created another, somewhat different independent panel. The Commission on National Security/21st Century has somewhat broader membership than the strictly defense expert makeup of the NDP, and was given a mandate to look further down the road than the NDP, out to 2025.

The commission has issued two of its planned three reports: the first assessed what the future global situation and potential threats might look like; the second focused on strategy. The second report usefully identified goals for U.S. foreign policy, but unfortunately the commission’s members were unable to agree on a clear strategy to reach them. Useful emphases in the report included overcoming U.S. “ambivalence” about international institutions, giving greater autonomy and responsibility to allies, and doing a better job of bringing Russia and China into the mainstream of the international community. Although the commission provided these “ends,” it did not spell out which “means” to prioritize in order to reach those ends.
 

IMPROVING ON PAST REVIEWS

Why did all of these major official reviews fail to spark the deep restructuring that would enable the military to operate effectively in a new world? Since it is usually difficult to radically reform large organizations from the inside, the core reason for slow progress from these reviews has been insufficient leadership from the outside — the White House and Congress.

The president and his or her cabinet develop an overall national security strategy, which sets directions and theoretically integrates all the tools of security — political, economic, social as well as military components. The national security strategy, in turn, shapes the national military strategy, which focuses primarily on military tools. Unless a White House national security strategy charts a new course, it is very difficult institutionally and politically for the Defense Department to forge ahead on its own.

Without direction to do otherwise, the Defense Department in the 1997 QDR left unchallenged key assumptions such as the plan to fight two major wars at once, the extent of “forward deployment” of U.S. forces in foreign countries, the existing division of “roles and missions” among the various services, and limited reliance on allied capabilities.

The Administration did, however, indicate at the outset of the review how much the Defense Department could spend on defense. The result was a focus on preserving “service shares” of the budget — how much each service received relative to the other services — rather than open-mindedly exploring new military strategies and roles for each service to play. In the end the services wielded substantial influence over the process and managed to preserve all their major weapons programs.
 

REVIEWS IN PROSPECT

Several strategic reviews will be delivered in 2001. In February the Commission on National Security/21st Century will release its third and final report, which will focus on proposed changes in national security organizations and structure. A new QDR will be conducted in 2001; it is due to Congress by September. The armed services have been conducting preparatory work for the QDR using each service’s existing “transformation” plan to adapt how it fights. But the National Defense Panel will not be part of the process as the Senate provision reconstituting it was dropped in the House-Senate Conference on the Fiscal Year 2001 Defense Authorization Bill.

Perhaps most important will be the president’s own national security strategy. Congressional legislation calls for a national security strategy to be delivered to Congress no later than June 2001. If the new president fails to lead the Defense Department through this review, deep restructuring will likely be pushed back. If, on the other hand, he sets a new course in the national security strategy, the military may finally be able to shake its Cold War shackles.
 

CALLOUTS

QDR ’01 will either substantially reshape the U.S. military or lock in old approaches and programs for another 4 years.

Unless a national security strategy charts a new course, it is very difficult institutionally and politically for DoD to forge ahead on its own.

For Additional Information:

CDI Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 Project Home Page

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