In an earlier Defense Monitor (Volume XXIX, Issue 1, 2000), we reported on the status of the National Missile Defense program (NMD). At that time the success rate of NMD was 50%, although even the October 2, 1999 success was qualified because the “kill vehicle” first homed on the single decoy until, at the last moment, it finally detected its true target nearby.

After the kill vehicle missed the target in the January 18, 2000 test, everything was dissected if not trisected. According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), a simple blockage in a pipe carrying coolant to the warhead’s infrared heat sensors caused the January failure. This, as every high school science student knows, is a problem not of rocket science but of fluid mechanics.

The Third Intercept Test

The third intercept test, held July 7 after being delayed twice, was well oiled. Yet once again it failed. Ironically, BMDO attributes the $100,000,000 debacle to the failure of an electronic component to signal the kill vehicle to separate from the surrogate booster. Again, this is not rocket science but simple electronics. General Ronald Kadish, who heads BMDO, said that this eventuality wasn't even on his "worry list." Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), an ardent NMD supporter, pointed out during a post-test interview that rocket separation was something solved by Dr. Werner von Braun over 40 years ago.

Less well reported was another problem, this one with the target’s single Mylar balloon decoy which failed to inflate properly. Even had the kill vehicle separated as programmed and its sensors worked perfectly, test results would have been ambiguous whether or not an actual intercept occurred.

The Documents Driving NMD

Thus to date the intercept tests are one (qualified) success for three attempts, not very reliable regardless of whether the failures were high or low tech. The real question is where does NMD stand now within future U.S. military security “requirements”?

To really answer this question, it’s helpful to refer to key documents that are driving NMD development.

The first is actually a series (three to date) of schedule and technology reviews by a panel headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch. Its 1998 report described the NMD deployment schedule (then set for 2003) as a “rush to failure.” The Pentagon subsequently decided to delay deployment until 2005, which is still the target year.

The second is the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission which studied potential ballistic missile threats to the United States. The Commission's findings, widely used to justify NMD, disputed a November1995 National Intelligence Estimate that said: “No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada.” The Commission said that a threat “could emerge with little warning” and “was likely” to do so earlier than predicted.

Subsequently, the revised 2005 deployment date, based purely on anticipated technological progress, became imbedded in the threat debate even though Rumsfeld Commission members have tried to maintain distance between the two reports. For example, Commission member and former CIA director James Woolsey observed: "It is important to move out promptly, but it is less important whether a system is deployed in 2005 or 2007." Richard Garwin, a physicist and Commission member, said: "[The 2005 deadline] seems to have sprung from nowhere.” Now, with the rocket booster development eight months behind schedule plus chronic testing problems, deployment of the initial system in 2005 is becoming a very long shot.

Third is the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, especially the 77 words of the two operative paragraphs:

“It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.

“It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.”

Mr. Cohen on the Hill

Since the July 7 test, the most significant event affecting NMD has been Secretary of Defense Cohen’s July 25 appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Key points in his presentation were the timing and criteria for deployment. Mr. Cohen reaffirmed that the 2005 date was not related to threat but to the anticipated evolution of the technology. He noted that in late June (before the latest intercept failure) General Welch testified that “meeting the 2005 date remains high risk” and that, while deployment of the basic system in 2005 is feasible it is not likely.

In response to a question from Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Mr. Cohen noted that, despite the latest test failure, he would still make a recommendation to the President on whether to go ahead with initial contracts leading to site preparation next summer for a new NMD radar in the Aleutian Islands. In noting that the next test, scheduled for November or December, could help clarify technological issues, he suggested that no decision that might tie the next president into one course of action should be made this late in the current Administration. (In this regard, given that the Pentagon has not met its own criterion of two successful intercepts -- one of which must be “integrated” (intercept, kill vehicle, command-communications links) – Mr. Cohen agreed with Senator Levin’s “3-D’ approach: (continue to) develop, discuss (with allies and others), and defer (any decision).)

Beyond Technology

Mr. Cohen’s second key point, the “technologically possible,” seemed to surprise some of his listeners. He reminded the Senators that this element goes beyond “does the science work.” It also involves how allies and adversaries react.

Most critically, for the system to be “technologically reliable” even in the first phase, the U.S. must be able to upgrade early-warning radar stations located in the U.K. and Greenland and eventually “forward-deployed X-band radars.” Neither the U.K. nor Denmark (which controls Greenland foreign and defense policy) have expressed support for NMD.

“Linkage” – NMD and the ABM Treaty

Secondly, if the response of non-allies such as Russia and China is to expand their offensive arsenals to ensure they can “overwhelm a limited system, then the question becomes, is it technologically feasible to provide protection against overwhelming numbers coming in....” It is this consideration – a decision to deploy NMD uncoupled from continued emphasis on negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals – that Mr. Cohen sees as a dangerous path, one that undercuts the full intent of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act.

Moreover, Mr Cohen called attention to what can only be described as a classic chicken and egg dilemma. Mr. Cohen told the committee that although initially other NATO nations were “quite skeptical” about if not opposed to NMD, he now believes they have “a better appreciation” of the emerging threat and the system the U.S. is developing to counter the threat. (He also noted that none have formally asked to be included in NMD.) But then he conceded that unless the U.S. could “persuade our allies to stand behind us” on NMD, the Russians would not agree to any modifications to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty. At the same time, he also acknowledged that “The allies in my judgment will support NMD if there is agreement [on modifying the AMB Treaty] on the part of the Russians. But unless the allies remain behind us, then the Russians are unlikely to agree.”

According to Mr. Cohen, both the Russians and the European NATO countries believe that the ABM Treaty “has been a stabilizing factor” in U.S.-Russian relations. Neither party wants to see the Treaty fall. Russia won’t bow to U.S. pressure unless NATO presents a solid front supporting NMD, and Europe won’t support NMD unless Russia assents to the needed ABM modifications.

Domestic Politics of International Leadership

Administration officials have said that the U.S. is the “indispensable nation.” To hold such a status requires leading from strength, but a strength which persuades without domineering or driving others to unite against the leader. During the Cold War American ideals and strength were rallying points for others against a palpable threat. We still are strong as Secretary Cohen notes: “We are not defenseless in the sense that we do have a very strong line of deterrence...that is, deterrence and the threat of retaliation is [sic] real.”

If this is the reality, then the American public is entitled to a full and free exploration of the need both for NMD in general and the need for the proposed system in the anticipated time frame and at the projected cost (now nearly $60 billion according to the Congressional Budget Office). With the political conventions over and the presidential campaign picking up momentum, now is the ideal time for such a debate. Given the far reaching foreign policy and budgetary ramifications of NMD, the public must challenge the candidates to more clearly describe how they see NMD contributing to real U.S. strength and to our leadership role in the 21st century.

Call outs

Where does NMD stand now within future U.S. military security “requirements”?

The 2005 deployment date is not related to threat but to the anticipated evolution of the technology

“If we don’t have the support of our allies [for radar sites]...you will not have an effective, technologically reliable system.” -- Secretary of Defense William Cohen

“The 1999 Act...contains two policies:...to deploy...an effective system [and] to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.” -- Sen. Carl Levin

 

For more details and analysis, visit CDI's National Missile Defense page.
 

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