On November 19, 1999, the states parties to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty signed an adaptation amendment which, if ratified by all the parties, would result in a radically restructured agreement. The adapted treaty is both more flexible than the previous document and better suited to the current geopolitical situation, including NATO expansion and peacekeeping. However, as was its predecessor, the adapted treaty regime will likely be plagued by illegal Russian actions in the North Caucasus and the former Soviet Socialist Republics. Moscow views noncompliance as consistent with its security interests and therefore is willing to risk ostracism while the NATO states are deterred from punishing Russia because they are not harmed by the Russian actions.

The Original Treaty

The original CFE treaty, negotiated between March 1989-November 1990, was intended to prevent NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) from acquiring the ability to successfully conduct a surprise conventional attack. It placed overall numerical limits on heavy weapons (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces over 100mm caliber, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters – collectively called Treaty Limited Equipment or TLE) and established a framework for further reductions and confidence building measures. Because of its success in accomplishing these tasks, the CFE treaty is often described as the "cornerstone" of European Security.

The treaty specified a balance of forces at the alliance level, with the individual states parties responsible for its smooth implementation. The treaty delineated two "groups of states parties," one consisting of states parties that had signed the NATO founding documents, the other consisting of states parties that had signed the WTO founding document. Group limits provided numerical parity between the groups of states parties while zonal limits were intended to prevent a concentration of forces in central Europe. The treaty also included information exchanges and inspection regimes to support the numerical and zonal limits. These regimes were critical to the treaty, for without them, compliance with treaty obligations would have been difficult to verify.

The numerical and zonal limits, as well as the inspection regimes, were based on the assumption that states parties within each group would be allies. If that were not the case, the "balance of power"central to the treaty would be disrupted, as well as the functioning of the inspection regimes and the zonal limits. Fearing such a situation, the Russian Federation threatened to withdraw from the treaty when NATO expanded.

The Adapted Treaty

The adapted treaty addresses the issue of NATO expansion by dispensing with the groups of states parties and replacing them with individual national and territorial limits. The national limits cap the amount of TLE a state party has, while the territorial limits cap the amount of TLE stationed on a state party's territory. The inspection regimes were also rewritten to reflect the new treaty structure. While the revised treaty was primarily intended to accommodate the changes introduced by NATO expansion, it also attempted to resolve long standing issues of Russian noncompliance with flank limits and the stationing of Russian troops abroad without host state consent.

The issue of noncompliance with flank limits originated in the early nineties. The original CFE treaty, as an aspect of the zonal limits, created "flank zones." In these "flank zones," each group of states parties could station 4,700 battle tanks, 5,900 armored combat vehicles, and 6,000 artillery pieces. These limits were intended to prevent attacks along the two secondary fronts of any European conflict: Norway in the north and Southern Europe and Turkey in the south.

The USSR was the only nation whose territory straddled the flank zones and was therefore uniquely constrained by the limits. The TLE stationed in the Leningrad, Odessa, North Caucasus and Transcaucasus military districts (MDs) counted towards the WTO flank limits as well as the overall group of states parties limit, while the TLE stationed in the rest of the European USSR only counted towards the later. Because these MDs were not on the Cold War front lines, the USSR left most of the flank TLE entitlements to its WTO allies. When the WTO collapsed and the USSR crumbled, the North Caucasus became Russia's southern border. Furthermore, Russia was required to divide its flank entitlements with the other Soviet successor states in the flank zone – Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. As a result, the Russian Federation emerged with flank entitlements for 1300 battle tanks, 1380 armored combat vehicles, and 1,680 pieces of artillery.

These entitlements may seem large, but they must be considered within the context of what Russia considers to be its security requirements. Russia views local wars and unrest near its borders as a primary security concern. Before the first Chechen War in 1994, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated that Russia's interests in the North Caucasus region required 1,100 battle tanks, 3,000 ACVs, and 2,100 artillery pieces. The conflict in Chechnya, of course, only increased the material requirements of the region further.

It became clear that Russia would exceed the flank limits when they came into force in November, 1995. The NATO states were unwilling to jeopardize the CFE treaty by declaring Russia noncompliant. Instead, they negotiated an agreement resolving the issue in time for the first review conference in May, 1996. The Final Act of the First Review Conference removed several administrative districts of the North Caucasus MD and the Pskov Oblast in the Leningrad MD (on the north) from the flank zones, adding them to the next innermost sub-zone. It established an overall limit on ground-based TLE in the old flank zones, with explicit limits on deployment in the zones other than the new "reduced" flank zone. Russia was permitted to station 1,897 battle tanks, 4,397 ACVs, and 2,422 pieces of artillery within the old zone until May 1999, and 1,800 battle tanks, 3,700 ACVs, and 2,400 artillery pieces thereafter.

Even so, Russia continued to violate the flank limits. One provision of the CFE adaptation amendment raised the TLE limits in the reduced zone to 1,300 battle tanks, 2,140 ACVs, and 1,680 artillery pieces and eliminated the limits in the original flank zone. Russia, in exchange, would cede the right to increase the number of ACVs stationed in the reduced zone through temporary deployments.

 
The Treaty Today

In general, the West has been willing to tolerate Russian noncompliance with the flank regime because Russian compliance with other aspects of the treaty has been very good. Russia has consistently complied with its overall numerical limits and the requirements of the inspection and information regimes. Therefore, it has not been a threat to the NATO states parties, though its buildup in the flank region could be interpreted as a threat to the security of the smaller, non-NATO states along its borders.

For its part Russia has been willing to risk possible NATO condemnation and sanctions (such as the cessation of economic aid). For example, it continues to station troops in states which have not given their consent. Like flank limits, the issue of state consent has persisted since the mid-nineties. In 1994, the Russian Federation agreed to withdraw its troops from Moldova, but never did so. Similarly, Moscow concluded a treaty with Georgia in 1995 giving it access to three bases in Georgia, but the treaty was never ratified by the Georgian parliament. Russian troops, however, remained in Georgia.

The CFE adaptation agreement addresses this issue. It states that troops may only be stationed on the territory of another state "in conformity with international law, the explicit consent of the host State Party, or a relevant resolution of the United Nations Security Council.".¹ This represents the first attempt by the states parties to use the CFE regime as a mechanism for resolving these disputes.

Moscow, however, considers the stationing of troops in the "near abroad" essential to its own security. It views the Transcaucasus as a potential buffer zone, one that would prevent Islamic fundamentalist movements and other separatist influences from spreading into its North Caucasus republics. Russia's National Security Blueprint, promulgated in 1997, links the prevention of disorder in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) member states to the prevention of "centrifugal phenomena within Russia itself."² Through military and economic agreements within the framework of the CIS, Moscow hopes to increase its control over the Transcaucasian republics.

Another source of intransigence is Russia's perception of its international status. Russia believes that efforts to force its troops out of the near abroad are disguised attempts to weaken Russia as a great power. Therefore, Russia will likely resist any Western attempts to enforce the treaty's language. In particular, the Russians will exploit the ambiguity of the "host state consent" provision by extorting the "consent" of its smaller neighbors.

The ability of the Russians to ignore treaty restrictions is largely a result of the inappropriateness of the CFE document as a method of limiting Russia's actions within its own territory and near abroad. The CFE treaty relies for its effectiveness on the desire of nations not to be seen as violating its norms as well as on the willingness of other nations to enforce its provisions. As long as Russia considers its actions consistent with its national security requirements, it will be unconcerned with strict adherence to the treaty provisions. While concerted NATO pressure might cause Russia to reconsider its actions, the NATO nations seem more interested in keeping Russia a party to the CFE treaty than in protecting the sovereignty and security of the states in the Russian near abroad. Therefore they will be unwilling to pressure Russia to comply with the treaty restrictions.

Footnotes:
 

CDI European Defense Home Page.

CDI Caucasus Conflicts Home Page.

CDI Russia Weekly Home Page.

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