

THE DEFENSE MONITOR



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Montenegro: Looking War In The Face

Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst

FEW OTHER PLACES IN THE world seem as close to war as Montenegro, Serbia's smaller partner in the all-but defunct Yugoslav Federation. Montenegro is poised to clash with troops carrying the federal flag of Yugoslavia but in reality serving only the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic. The two republics fell out over the nature of the political system: Serbia's government is turning increasingly dictatorial and autocratic while Montenegro is a fledgling democracy. Unlike all previous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, ethnic differences — which in the case of Serbia and Montenegro are blurry to the point of nonexistent — do not play a major role.

Montenegro's fight with the authorities in Belgrade began in 1996-97 when its current president, then-Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic broke ranks with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, accusing him of driving the country into international isolation and an economic crisis. Djukanovic initially hoped to challenge Milosevic for leadership of Yugoslavia. In 1996, Yugoslavia was the scene of massive opposition protests triggered by allegations of election fraud. Only after the opposition's bid to topple Milosevic failed did Djukanovic successfully run for president in Montenegro, settling for governing this small republic on the Adriatic coast rather than all of Yugoslavia.

Since winning Montenegro's presidency in 1997, Djukanovic has set out

to rebuild the country's prosperity (by opening it to tourism and encouraging foreign investment) and to integrate Montenegro into the European Union. His pro-Western course and focus on economic reconstruction won him the

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sympathy of both Montenegrins and Serbs tired of a decade of disastrous nationalist wars. Montenegro today stands in stark contrast to Milosevic's Serbia, which remains under economic sanctions and is ostracized by most countries of the world for the dictatorial nature of its political system and for its role in wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

The economic and political reforms introduced by the Djukanovic government have strained the ties between Montenegro and Yugoslavia to the

breaking point. Montenegro today is a part of the Yugoslav federation only on paper. It has not only its own government but also currency (the German mark) and a security force of 20,000. For over a year, Montenegro has all but ignored Yugoslav laws — it stopped requiring Yugoslav visas to enter the country and it sheltered journalists and politicians persecuted in Serbia.

In retaliation, Serbia has imposed a blockade on the transport of goods in and out of Montenegro. It also stopped the flow of funds between the two states, cutting off those in Montenegro who relied on pensions from the federal government. More recently, the Serbian-controlled Federal Parliament passed constitutional changes that dramatically weaken Montenegro's role in federal administration. The passage of these amendments prompted President Djukanovic to declare that Yugoslavia no longer exists.

Montenegro's leaders have resisted the temptation to declare outright independence lest they provoke a war with unforeseeable consequences.

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QUESTION:

By 2004, Russia says it will cut its conventional armed forces by how many troops?

for answers see page 5

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Serbia still has 14,000 troops of the Yugoslav Second Army in the republic, augmented by a further 1,100 members of a police battalion.

Thousands more troops wait in Serbia itself. Moreover, Djukanovic is not assured of the total loyalty of all of Montenegro's population. Even though the President remains popular, the pro-Yugoslav opposition made gains in recent local elections. Large parts of the population, especially on the border with Serbia, remain adamantly opposed to independence for Montenegro. A war would be nothing short of devastating and could leave Montenegro without much of the territory it now controls.

September Elections: Breaking Point For Yugoslavia?

The September 24 federal and presidential elections could bring the cold war between Serbia and Montenegro to a fiery end. Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic is running for another term. Although he lags far behind the opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, in pre-election polls, Milosevic's control over the media and police could help him engineer another victory. For Montenegro, the prospect of another presidential term by Slobodan Milosevic is proving too much to bear. Montenegro has essentially given the Serbs an ultimatum: remove Milosevic in September or lose the last partner in the dying federation. President Djukanovic warned that the more uncertain the beginning of democratic change in Serbia, the more the people of Montenegro will favor independence. Lest the point be lost on Serbian voters, Montenegro's Prime Minister, Filip

Vujanovic, elaborated. It is certain that the citizens of Montenegro will opt for an independent Montenegro if Slobodan Milosevic wins the September elections.

Would Milosevic fight to keep Montenegro in the federation? Past experience from Kosovo, Croatia, and Bosnia would suggest yes but it may not be a clear choice. Serbia's differences with the republic are political, not ethnic, as in all previous conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. In fact, ethnic distinctions in Montenegro are rather blurry. Most Montenegrins still belong

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to the Serbian Orthodox Church, although a Montenegro branch of the church has been revived and is gaining strength. The Djukanovic government has refrained from using ethnicity to define Montenegro's national identity. Popular movements — such as the renaissance of the Montenegro Orthodox Church — may foster a strong sense of separate ethnicity in the future but ethnic issues play a secondary role today.

Montenegro also lacks an organization with the zeal and tactics of the Kosovo Liberation Army whose attacks on Serbian security forces in 1997-98 precipitated the Yugoslav

army's crackdown on Kosovo. Nor does Montenegro have any besieged national minorities in need of defense. When in 1991 the Yugoslav army (mostly Serbian but with Montenegro troops as well) clashed with Croatian forces, it claimed to have acted on behalf of Serbian minorities in Croatia. In Bosnia, armed ethnic Serbs living in the republic actually did most of the fighting themselves. Montenegro has its share of the Serbian population as well as many Montenegrins who feel more loyalty to the Belgrade government than to the one in Podgorica, Montenegro's capital. But mostly because of the political, non-ethnic nature of the Serbia-Montenegro dispute, there have been no neighbor-against-neighbor violent outbursts such as were seen in Bosnia and Kosovo.

It is possible that Milosevic will need a war — any war — to give himself a pretext for breaking up opposition protests after the September 24 vote, or to prevent voting altogether should he expect an unwanted outcome. The Kosovo war and especially NATO's air attacks silenced the regime's critics better than any police or censor ever could have. But again, there are differences. Serbs genuinely felt under siege in Kosovo, where the culturally foreign Albanian majority displaced Serbs from some of Serbia's most treasured religious and historic locations. The sense of endangerment, in turn, fed a wave of nationalism in Serbia. NATO attacks fueled this nationalist sentiment. But no such links exist in Montenegro — no ethnic minority under siege, no orthodox churches being toppled. A war there will not garner as much popular support for the government as Kosovo did.

The military's support for a war in Montenegro is also in question. Milosevic recently replaced old hands

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in the Yugoslav (now essentially Serbian) army with cadres hardened in the Kosovo war to assure the military's loyalty. That may guarantee the officers' allegiance but will the ordinary troops fight? If Milosevic mo-

*Inaction would kill
Montenegro's reform process
and endanger its leaders.*

bilizes reservists already tired of a decade of wars and increasingly hostile to Serbia's ruling circles, he risks unleashing forces that might eventually topple him. Polls conducted by the Yugoslav army claim that over 90% of troops in Montenegro said they would fight for Yugoslavia's sovereignty. But surveys conducted in the atmosphere of fear and intimidation prevalent in today's Serbia can hardly be objective, and the very fact that the military leadership felt the need to conduct such a poll indicates its uncertainty about the troops' loyalty. In August, the Yugoslav army sacked three of its pilots in Montenegro, accusing them of plotting to turn over an army airport to Montenegro's security forces.

U.S. Choices In Montenegro

As the old adage goes, the job of the military is to prepare for the worst and hope for the best. In the case of Montenegro, a conflict with Serbia is clearly possible, although not preordained. What can the United States and the rest of the international community do to prevent the conflict? Should the

United States and its allies act to shield Montenegro from violence?

Inaction would kill Montenegro's reform process and endanger its leaders. It would allow Serbia to punish Montenegro for pursuing every ideal the United States holds dear. Montenegro is not without faults — most notably corruption — but unlike Serbia, it has free press, its politicians can disagree with government without fear of persecution, and it has mended fences and pursued friendly relations with its neighbors.

Unlike Kosovo, Montenegro is a republic and the United Nations has recognized the right of Yugoslav republics to secede from the federation. Four of them have already exercised that right with UN approval and assistance. A UN-sponsored intervention in Montenegro would stand on firm legal ground even though it would raise concerns about the deepening U.S. commitment to the Balkans. However, Montenegro is the last republic still in partnership with Serbia, and if it can be shielded from violence, it would leave Serbia isolated.

On the other hand, a forceful entry of U.S. and other Western forces into the Montenegro conflict would create a nationalist backlash in Serbia, thus solidifying Slobodan Milosevic's position and prolonging Serbia's agony. Moreover, international intervention may be powerless to reverse Serbian advances in Montenegro.

Ideally, outside assistance would deter a Serbian attack altogether, possibly through a preventive troop deployment. From 1995 to 1999, a relatively modest UN peacekeeping force of about 1,000 helped Macedonia become the only former Yugoslav republic to secede without an armed conflict. CDI called for a preventive mission for Montenegro shortly after the

end of the NATO air war against Yugoslavia in summer 1999. However, the chances for a successful preventive mission have dimmed considerably since then. Belgrade could — and almost certainly would — use the Yugoslav army to foil such a deployment. Since Yugoslav troops are already deployed in Montenegro, they could quickly gain control of ports and airports that are not already in their hands.

There is virtually no hope of catching the Yugoslav troops off guard. Unlike in 1999, neither the United States nor any other nation has sufficient strike forces in the area. It is doubtful that many of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Kosovo could be relieved of duties there without destabilizing their areas of operation (see graphic for information on U.S. forces in the Balkans). The deployment

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would take months to organize, giving Milosevic ample warning of upcoming military action and a chance to preempt it by stirring up trouble in Montenegro. If Serbian troops seize Montenegro's ports and airports and deploy on the border, U.S. and allied

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troops would be left to fight their way in from the Adriatic Sea and by land from Kosovo, Croatia, Albania, or Bosnia. A Serbian preemptive move would change the operation from a preventive deployment to a military

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intervention, rendering it unpalatable to political leaders in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.

In another scenario, Yugoslav troops might move against Montenegro's authorities to prevent the republic's secession from the federation. They may have been trying to do just that in March 2000, when Yugoslav troops seized the Podgorica airport shortly before President Djukanovic was scheduled to land there. The pilot avoided the trap by diverting to another airport. Serbia may in the future attempt to take over key government buildings in Podgorica and arrest the republic's leadership. Since the United States and its allies do not have sufficient forces in the region for a ground operation, their only immediate option would be air strikes. It is doubtful that any strikes from the air could come in time to stop a Serbian advance on



Montenegro government installations.

The final scenario — arguably the least likely one in the near future — is the outbreak of civil war in Montenegro. Its population, although divided on the issue of Montenegro's independence, is not nearly as polarized as in Kosovo or Bosnia. Nor are ethnic cleavages as clear and hostile as elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. However, if armed (which many in Montenegro have always been) and manipulated by Belgrade's propaganda, people of the border areas could try to thwart Montenegro's independence bid, especially if incited by the Serbian forces in the republic. Montenegro's government repeatedly alleged that the Yugoslav Seventh Military Police Battalion, recently established in Montenegro, is merely a cover for pro-

Belgrade paramilitary forces, who are ready to plunge the republic into violence on Milosevic's cue.

Again, NATO allies could do nothing, resort to air strikes and naval gunfire, or intervene on the ground. As Kosovo demonstrated, air strikes and cruise missiles alone cannot stop violence on the ground. They could be more effective in Montenegro if combined with ground operations by Montenegro's forces, which in Kosovo, for all practical purposes, never happened. A similar combination of Western air support and successful ground operations forced the Bosnian Serbs to lay down their weapons in 1995 (the Bosnian Serbs also began losing ground to combined Croat-Muslim forces). However, peace

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in Bosnia would not have come without Belgrade's pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to stop fighting and start negotiating. This time, Yugoslavia is more likely to unleash its full force against Montenegro. If so — and if the troops obey orders — Montenegro's population and security forces would find themselves outgunned and overwhelmed, with or without NATO air support. U.S. and allied ground forces could help stop a Serbian advance but, as noted above, any plans to assemble forces are likely to be complicated by a Serbian preemptive move against Montenegro.

Western powers could try to force Serbia to withdraw its forces by bombing Serbia itself. At this point — with Slobodan Milosevic's regime turning increasingly dictatorial and thus less responsive to public pressure — the bombing would be unlikely to force Belgrade to change course. It would, however, serve as a pretext for a crackdown on the remaining opposition in Yugoslavia and solidify Milosevic's position. In essence, the West would condemn the Serbs to more years of economic misery and increased political repression in exchange for a most likely doomed effort to stop the Serb aggression.

Conclusions and Recommendations

If Montenegro declares independence, a quick recognition by the United States would help facilitate international assistance to the republic and allow it to appeal for help to the United Nations.

Serbia may try to separate territories sympathetic to Belgrade from the Podgorica government using the local

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population and Yugoslav forces already in the republic. Montenegro's forces would find it very difficult to reverse such a result without massive bloodshed and the risk of provoking all-out intervention from Yugoslavia. More likely, the government would acquiesce in Belgrade's control over those territories. While a visible presence of U.S. and allied military forces near Montenegro may not completely deter Serbian forces, it could make a strike against Montenegro less appealing to the government of Slobodan Milosevic.

In the event of an attempted takeover by the Yugoslav army, the burden of fighting will be borne by Montenegro itself. Belgrade's troops would benefit from the element of surprise and could quickly move against government facilities. Unless the Yugoslav army implodes or Montenegro's forces resist far beyond what can be expected of a lightly armed force of 20,000, nothing short of a ground invasion is likely to prevent a Serbian victory. To prevent such an all-or-nothing outcome, the United States should:

- Initiate a UN Security Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Montenegro and have contingency plans ready should Serbia fail to meet UN conditions.
- Strengthen U.S. naval presence off the coast of Montenegro. As of September 13, there were no U.S. ships in the Adriatic (although an amphibious assault ship with a Marine Expeditionary unit was to arrive shortly), and only one British Royal Navy carrier. However, no U.S. aircraft carriers are in the Adriatic or nearby seas.
- To allow for a quick response, an aircraft carrier group should be moved into the Adriatic, and allied aircraft in and around the Balkans should be alerted for possible air operations over Montenegro.
- Under a UN mandate, endorse a no-fly zone over Montenegro to prevent the Yugoslav military from using airspace to attack government targets in the republic and to prevent air transport of Serb troops and equipment. Montenegro does not have an air force and would be powerless to stop Serb air operations.

Above all, the United States must be realistic about its options should Serbia invade Montenegro. Serbian forces outnumber Montenegro's by as much as six to one, and only a significant commitment of U.S. or other allied ground forces, under a UN mandate, could even begin to reverse the situation. ■

ANSWER:
350,000, to 850,000 total.
By contrast, last year
U.S. service chiefs
called for increases in the
active duty ranks.

A New U.S. Nuclear Weapon?

Rear Admiral Eugene Carroll, Jr. USN (Ret.)

A NUMBER OF SOURCES ARE now generating arguments in favor of the United States developing a new low-yield nuclear weapon with earth penetrating capability. As always in nuclear matters, there is more going on in the Pentagon, Congress, White House, and U.S. nuclear laboratories than is revealed in this rather bland proposal for one new nuclear weapon design. An extract from a commentary which appeared in the Los Angeles Times on July 14 provides some context.

The U.S. Senate is preparing to take a major step to abandon all pretense that U.S. nuclear forces exist only to deter war. An amendment to the pending Defense Authorization Act for 2001 would lead to the development of a new nuclear weapon designed expressly for fighting.

The new weapon is to be a low-yield device with earth penetration capability, intended to destroy deeply buried bunkers. Paul Robinson, Director of Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, NM, which would build the device, is a strong advocate of it. Robinson apparently favors a new, low-yield device because U.S. leaders presumably would be more ready to employ smaller weapons than to use the larger city- and silo-busting high-yield weapons in our current arsenal. He considers large weapons self-detering

Not only is the Senate's action a throw-back to those unlamented days of preparing to prevail in nuclear war, but it also is a flagrant repudiation of a solemn pledge the United States made in May at the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York. We joined with Britain, France,

China and Russia in a commitment to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament. . . .

Regrettably, this action is merely one more blatant signal that the United States is determined to pursue nuclear dominance indefinitely through enhanced readiness to fight a nuclear war. Additional preparations include the decision to resume production of tritium and plutonium pits for thermonuclear weapons, continued subcritical explosive testing in Nevada, and rejection of Russian proposals to reduce nuclear numbers 75% below START II levels. The thinking behind all of this was revealed by then Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre when he said in March: Nuclear weapons are still the foundation of a superpower...and that will never change .

It is the conflict between the true believers in U.S. nuclear supremacy and America's obligation to work for nuclear disarmament that should stimulate resistance to producing a

new, more usable nuclear weapon. The low yield strategy must be blocked or our nation will affirm its adherence to a nuclear warfighting doctrine and thereby weaken the entire global non-proliferation regime. A new weapon design would also strengthen the voices of those in our nuclear laboratories who continue to agitate for resumption of explosive nuclear testing.

In short, design and production of a new warfighting weapon would weaken every element of restraint embodied in current restrictions on U.S. nuclear programs. At the same time, coupled with U.S. failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and plans to deploy a National Missile Defense system, it would send a clear signal to the world that America is actively preparing for nuclear war. This signal might well ignite a new nuclear arms race and end non-proliferation efforts globally. Far from increasing national security, a new weapon would imperil the safety of all Americans. ■

••••• THE NEXT SPACE RACE •••••

Pursuing a vision of U.S. "control and dominance" in outer space, the United States military is developing technologies to make outer space the battlefield of the future. Meanwhile, the international community is working to ensure that outer space is used only for peaceful purposes and prevent a war in the heavens. In a race to the ultimate high ground, who will get there first?

Featured guests are: Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH); John Pike, Director Space Policy Project, Federation of American Scientists; Sen. Bob Smith (R-NH); and He Yafei, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Washington, DC.

This informative 30 minute video (Show #1351) is now available from CDI for \$39 or, if ordering via the Internet, for \$29. Order at 800-CDI-3334, or on the web at <http://www.cdi.org/adm/1351>.

Visit *America's Defense Monitor* WEBSITE at <http://www.cdi.org/adm/1351> for transcripts, CDI resources, RealVideo, and related links.

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

As the debate in the United States on the planned deployment of the national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information is releasing a timely *Issue Brief*, National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?

Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. CDI's *Issue Brief* offers unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate within following sections:

Why Should You/We Care?

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vice-President of CDI

Technological Challenges in National Missile Defense

The Ballistic Missile Threat: A Brief History of Missiles and Missile Defense

Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs
Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research

The Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense

Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst

The Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear Security

Dr. Bruce G. Blair, President of CDI

The Impact of NMD On Asia

Dr. Nicholas Berry, Senior Analyst

Europe's Role in National Missile Defense

Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst

In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the national missile defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.

CDI has also just produced a Film Documentary on missile defense, *Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?* A transcript of the film is available on the Web.

To get your copy of the Issue Brief, send a check for \$5 to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036. Please write NMD Issue Brief on the check. For the Film Documentary, send \$19 to the same address, specifying NMD Film. Or get BOTH for \$15. ■

WHAT "DEPLOYMENT" MEANS FOR NMD

ON SEPTEMBER 8, PHILIP COYLE, Director of the Pentagon's Office of Operational Test and Evaluation, testified about the status of the National Missile Defense (NMD) program before the National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations Subcommittee of the House Government Reform Committee.


Near the end of his opening statement, Mr. Coyle enumerated the capabilities and breadth of activities associated with deployment of an effective NMD system – points that any administration ought to fully understand before making a commitment to field NMD.

"Deployment means the fielding of an operational system with some military utility, which is effective under realistic combat conditions against realistic threats and countermeasures, possibly without adequate prior knowledge

of the target cluster composition, timing, trajectory or direction, and one operated by military personnel at all times of the day or night and in all weather."

In other words, to be considered a successful development, NMD must demonstrate that it can reliably perform hit-to-kill collisions [NMD has hit a target only once in three attempts to date], reliably perform hit-to-kill as an integrated weapons system [employing its designed interceptor-booster, radars, sensors, communications, and battle management suite], and reliably perform hit-to-kill against realistic targets employing realistic countermeasures.

As Mr. Coyle observed immediately after giving his definition of deployment, "Such a capability has yet to be shown practicable for NMD." ■



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