


THE DEFENSE MONITOR



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NMD Update: The Real World Intrudes

Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

IN AN EARLIER *DEFENSE MONITOR* (Volume XXIX, Issue 1, 2000), we reported on the status of the National Missile Defense program (NMD). At that time the success rate of NMD was 50%, although even the October 2, 1999 success was qualified because the kill vehicle first homed on the single decoy until, at the last moment, it finally detected its true target nearby.

After the kill vehicle missed the target in the January 18, 2000 test, everything was dissected if not trisected. According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), a simple blockage in a pipe carrying coolant to the warhead's infrared heat sensors caused the January failure. This, as every high school science student knows, is a problem not of rocket science but of fluid mechanics.

The Third Intercept Test

The third intercept test, held July 7 after being delayed twice, was well oiled. Yet once again it failed. Ironically, BMDO attributes the \$100,000,000 debacle to the failure of an electronic component to signal the kill vehicle to separate from the surrogate booster. Again, this is not rocket science but simple electronics. General Ronald Kadish, who heads BMDO, said that this eventuality wasn't even on his worry list. Rep-

*Where does NMD stand
now within future
U.S. military security
requirements?*

resentative Curt Weldon (R-PA), an ardent NMD supporter, pointed out during a post-test interview that rocket separation was something solved by Dr. Werner von Braun over 40 years ago.

Less well reported was another problem, this one with the target's single Mylar balloon decoy which failed to inflate properly. Even had the kill vehicle separated as programmed and its sensors worked perfectly, test results would have been ambiguous whether or not an actual intercept occurred.

The Documents Driving NMD

Thus to date the intercept tests are one (qualified) success for three attempts, not very reliable regardless of whether the failures were high or low tech. The real question is where does NMD stand now within future U.S. military security requirements?

To really answer this question, it's helpful to refer to key documents that are driving NMD development.

The first is actually a series (three to date) of schedule and technology reviews by a panel headed by former Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch. Its 1998 report described the NMD deployment schedule (then set for 2003) as a rush to failure. The Pentagon subsequently decided to delay deployment until 2005, which is still the target year.

The second is the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission which studied potential ballistic missile threats to the United States. The Commission's findings, widely used to justify NMD, disputed a November 1995 National Intelligence Estimate that said: No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states or Canada. The Commission said that a threat could emerge with

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QUESTION:

How much will it cost to implement the G-8 pledge to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria worldwide?

for answers see page 7

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little warning and was likely to do so earlier than predicted.

Subsequently, the revised 2005 deployment date, based purely on anticipated technological progress, became imbedded in the threat debate even though Rumsfeld Commission members have tried to maintain distance between the two reports. For example, Commission member and former CIA director James Woolsey observed: It is important to move out promptly, but it is less important whether a system is deployed in 2005 or 2007. Richard Garwin, a physicist and Commission member, said: [The 2005 deadline] seems to have sprung from nowhere. Now, with the rocket booster development eight months behind schedule plus chronic testing problems, deployment of the initial system in 2005 is becoming a very long shot.

Third is the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, especially the 77 words of the two operative paragraphs:

It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate) with funding subject to the annual authorization of appropriations and the annual appropriation of funds for National Missile Defense.

It is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces.

If we don't have the support of our allies [for radar sites]...you will not have an effective, technologically reliable system.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen

Mr. Cohen on the Hill

Since the July 7 test, the most significant event affecting NMD has been Secretary of Defense Cohen's July 25 appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Key points in his presentation were the timing and criteria for deployment. Mr. Cohen reaffirmed that the 2005 date was not related to threat but to the anticipated evolution of the technology. He noted that in late June (before the latest intercept failure) General Welch testified that meeting the 2005 date remains high risk and that, while deployment of the basic system in 2005 is feasible it is not likely.

In response to a question from Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Mr. Cohen noted that, despite the latest test failure, he would still make a recommendation to the President on whether to go ahead with initial contracts leading to site preparation next summer for a new NMD radar in the Aleutian Islands. In noting that the next test, scheduled for November or December, could help clarify technological issues, he suggested that no decision that might tie the next president into

one course of action should be made this late in the current Administration. (In this regard, given that the Pentagon has not met its own criterion of two successful intercepts — one of which must be integrated (intercept, kill vehicle, command-communications links) — Mr. Cohen agreed with Senator Levin's 3-D approach: (continue to) develop, discuss (with allies and others), and defer (any decision).)

Beyond Technology

Mr. Cohen's second key point, the technologically possible, seemed to surprise some of his listeners. He reminded the Senators that this element goes beyond does the science work. It also involves how allies and adversaries react.

Most critically, for the system to be technologically reliable even in the first phase, the U.S. must be able to upgrade early-warning radar stations located in the U.K. and Greenland and eventually forward-deployed X-band radars. Neither the U.K. nor Denmark (which controls Greenland's foreign and defense policy) have expressed support for NMD.

"Linkage" – NMD and the ABM Treaty

Secondly, if the response of non-allies such as Russia and China is to expand their offensive arsenals to ensure they can overwhelm a limited system, then the question becomes, is it technologically feasible to provide protection against overwhelming numbers coming in.... It is this consideration — a decision to deploy NMD uncoupled from continued emphasis on negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals — that

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Mr. Cohen sees as a dangerous path, one that undercuts the full intent of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act.

Moreover, Mr. Cohen called attention to what can only be described as a classic chicken and egg dilemma. Mr. Cohen told the committee that although initially other NATO nations were quite skeptical about if not opposed to NMD, he now believes they have a better appreciation of the emerging threat and the system the U.S. is developing to counter the threat. (He also noted that none have formally asked to be included in NMD.) But then he conceded that unless the U.S. could persuade our allies to stand behind us on NMD, the Russians would not agree to any modifications to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. At the same time, he also acknowledged that the allies in my judgment will support NMD if there is agreement [on modifying the AMB Treaty] on the part of the Russians. But unless the allies remain behind us, then the Russians are unlikely to agree.

According to Mr. Cohen, both the Russians and the European NATO countries believe that the ABM Treaty has been a stabilizing factor in U.S.-Russian relations. Neither party wants to see the Treaty fall. Russia won't bow to U.S. pressure unless NATO presents a solid front supporting NMD, and Europe won't support NMD unless Russia assents to the needed ABM modifications.

Domestic Politics of International Leadership

Administration officials have said that the U.S. is the indispensable nation. To hold such a status requires leading

from strength, but a strength which persuades without domineering or driving others to unite against the leader. During the Cold War American ideals and strength were rallying points for others against a palpable threat. We still are strong as Secretary Cohen notes: We are not defenseless in the sense that we do have a very strong line of deterrence...that is, deterrence and the threat of retaliation is [sic] real.

If this is the reality, then the American public is entitled to a full and free

*The 1999 Act...contains
two policies:...to
deploy...an effective system
[and] to seek continued
negotiated reductions in
Russian nuclear forces.*

Sen. Carl Levin

exploration of the need both for NMD in general and the need for the proposed system in the anticipated time frame and at the projected cost (now nearly \$60 billion according to the Congressional Budget Office). With the political conventions over and the presidential campaign picking up momentum, now is the ideal time for such a debate. Given the far reaching foreign policy and budgetary ramifications of NMD, the public must challenge the candidates to more clearly describe how they see NMD contributing to real U.S. strength and to our leadership role in the 21st century. ■

Congress Tells the President: Delay NMD Decision

On July 25, sixty-one members of the House of Representatives wrote a letter to President Clinton urging him to "defer the decision to deploy" any NMD system. Citing the Administration's four criteria for deployment – threat, cost, technological maturity, and arms control – the Members argued that to opt to deploy a system that has not been "demonstrated to work" and "undermines our security by provoking arms races around the globe...would be a dangerous liability."

The next day thirty-one Senators sent a similar letter to the President. They noted that the July 7 test failure "demonstrates that it is too early to know whether deploying a cost-effective NMD system will be possible in the near future and whether it will provide real protection" against identified and potential threats. As with their House counterparts, the Senators said that they feared that "a decision to deploy would imperil, not improve" national security.

Where Have All the Rogues Gone?

Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.)

WORDS ARE IMPORTANT. Spoken or heard, they reflect and affect our thoughts by the specific meanings they carry, the concepts they suggest, and the emotions they touch. Their influence on the human psyche, and therefore on our actions, is enormous.

That's why the State Department's July 19 announcement that henceforth rogue states will be called states of concern is a potential springboard for resolving long-standing but now anachronistic disputes with other nations.

From Whence Came the Rogues?

It really hasn't been that many years since rogue became linked with nations or states in the parlance of international relations and national politics. In 1991, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell observed, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung. He did not use the term rogue, with its connotation of being irrational or out of control, but he did name the men who were in charge of the two third world countries the U.S. most loved to hate."

When rogue became synonymous with a leader or country implacably opposed to U.S. interests, it was neither Castro nor Kim who set the standard but Saddam Hussein. This change occurred in the post-Desert Storm 1990s when nations like Iraq that supported terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction took center stage in the thinking of American policy makers.

In *An Elusive Consensus: Nuclear Weapons and American Security After the Cold War*, Janne Nolan presents a brief overview of how this change occurred. Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee

What's the point of having this superb military if we can't use it?

and soon to be Clinton's first Secretary of Defense, identified regional aggressors as the main threat to international peace. Mr. Aspin defined what Nolan describes as the Saddam Hussein four-point threat yardstick by which all regional renegades could be measured. The points were:

- ¥ willing to commit aggression;
- ¥ pursuing nuclear weapons development;
- ¥ using or supporting the use of terrorism; and
- ¥ employing a totalitarian system of governance.

Identifying the Rogues

In addition to Iraq, Aspin found that Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and even China fit the mold. But China was a major power and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council where it could wield the veto power. It could hardly be cast out of the international community. Thus, despite some profound differences

among them, only the first five were lumped together under the indiscriminate rogue label.

Using Iraq's leader as the measuring stick for rogueness was only the beginning. According to Ms. Nolan, Aspin was the one who suggested what might be termed the rogue blackmail scenario. This declared that, had Saddam Hussein succeeded in developing nuclear weapons and mating them to delivery systems capable of threatening key U.S. allies, America might have thought twice about mounting Desert Storm — or at least have been forced into different and more costly operations. Ms. Nolan writes: "The notion that the United States would have been unable to assemble a credible military coalition to deter or defeat a nuclear-armed, or even a chemically-armed, Iraq took hold and soon became conventional wisdom."

Implicit in this observation are two other criteria: a rogue would always be a country whose leadership opposed U.S. actions or physical presence, and, in opposing America, was being irrational because it was willing to risk everything for the sake of such opposition.

Thus Iraq, which had refused to leave Kuwait when faced with overwhelming military might, became *primus inter pares* — first among equals — in the universe of rogues.

Sudan was the seventh rogue. Its fall from grace was sealed in August, 1998, the same month that the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were blown up in a coordinated attack allegedly master-

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minded by Osama bin Laden, the Saudi businessman turned terrorist. On August 20, 1998, the U.S. Navy launched a cruise missile attack on Sudan (as well as on Afghanistan) in retaliation for Khartoum's alleged support of bin Laden. The Sudanese government was also accused of producing precursor agents for the highly toxic nerve gas VX. Sudan denied both charges, and subsequent events substantiated its denial of manufacturing VX. (However, in August 1999 the UN undertook an investigation of reports that the Khartoum government had dropped 22 canisters filled with chemical agents on rebels who have been fighting for nearly two decades.)

Responding to the Rogues

The ascribed irrational willingness of the leaders of the rogue states to strike out at the United States, its military forces, diplomatic personnel, and even ordinary citizens in turn focused the response of the Clinton Administration on military countermeasures. Even Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, challenged Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell in 1993 by asking, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?"

Yet as late as 1995, William Perry's first Annual Report as Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress did not include the term *rogue*. The terms Dr. Perry used were *aggressor*, *adversary*, *hostile*, and of particular note for subsequent developments, *countries of concern*.

In the introductory paragraph of Dr. Perry's 1996 report he included for

A single description, one size fits all, doesn't really fit anymore.

the first time the term *rogue nation*. This seemed to break the official Pentagon lexicon dam; under William Cohen, Secretary of Defense in the second Clinton Administration, four countries — Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea — were specifically identified as *rogue states* in the counter-proliferation section of the 1997 Annual Report. A further reference to *rogue states* was made in the section on countering terrorism, Mr. Aspin's third signature of a *rogue*. But in the next three volumes (1998-2000) no countries were specifically mentioned and *rogue states* appeared in the discussion about smaller scale contingencies (i.e., less than a major theater war) under the section on readiness for the full spectrum of conflict.

Goodbye Rogues, Hello States of Concern

The change that set the press corps twittering came during a June 19 National Public Radio interview of Secretary of State Albright by Diane Rehm on WAMU-FM in Washington, DC.

We are now calling these states states of concern because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, their desire to disrupt the international system.

Commenting on the shift in terminology later in the day, a State Depart-

ment spokesperson noted that *rogue* had not been used for a number of months in statements and briefings by State Department officials. It's not really a change in behavior or policy...as much as it is finding a better description...because a single description, one size fits all, doesn't really fit anymore.

Yet habits die hard. While the State Department may have been phasing out the terms *rogue*, *rogue state*, and *rogue nation*, the current (106th) Congress has not. The Congressional Record has 50 entries between January 6, 1999 and July 18, 2000 — with 18 in 2000 alone — in which at least one Member used one of these terms.

From "Threats" to Doing Business

Indeed, during the 1990s *rogue nations* were identified as the major new threat despite the fact that none were major powers and their combined military outlays today are less than 5% what the U.S. will spend in Fiscal Year 2001. Nonetheless, in the strange world of international relations, from the mid-point of the decade the U.S. found that it could do business with the then *rogue states* on different issues.

North Korea: In 1994 the U.S. negotiated the Agreed Framework which froze the North's nuclear weapons program in return for the promise of new light water nuclear energy power plants. The North subsequently (1999) agreed to a moratorium on testing long-range missiles and this June Kim Jong Il held an historic summit meeting with South Korean president Kim Dae Jung. In July North Korea joined the Asian Regional Forum and expressed interest in joining other re-

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gional and international organizations. The U.S. has substantially eased sanctions for items that fall under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the export administration regulations, and the Defense Production Act. However, missile and missile technology proliferation remain sticking points.

Iran: The election of the relatively moderate Mohammed Khatemi as president in 1997 signaled the beginning of a shift in U.S.-Iranian relations.

People-to-people exchanges, particularly in sports, began. In July 1999 restrictions on sales of food and medicine were lifted (as were sales to Libya and Sudan). The election this year to the parliament of a majority who support President Khatemi has strengthened his hand, and he has suggested exploring more formal government-to-government relations with the United States. As with North Korea, however, Iran's nuclear and missile programs are concerns.

Libya: With the surrender for trial in the Hague of the two men accused of the Pan Am 103 bombing in 1986, Libya is a prime candidate for rehabilitation and removal, after nearly 21 years, from the State Department's list of states accused of supporting terrorism (one of Mr. Aspin's four criteria). In the early 1990s the plants at Rabta and Tarhunah are believed to have produced limited amounts of chemical agents, but activity seems to have ceased at both locations. U.N. imposed sanctions have been suspended but not permanently revoked.

Sudan: The unfreezing of Sudanese assets in 1999, Sudan's signing of the 1993 treaty banning the use, development, and production of chemical

weapons and the U.N. convention on suppressing terrorism, and the lifting of sanctions on medicine and food seemed to signal a change in attitude toward Khartoum. Yet U.S. officials seem unwilling to absolve the Sudanese owner of the pharmaceutical plant destroyed by the August 1998 cruise missile attack of complicity in terrorism. The reported use of chemical weapons against rebels also is a red flag against the government.

We are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, their desire to disrupt the international system.

Syria: The drive for a comprehensive Middle East peace required the U.S. to negotiate with Syria. The first major change in America's attitude came in 1990-1991 when Syria sent troops to Saudi Arabia to join the coalition that threw Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But Syria has continued to at least tolerate groups in Lebanon that routinely attack Israeli forces in southern Lebanon or Israel itself. It also appears that Bashar Assad, who formally succeeded his father as president in July, will insist that the entire Golan Heights be returned to Syrian control before the elusive peace accord will be signed.

Cuba: Considered a nemesis for 41 years, Cuba too is being regarded in a new light. It has been decades since

Cubans sought to export their revolution to Latin America or sent forces to fight with the Marxist government of Angola against U.S. backed rebels. Moreover, Cuba has cooperated with the U.S. on drug interdiction and refugee matters. For some time the U.S. has been virtually alone in trying to impose trade sanctions on Cuba, and in early July efforts to lift enforcement of some long-standing sanctions finally gathered real momentum in the Congress.

Iraq: Unrepentant and defiant of U.S. bombings, Iraq is suspected of reconstituting its chemical and biological agent stockpiles and redeveloping its nuclear weapons program. Under U.N. rules, Iraq can develop short range ballistic missiles, which it has done. Most trade remains under U.N. sanctions although oil is being sold to allow the purchase of food and medicine. The U.S. Congress passed and the President signed legislation that allocates \$97 million for supporting dissident groups, but this money has barely been touched.

Why "One Size" Never Fits

The wisdom of breaking from the one size fits all characterization of nations as rogues is perhaps clearest with respect to Mr. Aspin's fourth yardstick — a totalitarian system of governance. Arguably it does not apply to Iran even though there remains a pre-screening process for candidates. And while some Americans might condemn the election of Bashar Assad as non-democratic, a process that allows for peaceful transfer of authority — if that authority is not abused — may be preferable to a bloody power struggle that could destroy the hard won progress made to date.

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New CDI Issue Brief and Film Documentary on National Missile Defense

AS THE DEBATE IN THE United States on the planned deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system heats up, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) has released a timely Issue Brief, *National Missile Defense: What Does It All Mean?*

Missile defense has gained additional prominence as one of the most divisive and defining issues in this year's presidential campaign. CDI's Issue Brief offers unbiased, in-depth, and up-to-date information on all aspects of the NMD debate within the following sections:

"Why Should You/We Care?"

Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vice President of CDI

"Technical Challenges in National Missile Defense"

"The Ballistic Missile Threat"

"A Short Narrative of Missiles and Ballistic Missile Defense"

"Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs"

Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research

"Current and Past Cost Estimates"

Christopher Hellman, Senior Analyst

"The Impact of National Missile Defense on Strategic Relations with Russia"

Dr. Bruce G. Blair, President of CDI

"NMD and Asia: Views from China, India, Pakistan, Japan, North and South Korea"

Dr. Nicholas Berry, Senior Analyst

"Europe and NMD: Views from the European Continent and the Role of Europe in NMD Architecture"

Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst

In addition to the print version, CDI is preparing a web site with further information on the National Missile Defense program. Each section in the print version will be updated on the web, on an as-needed basis, to keep the document current.

CDI also has just produced a Film Documentary on missile defense, *Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?* A transcript of the film is available on the Web.

To get your copy of the Issue Brief, send a check for \$5 to the Center for Defense Information, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 615, Washington, DC 20036. Please write NMD Issue Brief on the check. For the Film Documentary, send \$19 dollars to the same address, specifying NMD Film. Or get BOTH for \$20. ■

ROGUES

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Finally, does the demise of rogue nations signal a change in the rationale for developing any national missile defense? According to the State Department, it does not. The reality is that the states formerly called rogues are still working to develop new ballistic missiles — in mid-July Iran tested an intermediate range Shahab 3 which is based on the North Korean No-Dong missile.

Americans like things simple, and broad, inclusive categories are simple.


But in this instance adding a bit of complexity may well increase our security by allowing policymakers to distinguish the real from the illusory challenges to the U.S. and the international community. Constructive multilateral diplomacy which encourages peaceful aspirations could selectively reduce the hostility that in some cases has marked U.S. relations with these nations for decades.

Removing the stigma of rogue is the first step along this path because it also removes the unproductive implication that the leaders of these countries are irrational men bent on

self-destruction. In fact, as some have recently demonstrated, there are many issues on which we can do business if we give them — and ourselves — a little breathing space for respect and time for peace to take hold. ■

ANSWER:

The UN estimates \$5 billion for at least each of the next 5 years. That's only 1.6% of planned U.S. military spending in 2001.



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